JUDGMENT : This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2020 passed in A.S.No.136/2020 on the file of the Additional District Court-V, Palakkad challenging the order dated 07.09.2020 passed in Claim E.A.No.195/2020 in E.P.No.150/2016 in O.S.No.221/2013 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Chittur. 2. Claim E.A.No.195/2020 was filed by the appellant as the claim petitioner under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the C.P.C.'). The respondent Nos.1 and 2 are the decree holders and the 3rd respondent is the judgment debtor and respondent No.4 is the transferee of the respondent No.3. The 4th respondent is not a party to the Execution Petition and the Original Suit. He had filed a claim petition as E.A.No.157/2018 in execution petition. The claim petition was dismissed on merits later. 3. A suit was filed for both mandatory and prohibitory injunction directing the 3rd respondent to remove the iron staircase situated on the southern side of the plaint schedule item No.1 property and for consequential permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the 3rd respondent from causing obstruction to the plaintiff in possessing and enjoying the plaint schedule property in any manner. 4. The suit was decreed ex parte on 19.12.2013. The 3rd respondent, the owner of the building sold out the building to other persons and ultimately the first floor was purchased by the 4th respondent in the year 2018. On 26.12.2019, the 4th respondent leased out the first floor to the appellant and since then it is alleged that she has been making use of the disputed staircase for ingress and egress to the room. It is contended that the disputed staircase is the main ingress and egress to the upstairs of the said building and no proceedings have been initiated by the local authority to remove the staircase. 5. The case of the claim petitioner is that she is a lessee of the premises as per the agreement dated 26.12.2019 with respondent No.4, for the purpose of conducting fashion designing shop for a period of 11 months. She would swear that she has been conducting business therein under the name and style 'Veda Designing Boutique' in the said room situated in the first floor of the building. She would swear that she has been conducting business therein under the name and style 'Veda Designing Boutique' in the said room situated in the first floor of the building. According to her, the iron staircase referred to in the plaint B schedule property in E.P.No.150/2016 is being used for ingress and egress to the above shop room. She would say that on 20.8.2020, the respondents 1, 2 and 4 tried to remove the iron staircase and hence the petition was filed before the court. The above Claim EA was dismissed by the executing court as per common order dated 07.09.2020. Challenging the above order, an appeal was taken before the District Court, Palakkad which was later dismissed. Hence, this Execution Second Appeal. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the 4th respondent and his predecessors are bonafide purchasers for valid consideration. Elaborating on the submission, the learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the right on the staircase was vested with the appellant and the same cannot be taken away in furtherance of a judgment passed in the above suit behind the back of the appellant. Thus, it is contended that the decree allowing to dismantle the staircase is void ab initio. The learned counsel for the appellant maintained that the appellant being a tenant, her rights cannot be denied except in accordance with the procedure established by law. It is further contended that the earlier proceedings initiated by the 1st and 2nd respondents against the 3rd respondent is collusive in nature and thus hit under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was argued that the parties were not accorded with necessary opportunity to tender their evidence by the trial court as provided under Order XXI Rule 101 of the C.P.C. 7. After having heard the learned counsel for the appellant a learned Single Judge of this Court admitted the appeal on 04.02.2021 and called for the Judges papers in F.A.O.133/19, R.P.742/20, O.P.(C).972/20, OP(C).No.1290/20, OP(C)No.1306/20 and OP(C)No.1345/20. Since no substantial questions of law were framed at the time of admission, after having heard both sides, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law on 18.2.2021:- (i) Since the appellant being a tenant, can the rights enjoyed by her be denied except in accordance with the procedure established by law? Since no substantial questions of law were framed at the time of admission, after having heard both sides, this Court framed the following substantial questions of law on 18.2.2021:- (i) Since the appellant being a tenant, can the rights enjoyed by her be denied except in accordance with the procedure established by law? (ii) Are the earlier proceedings initiated by the 1st and 2nd respondents against the 3rd respondent collusive in nature and thus Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable? (iii) Whether the appellant has set up an independent right over the decree schedule property warranting an adjudication under Order XXI Rule 101 of the C.P.C.? 8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the resistance and obstruction to possession of immovable properties as contemplated under Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. could have been offered by any person. The words 'any person' as contemplated by Order XXI Rule 97 sub-rule (1) are comprehensive enough to include apart from judgment-debtor or anyone claiming through him even persons claiming independently and who would, therefore, be total strangers to the decree, it has been contended. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that when such resistance is offered, it has to be adjudicated upon as provided under Order XXI Rule 97 sub-rule (2) of the C.P.C. and the procedure for adjudicating such an application has to be culled out from the remaining succeeding rules of Order XXI of the C.P.C. Pointing out Order XXI Rule 101 of the C.P.C., the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit. The sum and substance of the contention is that the aforesaid statutory provisions of Order XXI laid down a complete code for deciding all disputes pertaining to the execution of the decree for possession obtained by the decree holder. Once such resistance is offered by any person, it is within the realm of the decree holder to move an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. to remove the obstruction, if any, caused. Once such resistance is offered by any person, it is within the realm of the decree holder to move an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. to remove the obstruction, if any, caused. In this case, the facts are that the petitioner, who is a stranger to the decree and who claims an independent right in the decretal property, offered his resistance before getting actually dispossessed and which is sought to be removed by the decree holder by way of counter. Relying on Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and another [ (1998) 3 SCC 723 ], Ayyappan Pillai v. Raveendranathan [ 1999 (1) KLT 484 ], Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries (P) Ltd. v. Narayanan [2003 KHC 285] and Sameer Singh and another v. Abdul Rab and others [ (2015) 1 SCC 379 ], the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the executing court disallowed the resistance offered by the appellant on technical grounds in violation of the procedure prescribed under Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. and the succeeding rules of Order XXI. 10. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents submitted that the appellant is claiming right under the 4rd respondent and is not claiming any independent right over the property as contended by her. The 4th respondent had earlier filed similar claim petition claiming similar rights as E.A.No.157/2018 and the same was dismissed by the executing court. Later, the 4th respondent filed A.S.No.66/2019 before the first appellate court along with I.A.No.497/2019 for stay of the execution. The said I.A. was considered by the appellate court as directed by this Court in O.P.(C)No.636/2020. The said I.A. was dismissed on 16.06.2020 by the Executing Court. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents further submitted that the appellant filed the present application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. on the basis of an agreement which is created for the purpose of this case to delay the execution proceedings. 11. Admittedly, the 4th respondent purchased the shop room during the pendency of the execution proceedings in E.P.No.150/2016. According to the 4th respondent, the property was obtained by him by virtue of assignment deed No.559/2018 of the S.R.O., Nenmara. It is his case that thereafter he came to know the pendency of E.P.No.150/2016 in O.S.No.221/2013. Hence, he filed a E.A.No.157/2018 before the executing court. According to the 4th respondent, the property was obtained by him by virtue of assignment deed No.559/2018 of the S.R.O., Nenmara. It is his case that thereafter he came to know the pendency of E.P.No.150/2016 in O.S.No.221/2013. Hence, he filed a E.A.No.157/2018 before the executing court. Since the 4th respondent failed to appear before the executing court, the same was dismissed by order dated 29.3.2019 against which an appeal was preferred before the District Court as A.S.No.66/2019 along with an application as I.A.No.497/2019 to stay the proceedings. The said application was dismissed by the first appellate court. Challenging the order he preferred O.P.(C)No.972/2020 before this Court and the same is pending consideration. The above facts and figures are correct in view of the connected matters pending before this Court. 12. There cannot be any quarrel over the legal proposition put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner that once an obstruction is on the record of the executing court, the executing court is obliged to follow the provisions under Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. and the succeeding Rules thereof. It is evident from the contention of the appellant that she obtained possession of the property on 26.12.2019 by virtue of the lease deed executed between her and respondent No.4. It is the consistent case of the appellant that the property in dispute was purchased by the 4th respondent by virtue of document No.559/2018 of S.R.O., Nenmara when an executable decree was in force against the 3rd respondent. The appellant admitted that she is a tenant under the 4th respondent during the pendency of the execution proceedings and a lease deed was executed on 26.12.2019 between the appellant and the 4th respondent. The judgment debtors are contesting the case right from the inception of the suit filed by the decree holder. They have filed several cases before various courts. They have also objected for issuing delivery warrant in the execution proceedings bringing obstruction to the execution. It is not in dispute that the appellant is claiming right in respect of the property under the 4th respondent U.Liyakhath Alikhan. The 4th respondent filed O.P.(C)No.1290/2020 before this Court. In the said case, he prayed before this Court to keep in abeyance the order of delivery mentioned in E.A.No.189/2020 in E.P.No.150/2016 and in O.S.No.221/2013 on 19.8.2020. It is not in dispute that the appellant is claiming right in respect of the property under the 4th respondent U.Liyakhath Alikhan. The 4th respondent filed O.P.(C)No.1290/2020 before this Court. In the said case, he prayed before this Court to keep in abeyance the order of delivery mentioned in E.A.No.189/2020 in E.P.No.150/2016 and in O.S.No.221/2013 on 19.8.2020. It is clear that the executing court adjudicated the rights of the 4th respondent independently and ordered delivery of the property. Thereafter, the appellant, who allegedly obtained possession under the 4th respondent, filed this application under Order XXI Rule 97 C.P.C. to adjudicate her application in accordance with provisions of Order XXI Rule 97 of the C.P.C. treating the same as a regular suit. It is a settled law that obstruction can be made only by a stranger to the decree, who claims an independent right, title and interest in the decretal property. He is also entitled to agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication of his independent right, title and interest in the decretal property even after losing his possession as per Order XXI Rule 99 of the C.P.C. Order XXI Rule 97 deals with the stage which is prior to the actual execution of the decree. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner is claiming right under the 4th respondent as a lessee. The 4th respondent had no privity of contract with the decree holder. He cannot be treated as a stranger to the decree. She is seeking an adjudication to defeat the interest of the decree holder. The 4th respondent raised his claim before the executing court and the executing court negatived his contentions by a well-reasoned order. He preferred an appeal before the first appellate court and suffered an order. It was challenged before the High Court in O.P. (C)No.1290/2020. No stay order was passed in the said case. A person bound by the decree includes a person claiming through the judgment-debtor whose claim has been adjudicated by the court. 13. The appellant is not a tenant of the disputed premises. She is not entitled to get the benefit of Act 2 of 1965. The earlier proceedings initiated by the 1st and 2nd respondents against the 3rd respondent is apparently in accordance with law. The plea of collusion raised by the appellant who is claiming under the 4th respondent is clearly unsustainable. She is not entitled to get the benefit of Act 2 of 1965. The earlier proceedings initiated by the 1st and 2nd respondents against the 3rd respondent is apparently in accordance with law. The plea of collusion raised by the appellant who is claiming under the 4th respondent is clearly unsustainable. The appellant has failed to set up an independent right over the decree schedule property warranting a full-fledged adjudication as contemplated under Order XXI Rule 101 of the C.P.C. The condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal being the existence of a substantial question of law, on a perusal of the facts and circumstances involved, all the questions canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant were practically covered by the decisions of this Court and the Apex Court and if the general principles to be applied in determining the questions formulated are well-settled, then the appellant is not entitled to claim independent right over the scheduled property at the instance of the 4th respondent whose claim has been negatived by the executing court in accordance with law. The 4th respondent did not succeed in his attempt to resist the execution though he had raised an obstruction before the executing court. It is not correct to repeat the cycle at the instance of the appellant who is claiming under the 4th respondent. The decree passed by a competent court is liable to be executed in accordance with law. The obstruction raised by the appellant lacks bonafides and both the executing court and the appellate court concurrently dismissed the same on tenable grounds. All the contentions raised by the appellant are technical in nature and are an attempt to overreach the decree. 14. Sitting in execution, an executing court is bound to execute the decree as it stands unless the decree is a nullity or the court which passed the decree lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass such a decree. The executing court repelled all the contentions raised by the 4th judgment-debtor in E.A.No.157/2018 between the decree holder and the 4th judgment debtor. 14. Sitting in execution, an executing court is bound to execute the decree as it stands unless the decree is a nullity or the court which passed the decree lacks inherent jurisdiction to pass such a decree. The executing court repelled all the contentions raised by the 4th judgment-debtor in E.A.No.157/2018 between the decree holder and the 4th judgment debtor. The appellant who is claiming under the 4th judgment debtor is not entitled to obstruct the execution proceedings contending that the executing court is obliged to determine under Rule 101 of the C.P.C. as desired by the appellant on the strength of an agreement executed between the appellant and the 4th respondent during the pendency of the execution proceedings. In the case on hand, the obstructer has admitted that he is a transferee pendente lite from the 4th respondent. Hence it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the collusive litigation between the decree holder and the respondents 1 to 4 when he was put in possession of the property as a tenant in view of the legal principles formulated by the Apex Court in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd.'s case (supra). Similarly, the appellant, who stepped into the shoes of the 4th respondent is not entitled to question the validity of a decree passed in this case as such questions have already considered and decided by the executing court in E.A.No.157/2018 between the 4th respondent and the respondents 1 to 3. Hence, the executing court is not obliged to determine a question under Rule 101 of the C.P.C merely because the resistor raised it. The words “all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Order XXI Rule 97” would envelope only such questions as would legally arise for determination between the parties and that such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties. Viewing the substantial questions of law in this backdrop, this Court is of the view that this Execution Second Appeal deserves only a dismissal. For the reasons discussed above, this Execution Second Appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.