JUDGMENT : Pushpa Sathyanarayana, J. (Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the order dated 02.12.2019 in W.P.No.27778 of 2017.) 1. This intra-court appeal is filed by the authorities of the Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax Department, challenging the order passed in W.P. No.27778 of 2017 dated 02.12.2019. When the writ petitioner approached the third appellant/Tahsildar for issuance of patta in respect of his landed property on which he has already put up constructions, the same was rejected by the authorities on the ground that the land was already acquired under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as Urban Land Act). 2. The property in question, situate in an approved lay out No.LPDM/D/TC&P No.25/1975 in Brindavan Nagar, Kodungaiyur village, Tondiarpet, measuring an extent of 3486 and 3080 sq.fts. which originally belonged to one Pankajakshiamma. She had purchased the same from one Ethirajulu by way of a sale deed dated 16.10.1980. The said Pankajakshiamma sold the above plots 1 and 2 in favour of one Maya Devi, who is the daughter of the writ petitioner vide sale deeds dated 06.03.2003 and she has been in possession from the date of her purchase and has been paying all the taxes in her name. She had also put up construction in the above subject land after obtaining due sanction from the Corporation of Chennai and the said construction was assessed to property tax, M.M.W.S.S.B. Tax and charges and electricity charges. The said Mayadevi, also had borrowed money by way of loan from bank on 01.03.2010 by showing the above said properties as collateral security and it was subsequently discharged. 3. She had also sold a portion of the property to an extent of 1800 sq.ft. in favour of one Mrs.Thulasi on 26.12.2011. Again on 23.01.2014 she had settled the remaining property, which is having an extent of 4766 sq.ft. with construction by way of a settlement deed in favour of the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner has been in sole, exclusive and in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the same from the date of settlement deed and has been paying all the taxes in his name. Subsequent to the settlement deed, the writ petitioner had approached the third appellant Tahsildar for transfer of patta. The writ petitioner has been in sole, exclusive and in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the same from the date of settlement deed and has been paying all the taxes in his name. Subsequent to the settlement deed, the writ petitioner had approached the third appellant Tahsildar for transfer of patta. The Tahsildar has refused to transfer the patta on the ground that the vacant land was covered under the Urban Land Act. The said notice was under challenge in the writ petition, which did not even contain any particulars regarding the exact date on which the proceedings were initiated, possession was taken and compensation paid, etc. 4. As the order impugned in the writ petition was bereft of any details, the petitioner attempted to get particulars by applying under RTI Act in the name of his wife. However, his request was declined and an application was made once again before the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax Department seeking the details. Again the same was rejected and hence an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax was made. As per the reply given by the Commissioner of Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax, land measuring an extent of 9250 sq.ft. out of 2 Acres and 53 cents, was acquired on 12.11.1996 from one Ethirajulu and also stated that no compensation was paid. 5. It is curious to note that on the above said date, namely 12.11.1996, the said Ethirajulu was not the owner as he had laid out the entire extent of land as residential plots, as early as in the year 1979 as per the approved lay out No.25/1975, during which time, the said Pankajakshiamma purchased the same from Ethirajulu and the petitioner’s daughter having purchased from her, had become the absolute owner of the petition mentioned properties. Again when a request was made for changing the name in the patta, a reply was received from the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax stating that the Urban Land Act was repealed on 16.06.1999 and therefore, the question of releasing the acquired land does not arise. 6. Again when a request was made for changing the name in the patta, a reply was received from the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Ceiling and Urban Land Tax stating that the Urban Land Act was repealed on 16.06.1999 and therefore, the question of releasing the acquired land does not arise. 6. In the writ petition, it was contended that on the alleged date of acquisition and possession by the respondent on 12.11.1996 from the original owner Ethirajulu, he did not have any right or title over the property, as the entire property was sold in the year 1980 itself. 7. The learned Government Counsel appearing for the appellants contended that a notice under Section 7(2) of the Urban Land Act was issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, which was served on the wife of Ethirajulu, in person and as there was no objection, Section 9(4) notice along with draft statement under Section 9(1) was issued on 28.02.1986 and the same was returned. Therefore the service was effected by affixture on the land by the concerned Village Administrative Officer. Since no objections were received on the Urban Land Ceiling, final statement under Section 10(1) was issued, which was returned unserved. Notification under Section 11(1) was issued on 30.11.1990 and was published in the Gazette on 09.01.1991. However, all these proceedings were said to have been effected only after the erstwhile urban land owner Thiru. Ethirajulu, parted with the land by selling the same by virtue of an approved lay out. Therefore, the learned single Judge allowed the writ petition by setting aside the impugned communication dated 03.06.2016 and directed the appellants herein to delete the entry made in the records showing as if the land is Government land declared as ‘surplus’ under the Act and to consider the petitioner’s application to issue patta in his name, based on the title and document. The above said order is now challenged in this writ appeal. 8. The question that has to be determined in the above appeal is, whether the property in question i.e. the petition mentioned property can be declared as surplus under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978? 9. The above said order is now challenged in this writ appeal. 8. The question that has to be determined in the above appeal is, whether the property in question i.e. the petition mentioned property can be declared as surplus under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978? 9. From the foregoing facts, it is seen that the proceedings have been initiated against the original land owner Ethirajulu, who has sold the property in favour of one Pankajakshiamma, predecessor in title of the writ petitioner even in the year 1980. It is not in dispute that the proceedings under the Urban Land Act, were initiated against the original owner in the year 2003, when the said urban land owner ceased to be the owner and parted with the lands, by virtue of a sale deed, based on an approved lay out of the year 1975. It is also admitted that the proceedings that were initiated and ended were all in the absence of the original owner. Even presuming that the acquisition was over under Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act, when the actual possession was admittedly with the petitioner’s daughter and prior to her with her vendor, mere recording of a symbolic possession will not confer the acquisition proceedings. As per the information obtained through RTI also, it has been categorically stated that no compensation was paid to the erstwhile urban land owner. Even today, no particulars about the said amount of compensation are given, whether it is lying in deposit or disbursed to the owner. 10. From the records produced before this court, it is seen that Section 9(4) notice was issued on 28.02.1986 along with the draft statement. On 31.07.1989 orders under Section 9(5) of the Act was issued and the service was admittedly by affixture of notice on 24.05.1990. A copy of the final statement was issued on 26.06.1990 under Section 10(1) of the Act. Notification under Section 11(1) of the Act was issued on 30.11.1990. A copy of the Form of Notice under Section 11(5) of the Act, was issued on 28.11.1991, which was also done by affixture. 11. A copy of the final statement was issued on 26.06.1990 under Section 10(1) of the Act. Notification under Section 11(1) of the Act was issued on 30.11.1990. A copy of the Form of Notice under Section 11(5) of the Act, was issued on 28.11.1991, which was also done by affixture. 11. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that, when all these proceedings were initiated after the property was sold by the urban land owner Ethirajulu from the approved lay out of the year 1975, the proceedings are only vitiated, as the Act cannot be applied. Therefore, any entry made in the Government records showing the land as ‘surplus’ or ‘government land’, has necessarily to be deleted and a patta be issued in the name of the present owner, namely the writ petitioner. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel also placed his reliance on the following decisions. 11.1. In the Government of Tamil Nadu vs. Mecca Prime Tannery reported in 2012-4-L.W.289, the First Bench of this court, in paragraph Nos.9 and 35, held as under: “9. In most of the appeals, service of notice under Section 9(4) and the draft statement under Section 9(1) are by way of affixture. Hence, if the proceedings on the date of commencement of acquisition is bad and violates the mandatory provisions of the Act and such violations percolates upto vesting and possession, such a vesting and possession and void ab initio. The authorities are expected to follow the Act and the Rules meticulously without deviation and any deviation in procedure leading to wrong acquisition of land would not confer any right on the authorities to state that they have taken possession. 35. However, there are cases where although the competent authority issued the notice under Section 11(5) of the Act to the land owners or persons in possession to surrender or deliver possession of the land, but the land owner or the person in possession fails to deliver the land and continues to be in possession of such land and the authority of the State did not take action under Section 11(6) of the Act for taking delivery of possession, then in such cases, the State Government shall not be deemed to be in possession of those lands.” 11.2. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram reported in (2013) 4 SCC 280 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraphs 41 and 42, held as under: “Effect of the Repeal Act 41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act, 1999 has expressly repealed Act 33 of 1976. The objects and reasons of the Repeal Act have already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. The Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case. 42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18-3-1999. The State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the landowner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 4 of the Repeal Act. 11.3. In Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector & Competent Authority reported in (2014) 12 SCC 523 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraph 12, held as under: “12. We have, therefore, clearly indicated that it was always open to the authorities to take forcible possession and, in fact, in the notice issued under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, it was stated that if the possession had not been surrendered, possession would be taken by application of necessary force. For taking forcible possession, certain procedures had to be followed. The respondents have no case that such procedures were followed and forcible possession was taken. For taking forcible possession, certain procedures had to be followed. The respondents have no case that such procedures were followed and forcible possession was taken. Further, there is nothing to show that the respondents had taken peaceful possession, nor is there anything to show that the appellants had given voluntary possession. The facts would clearly indicate that only de jure possession had been taken by the respondents and not de facto possession before coming into force of the repeal of the Act. Since there is nothing to show that de facto possession had been taken from the appellants prior to the execution of the possession receipt in favour of Mmrda, it cannot hold on to the lands in question, which are legally owned and possessed by the appellants. Consequently, we are inclined to allow this appeal and quash the notice dated 17-2-2005 and subsequent action taken therein in view of the repeal of the ULC Act. The above reasoning would apply in respect of other appeals as well and all proceedings initiated against the appellants, therefore, would stand quashed.” 11.4. The First Bench of this court in A.N.Visalakshi and others vs. The Special Commissioner, Urban Land Ceiling and Land Refors and others in W.P. No.2998 of 2004 dated 05.08.2015, in paragraphs 14 and 15, held as under: “14. Admittedly in the instant case, an order under Section 11(5) of the State Act was passed and notice issued to the land owners. The land owner by representation requested for keeping the proceedings under abeyance, since he has preferred an appeal. The proceedings were not deferred, but the respondent would state that they have taken over possession pursuant to a land delivery receipt. In the preceding paragraphs, we have seen that the land delivery receipt has been executed between the Urban Land Ceiling Department and the Revenue Department and the land owner had not surrendered possession pursuant to the order under Section 11(5) of the State Act. Therefore, if the respondents claim that they have taken over possession, then they should have resorted to the procedure under Section 11(6) of the Act which has not been done and the manner in which the possession is sought to be recorded or taken over, is not in accordance with law and the Government are not deemed to be in possession of the land in question. 15. 15. In the light of the above, we have no hesitation to hold that the possession said to have been taken over by the Revenue Department, pursuant to the land delivery receipt cannot be construed as possession taken in accordance with law and therefore, cannot confer any right on the Department/Government and the land owners are held to be continued to possession and consequently, the proceedings initiated under the Urban land Ceiling Act stand abated in the light of the coming into force of the Repealing Act, Act 20 of 1999.” 12. From the catena of cases cited above, the appellants have not proved that the vesting of the land under Section 13 of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978, is pari materia to Section 11(3) of the Act. The vacant land is deemed to have been acquired, but the said acquisition, does not mean taking over the possession of the land. For taking possession of the land, the procedure contemplated under the Act, has to be followed. 13. Section 11(5) of the Act stipulates that any vacant land, vested in the State government under Section 11(3), the competent authority, may, by notice and writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it, to surrender or deliver possession to the state government within 30 days of service of the notice. 14. Section 11(6) of the Act stipulates that in the event, the person in possession fails or refuses to surrender possession, the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land by using force, as may be necessary. 15. Therefore, the procedure under Section 11(6) operates or come into force, when the land owner refuses or fails to comply with the direction issued to him under Section 11(5) of the Act. 16. As argued by the learned Government Pleader, mere silence on the part of the land owner, does not mean that the possession is deemed to have been taken and the procedure contemplated under Section 11(6) of the Act, need not be followed. Even in this case, every notice or every proceeding, was initiated only in the absence of the original land owner. 17. Even in this case, every notice or every proceeding, was initiated only in the absence of the original land owner. 17. The Act came into force on 03.08.1976, on which date, as per the revenue records, the urban land owner had an extent of 2.5 Acres of land, that itself does not give right to the authorities to take possession without following the procedure contemplated under the Act. 18. In the light of the above discussions, the provisions of the Act cannot be applied to a land, which was not owned by the urban land owner on the date of initiation of the proceedings. Therefore, the writ court had come to the right conclusion that the impugned communication has to be set aside and the entry has to be deleted in the records showing that the land is a Government land or declared as surplus in the Act. We see no reason to interfere with the well reasoned order of the learned single Judge and thus we confirm the same by dismissing the writ appeal. The direction given by the writ court has to be complied with. 19. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. Appellants are directed to comply with the order of the learned single Judge, within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. However, there is no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected civil miscellaneous petition is closed.