JUDGMENT : Vijay Kumar Shukla, J. Hearing convened through video conferencing mode. 1. The present intra-court appeal has been filed under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by the order dated 13-8-2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP 17512 of 2019 [Brij Kishore Soni vs. State of M.P. and others], whereby the petition filed by the respondent/writ-petitioner has been allowed with a direction to reinstate him with all consequential benefits. 2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts which are obligatory to be uncurtained are that the respondent/writ-petitioner [hereafter referred to as "the respondent"] submitted his candidature for appointment, in pursuance to the advertisement issued by the M.P. Professional Examination Board, Bhopal for the post of Constable Excise (Class III Executive). The respondent was selected and appointed by order dated 18-9-2013. He was required to fill-up an attestation form. In the relevant column, i.e. para 12, the respondent furnished the requisite information, wherein it was clearly mentioned that he faced a criminal case for the offence punishable under sections 325/34 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. Vide Case No. 1569/2010, decided on 28-7-2006, the respondent was acquitted of the charge, which was based on a compromise (Rajinama). 3. A notice to show cause, dated 15-12-2015 was issued to the respondent, wherein allegation was made taking aid of the M.P. Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 [hereinafter referred to as "the Rules 1965"] and the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 [for brevity, "the CCA Rules"]. The respondent filed his detailed reply on 04-01-2016, wherein it was pointed out that he has not committed the alleged misconduct. He had disclosed all material facts while filling-up the form. 4. The appellants/Department was not satisfied with the reply filed by the respondent and, therefore, issued a charge-sheet under Rule 14 of the CCA Rules on 4-5-2016. After conducting enquiry the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 29-6-2018. The Enquiry Officer has not given any definite opinion regarding guilt of the respondent. The respondent filed his response to the report of the Enquiry Officer with the prayer to drop the departmental enquiry. However, by the impugned order dated 13-8-2019 the respondent was dismissed from service by the appellants, invoking Rule 12 of the M.P. Government Service (Permanent and Quasi Permanent) Rules, 1960 [for short, "the Rules 1960"]. The respondent filed his response to the report of the Enquiry Officer with the prayer to drop the departmental enquiry. However, by the impugned order dated 13-8-2019 the respondent was dismissed from service by the appellants, invoking Rule 12 of the M.P. Government Service (Permanent and Quasi Permanent) Rules, 1960 [for short, "the Rules 1960"]. 5. The respondent challenged the impugned order dated 13-8-2019 before the learned Single Judge on the ground that he had disclosed the antecedents in the verification correctly and fairly stated that a criminal case relating to the offence under Sections 323 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal Code in the Police Station, Ranjhi District Jabalpur was registered. He further disclosed in the verification form that he was acquitted of the charge on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties and has not suppressed any fact. He has further stated that he was not charged for an offence relating to mortal turpitude and there was no reason to hold that he was unsuitable for the Government job. Therefore, the finding recorded in the enquiry report was absolutely illegal and in gross violation of the CCA Rules and principle of natural justice. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition directing the appellants to reinstate the respondent with all consequential benefits within a period of 60 days from the date of production of the copy of the order. 6. The appellants referred the Circular dated 24-11-2012 issued by the General Administration Department, Govt. of Madhya Pradesh and the appointment order dated 18-9-2013 with a condition that after the character verification, if the report of the candidate is not found fit for Government job, his services will be terminated. It is put forth that the Inspector General of Police (Security) issued a communication dated 28-9-2014 to the Commissioner (Excise), Madhya Pradesh, to take a decision on the character verification report of the respondent. The case of the respondent was considered in the light of the policy dated 5-6-2003 of the Home Department, Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, instructions relating to character verification applicable as condition of service of the respondent. It is further canvassed that the offence relating to Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code is an offence of mortal turpitude. In this regard they relied upon the "Appendix A" of the Circular dated 5-6-2003. of Madhya Pradesh, instructions relating to character verification applicable as condition of service of the respondent. It is further canvassed that the offence relating to Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code is an offence of mortal turpitude. In this regard they relied upon the "Appendix A" of the Circular dated 5-6-2003. It is submitted that there is no illegality in consideration of the case of the respondent. 7. To substantiate their case, the appellants have relied on a judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (para 38.5), wherein it is held that in a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider the antecedent and it cannot be compelled to appoint the candidature. They have further relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of M.P. and others vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar, (2018) 18 SCC 733, wherein it is held that even after the disclosure is made by a candidate, the employer should be well within its rights to consider the antecedents and suitability of the candidate. While so considering the employer then can certainly take into account the job profile of the employee for which the charges were levelled against him. 8. It is strenuously urged on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the terms and conditions of the appointment order dated 18-9-2013 and also the Circular issued by the General Administration Department of the State of M.P., dated 24-11-2012. It is further contended that the respondent was appointed with the specific conditions of service, vide condition Nos. (1) and (3) of the appointment order, dated 13-8-2019 and the Circular dated 24-11-2012, issued by the General Administration Department, Govt. of Madhya Pradesh and he was afforded sufficient opportunity of being heard following the principles of natural justice, under the Rules 1965 and the CCA Rules. It is asserted that the order dated 13-8-2019 has been passed terminating the service of the respondent after following the principles of natural justice in accordance with the CCA Rules. Further, sufficient opportunity was granted to the respondent to prove his innocence and, thereafter he was found unsuitable/unfit for the post of Constable having criminal antecedents. 9. It is asserted that the order dated 13-8-2019 has been passed terminating the service of the respondent after following the principles of natural justice in accordance with the CCA Rules. Further, sufficient opportunity was granted to the respondent to prove his innocence and, thereafter he was found unsuitable/unfit for the post of Constable having criminal antecedents. 9. It is vehemently urged by the appellants that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate that the order dated 13-8-2019 was issued in accordance with Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules 1960, declaring the respondent unfit in accordance with the Instructions, dated 24-11-2012 issued by the Governor. Thus, the competent authority has issued the order dated 13-8-2019 declaring the respondent unfit for service following the principles of natural justice by invoking the CCA Rules, as the respondent had acquired the status of a quasi permanent employee. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge and argued that the respondent was duly selected and appointed after due verification of his character and antecedents. In absence of any suppression of the fact, the respondent cannot be said to be "unsuitable" and it can safely be concluded that he has not committed any misconduct. It is assiduously urged that the action of the appellants in terminating the services of the respondent after rendering almost 7 years of service, is bad in law. More so, during these 7 years no any allegation has been made against the respondent pertaining to his unsuitability. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants did not dispute the fact that the respondent has completely disclosed his previous criminal history. Placing reliance on the judgment of this Court passed in W.P.(S) No. 3101-2005 [Union of India vs. Smt. Kamlabai and another], dated 12-9-2019, it is argued that there is distinction between the terms "eligibility" and "Suitability". The respondent may be eligible, but in view of his previous criminal record, he cannot be said to be suitable. It is contended that there is no fault in the impugned disciplinary proceeding initiated against the respondent and the final decision dated 13-8-2019. A reference is also made to the order of the Apex Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 3046/2019 [State vs. Banti]. 12. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. It is contended that there is no fault in the impugned disciplinary proceeding initiated against the respondent and the final decision dated 13-8-2019. A reference is also made to the order of the Apex Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 3046/2019 [State vs. Banti]. 12. We have bestowed our anxious consideration on the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties. Undisputedly, in this case the respondent had apprised the Department by furnishing requisite informations regarding his criminal antecedent, while filling-up column No. 12 of the verification form. The Department with the eyes opened, considered the candidature of the respondent and appointed him. It is not the case of the Department that the information relating to criminal antecedent so furnished by the respondent had escaped the notice of the Department. Thus, it is crystal clear that the Department had appointed the respondent after fully knowing about his criminal antecedent/character and after appointment of the respondent, the question emerges for consideration that whether after rendering 7 years of services, it was open to the appellants to proceed against the respondent by taking aid of the CCA Rules. 13. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , it is ruled that validity of an order of a statutory authority needs to be examined on the grounds mentioned therein. Conduct of Rules can be invoked when an employee commits misconduct after entering into service. As per averments made in the charge-sheet the respondent has not committed any misconduct whatsoever. Thus, the question of invoking Conduct Rules does not arise. However, the Department without considering this aspect has issued the charge-sheet, dated 4-5-2016. Conduct of Rules can be invoked when an employee commits misconduct after entering into service. As per averments made in the charge-sheet the respondent has not committed any misconduct whatsoever. Thus, the question of invoking Conduct Rules does not arise. However, the Department without considering this aspect has issued the charge-sheet, dated 4-5-2016. The relevant portion of the charge-sheet reads as under: ^^vkjksi Øekad&01 iqfyl v/kh{kd] ftyk tcyiqj ls pfj= lR;kiu ds ijh{k.k ds nkSjku ik;k x;k fd] vkids fo#) Fkkuk jka>h v-i-Ø-&55@06 /kkjk 323] 325@34 Hkk-n-fo- fnukad 21-01-06 dk;e fd;k tkdj] pkyku Øekad&29@06 fnukad 22@01@06 dks iathc) fd;k x;k tks ekuuh; U;k;ky; tcyiqj ds le{k is'k fd;k x;kA ^vkjksi Øekad&02 vfr0 eq[; U;k;kf;d n.Mkf/kdkjh] tcyiqj] vkns'k fnukad 28-07-2006 ls jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij /kkjk 325@34 Hkk-n-fo- ls vkjksi ls nks"keqDr fd;k x;kA ^vkjksi Øekad&03 e/;Áns'k 'kklu] lkekU; Á'kklu foHkkx ds i= Øekad ,Q lh&3&15@2012@1@3 fnukad 24 uoacj 2012 ds }kjk lh/kh Hkjrh ds fy, p;fur mEehnokjksa ds pfj= lR;kiu dh ÁR;k'kk esa] vkidks tkjh bl foHkkx ds vkns'k Øekad&2773 fnukad 18-09-2013 ls vkcdkjh vkj{kd ds in ij fu;qfDr nh x;hA fu;qfDr bl 'krZ ij nh xbZ] fd ;fn vkids pfj= lR;kiu dh fuiksVZ esa v;ksX; ik;s tkrs gks rks] fu;qfDr rRdky ÁHkko ls lekIr dh tkosxhA ftldk mYys[k fu;qfDr vkns'k esa 'krZ Øekad 03 ij Li"V vafdr fd;k x;k gSA ^vkjksi Øekad&04 fof/k vkSj fo/kk;h dk;Z foHkkx ,oa x`g foHkkx ls ÁkIr ls vfHker Øe'k% fnukad 25 vxLr 2015 ,oa fnukad 10 flrEcj 2015 esa Li"V mYys[k gS fd] lacaf/kr vkcdkjh vkj{kd ds fo#) vijkf/kd ekeys esa jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij /kkjk 323] 325 lgifBr /kkjk 34 Hkk-n-fo esa nks"keqfDr dks xq.k&nks"kksa ds vk/kkj nks"keqfDr ekU; ugha fd;k x;k gS ,slh fLFkfr esa lacaf/kr vkcdkjh vkj{kd] 'kkldh; lsok gsrq mi;qDr ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA Jh lksuh] vkcdkjh vkj{kd] }kjk mDr d`R; 'kkldh; dk;Z ds Áfr ?kksj mnkulhurk ykijokgh] vdrZO;ijk;.krk] dk mYya?ku dk ifjpk;d gksdj e/;Áns'k flfoy ¼vkpj.k½ fu;e 1965 ds fu;e&3 ¼1½ ¼,d½] 3 ¼1½ ¼nks½ ,oa 3 ¼1½ ¼rhu½ dk mYya?ku gSA^^ 14. On a plain reading of the Charge Nos. 1, 2 & 3, it is vivid that the allegations made therein, do not constitute misconduct on the part of the respondent. To elaborate: if during course of police verification it was found that a criminal case was registered against the respondent, it does not amount to misconduct. On a plain reading of the Charge Nos. 1, 2 & 3, it is vivid that the allegations made therein, do not constitute misconduct on the part of the respondent. To elaborate: if during course of police verification it was found that a criminal case was registered against the respondent, it does not amount to misconduct. Similarly, as alleged in the Charge No. 2 that the respondent was acquitted because of a "Rajinama" (compromise-deed), it also does not constitute a misconduct. Moreso, when there is no iota of suppression of these aspects on the part of the respondent. Likewise, the Charge No. 3 refers about the condition of appointment order relating to opinion of police verification about suitability, but the same does not fall within the ambit and sweep of misconduct. So far as the Charge No. 4 is concerned, it is averred that the acquittal of the respondent on the ground of compromise does not amount to acquittal as per the information of the General Administration Department. It also does not amount to any misconduct on the part of the respondent. The Enquiry Officer has not given any opinion, whether the respondent was found guilty or not. The opinion of the Enquiry Officer reads as follows: ^^mDrkuqlkj rF;ksa ds ifjÁs{; esa vipkjh deZpkjh ds fo#) fdlh vijk/k esa fdlh U;k;k;y }kjk nf.Mr gksuk ugha ik;k x;k gSA vipkjh deZpkjh ds fo#) fdlh iwoZ vkijkf/kd pfj= lEcU/kh dksbZ Ádj.k@?kVuk tkap ds nkSjku ugha ikbZ xbZ gSA jkthukek ds vk/kkj ij] vkijkf/kd Ádj.k lekIr fd;s tkus ds ifjÁs{; esa ,oa mDrkuqlkj voj lfpo] fof/k dh Vhi fnukad 25-03-2013 ds vuqØe esa lafLFkr foHkkxh; tkap fo#) Jh c`tfd'kksj lksuh ekeys esa tkap Áfrosnu Ásf"kr gSA** 15. On scanning and studied scrutiny of the charge-sheet issued against the respondent, it is graphically clear that the learned Single Judge rightly considered that the disciplinary authority under the Rules 1965 as well as the CCA Rules has two options after receiving the enquiry report. First, he can accept the Enquiry Officer's report and put the employee to notice, if he is found to be guilty and after obtaining his response, can impose adequate punishment; and secondly he may disagree with the report of the Enquiry Officer by assigning reasons provide a discordant note based on material brought on record to the delinquent employee, call for response and then impose appropriate punishment. 16. 16. In the case in hand, the Enquiry Officer has not held the respondent guilty and the Disciplinary Authority has not disagreed with the finding, yet he has decided to terminate the services of the respondent. For the first time, he invoked the Rules 1960. The respondent was never put to notice in this regard. Putting it differently, at no point of time, it was informed to the respondent that the Department intends to invoke these Rules and he is obliged to submit response in the light of these Rules. The learned Single Judge has recorded his opinion that the Department has committed an error of law in subjecting the respondent to disciplinary proceedings. 17. Thus, initiation of departmental proceedings and imposition of punishment, as an outcome of disciplinary proceedings by passing the impugned order dated 13-8-2019, cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. The learned Single Judge has interfered with the disciplinary proceedings on the ground that the charge-sheet issued against the respondent does not constitute misconduct, or in the other words, the charges so mentioned in the charge-sheet does not amount to misconduct. An inference can be drawn if the decision-making process is polluted and imposition of punishment is uncalled far and unwarranted and, therefore, interfered with the departmental enquiry. 18. The learned Single Judge has referred to the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in Baru Ram vs. Prasanni, AIR 1959 SC 93 and Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Ajum M.H. Ghaswala and others, (2002) 1 SCC 633 , to the effect that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in the same manner. A departmental enquiry instituted for committing misconduct cannot culminate with declaration of unsuitability as per a different rules of 1960. There is no doubt that "eligibility" and "suitability" are two different facets. If the respondent was not suitable, the employer could not have selected and appointed him. The disciplinary proceeding is not initiated against the respondent regarding any allegation that he secured the employment by misrepresentation or suppression of facts. It is not the case of the of the employer that the respondent projected himself to be "suitable" on the basis of any incorrect information. After getting all requisite informations, the respondent was appointed. The disciplinary proceeding is not initiated against the respondent regarding any allegation that he secured the employment by misrepresentation or suppression of facts. It is not the case of the of the employer that the respondent projected himself to be "suitable" on the basis of any incorrect information. After getting all requisite informations, the respondent was appointed. During course of his 7 years of employment also, nothing has been pointed out to him which shows that he was 'unsuitable' to perform the duties entrusted to him. 19. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra) the Apex Court ruled that in a case where the employee has made a truthful declaration of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidature. The same view was reiterated in the case of Abhijit Singh Pawar (supra). 20. In the present case, the respondent has apprised the Department by furnishing necessary informations about his criminal antecedent, while filling-up the Column No. 12 of the verification form. The Department with the eyes opened, considered the candidature of the respondent and appointed him. It is not the case of the appellants/Department that the information regarding criminal antecedent furnished by the respondent, had escaped notice of the Department. The Department appointed the respondent after knowing fully well about his criminal antecedent/character. After having appointed by the appellants the respondent worked for 7 years successful services. The charges levelled against the respondent do not constitute a misconduct. Thereafter, the appellants resorted to the Rules 1960 after conducting departmental enquiry without serving any notice to the respondent. In the facts of the present case, the judgments rendered in the cases of Avtar Singh (supra) and Abhijit Singh Pawar (supra) cannot be pressed into service in a case of this nature. 21. In the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and others vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and others, (1996) 3 SCC 52 , the Apex Court ruled, that in an intra-court appeal the appellate Court is a Court of Correction which corrects its own orders, in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. 22. Such is not an appeal against an order of subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. 22. We do not perceive any illegality in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge warranting any interference in the present intra-court appeal. Accordingly, the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.