SHANKARBHAI SOMABHAI PARMAR SINCE DECEASED v. STATE OF GUJARAT THRU SECRETARY REVENUE DEPT.
2021-03-22
BIREN VAISHNAV, VINEET KOTHARI
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : VINEET KOTHARI, J. 1. This Intra Court Appeal has been filed by Legal Heirs of Chanchalben daughter of original Land Holder Motibhai Gamanbhai against the Order of learned Single Jude dated 8.11.2016, by which the learned Single Judge (Coram: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Bela Trivedi) dismissed the Special Civil Application No.6855 of 1996. 2. Said Chanchalben, wife of Somabhai Parmar and daughter of Motibhai Gamanbhai, died on 6.6.1984, whereas the original Land Holder – her father Motibhai Gamanbhai died on 19.3.1980. The proceedings under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act, 1976) were initiated and concluded by the Competent Authority under the ULC Act, 1976, during the lifetime of said Chanchalben. 3. The Competent Authority passed an Order under Section 8(4) / Section 9 of the ULC Act, 1976 on 31.1.1983 declaring 3225 sq. mtrs. of land bearing Survey Nos.109 and 52, situated at Manjalpur, as excess vacant land after giving deduction of 1 unit of 1500 sq.mtrs. to said Chanchalben. 4. In pursuance of the said adjudication under Sections 8(4) / Section 9 of the ULC Act, 1976, the Declaration under Section 10(3) of the Act vesting the land in the State was issued on 11.9.1984 and in pursuance thereof Section 10(5) Notice was also issued to the present Appellants/Petitioners, sons and Legal Heirs of said Chanchalben. The possession of the surplus land in question was taken over by the State Authorities on 14.2.1985 and Compensation Order under Section 11 of the ULC Act, 1976 was passed on 29.8.1985 in presence of the Petitioner – Shankarbhai Somabhai Parmar himself who had remained present before the Authority on 19.4.1985. 5. After the death of their mother Chanchalben, the sole daughter and legal Land Holder of Motibhai Gamanbhai, the Appellants/Petitioners – the three brothers appeared to have laid their first challenge to the Order passed by the Competent Authority under Section 8 (4) / 9 of the ULC Act, 1976 dated 31.1.1983 by filing an Appeal after 6 years of the same in the year 1989 viz. Appeal No.47 of 1989 which came to be dismissed by the learned Tribunal on 30.9.1993.
Appeal No.47 of 1989 which came to be dismissed by the learned Tribunal on 30.9.1993. The Petitioners thereafter filed a Revision Application before the State on 22.3.1994 under Section 34 of the ULC Act, 1976 challenging the said Order dated 31.1.1993 and the Order dated 29.8.1985 passed by the Competent Authority under Section 11 of the ULC Act, 1976 for payment of compensation, as also the Order dated 30.9.1993 passed by the Tribunal, but the State Government also dismissed the said Revision Application under Section 34 of the ULC Act, 1976 on 20.6.1996 on the ground of non-maintainability. 6. Aggrieved by the same, the present Special Civil Application No.6855 of 1996 was filed by the Petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge, however, dismissed the said Writ Petition by the Order dated 8.11.2016 aggrieved by which the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Appellants-Petitioners. 7. The two sons of Chanchalben are now represented by their Legal Representatives Shankarbhai Somabhai Parmar through his wife Kashiben, son Amarsinh and another son Kaushik, whereas other son Bhikhabhai Somabhai Parmar is represented by his Legal Representatives wife Savitaben, son Kanubhai, son Laljibhai. The third son Ramsingbhai Somabhai Parmar is still alive. 8. Mr. Jitendra Patel, learned counsel appearing for the Appellants sought to emphasise and submit before us that the land of Survey No.109 was subject matter of land acquisition for Gujarat Housing Board as would appear from the Certificate issued on 23.8.1996 by Vadodara Urban Development Authority on the Application of the Legal Representatives of Motibhai Gamanbhai dated 14.8.1996 and therefore, since the land in question of Survey No.109 was acquired, for which the relevant Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1891 were required to be produced by the Respondent-State as per the Interim Orders passed by this Court, then such land could not have been assessed as excess or surplus land in the hands of their mother Chanchalben and the entire proceedings under the ULC Act, 1976, therefore, deserve to be quashed and set aside. 9. Mr.
9. Mr. Jitendra Patel, learned counsel also contended that the sons of Chanchalben were entitled to 4 Units as against only deduction of 1 Unit was given in the hands of their mother Chanchalben by the Competent Authority by the Order dated 30.1.1983 and he sought to rely upon the case laws with regard to condonation of delay by the Tribunal for taking a liberal approach. 10. On the other round of Appeal under Section 33 being filed by present Petitioners-Appellants after 6 years in the year 1989 viz. Appeal No.47/89 against the Order of the Competent Authority dated 30.1.1983, the learned counsel sought to submit that delay was bona fide which occurred on account of Civil Suits filed by the cousins of Chanchalben namely, Hiraben and Sonaben, daughters of the Uncle of the petitioners or brother of Motibhai Gamanbhai which Suit was decided in the year 1989 and thereafter only they preferred the said Appeal No.47/1989 before the ULC Tribunal, which the Tribunal has erred in dismissing on the ground of delay. 11. Learned counsel further submitted that though Notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was served upon the Petitioners, the possession was taken through the Panchnama process in the absence of any of the Petitioners-Appellants and, therefore, it could not be said to be a valid taking over the possession and consequently, with the Repeal of the ULC Act, 1976 w.e.f. 30.3.1999, the land should be deemed to have remained and vested with the present Petitioners-Appellants and the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioners-Appellants. 12.
12. On the other hand, Mr.K.M. Antani, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the Respondent-State vehemently submitted that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in dismissing the Appeal filed by the present Petitioners-Page Appellants as time barred, as the prescribed time limit for filing Appeal under Section 33 of the ULC Act, 1976 is only 30 days and even with the power of extending the time given to the Appellate Tribunal, it could not be stretched for a period of 6 years so as to enable the Appellants, the Legal Representatives of late Chanchalben to assail with the Order after lapse of 6 years and that too after conclusion of the proceedings under Sections 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act, 1976 in the year 1985 itself and therefore, the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Appeal as time barred. 13. The learned Assistant Government Pleader further submitted that the Appellants have deliberately sought to confuse and mislead this Court by creating a story of land of Survey No.109 acquired by the Gujarat Housing Board and except one document issued on the Application of the Petitioners only, namely the Certificate dated 14.8.1996, issued by Vadodara Development Authority on 23.8.1996 purportedly saying that the land of Survey No.109 is reserved (not acquired) for Gujarat Housing Board, no other documents have been produced by the Petitioners-Appellants in proof of the averment made that the land in question stood acquired by the Gujarat Housing Board. 14. He submitted that no such objection was raised by the Land Holder – Motibhai Gamanbhai or his daughter Chanchalben during their lifetime and it is only in the year 1996, much after even the dismissal of the Appeal by the Tribunal, the said point is sought to be raised by the Petitioners/Appellants just to create a confusion on wholly unfounded premise.
He further submitted that nothing prevented the Petitioners/Appellants to produce the Notifications, if any, were actually issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1891 in respect of Survey No.109 under Section 4 or 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1891, which were very much in public domain before any of the Authorities below or Tribunal or even the State Government when they approached the State Government under Section 34 by way of Revision Application and had it been so, the State Authorities would not have confirmed the proceedings under the provisions of ULC Act, 1976 in respect of Survey No.109 and, therefore, the said contention deserves to be ignored or rejected by the Court. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that there is no merit in the present Intra Court Appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed. The reasons are as follows. 16. In our opinion, the learned Tribunal was justified in rejecting the Appeal filed by the Petitioners/Appellants after 6 years of the impugned Order dated 30.1.1983, in the year 1989. The Appeal being Appeal No.47 of 1989 was filed as an afterthought, much after the proceedings under ULC Act, 1976 got concluded with the vesting of the land in the State under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act,1976 and physical possession taken after serving the Notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act,1976 and in terms of Section 10(6) of the ULC Act,1976. Upon service of the Notice under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act,1976, the presence of any of the Legal Heirs or Occupants of the land is not even necessary and as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma [ (2015) 5 SCC 321 ], and a belated challenge to such taking over the possession, even where no Notice under Section 10(5) of the Act is served is not sustainable and such proceedings of taking over the possession under Section 10(6) of the ULC Act,1976 acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. 17. The said later Judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court distinguished the case of State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram [ (2013) 4 SCC 280 ] and these two Judgements have been discussed by this Court in the recent Judgement in the case of Heirs of Dec. Jethabhai Ishwarbhai vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. decided on 22.1.2021.
17. The said later Judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court distinguished the case of State of U.P. vs. Hari Ram [ (2013) 4 SCC 280 ] and these two Judgements have been discussed by this Court in the recent Judgement in the case of Heirs of Dec. Jethabhai Ishwarbhai vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. decided on 22.1.2021. The relevant extract of which is quoted herein below for ready reference: “18. Subsection (5) of Section 10 after vesting of the surplus land with the State Government provides that the Competent Authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it, to surrender or give the possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government within 30 days of service of notice. The plain language of subsection (5) of Section 10 means and envisages a notice in writing in the form of an order to surrender or make over the possession to the State. Subsection (5) notice is not in the form of a show cause notice but in the form of an order apparently because the process of hearing the objections to such declaration of surplus land is already taken care in subsections (1) and (2) of Section 10. Once the land is vested, after dealing with such objections, in the State Government, the only activity remaining to be done is to complete the process and achieve the object of this Act, was to take over the physical possession of such declared excess land. Therefore, a notice in the form of an order was prescribed in subsection (5) to deliver the possession within 30 days of service of the notice. 19. There is no question of any voluntary handing over of possession on the part of the land owner. Whatever is done under subsection (5) is done in pursuance of the notice-cum-order of the Competent Authority under Section 10(5) of the Act. 20. The argument based on the premise of voluntary handing over of the possession within 30 days of the said notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act is, therefore, a misnomer. If the possession is handed over in compliance with the notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act to the State authorities or person nominated by the State, the proceedings under the ULC Act get concluded under Section 10(5) of the Act.
If the possession is handed over in compliance with the notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act to the State authorities or person nominated by the State, the proceedings under the ULC Act get concluded under Section 10(5) of the Act. If that is not done by the land owner in pursuance of notice-cum-order under Section 10(5) of the Act, whatever thereafter is done to take over the physical possession of the excess land in question, that can only fall under Section 10(6) of the Act, which says that if any person refuses or fails to comply the order made under subsection (5), then the Competent Authority may take possession of vacant land and may use such force as may be necessary for that purpose. Subsection (6) does not require any other notice or order once again to be passed by the Competent Authority. It only envisages act of taking over the physical possession in the manner known to law including Panchnama process and presence of the owner of the land is not a condition precedent for such taking over of the possession. The last part of subsection (6) is only enabling and empowering provision for the Competent Authority who may use the force for taking over the physical possession, if there is any obstruction or hindrance created by anybody including the land owner in that process. Otherwise use of force is not necessary. Subsection (6), therefore, is not of an adjudicatory nature, but it only provides for a physical process to take de facto possession with or without the use of force. Then the proceedings under ULC Act get concluded under Section 10(6) of the Act. Both these subsections are not necessary to be operated and invoked in each and every case. The proceedings under ULC Act can get concluded either under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act as indicated above. 21. Therefore, in our opinion, the arguments raised before us that subsection (5) envisages voluntary handing over of possession and subsection (6) talks of forcible taking over possession, both are incomplete and misleading arguments. The scheme of this two subsections as explained above does not put these two provisions in silos or watertight compartments. They, on the other hand, provide for a smooth and barrierless process of taking over of the possession under the 1976 Act. 22.
The scheme of this two subsections as explained above does not put these two provisions in silos or watertight compartments. They, on the other hand, provide for a smooth and barrierless process of taking over of the possession under the 1976 Act. 22. In these circumstances, if the possession is not handed over within 30 days of service of notice under Section 10(5), it will amount to failure to comply with the order under subsection (5) and thereafter whenever the possession is taken by the State authorities, even though after 6 years, as it has happened in the present case through Panchnama process in the absence of physical presence of the land owner, it does not vitiate those proceedings which will fall under Section 10(6) of the Act. The taking over of the possession through Panchnama process in the presence of two witnesses is a well recognised process for taking over the possession in law and cannot be said to be void, non est or illegal in any manner. The land owner cannot claim that since such possession was taken over after a belated period after expiry of 30 days as prescribed in Section 10(5) of the Act, he was entitled to again a notice in this regard requiring his presence on the spot giving him option either to voluntarily surrender such possession or obstruct the same. No such notice or opportunity is intended to be given under Section 10(6) of the Act. Therefore, in the present facts before us, the possession taken over by the State authority on 24.11.1993 was justified and legally undertaken through Panchnama process and in our opinion, no valid exception to the same can be taken by the Appellant. 23. As far as reliance placed on the case of Hari Ram (supra) is concerned, we are of the clear opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in distinguishing the said judgment as it is not a case before us where no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued to the land owner. On the contrary, it is admitted position that such notice was given to the land owner on 4.6.1988.
On the contrary, it is admitted position that such notice was given to the land owner on 4.6.1988. The later judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court fully explained the purport of the decision in the case of Hari Ram (supra) in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra) where even Section 10(5) notice was not given and still taking over the possession was held as valid, as quoted in extenso by the learned Single Judge and that in our respectful understanding, clinches the issue in favour of the State. 24. As far as the question of exemption under Section 21 as sought by the Appellant land owner is concerned, we are of the opinion that it was the just an excuse or ruse to save the land in the hands of the land owners themselves as neither any concrete scheme for development of dwelling units for weaker sections was ever placed by the land owner before the Competent Authority or before this Court, nor the said application appears to have been pursued by the Appellant in an appropriate manner. Mere filing of the application could not have led the authorities to grant exemption to such excess or surplus land under Section 21 of the Act and save the said land from the rigour and scheme of the 1976 Act of taking over of excess land in the larger public interest and therefore, the learned Single Judge was right in rejecting the said contention as well. 25. Thus, on the overall analysis of the facts and legal position as discussed above, we do not find any merit in the present appeal filed by the Appellant and the same is liable to be dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 26. Consequently, the Civil Application stands also dismissed.” 18. In the present case, the proceedings under the provisions of ULC Act, 1976 stood concluded without any demur from the side of the sole Legal Heir of original Land Holder – Motibhai Gamanbhai namely, Chanchalben with the passing of the Order on 31.1.1983 and no challenge was laid by her during her lifetime upto 6.6.1984. It is only after 6 years that the said Appeal came to be filed by the present Petitioners/Appellants, her three sons raising the bogeys viz.
It is only after 6 years that the said Appeal came to be filed by the present Petitioners/Appellants, her three sons raising the bogeys viz. – (i) they were entitled to 4 Units as against 1 Unit deduction given to their mother Chanchalben; (ii) the land in question was subject matter of acquisition by Gujarat Housing Board. 19. Both these unfounded claims were made without any basis whatsoever and no such objections were raised in the contemporary period before the possession was taken over by the State Authorities and even compensation was determined under Section 11 of the ULC Act,1976, in which proceedings the present Petitioners/Appellants themselves were parties, after the death of Chanchalben and, therefore, they are clearly estopped from raising these bogey arguments at much belated stage just to raise a cloud of confusion which does not really exist. The Certificate issued by Vadodara Urban Development Authority on 23.8.1986 is a self-serving document without any basis whatsoever. It could be even with reference to later on announced Town Planning Scheme. Nothing prevented the Petitioners to corroborate the act of acquisition under 1891 Act with the Notifications under Section 4 or 6 of that Act with the specified details of land in question being acquired by the State or by the Gujarat Housing Board. The two proceedings one under the ULC Act, 1976 against their mother and acquisition of land by Gujarat Housing Board are self-contradictory as far as Survey No.109 was concerned and it cannot be believed that despite the matter reaching upto ULC Tribunal under Section 33 and State under Section 34 of the ULC Act, 1976 such a significant fact would escape the notice of all these authorities. A negative burden cannot be put on the State to prove the fact alleged and averred by the Petitioners that subject matter land of Survey No.109 was subject of land acquisition for Gujarat Housing Board. The Notifications issued under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1891 are fully in public domain and even individual Notices under Section 9 was the Notice served on the Petitioners/Appellants only and nothing prevented them to produce the same. Therefore, effort of the Petitioners/Appellants to build their case on this premise by casting a negative burden on the State is neither justified nor it requires any further investigation by this Court at the instance of the Petitioners/Appellants.
Therefore, effort of the Petitioners/Appellants to build their case on this premise by casting a negative burden on the State is neither justified nor it requires any further investigation by this Court at the instance of the Petitioners/Appellants. Even if some Interim directions were given in that regard and the State has not adduced the same, no such adverse inference can be drawn in favour of the Petitioners/Appellants for this reason, who himself failed to discharge their own burden to prove the fact alleged by them. 20. As far as ULC Tribunal require to be entertained the Appeal on merits even after 6 years is concerned, we cannot accept the submission of learned counsel for the Appellants Mr.Jitendra Patel that it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to condone the delay of 6 years and entertain the Appeal on merits. The delay of 6 years is a huge delay and without any proper explanation for such delay of 6 years in view of the fact that the proceedings under ULC stood concluded at the hands of the Competent Authority in the year 1985, the Tribunal in our opinion was perfectly justified in dismissing the Appeal as time barred. The Petitioners/Appellants tried their luck even under Section 34 of the Act by filing a Revision Petition before the State and even that too was rejected. 21. Therefore, in extraordinary writ jurisdiction this Court could not be called upon to make a fishing and roving inquiry on these lines and by directing the Tribunal to decide the Appeal on merits by mandatorily condoning the delay of 6 years. The delay condonation is a matter of discretion for a Court or the Tribunal and the Higher Courts cannot mandate such discretion to be exercised in favour of the Appellants. 22. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 8 of the impugned Order has clearly noted that the Appellants/Petitioners even did not file any application for condonation of delay and the only bald and vague contention was raised that there was some litigation pending between them and cousin sisters and therefore delay had occurred.
22. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 8 of the impugned Order has clearly noted that the Appellants/Petitioners even did not file any application for condonation of delay and the only bald and vague contention was raised that there was some litigation pending between them and cousin sisters and therefore delay had occurred. The pendency of Civil Suit did not bar in any way the filing of the Appeal in due time and firstly after the Order dated 31.1.1983 by the Land Holder Chanchalben herself when she was alive and available to do so during her life time till 6.6.1994 almost 1 ½ years for that matter. But she never challenged the Order passed by the Competent Authority on 31.1.1983. Therefore, we do not find any good reason to allow the Petitioners/Appellants to assail the Order of learned Tribunal of not condoning the delay and dismissing the Appeal as time barred. Thus, on an overall analysis of the facts and legal position, we do not find any merit in the present Appeal filed by the Appellants/Petitioners. The same is liable to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 23. Consequently, the Civil Application (For Stay) No.1 of 2017 stands also dismissed.