JUDGMENT : Manoj Kumar Vyas, J. 1. By this order all three appeals are being disposed of as they involve common question of law. Facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12107/2012 2. The case of the petitioner Mahendra Singh Ola in the petition is that he is an Ex-Army personnel. In pursuance to the advertisement issued by the respondents for the post of Sepoy, the petitioner applied as an Ex-Army Personnel and after due process he was appointed in Excise Preventive Force. After successful completion of training, the petitioner started discharging his duties as a Sepoy under District Excise Officer, Jhunjhunu of Excise Preventive Force, Chirawa, Jhunjhunu. While the petitioner was on duty at Chirawa, he received an information regarding a dispute in his family members. Thereupon, the petitioner proceeded to his village by taking one day's casual leave for 8.5.2012. However, a false FIR was lodged against other members of his family for offences under Sections 451, 323 and 379 of IPC, wherein the petitioner was also falsely implicated. In connection with the said FIR, the petitioner was arrested on 15.5.2012 and subsequently he was released on bail on 19.5.2012. Respondent No. 1, without issuing any memo of explanation or charge-sheet and without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, issued order dated 17.7.2012 dismissing the services of the petitioner in terms of Rule 23A of the Rajasthan Service Rules (hereafter referred as 'the Rules') on the ground that a case for offence under Sections 323, 451 and 379 of IPC was registered against the petitioner and as such, the petitioner was not suitable for the services of the State Government. The order impugned in the writ petition dated 17.7.2012, reads as follows:- jktLFkku vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny esa o"kZ 2010&11 ds nkSjku HkwriwoZ lSfudksa dks lh/kh HkrhZ ls bl dk;kZy; ds vkns'k Øekad iå2¼,½laLFkk@vkc@fuåny@2009@52 fnukad 13@02@2012 }kjk nks o"kZ dh ifjoh{kk vof/k ds fy, flikgh ds in ij fu;qDr fd;k tkdj vkns'k Øaekd iå1¼½laLFkk@vkc@fuåny@2010&11@113 fnukad 12@03@2012 }kjk inLFkkiu fd;k x;k FkkA mDr ifjoh{kk/khu izf'k{kq flikfg;ksa esa ls Jh egsUnz flag iq= Jh izgykn tkV] fuoklh vjMkork] iqfyl Fkkuk&fpM+kok] ftyk >qa>uwa dk inLFkkiu vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny fpM+kok ¼>qa>uwa½ esa fd;k x;k FkkA Jh egsUnz flag] flikgh vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny fpM+kok ¼>qa>uwa½ esa inLFkkiu ds nkSjku fnukad 08@05@2012 dk ,d fnu dk vkdfLed vodk'k ysdj fnukad 07@05@2012 dks lka;dky ?kj x;k rFkk fnukad 09@05@2012 dks drZO; LFky ij mifLFkr gksdj iqu% fnukad 15@05@2012 ls 19@05@2012 rd ds vodk'k ckcr izkFkZuk i= nsdj ?kj pyk x;kA Jh egsUnz flag] flikgh ds fo#} fnukad 08@05@2012 dks Hkkjrh; n.M izfØ;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 451] 323] 379 ds vUrxZr iqfyl Fkkuk fpM+kok ¼>qa>uwa½ esa izdj.k la[;k 213@2012 ntZ gksdj 24 ?k.Vs ls vf/kd U;kf;d fgjklr esa jgk gS rFkk U;kf;d eftLVªsV] fpM+kok] ftyk >qa>uwa ds vkns'k fnukad 19@05@2012 ds }kjk tekur ij NksM+k x;k gSA bl izdkj Jh egsUnz flag] flikgh ds fo#} /kkjk 323] 451 ,oa 379 Hkkånaålaå ds rgr izdj.k ntZ gksdj vUos"k.kk/khu gSA mDr ifjfLFkfr esa Jh egsUnz flag jkT; lsok esa mi;qDr ugha gksus ls budh lsok,a jktLFkku lsok fu;eksa ds fu;e 23¼,½ ds vUrxZr iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, rqjUr izHkko ls lekIr dh tkrh gSA ¼fnus'k ;kno½ vkcdkjh vk;qDr] jktLFkku] mn;iqj 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 17.07.2012, the petitioner preferred the writ petition. 4. In reply, it was averred that the petitioner had been dismissed from service in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 23A of the Rules and in the said rule there is no provision for giving any prior notice. The appointment letter of the petitioner was subject to character verification to be received from the police and in the instant case the FIR itself was lodged against him and since he was found involved in criminal case, services of the petitioner were dispensed with by invoking the powers under Rule 23A of the Rules. The petitioner remained in custody from 15.5.2012 to 19.5.2012. The petitioner had not informed the Department about the said criminal case. The petitioner remained in custody from 15.5.2012 to 19.5.2012. The petitioner had not informed the Department about the said criminal case. Such conduct of the petitioner was unbecoming of a government servant and as such dismissal order was rightly passed. It was also submitted that under Rule 23A of the Rules, the services of the temporary/probationer can be terminated without any notice. The petitioner was a probationer and in light of the fact that he was arrested in a criminal case, his services were rightly terminated. 5. After hearing both the parties, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition in the following terms:- "In the circumstances, the order passed by the respondents dated 17.07.2012 (Annexure-4) is quashed and set aside with all consequential benefits of continuity of service and seniority etc. and pay fixation. Arrears consequent to the reinstatement shall also be released to the petitioner within a period of three months henceforth." 6. Aggrieved by the impugned order of learned Single Judge dated 06.10.2018, the appellant-State has preferred this appeal. Facts of S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 11784 & 11785/2012 7. It is the case of the petitioners that in pursuance to the advertisement issued by the respondents for the post of Sepoy, the petitioners applied as Ex-Army Personnel and after due process, they were selected and posted vide order dated 27.4.2011 in Excise Preventive Force, Jhunjhunu. They also successfully completed the training. While the petitioners were posted in Excise Preventive Force Line, Jhunjhunu, the respondent No. 2 in the writ petition, illegally and arbitrarily subjected the petitioners to great humiliation on the pretext that during inspection they were found under intoxication. They were subjected to medical examination and on the basis of medical report, a criminal case under Section 60 of the Police Act, was registered against the petitioners in which they were arrested and subsequently released on bail on 21.5.2012. The respondent No. 2 thereafter vide order dated 21.5.2012 relieved the petitioners from Excise Preventive Force Line, Jhunjhunu to report in the office of Excise Commissioner, Udaipur. The respondent no. 1 without serving any memo or charge-sheet and without holding any enquiry against the petitioners and without affording any opportunity of hearing, vide order dated 17.7.2012 dismissed the services of the petitioners with immediate effect based on the report submitted by the District Excise Officer, Jhunjhunu. The respondent no. 1 without serving any memo or charge-sheet and without holding any enquiry against the petitioners and without affording any opportunity of hearing, vide order dated 17.7.2012 dismissed the services of the petitioners with immediate effect based on the report submitted by the District Excise Officer, Jhunjhunu. The respondents have passed the impugned order by invoking the provision of Rule 23A of the Rules, which has got no application to the case of the petitioners. The respondents have passed the impugned order by invoking the provision of Rule 23A of the Rules, which has got no application to the case of the petitioners. The order impugned in the writ petition dated 17.7.2012, reads as follows:- ¼11784@2012½ jktLFkku vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny esa o"kZ 2010&11 ds nkSjku HkwriwoZ lSfud vH;fFkZ;ksa dh lh/kh HkrhZ ls bl dk;kZy; ds vkns'k Øaekd iå2¼,½laLFkk vkc fuåny@2009@152 fnukad 29-03-2011 }kjk ftu vH;fFkZ;ksa dks nks o"kZ dh ifjfo{kk vof/k ds fy, flikgh ds in ij fu;qDr fd;k tkdj vkns'k Øaekd iå1¼½laLFkk@vkc@fuåny@2010&11@179 fnukad 27-04-2011 }kjk inLFkkiu fd;k x;k FkkA mDr uofu;qDr ifjfo{kk/khu izf'k{kq flikfg;ksa esa ls loZJh egsUnz dqekj iq= Jh xaxkjke tkV fuoklh dksVM+k iqfyl Fkkuk uhe dk Fkkuk ftyk lhdj dk inLFkkiu vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny >qa>uwa esa fd;k x;k gSA fnukad 20-05-2012 dks Jh uwj eksgEen ftyk vkcdkjh vf/kdkjh >qa>uwa }kjk vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny ykÃu >qa>uwa dk vkdfLed fujh{k.k fd;k x;kA fujh{k.k ds nkSjku ykÃu esa Jh vehyky teknkj] Jh jkts'k] teknkj] Jh egkflag] flikgh] Jh psrjke] flikgh] Jh c`tyky lSuh] flikgh] Jh nyhi flag] flikgh] Jh egsUnz dqekj] flikgh ,oa Jh lqjsUnz dqekj] flikgh ekStqn feysA mDr fujh{k.k Jh egsUnz dqekj iq= Jh xaxkjke tkV flikgh vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny >qa>uwa vR;kf/kd 'kjkc dk lsou fd;s gq, ik;s x;s rFkk 'kjkc ds u'ks esa lgdfeZ;kas ds lkFk xkyh xyksp djrs gq, ik, x,A Jh uwj eksgEen ftyk vkcdkjh vf/kdkjh }kjk mDr Jh egsUnz dqekj dks 'kkar djuk pkgk] ysfdu mudh mifLFkfr esa Jh lqjsUnz dqekj xkyh xyksp djrs jgsA Jh egsUnz dqekj ds ykÃu esa M~;wVh ij jgrs gq, 'kjkc dk lsou djus ,oa mRikr epkus ij LFkkuh; iqfyl Fkkuk dksrokyh] >qa>uwa esa fjiksVZ dh tkdj budk esfMdy eqvk;uk djk;k x;kA bl ij iqfyl }kjk buds fo#} nQk 60 iqfyl ,DV esa ifjokn ntZ jftLVj dj bUgsa gokykr esa nkf[ky fd;k x;kA Jh egsUnz dqekj dks fnUkkad 21-05-2012 dks tekur ij fjgk fd;k x;k gSA bl izdkj Jh egsUnz dqekj dk vkpj.k vuq'kklughurk dh Js.kh es vkrk gS tks deZpkjh dh jkT; lsok djus dh {kerk ij iz'u fpg~u yxkrk gS rFkk foHkkx dh Nfo dks /kwfey djus okyk gSA buds }kjk dh x;h mDr ?kVuk dk lekpkj nSfud HkkLdj 'ks[kkokVh HkkLdj fnukad 21-05-2012 ds i`"B 16 rFkk jktLFkku if=dk >qa>uwa laLdj.k fnukad 21-05-2012 ds i`"B 5 ij izdkf'kr gqvk gSA orZeku esa mDr flikgh ifjoh{kk/khu vof/k esa gksdj izf'k{kq ds #i esa vkcdkjh fujks/kd ny esa fu;r ikfjJfed ij dk;Zjr gSA v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ }kjk lEiw.kZ izdj.k dk xaHkhjrk ls v/;;u djus ds mijkUr bl fu.kZ; ij igaqpk gw¡ fd jktLFkku lsok fu;e 1950 ds fu;e 23, ds varxZr mDr Jh egsUnz dqekj iq= Jh xaxkjke tkV tUe frfFk 01-07-1975 dh lsok,a rRdky izHkko ls lekIr dj nh tkosA vr% bl dk;kZy; ds vkns'k iå2, laLFkk@vkc@fuåny@2009@152 fnukad 29-03-2011 ls fu;qDr fd;s x;s Jh egsUnz dqekj iq= Jh xaxkjke tkV tUe frfFk 01-07-1975 dh lsok,a rRdky izHkko ls lekIr dh tkrh gSaA fnus'k dqekj vkcdkjh vk;qDr jktLFkku] mn;iqjA 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 17.7.2012, the petitioners preferred the writ petitions. 9. It was averred on behalf of the respondents in the writ petitions that petitioners were removed by exercising powers under Rule 23A of the Rules. Under the said rule no prior notice is required and there was no need to conduct any departmental enquiry as services of the petitioners were liable to be dispensed with under the provisions of Rule 23A of the Rules. Apart from this, it was argued that petitioners themselves admitted to their guilt in the criminal proceedings. Hence, there was no need of any enquiry. Their dismissal was legal in view of institution of criminal case against them and subsequent admission of guilt by the petitioners in the criminal proceedings. 10. After hearing both the parties, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions in the following terms:- "Accordingly the order dated 17.07.2012 is quashed same is set aside with all consequential benefits to the petitioners. The petitioners would be reinstated and granted the benefit of pay fixation, continuity of service and arrears of salary. The exercise shall be conducted for the purpose in three months." 11. Aggrieved by the impugned order of learned Single Judge dated 06.10.2018, the appellant-State has preferred the appeals. 12. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that services of the respondent-petitioners have been terminated in exercise of powers under Rule 23A of the Rules. They were found guilty of misconduct. Criminal cases were registered against them and it was found that they were not suitable for Government Service, hence their services were dispensed with. It has been further submitted that looking to the admission of guilt in the criminal proceedings, there was no need of any enquiry. The impugned order is perfectly legal. Petitioners were holding a responsible post and their conduct was not fit for the Disciplined Force. Sudden inspection was conducted of the police lines and petitioners in writ petition nos. 11784 and 11785/2012 were found in inebriated condition. A case was registered against them under Section 60 of Police Act. Both the petitioners were arrested. The petitioners admitted to the guilt and deposited fine also. The departmental reputation was also put to stake as the matter was published in almost all the newspapers of the area. In such circumstances, the powers were rightly exercised under Rule 23A of Rules. 13. Both the petitioners were arrested. The petitioners admitted to the guilt and deposited fine also. The departmental reputation was also put to stake as the matter was published in almost all the newspapers of the area. In such circumstances, the powers were rightly exercised under Rule 23A of Rules. 13. It was further submitted that the petitioner in writ petition no. 12107/2012 was arrested on 15.5.2012 in a criminal case bearing FIR No. 213/2012 and was released on bail on 19.5.2012. The petitioner was under probation and he remained in custody in the criminal case. The petitioner did not inform the Department about the criminal case and submitted application for casual leave and joined duty after he was released on bail. Hence, the provisions of Rule 23A of Rules were rightly applied and the services of the petitioner were dispensed with. There is no violation of rights of the petitioner. All the requirements of natural justice were complied with. 14. It has been argued on behalf of respondent-petitioners that the impugned termination order is illegal because they were not served with any charge-sheet. No opportunity of hearing was afforded to them. Without any kind of enquiry, they were summarily terminated from the service in exercise of powers under Rule 23A of the Rules. The petitioners were appointed to the service after regular process and at the relevant time they were serving in the Department as probationers. The petitioners were not appointed as temporary employees. Hence, Rule 23A of the Rules had no application to them. Thus, on this ground alone, the termination was liable to be set aside. Hence, the judgment passed by learned Single Judge is based upon correct application of facts as well as law. It is further argued that the termination orders are illegal on the ground of being passed without following the principles of natural justice. Hence, these appeals are liable to be dismissed. 15. We have heard both the parties and carefully perused the record available on the file. 16. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were appointed after regular process and they were working as probationers. It is also not in dispute that the services of the petitioners were dispensed with in exercise of powers under Rule 23A of the Rules of 1951. Rule 23A reads as under:- "23A. 16. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were appointed after regular process and they were working as probationers. It is also not in dispute that the services of the petitioners were dispensed with in exercise of powers under Rule 23A of the Rules of 1951. Rule 23A reads as under:- "23A. Notice for termination of service of a temporary employee.- 1 (a) Except as otherwise provided in sub-rule (2), the service of a temporary Government Servant shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the government servant. (b) The period of such notice shall be one month; Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowance for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of the services or as the case may be for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. 2(a) The service of a temporary Government servant who has been in continuous Government service for more than three years and who satisfied the suitability in respect of age and qualifications prescribed for the post and has been appointed in consultation with the Rajasthan Public Service Commission where such consultation is necessary, shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice of three months given in writing either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant: Provided that the service of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rate at which he was drawing immediately before the termination of his service for the period by which such notice falls short of three months, as the case may be; (b) Where reduction has occurred in the number of post available for Government servants not in permanent service, termination of service consequent upon the reduction of posts in the cadre under the appointing authority shall take place in the order of juniority. Note--The expression "Qualifications prescribed for the post" means qualifications on the satisfaction of which only the person in question could have been recruited to the post, and includes compliance with rules regulating eligibility for permanent appointment to the post including rules promulgated under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution." 17. Learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment of this court in Dinesh Kumar Meena v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 2018 (3) WLC (Raj) 48. Para 44 of the order reads as under:- "This Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Sharma (supra) had an occasion to deal with the similar issue with respect to termination of the services of a trainee Constable. This Court found that the services of the petitioner in that case who was working on the post of Constable came to be terminated by order of discharge on account of unsatisfactory performance found by the Superintendent of Police, the Court found that if the probationer remained absent form duty, question of his performance becoming unsatisfactory, did not arise. The Court further found that if termination of service has been brought about on account of alleged willful absence, action of the respondents was liable to be quashed on this ground alone as no notice was given to the petitioners and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him before the Superintendent of Police, who took the decision of dispensing with the services merely on the ground of the alleged willful absence. The relevant para of the judgment is quoted hereunder:- "9. Coming to the legal aspect of the matter, I must observe that while in the order of discharge from service reason of unsatisfactory performance has been given out as the basis of the action taken by the Superintendent of Police, in the reply respondents have come out with the case that the petitioner has willfully remained absent from duty and, therefore, the competent authority issued order of his discharge from service. If petitioner is said to have remained absent from duty, question of his performance being unsatisfactory simply did not arise. If petitioner is said to have remained absent from duty, question of his performance being unsatisfactory simply did not arise. That apart if termination of his service has been brought about on account of his alleged willful absence, action of the respondents is liable to be quashed only on the ground that no action oriented notice was given to the petitioner and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him before the Superintendent of Police took a decision to dispense with his service on the ground of alleged willful absence. It cannot be doubted that willful absence from duty amounts to misconduct and any action on the basis of such allegation of misconduct can be taken only in accordance with the provisions of 1958 Rules and the principles of natural justice. Since neither Rules of 1958 nor the principles of natural justice have been followed before passing the order of termination of service of the petitioner on 26.08.1982, this Court is left with little option but to declare the order of termination of service of the petitioner to be illegal. A similar question has been examined by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 324/85 Kaluram Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, 1993 Vidhi Patrika 43. After making reference to a number of decisions of the British Courts and of the Supreme Court of India including Jaishankar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 492 , and of this Court in Chetan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN (UC) 377, it has been held that termination of service of an employee on the allegation of absence from duty without following the procedure prescribed in the Rules and the principles of natural justice, is liable to be declared as void." 18. Thus, it has been held by this court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Meena (supra) that if the appointment has been made after full participation in the selection process and the employee is working in the capacity of a probationer, then he cannot be termed as a temporary employee. Thus, Rule 23A of the Rules of 1951 had no application to the petitioners because they were duly selected after regular process and they were working in the capacity of probationers. They could not have been treated as temporary employees. Thus, Rule 23A of the Rules of 1951 had no application to the petitioners because they were duly selected after regular process and they were working in the capacity of probationers. They could not have been treated as temporary employees. Rule 23A of the Rules of 1951 was wrongly applied to the petitioners case, hence on this ground alone the termination orders become illegal and without authority. 19. A perusal of the impugned termination orders reveals that these orders are stigmatic and punitive in nature. It is well settled principle of law that if order of termination carries stigma, it must be preceded by enquiry. No stigmatic order of termination can be passed unless the employee has been given notice and opportunity of hearing. Stigmatic termination order can be passed only after due enquiry. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Indra Pal Gupta v. Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora, (1984) 3 SCC 384 , as under:- "...This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. Secondly, the Division Bench has tried to justify the action of the Management by observing that since the Management had to secure the approval of the District Inspector to its action, it was necessary for it to give its assessment of the work of the appellant as Principal and, therefore, "in the context of the statutory requirements, it cannot be said that merely because the Manager's report or the resolution of the Managing Committee refers to the various aspects of the assessment of the performance of the Principal in terms unfavourable to him, it would in law, amount to casting a stigma upon the Principal". It is difficult to engraft an exception of the above type to the well-settled rule that if the order of termination carries a stigma, it has to fall to the ground unless it is preceded by an enquiry as contemplated by law. A reading of the letter of termination of the service and the resolution which forms part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark of disgrace or infamy and that the appellant is visited with evil consequences as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case. A reading of the letter of termination of the service and the resolution which forms part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark of disgrace or infamy and that the appellant is visited with evil consequences as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case. The Division Bench, therefore, erred in holding that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of termination was an innocuous one and did not carry any stigma. The order of the Division Bench is, in our opinion, an unsustainable one and is liable to be set aside." 20. Similarly, it has been held in V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab and Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 239 , as under:- "...The order, ex facie, is stigmatic as also punitive. The order is founded on the ground that the appellant had failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically. It is for this reason that the services of the appellant were terminated. As pointed out above, the order ex facie, is stigmatic... ..A probationer, like a temporary servant, is also entitled to certain protection and his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily, nor can those services be terminated in a punitive manner without complying with the principles of natural justice. The affidavits filed by the parties before the High Court as also in this Court indicate the background in which the order, terminating the services of the appellant, came to be passed. Such an order which, on the face of it, is stigmatic, could not have been passed without holding a regular enquiry and giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant..." 21. Hon'ble Apex Court has held in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Ors., (1999) 3 SCC 60 , as under:- "As to what amounts to stigma has been considered in Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways, (1987) I LLJ 107 SC. This Court explained the meaning of "stigma" as follows (p.150): According to Webster's New World Dictionary, it (stigma) is something that detracts from the character or reputation of a person, a mark, sign etc., indicating that something is not considered normal or standard. The Legal Thesaurus by Burton gives the meaning of the word to be blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame. The Legal Thesaurus by Burton gives the meaning of the word to be blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame. The Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning as a mark or label indicating a deviation from a norm. According to yet another dictionary 'stigma' is a matter for moral reproach." 22. It is admitted position of facts that no charge-sheet was issued to the petitioners. No opportunity of hearing was afforded. The department straightaway passed the impugned orders of termination under Rule 23A of the Rules of 1951. Thus, such termination order passed without following the process of natural justice and without any preceding enquiry, is bad in law and cannot be legally sustained. 23. It has also been argued on behalf of the appellants that the petitioners admitted to their guilt in the criminal proceedings, thus there was no need to issue any notice to them or to obtain any explanation from them. The appellants relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and Ors. v. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 569 , in which it has been held as under:- "The respondent was a repeated absentee but still appellant employer let him off by taking a lenient view in earlier cases of unauthorised absence. In response to last charge-sheet the respondent admitted that he absented himself unauthorisedly. In view of his voluntary admission, enquiry was closed and penalty of removal from service was imposed on him by a reasoned order. The respondent's writ petition was dismissed by a Single Judge of the High Court but Division Bench reversed it, observing that removal order violated principles of natural justice inasmuch as the respondent's explanation that he absented himself due to his mother's illness was not considered. Disagreeing with the Division Bench of the High Court, the Supreme Court Held: The respondent was a habitual absentee. He in his explanation, in answer to the charge-sheet pleaded guilty admitting the charges. In terms of Section 58 of the Evidence Act, charges having been admitted were not required to be proved. It was on that premise that enquiry proceeding was closed. Before the enquiry officer he did not submit explanation of his mother being ill. He, despite opportunities granted to report for duty, did not do it. He failed to explain even his prior conduct. It was on that premise that enquiry proceeding was closed. Before the enquiry officer he did not submit explanation of his mother being ill. He, despite opportunities granted to report for duty, did not do it. He failed to explain even his prior conduct. Judicial admission can be made foundation of rights of parties. A subsequent explanation before another authority, which had not been pleaded in the departmental proceedings, cannot by itself be a ground to hold that principles of natural justice had not been complied with in the disciplinary proceedings." 24. It is admitted that no charge-sheet was issued in this case. No departmental enquiry was conducted and even no show-cause notice was given to the petitioners. The appellants have relied upon the admission of guilt of the petitioners in the criminal proceedings. 25. Though the appellants have averred in the memo of appeal that petitioners admitted to their guilt during the trial and they also deposited the fine imposed upon them, but this ground has been taken in the appeal. Perusal of the termination orders reveal that it is not based upon the admission of guilt of petitioners during the course of criminal trial against them. Thus, this ground has been afterwards added in the memo of appeal. Considering the fact that termination orders were not based upon admission of guilt of the petitioners during the course of criminal trial, it was necessary for the appellants to hold departmental enquiry against the respondent-petitioners before any action was proposed against them. It is also a settled position of law that departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings are independent of each other. Evidence recorded in a criminal proceeding cannot be read into any departmental enquiry and termination order cannot be passed on the basis of the finding of a criminal court. 26. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Shashi Bhusan Prasad v. Inspector General Central Industrial Security Force and Ors., (2019) 7 SCC 797 , as under:- "We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down by this court and it is fairly well settled that two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on an offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. Even the rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law whereas in the departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis of "preponderance of probability". Acquittal by the Court of competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authority..." 27. Similarly in Depot Manager A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 699 , it has been held as under:- "..The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act..." 28. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by the Evidence Act..." 28. In S. Sreesanth v. Board of Control for Cricket in India and Ors., (2019) 4 SCC 660 , following observations have been made:- "..The standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry and in a trial of a criminal case are entirely different. In a criminal case it is essential to prove a charge beyond all reasonable doubt wherein in disciplinary inquiry under the Anti-Corruption Code of BCCI the preponderance of probability is to serve the purpose. We although have upheld the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of BCCI on proof of charges, which upholding of the decision of the Disciplinary Committee shall have no effect on the criminal appeal which is pending against the appellant against the discharge order. The conclusions and observations as recorded in the Disciplinary Committee under the Anti-Corruption Code are entirely different from proof of criminal charges which require higher yardstick to prove..." 29. In Chairman & Managing Director, V.S.P. and Ors. (supra), the judgment cited by appellants, it transpires that charge-sheet was issued to the employee and in the departmental enquiry the employee admitted the charges and hence the enquiry was closed. Hence, it was held that there was no necessity of detailed departmental enquiry but in the instant case the respondent-petitioners were not even served with any charge-sheet. No notice was issued to the petitioners and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to them. Hence the facts of this matter are different from the facts of the judgment relied upon by the appellant. 30. The learned Single Judge has, by the impugned orders, dated 06.10.2018, quashed the impugned termination orders dated 17.07.2012 and the petitioners were declared to be entitled to all consequential benefits - reinstatement, benefit of pay fixation, continuity of service and arrears of salary (back wages). The petitioners admittedly did not work during the period for which arrears of salary have been allowed to them. 31. The petitioners admittedly did not work during the period for which arrears of salary have been allowed to them. 31. In the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders of learned Single Judge dated 06.10.2018 are just and proper but the orders require modification so far as the arrears of salary have been allowed to the petitioners. 32. Thus, the appeals are liable to be partly allowed in the manner indicated above. 33. Consequently, the appeals are partly allowed. The impugned orders of learned Single Judge dated 06.10.2018 are upheld with the modification that petitioners will not be entitled to back wages. 34. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.