JUDGMENT : R.D. DHANUKA, J. 1. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned the Show Cause Notice dated 19th October, 2020 issued by the respondent no. 1. By the said show cause notice, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why disciplinary action shall not be initiated against the petitioner in respect of various alleged acts on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner has also prayed for an order and direction against the respondent nos. 1 and 2 to pay full back wages in compliance with the order dated 28th March, 2019 passed by the Mumbai University and School Tribunal along with cost. 2. Matter was adjourned on the last date to enable the learned counsel for the respondents to take instruction whether respondents would pay the back wages on its own or requires an order to be passed by this Court. Today, the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 instead of making a statement, seeks to challenge the writ petition on the ground of maintainability. 3. Mr. Shaikh, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 & 2 raised an issue of maintainability of this Writ petition on the ground that the respondent no.1 is a private institution and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He submits that the petitioner even otherwise is not entitled to challenge the show cause notice in this writ petition. 4. In support of his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the following Judgments:- (i) Judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of D.S. Veer Ranji Vs. Ciba Speciality (I) Ltd. & Ors., 2002 (1) Bom.C.R. 29 ; (ii) Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of M/s.Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., 2005 AIR (SC) 2677; (iii) Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Trigun Chand Thakur Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 2019 DGLS (SC) 935; (iv) Judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Chandra Nath Thakur & Ors., 1999 (1) B.L. Jud. 740; (v) Judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Trigun Chand Thakur Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 2008 (2) PLJR 718 . 5. State of Bihar & Ors., 2019 DGLS (SC) 935; (iv) Judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Chandra Nath Thakur & Ors., 1999 (1) B.L. Jud. 740; (v) Judgment of Patna High Court in the case of Trigun Chand Thakur Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 2008 (2) PLJR 718 . 5. In view of issue of maintainability raised by the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2, we shall first deal with the said objection. It is not in dispute that Pravin Gandhi College of Law is affiliated to University of Mumbai and is run by Shri Vile Parle Kelavani Mandal. 6. It is also not in dispute that the said institution running the said college, Pravin Gandhi College of Law had appointed the petitioner as Assistant Professor in Political Science in the said college. In clause 9 of the order dated 2nd January 2016, it was clearly provided that services of the petitioner will be governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Universities Act 1994 and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules of the University of Mumbai for the time being in force and the rules of Shri Vile Parle Kelavani Mandal not consistent with the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules of the University. The petitioner had accepted the terms and conditions of the said appointment. In view of the dispute having been arisen between the petitioner and the respondent nos.1 and 2 arising out of the said employment, the petitioner had exercised his remedy by filing an appeal bearing No.26 of 2018 under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. 7. Section 81 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 prescribed the condition for affiliation and recognition of College or Institution. The Management applying for affiliation or recognition and management whose college or institution has been granted affiliation or recognition has to file an undertaking in the manner prescribed therein. Clause (f) of Section 81 provides for strength and qualifications of teaching and non-teaching staff of the affiliated colleges and recognised institutions and the affiliated colleges as prescribed by the university and which shall be sufficient to make due provision for courses of study, teaching or training or research, efficiently. Clause (f) of Section 81 provides for strength and qualifications of teaching and non-teaching staff of the affiliated colleges and recognised institutions and the affiliated colleges as prescribed by the university and which shall be sufficient to make due provision for courses of study, teaching or training or research, efficiently. Clause (h) of Section 81 provides that the undertaking shall also record that directions and orders issued by the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and other officers of the university in exercise of the powers conferred on them under the provisions of the Act, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations shall be complied with. Clause (i) of Section 81 provides that an undertaking shall also be to the effect that there shall be no change or transfer of the management without previous permission of the university. It is not the case of the respondent nos.1 and 2 that they are not bound by any such provisions of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 and the undertaking that is required to be filed under the aforesaid provisions. 8. The letter of appointment itself clearly indicates that appointment of the petitioner admittedly was governed by the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 and also the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules of Shri Vile Parle Kelavani Mandal not inconsistent with the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules of the University. 9. We have perused the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2. None of the aforesaid judgments are even remotedly applicable to the facts of this case. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 on those judgments is totally misplaced. In this case, the impugned show cause notice for Disciplinary Action is issued by Pravin Gandhi College of Law annexed at Exhibit ‘F’ to the petition run and managed by the Management Committee and Trustees of Shri Vile Parle Kelavani Mandal. 10. Supreme Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Srivastava & Ors., (2019) SCCOnline SC 408 considered the issue whether writ petition was rightly entertained by the High Court against private school or not. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after adverting to its earlier judgment in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. 10. Supreme Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Srivastava & Ors., (2019) SCCOnline SC 408 considered the issue whether writ petition was rightly entertained by the High Court against private school or not. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after adverting to its earlier judgment in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., (2012) 12 SCC 331 held that the judgment of the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained on the proposition that the writ petition would not be maintainable merely because the respondent institution is a purely unaided private educational institution. It is further held in the said judgment that Court has no hesitation to hold that the Writ Application is maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also considered the fact that the institution was performing public functions i.e. providing education to children in their institutions throughout India. Supreme Court held that the Writ Application is maintainable in such a matter even as against the private unaided educational institutions. 11. Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia (Supra) after adverting to various judgments has set aside the judgment of a learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court holding that the writ petition would not maintainable merely because the respondent institution is a purely unaided private educational institution. In our view, the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of this case. We respectfully bound by the said judgment. 12. Supreme Court in the case of Rajbir Surajbhan Singh Vs. Chairman, institute of Banking Personnel Selection, Mumbai, (2019) 14 SCC 189 including in case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust Vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 and in the case of K.K. Saksena Vs. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage, (2015) 4 SCC 670 held that there is no manner of doubt that a Writ Petition under Article 226 is maintainable even against a private body provided it discharges public functions. It is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is. It can reasonably be said that such functions as are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity, are public functions. 13. It is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is. It can reasonably be said that such functions as are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity, are public functions. 13. In the case of Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that the words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or the authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied. 14. In our view, various duties and obligations are cast on the respondent nos.1 and 2 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 by which provision, the appointment of the petitioner was also governed admittedly. The respondent nos.1 and 2 have been imparting education which is part of public duty in compliance with the obligation prescribed under the provisions of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. In our view, the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajbir Surajbhan Singh (supra), Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust (supra) and K.K. Saksena Vs. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of this case. We are respectfully bound by the said judgments. There is thus no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 that this writ petition is not maintainable. We shall now decide the issues raised by the petitioner on merit and dealt with by the learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2. 15. In prayer clauses (a) & (b) of the writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside Show Cause Notice dated 18th September 2020 issued by the respondent no.1. 15. In prayer clauses (a) & (b) of the writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for writ of certiorari for quashing and setting aside Show Cause Notice dated 18th September 2020 issued by the respondent no.1. In prayer clause (d) of the petition, the petitioner has prayed for an order and direction against the respondent nos.1 and 2 to follow in true spirit the order dated 20th March 2019 passed by the Mumbai University and College Tribunal at Mumbai in Appeal No.26 of 2018 filed by the petitioner and seeks payment of full back wages along with cost of Rs.15,000/- as per order dated 20th March 2019. 16. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since the respondent nos.1 and 2 has not initiated the disciplinary action against the petitioner permitted by the said order dated 20th March 2019, the respondent nos.1 and 2 cannot be allowed to proceed with the show cause notice dated 19th October 2020. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2, on the other hand, submits that his client has already applied for extension of time to the said Tribunal for six months to conduct the said enquiry as per order dated 20th March 2019. The respondent no.1 has already issued show cause notice on 18th September 2020 for disciplinary action. 18. A perusal of the order dated 20th March 2019 passed by the said Tribunal clearly indicates that if enquiry is not conducted and completed against the petitioner within a period of one year, the petitioner shall be entitled to back wages as per the rules forthwith after expiry of the said period. 19. In our view, since the consequences is provided in the said order for not conducting and completing the enquiry within one year by providing for payment of back wages, there would be no bar against the respondent nos.1 and 2 from conducting such enquiry even after expiry of one year provided extension of time is granted by the said Tribunal in respect of which the application filed by the respondent no.1 before the Tribunal is already pending. We are thus not inclined to interfere with the show cause notice issued by the respondent no.1. 20. We are thus not inclined to interfere with the show cause notice issued by the respondent no.1. 20. The next question that arises for consideration of this Court is whether in view of default committed by the respondent no.1 and 2 in not conducting and completing the enquiry within a period of one year, the petitioner would become entitled for back wages as per Rules and also cost of Rs.15,000/- as provided in the said order dated 20th March 2019 or not. 21. It is not in dispute that the respondent nos.1 and 2 have not impugned the said order dated 20th March 2019 providing for entitlement of the petitioner for back wages as per Rules after expiry of period of one year from the date of the said order for conducting and completing enquiry against the petitioner. The respondent nos.1 and 2, in these circumstances, cannot refuse to make payment of back wages as per Rules and also the payment of cost of Rs.15,000/- which was even otherwise payable by them to the petitioner within a period of two months from the date of the said order. 22. Mr.Shaikh, learned counsel for the respondent nos.1 and 2 strenuously urged before this Court that since the application for extension of time filed by the respondent no.1 for completing the enquiry is still pending before the Tribunal, this Court shall not pass any order for payment of back wages at this stage. Admittedly, the said order dated 20th March 2019 passed by the Tribunal is not impugned by the respondent nos.1 and 2 till date. The said order dated 20th March 2019 is thus clearly enforceable. The respondent nos.1 and 2 has also not paid cost of Rs.15,000/- which payment has even otherwise nothing to do with the pending application of the respondent no.1 for extension of time to complete the enquiry against the petitioner. Both these amount shall be paid within two weeks from today. 23. Writ Petition is disposed of in aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs. 24. In so far as the application for extension of time filed by the respondent no.1 before the Tribunal is concerned, we do not express any observations on merit of the said application filed before the Tribunal and the same shall be disposed of on its own merit. 25. There shall be no order as to costs. 24. In so far as the application for extension of time filed by the respondent no.1 before the Tribunal is concerned, we do not express any observations on merit of the said application filed before the Tribunal and the same shall be disposed of on its own merit. 25. It is made clear that the payment of back wages that would be made by the respondent nos.1 and 2 to the petitioner would be subject to further orders as may be passed by the respondent nos.1 and 2 after conclusion of the enquiry on grant of extension of time, if any, by the said Tribunal. Parties to act on this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court.