JUDGMENT : The unsuccessful petitioner employer in the instant Writ Petition (Civil) WP(C) No. 7103/2019 has instituted the afore captioned intra court appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, to impugn the judgment dated 9.12.2020 rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing the above Writ Petition (Civil). 2. Heard Sri.A.V.Xavier, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner, Sri.Paulson C.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for R-2 to R-18 in this appeal and Sri.Asok M.Cherian, learned Senior Amicus Curiae ably assisted and instructed by Sri.Ashok B.Shenoy, learned Amicus Curiae. Since R-1 in this appeal is the Labour Court, notice to that respondent will stand dispensed with. 3. The case projected in the above writ proceedings is broadly as follows: That, contesting respondents 3 to 18 in the WP(C)/WA are workmen of the appellant/writ petitioner Lisie Hospital and R-2 claims to be the registered trade union of employees of said hospital. That, from the beginning of the year 2000, the contesting respondents herein had organized a strike resulting in alleged misconduct inside the hospital and in front of the Director's chamber, which resulted in disciplinary action. Further that, R-4 (one Sri.C.C.Michael) was dismissed from service vide order dated 8.1.2015 pursuant to the finalization of disciplinary action taken in pursuance of the memo of charges dated 28.12.2013. Further that, though he had raised an individual industrial dispute vide his complaint to the District Labour Officer (DLO) and which later resulted in conciliation proceedings, the further outcome of said proceedings is stated to be not known to the employer. Further that, contesting respondents 5 to 18 were dismissed from service on 14.9.2015 pursuant to disciplinary action against them for the alleged misconduct committed by them on 24th & 25th December, 2014, along with the 3rd & 4th respondents, and the incumbent who was then the Public Relations Officer (PRO), who according to the employer is not a workman and who was later retired from service on 2.6.2014, and the said incumbent had raised an individual industrial dispute as per Sec.2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 {hereinafter referred for short as 'The ID Act'}. Further, the claim of the writ appellant is that the 2nd respondent Union had been defunct from the year 1997 and had lost representative capacity, which according to the employer is discernible from Exts.P-2 to P-7. Further, the claim of the writ appellant is that the 2nd respondent Union had been defunct from the year 1997 and had lost representative capacity, which according to the employer is discernible from Exts.P-2 to P-7. Further that, respondents 5 to 18 had raised an industrial dispute vide Ext.P-10 complaint petition dated 16.11.2015, etc. That, later the Conciliation Officer had sent his failure report to the competent authority of the State Government in the Labour Department. This in turn resulted in Ext.P-11 G.O.(Rt.) No.432/2016/LBR dated 15.3.2016 whereby the competent authority of the State Government in the Labour Department has in exercise of the powers under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act, had referred the said industrial dispute between the Director, Lisie Hospital, Cochin, and the workmen of above referred establishment represented by the Secretary of above Union, for adjudication to the Labour Court, Ernakulam, and further it was ordered that the Labour Court may pass award thereon within 3 months, which was registered as I.D.No.8/2016 on the file of the Labour Court, Ernakulam. 4. Further that, the 2nd respondent Union had filed a claim statement dated 13.7.2016 and the appellant had filed preliminary written statement dated 18.1.2017 and an additional written statement dated 25.10.2017 before the Labour Court. That, in both in abovesaid written statements, the appellant has raised a specific plea that the 2nd respondent Union does not have representative capacity on account of poor percentage of membership of employees of appellant establishment. The appellant has further alleged that the said Union has only less than 20 members who were employees of the above employer, out of a total strength of about 1245 workmen excluding doctors, religious sisters and employees of contract agencies. The said membership strength of the 2nd respondent Union is much below the required membership of a trade union under Sec.9A of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. That, on account of the abovesaid aspects the DLO in his capacity as Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions have issued Ext.P-7 proceedings dated 2.6.2018 whereby it was ordered that the registration of the 2nd respondent Union will stand cancelled. Ext.P-7 proceedings dated 2.6.2018 issued by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions & District Labour Officer, Ernakulam, reads as follows: “As per Ref (1) Union named “Lisie Hospital Employees Union” was granted registration with No.07-37-94 Under Trade Union Act 1926. Ext.P-7 proceedings dated 2.6.2018 issued by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions & District Labour Officer, Ernakulam, reads as follows: “As per Ref (1) Union named “Lisie Hospital Employees Union” was granted registration with No.07-37-94 Under Trade Union Act 1926. But on being satisfied that the above Trade Union has not submitted yearly returns after the year 1997, the above union was asked to submit return vide Ref.(2). As per Ref.(3) registered Lr. was issued and the same was accepted and the receipt was received in this office. The union submitted Lr. asking for extension of time for submitting yearly return as required in Ref (2). Non submission of yearly return even after issue of Forum 'E' notice and elapse of several month and giving extension of time for submitting yearly return, is violation of Sec.28 of Trade Union Act. In the above circumstances, it is hereby ordered that the registration of union named “Lisie Hospital Employees Union” stands cancelled.” 5. A perusal of Ext.P-7 would make it clear that R-2 Union was earlier granted registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, but that the said Union had not submitted yearly returns after the year 1997 as envisaged in Sec.28 of the said Act. That, R-2 Union was thereafter instructed by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions as per letter dated 22.7.2016 to submit returns. Still further, letter dated 23.1.2017 was issued by said officer to R-2 Union in that regard and later the Union had submitted a request for extension of time for submitting the yearly returns. Further that, form E notice dated 23.1.2017 was also issued by the said official to the Union and that on account of non submission of yearly returns even after issuance of form E notice and the lapse of several months giving extension of time for yearly returns, would amount to violation of Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act and therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.10 of the Trade Unions Act, the registration granted to the 2nd respondent Union (Lisie Hospital Employees Union) thus stands cancelled as per Ext.P-7 etc. That, on the basis of Ext.P-7 the appellant's counsel would contend that the R-2 Union has become defunct and it does not have representative capacity of even the minimum workmen to represent and champion the clause of 'workmen' in terms of the provisions contained in the ID Act, etc. That, on the basis of Ext.P-7 the appellant's counsel would contend that the R-2 Union has become defunct and it does not have representative capacity of even the minimum workmen to represent and champion the clause of 'workmen' in terms of the provisions contained in the ID Act, etc. On this premise, the appellant employer had raised a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the industrial dispute that was registered in pursuance of Ext.P-11. 6. The contesting respondents resisted the said pleas. Further, contesting respondents 3 to 18 had filed individual affidavits along with Ext.P-8 I.A. No.119/2018 under Sec.18(3) of the ID Act, to implead applicants 1 to 16 in the said I.A. as respondents 2 to 17 in abovesaid I.D.No.8/2016 before the Labour Court, Ernakulam. The plea for impleadment was opposed by the appellant. The Labour Court has passed the impugned Ext.P-1 order dated 6.2.2019 in abovesaid I.A. holding that the said applicants in Ext.P-8 are allowed to get themselves impleaded for effective adjudication of the issues under reference and the above workmen were impleaded as respondents 2 to 17 in abovesaid I.D.No.8/2016 on the file of the Labour Court, Ernakulam. The Labour Court has held that it has power to order for impleadment of additional necessary parties in view of the provisions contained in Sec.18(3)(b) of the ID Act and in view of the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Kerala State Co-operative Employees Front v. Chandramathi Amma [ 1996 (1) KLT 540 (DB)] wherein it has been held that, since Sec.18(3)(b) of the ID Act empowers that “all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings” as parties to the dispute necessarily implies that some persons other than the original parties to the dispute can be summoned in order that the award may become enforceable and binding on those parties also. The Labour Court has also noted in the order in impugned Ext.P-1 that a plain reading of the provisions contained in Sec.2A(2) of the ID Act it can be seen that legislature clearly intended to clear the redress the grievances of workmen in industrial dispute, wherein it has been mandated that dismissal of an individual workman shall be deemed to be industrial dispute etc, and that since the industrial dispute workmen have been dismissed from service, their case would come within the scope and ambit of Sec.2A of the ID Act, that the workmen were under the bonafide belief that their Union will be able to champion and protect their legal rights in the above industrial dispute, and that merely for the reason that the statutory authority under the Trade Unions Act has cancelled the registration of the Union, the right to the members cannot be thrown away. It is this order at Ext.P-1 overruling the abovesaid objections of maintainability raised by the employer and allowing the plea of the workmen to get themselves impleaded as additional workmen in the above industrial dispute, that is under challenge in the above writ proceedings. 7. After hearing both sides the learned Single Judge has held that indisputably the 2nd respondent Union was already registered as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act, 1926, and that said Union had registration at the time it had filed Ext.P-10 complaint before the labour authorities on 16.11.2015 and also at the time when the Conciliation Officer had sent the failure report to the Government and also at the time when the Government had passed Ext.P-11 reference order under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act and further that, the registration of Union had continued even at the time of actual registration of the industrial dispute as I.D.No. 8/2016 on the file of the Labour Court, and at the time of submission and completion of pleadings. It is much thereafter that the authority under the Trade Unions Act has passed Ext.P-7 order on 2.6.2018 directing that the registration of said Union stands cancelled. It is much thereafter that the authority under the Trade Unions Act has passed Ext.P-7 order on 2.6.2018 directing that the registration of said Union stands cancelled. The learned Single Judge has clearly held in the impugned judgment that, since the registration of trade union was cancelled as per Ext.P-7 only on 2.6.2018, it cannot be said that the initiation of the proceedings for the industrial dispute and the statutory reference order made by the Government as per Ext.P-11 dated 15.3.2016 etc as bad right from its inception. In other words, it appears that the learned Single Judge has held that since the trade union had registration at the time of the initiation of complaint before the labour authorities as well as at the time of submission of failure report by the Conciliation Officer even at the time of issuance of statutory reference order made by the Government on 15.3.2016, etc it cannot be said that the subsequent cancellation of the registration of trade union thereafter, will any manner affect the validity of the statutory reference as well as the registration of industrial dispute before the Labour Court, etc. The learned Single Judge has so held that the Division Bench of this Court has held in the case in Kerala State Co-operative Employees Front v. Chandramathi Amma [ 1996 (1) KLT 540 (DB)] that there can be impleadment of party in the industrial dispute in exercise of the powers under Sec.18 of the ID Act, etc and the Labour Court cannot be faulted for taking the aid of Sec.2A(2) of the ID Act for allowing the impleading application as per the impugned Ext.P-1 order, and that as per Sec.2A of the ID Act an individual workman is permitted to raise grievances in the matter of industrial dispute before the appropriate forum, the learned Single Judge has clearly held that in a case of this nature, when a matter is challenged in judicial review proceedings, the parameters to be taken into consideration in the said matters by this Court are no longer res integra and that the welfare based statutes like the ID Act are required to be construed in favour of the subject for advancing remedy and for suppressing mischief, and that this Court in exercise of its powers in judicial review and superintendence can interfere with the orders impugned therein, only if the same suffers from error on the point of law reflecting on record patently so as to warrant the extra ordinary interference, and that this Court cannot act as a court of appeal and dealing with the challenge to the orders of an inferior Tribunal like the Labour Court, unless and until it is shown that such order has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice, or it would amount to flagrant violation of law, etc. 8. Both sides have been heard in extenso. We had initially appointed Sri.Asok M.Cherian, learned Advocate of this Court as Senior Amicus Curiae in this case and later we had also requested Sri.Ashok B.Shenoy, learned Advocate of this Court to act as Amicus Curiae and also to assist abovesaid Senior Amicus Curiae. The learned Senior Amicus Curiae has made submissions in the matter and has submitted an Amicus Curiae Brief in this case. An over view of the matter, the submissions made by the Senior Amicus Curiae may be relevant and pertinent in this case. 9. The learned Senior Amicus Curiae has made submissions in the matter and has submitted an Amicus Curiae Brief in this case. An over view of the matter, the submissions made by the Senior Amicus Curiae may be relevant and pertinent in this case. 9. Sec. 2(k) of the ID Act reads as follows: ““industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;” 10. Sec. 2A of the ID Act was initially introduced as per an amendment made as per the Central Act 35 of 1965 and the said amended provision has been made effective from 1.12.1965. Later, Sec.2A was renumbered as Sub Section (1) thereof and Sub Sections 2 & 3 were also introduced as per the amendment act made effective as per the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2010, (Central Act 24 of 2010) made effective from 15.9.2010. Section 2A of the ID Act as it now stands in the statute book reads as follows: “2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.-(1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government. (3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).” 11. Sec.2A of the ID Act stipulates that dismissal of an individual workman is to be deemed to be an industrial dispute etc. It has been held by the Apex Court in the decision in Ruston and Hornsby (I) Ltd. v. T.B.Kadam [ (1976) 3 SCC 71 = 1975 (2) LLJ 352 ] that Section 2A is in effect a definition section. It provides in effect that what would not be an industrial dispute as defined in S.2(k) as interpreted by this Court would be deemed to be an industrial dispute in certain circumstances. 12. In the case in Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. State Industrial Tribunal U.P. and others [ AIR 1957 SC 532 ] it has been observed that in the case in Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., Nagpur v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan [ AIR 1957 SC 104 ] supra, the Court has taken note that the decided cases disclose three views as to the meaning of industrial dispute viz, (i) a dispute between an employer and a single workman cannot be an 'industrial dispute'. (ii) it can be an industrial dispute; and (iii) it cannot per se be an industrial dispute but may become one if taken up by a trade union or a number of workmen. 13. Further, the Apex Court in Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., Nagpur v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan [ AIR 1957 SC 104 ] supra has considered the scope and ambit of industrial dispute as defined in Sec.2(k) of the ID Act and after referring to the conflict of divergence of judicial opinion as to its applicability to a case of dispute between an employer and a single workman has held as follows: “The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three view stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it. Notwithstanding that the language of S.2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only disputes which involve the rights of a workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the union or a number of workmen.” 14. In Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., Nagpur v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan [ AIR 1957 SC 104 ] supra, it has been observed that notwithstanding that the language of Sec.2(k) is wide enough to cover the dispute between an employer and a single workman, the scheme of Industrial Disputes Act thus appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only disputes which involves rights of workmen as a class, and that disputes touching individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of adjudication under the Act and the same had not been taken by the Union or a number of workmen. 15. Further, in the case in Ram Prasad Vishwakarma v. The Chairman, Industrial Tribunal [ AIR 1961 SC 857 = 1961 (1) LLJ 504 ] a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court has held as follows in para 8 & 9 thereof: “(8) The necessary corollary to this is that the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the Union. The Union or those workmen who have by the sponsoring turned the individual dispute into an industrial dispute, can therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal. (9) It is not unreasonable to think that Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act recognises this position, by providing that the workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member. (9) It is not unreasonable to think that Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act recognises this position, by providing that the workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member. While it will be unwise and indeed impossible to try to lay down a general rule in the matter, the ordinary rule should in our opinion be that such representation by an officer of the trade union should continue throughout the proceedings in the absence of exceptional circumstances which may justify the Tribunal to permit other representation of the workman concerned. We are not satisfied that in the present case, there were any such exceptional circumstances. It has been suggested that the Union's Secretary Fateh Singh himself had made the complaint against the appellant which resulted in the order of dismissal. It has to be observed however that in spite of everything, the Union did take up this appellant's case against his dismissal as its own. At that time also, Fateh Singh was the Secretary of the Union. If are Union had not taken up his cause, there would not have been any reference. In view of all the circumstances, we are of opinion, that it cannot be said that the Tribunal committed any error in refusing the appellant's prayer for representation through representative of his own choice in preference to Fateh Singh, the Secretary of the Union.” 16. Later, a different note has been struck in the case in Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 318 = (1962) 3 SCR 893 = 1961 (2) LLJ 436 ], wherein it has been held as follows: “(15) The Tribunal observed that if even after the reference Venkateswaran and Tiwari ceased to support the cause of Salivateeswaran, being the only person who could support the cause, the reference must fail, and in support of that view relied upon the judgment of a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in The Hindu v. The Working Journalists of the Hindu in Madras, but this decision has since been overruled by a Division Bench of the Madras High, Court in the Working Journalists of the Hindu v. The Hindu. In that case the Court observed : It must be hold that the jurisdiction of the labour court to proceed with the matter wholly depends on whether the industrial dispute referred to it for adjudication existed or was apprehended on the date of the reference and not on any subsequent date. Having regard to the relevant statutory provisions it must be held that the jurisdiction of the labour court to proceed with and adjudicate upon an industrial dispute stems from and is sustained, until it makes an award and the same becomes enforceable, by the reference itself which has been made on the basis of an industrial dispute existing or apprehended on the date of the reference and that the jurisdiction of the labour court to proceed in the matter is not in any way affected by the fact that subsequent to the date of the reference, the workers or a substantial section of them who had originally sponsored the cause, had later resiled and withdrawn from it." In our view, these observations correctly set out the effect of a subsequent withdrawal of support by the workmen of a cause previously espoused by them. In each case in ascertaining whether an individual dispute has acquired the character of an industrial dispute the test is whether at the date of the reference the depute was taken up as supported by the Union of the workmen of the employer against whom the dispute is raised by an individual workman or by an appreciable number of workmen. If Venkateswaran or Tiwari had prior to the date of the reference supported the cause of Salivateeswaran, by their subsequent affidavits the reference could not have been invalidated. But as we have already observed there was, in fact, no support to the cause of Salivateeswaran by Venkateswaran or by Tiwari and therefore the dispute continued to remain an individual dispute. (16) The effect of the support to the cause of Salivateeswaran by the Indian Federation of Working Journalists and the claim founded thereon does not call for any detailed consideration. (16) The effect of the support to the cause of Salivateeswaran by the Indian Federation of Working Journalists and the claim founded thereon does not call for any detailed consideration. After the reference was submitted and it was pending hearing before the Tribunal a letter was written by the President of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists to the General Secretary of the Bombay Union of Journalists on April 16, 1959, stating that the Federation had lent support to Salivateeswaran in the writ petition filed by "The Hindu" in the Supreme Court and that the Federation did so as it was a test case. Another letter dated April 17, 1959, was addressed by the General Secretary of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists to the General Secretary, Bombay Union of Journalists Bombay, stating that they had advised Salivateeswaran to file a petition before the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Court in Bombay and had also intervened in the Supreme Court, and further that the Federation fully supported all actions taken by the Bombay Union of Journalists to get justice for Salivateeswaran, The Secretary of the Union by letter dated July 9, 1959, wrote to the President and Secretary-General of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists that Salivateeswaran's case was being heard for a week and that Salivateeswaran was to undergo cross-examination on the next day and that Mahatame, the previous Secretary was to give evidence. Ho further stated "I am of opinion that we must produce some document whereby it will be possible to prove that the Federation had supported Salivateeswaran's case" and requested the Federation to send a document in the form of a minute of a meeting or a letter or a resolution and if there was none such on the record, to pass a fresh resolution supporting the Bombay Union's action regarding Salivateeswaran's case and to send the same by return of post. Taking a clue from this letter, on July 24, 1959, the President of the Federation sent a copy of the resolution alleged to have been adopted by the members of the Working Committee of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists regarding Salivateeswaran's case. The draft resolution sought to support the case of the Bombay Union of Journalists before the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, and to "'direct the Union to fight the case with all its strength". The draft resolution sought to support the case of the Bombay Union of Journalists before the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, and to "'direct the Union to fight the case with all its strength". This resolution is alleged to have been passed by circulation after the commencement of the adjudication proceedings. If the dispute was in its inception an individual dispute and continued to be such till the date of the reference by the Government of Bombay, it could not be converted into an industrial dispute by support subsequent to the reference even of workmen interested in the dispute. We have already held that subsequent withdrawal of support will not take away the jurisdiction of an industrial tribunal. On the same reasoning subsequent support will not convert what was an individual dispute at the time of reference into an industrial dispute. The resolution of the Indian Federation of Working Journalists, assuming that it has any value, would not be sufficient to convert what was an individual dispute into an industrial dispute. On the view taken by us this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. The abovesaid views of the Apex Court in the case in Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 318 = (1962) 3 SCR 893 = 1961 (2) LLJ 436 ], has been followed in subsequent decisions as in the Workmen of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. v. Management of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. [ AIR 1970 SC 737 = 1970 (2) LLJ 132 ], Binny v. Their Workmen [ AIR 1972 SC 1975 = (1972) 3 SCC 806 = 1972 (1) LLJ 478 ]. 18. In the Workmen of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. v. Management of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. [ AIR 1970 SC 737 = 1970 (2) LLJ 132 ] it has been held by Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in para 6 thereof as follows: “6. The resolution, dated December 1, 1960, passed by the Executive Committee of the union was not disbelieved by the Tribunal. That, coupled with the fact that the union authorities initiated the conciliation proceeding, must mean that union had espoused the cause of the two workmen. The dispute arose in July, 1959, when the management refused to treat the two workmen as proof-readers. That, coupled with the fact that the union authorities initiated the conciliation proceeding, must mean that union had espoused the cause of the two workmen. The dispute arose in July, 1959, when the management refused to treat the two workmen as proof-readers. Thereafter the Executive Committee, after considering a representation made to it by the employees of the respondent company, as the resolution reads, passed the said resolution authorising the officer-bearers of the union to initiate proceedings in the matter of the said dispute and the Secretary accordingly initiated proceedings before the Conciliation Officer. In these circumstances, it is not possible to appreciate how the espousal by the union can be said to be beyond time, as such espousal can only take place after and not before the dispute arose, or as counsel put it, the cause of action arose. In The Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, Bombay, this court in clear terms laid down that the test of an industrial dispute is whether at the date of the reference the dispute was taken up and supported by a union, or by an appreciable number of workmen. There being no doubt of the union having taken up the cause of the two workmen before the reference the first two parts of the question must be answered in the affirmative.” 19. One of the main questions considered by the Apex Court in the case in Binny v. Their Workmen [ AIR 1972 SC 1975 = (1972) 3 SCC 806 = 1972 (1) LLJ 478 ] was whether the Labour Court was justified in proceedings with the reference after the Union had ceased to sponsor the case of workman concerned, and it has been held in para 13 thereof as follows: 13. The next submission was that the dispute with regard to the dismissal of Kuppuswamy ceased to be an industrial dispute after the Union ceased to sponsor his case. As already mentioned, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court, there was a settlement of the disputes between the Union and the Management with regard to all the employees other than Kuppuswamy. As already mentioned, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court, there was a settlement of the disputes between the Union and the Management with regard to all the employees other than Kuppuswamy. The memorandum of settlement under S. 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which was put in on the 24th June 1967 shows that the Union had proposed that in consideration of their withdrawal of the cases of Madaiah, Ekambaram and Devaiah, Ramanatha and Kuppuswamy may be taken back into service but the Management did not accept the proposal but offered to take back Ramanatha only, which was accepted by the Union. The Union further undertook not to represent Kuppuswamy's case or prosecute it before the Labour Court in view of this overall settlement with the Management. It is not necessary for us to consider whether S. 2A of the Act which was introduced in the statute in 1965 has any application to the facts before us. We do not however see any reason to hold that the dispute which had already been referred by Government should cease to be one in respect of a portion of it merely because the Union did not choose to represent the case of a particular dismissed employee. If there was an industrial dispute at the time of reference it would not cease to be one merely because the claim of some of the dismissed employees was settled by mutual agreement.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. Certain other decisions has also been rendered on the point that the industrial dispute need not be sponsored by a registered trade union. The decision in Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. U.P. State Industrial Tribunal & Ors. [ AIR 1960 SC 1328 = 1960 (2) LLJ 37 ] dealt with a case concerning termination of services of 3 workmen and their case has been sponsored by Association of Workers which was not a registered trade union. The State Government referred the matter for adjudication and the Tribunal ordered to reinstate the workmen. The manager challenges the same in writ petitions which were dismissed by the High Court and when the matter was taken up thereafter in civil appeal before the Apex Court, the counsel for the appellant therein had taken a contention that the Association which sponsored the case of individual workman was an unregistered body and hence reference made was invalid. The manager challenges the same in writ petitions which were dismissed by the High Court and when the matter was taken up thereafter in civil appeal before the Apex Court, the counsel for the appellant therein had taken a contention that the Association which sponsored the case of individual workman was an unregistered body and hence reference made was invalid. A Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in the said case held as follows in para 4 thereof: “(4) Then it was urged that the association which sponsored the case of respondents 3 to 5 was an unregistered body and that made the reference invalid. Both the courts have held, and rightly, that it is not necessary that a registered body should sponsor a workman's case to make it an industrial dispute. Once it is shown that a body of workmen, either acting through their union or otherwise had sponsored a workman's case it becomes an industrial dispute.” 21. The abovesaid views has been reiterated by the Apex Court by yet another Three Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Pradip Lamp Works, Patna and another v. Workmen of Pradip Lamp Works, Patna and another [1970 (1) LLJ 507] wherein 10 workmen were dismissed by the employer and the cause of the workmen were taken up by the newly formed trade union which is formed by the workers who were not satisfied with the union's existence. The newly formed union was not yet registered and the union was not recognized by the management as well. Overruling the contention of the employer that the dispute regarding the dismissal of the workmen is an individual dispute and not industrial dispute. The Apex Court has held in para 7 & 8 thereof as follows: “7. The second contention that the dispute regarding the dismissal of the 10 workmen was an individual and not an industrial dispute equally has no merit. The dispute, no doubt, was not sponsored by the recognised union but it cannot be said for that reason alone that it was not an industrial dispute. There is clear evidence that a large number of workmen, if not a majority of them, had formed a rival union. Though complaints filed before the conciliation officer at first were by the individual workmen, their cause was subsequently taken up by the new union. There is clear evidence that a large number of workmen, if not a majority of them, had formed a rival union. Though complaints filed before the conciliation officer at first were by the individual workmen, their cause was subsequently taken up by the new union. This is clear from the meeting held on December 9, 1963 at which the said 5 representatives were elected to prosecute the cases of the 10 workmen. That course presumably was adopted because the new union was not yet registered as its application for registration had not yet been finally disposed of. The letter of January 29, 1964 shows that it was in pursuance of the authority given to them at the said meeting that the said 5 representatives took up these cases and complained that nothing was being done by the conciliation officer against those dismissals, and threatened a strike. 8. There is, thus clear evidence of these-cases-having been espoused by the new union or, being yet unregistered, by a substantial number of workmen. The fact that these cases were not taken up by the recognised union does not mean that they were not industrial disputes. There are decisions of this Court which have laid down that espousal of a dispute before a reference is made even by a minority union, having a membership of substantial number of workmen, is sufficient to make such a dispute an industrial dispute. See Workmen of Indian Express v. The Management C.A. No.1733 of 1967, decided on November 26, 1968. It is, therefore, impossible to say that these disputes were individual and not Industrial disputes and that for that reason the impugned reference was incompetent.” 22. It can be seen from para 8 of the decision of the Apex Court in Pradip Lamp's case supra, that the abovesaid conclusion has been arrived by the Apex Court therein by placing reliance on the judgment in the case in Workmen of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. v. Management of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. [ AIR 1970 SC 737 = (1970) 2 LLJ 132 ]. 23. 23. Apart from the abovesaid aspects pointed out by Sri.Asok M.Cherian, learned Senior Amicus Curiae, our attention was also pointedly drawn by Sri.Ashok B.Shenoy, learned Amicus Curiae, to the decision of the Four Judges' Bench of the Apex Court in the case in Workmen of M/s.Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) v. M/s.Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) [ AIR 1966 SC 182 ]. In the said decision, the Apex Court has also placed reliance on various decisions in the afore cited Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd., Nagpur v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan [ AIR 1957 SC 104 ], Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. U.P. State Industrial Tribunal & Ors. [ AIR 1960 SC 1328 = 1960 (2) LLJ 37 ], Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 318 = (1962) 3 SCR 893 = 1961 (2) LLJ 436 ]. 24. In para 11 of the decision in Workmen of M/s.Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) v. M/s.Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) [ AIR 1966 SC 182 ] supra, it has been inter alia held that if there is no union of workmen in any establishment, a group of employees can raise a dispute and dispute then become industrial dispute, though it relates to the dismissal of an individual employee, and that this position cannot be disputed. Therein when the Industrial Tribunal had taken up the industrial dispute for hearing, the respondent employer had raised a preliminary objection that the reference was invalid inasmuch as, the dispute referred to the Tribunal by the impugned order of reference issued by the Government, is not an industrial dispute but is merely an individual dispute which cannot be the subject matter of a valid reference under Sec.10(1), etc. Therein, the respondent employer had passed an impugned order dismissing 18 employees out of the total 45 employees from service and the dismissed 18 employees had become employees of a mercantile employees association, which is registered as a trade union and the said association had taken up the cause of the dismissed employees, and carried the dispute before the Conciliation Officer, which resulted in the impugned order of reference. It may be profitable to refer to para 9 to 14 of the Four Judges' Bench decision of the Apex Court in Workmen of M/s.Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) v. M/s.Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) [ AIR 1966 SC 182 ] supra, which read as follows: “(9) It does appear that in dealing with the point of law as to the requirements of a valid reference, this Court observed that the dispute, in the present case, being prima facie an individual dispute, in order that it may become an industrial, it had to be established that it had been taken up by the Union of employees of the "Hindu”, Bombay, or by an appreciable number of employees of the “Hindu”, Bombay”. Similarly, it was also observed that the “Principle that the persons who seek to support the cause of a workman must themselves be directly and substantially interested in the dispute, applied to the case before the Court"; and so, one of the tests which this Court applied was whether the persons who supported the cause, were employees of the same employer; if they were not, it was thought that they could not be regarded as interested in the dispute and as such, their support may not convert an individual dispute into an industrial dispute. That is why the support lent to the cause of Salivateeswaran by the Bombay Union of Journalists was found to be insufficient to convert the cause into an industrial dispute. (10) These observations, no doubt, prima facie lend support to the view which the Tribunal has accepted. It appears that the Bombay Union of Journalists had on its roll several working with the “Hindu" at its Bombay office, two had become the members of the Bombay Union of Journalists, viz., Salivateeswaran and Venkataswaran. Tiwari, the third working journalist working in a Union the office of the Hindu", Bombay, had became a member of the said union. In the office of the "Hindu", there were seven other workmen, but they were working on the administrative side. In other words, out of the ten employees in the office of the "Hindu", seven were on the administrative side and out of these three on the journalism side and out of these three, two were members of the Union. In the office of the "Hindu", there were seven other workmen, but they were working on the administrative side. In other words, out of the ten employees in the office of the "Hindu", seven were on the administrative side and out of these three on the journalism side and out of these three, two were members of the Union. It expressed the opinion that the Bombay Union of Journalists was not competent to raise the dispute, and even if it had raised it, the dispute could not have becomes an industrial dispute. (11) In our opinion, the observations on which the Tribunal has relied in support of its conclusion in the present case, should not be read as laying down any hard and fast rule in the matter. Take, for instance, the case of an employer who employs 20 workmen, and assume that these workmen have not formed any Union. If the employer illegally dismisses all the workmen employed by him, it cannot be suggested that the dispute about the dismissal employees of these employees would not become an industrial dispute because there is no Union to support them and the dismissed employees themselves cannot convert their individual dispute into an industrial dispute. In the present case, out of 45 employees 18 have been dismissed, and there is no evidence to show that these employees have a union of their own. In such a case, it would be difficult to hold that though the number of employees dismissed is 18, they cannot raise a dispute by themselves in a formal manner. Considerations which would be relevant in dealing with a dispute relating to an individual employee's dismissal, would not be material in dealing with a case where a large number of employees have been dismissed on the same day. It is not disputed that a Union of workmen may validly raise a dispute as to dismissal even though it may be a Union, of the minority of the workmen employed in any establishment. The majority Union, of course, can raise a dispute, and if a reference is made under S. 10(1) of the Act at its instance,the reference is valid. Similarly, if there is no Union of workmen in any establishment, a group of employees can raise the dispute and the dispute then becomes an industrial dispute, though it may relate to the dismissal of an individual employee. Similarly, if there is no Union of workmen in any establishment, a group of employees can raise the dispute and the dispute then becomes an industrial dispute, though it may relate to the dismissal of an individual employee. This position is not disputed. If that is so, it is difficult, we think, to apply or extend the observations made in the case of the Bombay Union of Journalists, 1961-2 Lab LJ 486: ( AIR 1963 SC 318 ) (supra) to the present case. In the present case, we are dealing with a reference made by the Delhi Administration in relation to the appellants' contention that the dismissal of 18 employees is invalid, and not with a case of the dismissal of a single employee. Therefore, we do not think that the Tribunal was right in relying upon the decision in the case of the Bombay Union of Journalists. 1961-2 Lab LJ 486: ( AIR 1963 SC 318 ) (supra) in support of its conclusion that the present reference was invalid. (12) It is well known that in dealing with industrial disputes, industrial adjudication is generally reluctant to lay down any hard and fast rule or adopt any test of general or universal application. The approach of industrial adjudication in dealing with industrial disputes has necessarily to be pragmatic, and the tests which it applied and the considerations on which it relies would vary from case to case and would not admit of any rigid or inflexible formula. There is no doubt that the limitations introduced by the decisions of this Court in interpreting the effect of the definition prescribed by S. 2(k) of the Act were based on such pragmatic considerations. It may also be conceded that if the dismissal of an individual employee working in an establishment in Delhi is taken up by the Union of workmen in a place away from Delhi, that would clearly not make the dispute an industrial dispute. Section 36 of the Act which deals with the representation of parties, incidentally suggests that the Union which can raise an individual dispute as to a dismissal validly, should be a Union of the same industry. Generally, it is the Union of workmen working in the same establishment which has passed the impugned Order of dismissal. Section 36 of the Act which deals with the representation of parties, incidentally suggests that the Union which can raise an individual dispute as to a dismissal validly, should be a Union of the same industry. Generally, it is the Union of workmen working in the same establishment which has passed the impugned Order of dismissal. But in a given case, it is conceivable that the workmen of an establishment have no Union of their own, and some or all of them join the Union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. In such a case, if the said Union takes up the cause of the workmen working in an establishment which has no Union of its own, it would be unreasonable to hold that the dispute does not become an industrial dispute because the Union which has sponsored it is not the Union exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. In every case where industrial adjudication has to decide whether a reference in regard to the dismissal of an industrial employee is validly made or not, it would always be necessary to enquire whether the Union which has sponsored the case can fairly claim a representative character in such a way that its support to the cause would make the dispute an industrial dispute "Industry" has been defined by S.2(j) of the Act and it seems to us that in some cases, the Union of workmen working in one industry may be competent to raise a dispute about the wrongful dismissal of an employee engaged in an establishment belonging to the same industry where workmen in such an establishment have no Union of their own, and an appreciable number of such workmen had joined such other Union before their dismissal. In fact,the object of trade Union movement is to encourage the formation of larger and bigger Unions on healthy and proper Trade Union lines, and this object would be frustrated if industrial adjudication were to adopt the rigid rule that before any dispute about wrongful dismissal can be validly referred under S. 10(1) of the Act, it should receive the support of the Union consisting exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. (13) Besides, there is another way in which this question can be considered. (13) Besides, there is another way in which this question can be considered. If 18 workmen are dismissed by an order passed on the same day, it would be unreasonable to hold that they themselves do not form a group of workmen which would be justified in supporting the cause of one another. In dealing with this question, we ought not to forget the basic theory on which limitation has been introduced by this Court on the denotation of the words "industrial dispute” as defined by S. 2(k) of the Act. Therefore we are satisfied that the Tribunal was in error in rejecting the reference on the preliminary ground that the dispute referred to it was an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k). (14) The result is, the appeal is allowed, the finding of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue is reversed, and the matter is sent back to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.” 25. In the light of abovesaid aspects Sri.Asok M.Cherian, learned Senior Amicus Curiae ably instructed and assisted by Sri.Ashok B.Shenoy, learned Amicus Curiae would submit that the effect of cancellation of registration of registered trade union is that, the registration granted to the trade union in terms of the Trade Unions Act may lose its efficacy. In such a case, the union need be treated as an association of person and further that, since it has been held by some of the afore cited decisions of the Apex Court in clear terms that the dispute could be espoused even by an unregistered or unrecognized State Union, the championing of the cause of the workman at the stage of complaint before the Labour authorities, the failure of conciliation of proceedings, and subsequent reference made by the Government etc by and even if it is taken by the union, which is unregistered or unrecognized, and once it is shown that the body of workman either acting through the union or otherwise had sponsored the workman's case, it becomes industrial dispute, etc. 26. 26. One of the prime contentions now sought to the urged by Sri.A.V.Xavier, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, at the time of his submissions in this appeal is that the effect of Ext.P-7 order dated 2.6.2018 dealing with the cancellation of registration of trade union, would show that the union was defunct and further that it prove and establish that R-2 Union did not have sufficient strength of workmen to represent and espouse the cause of abovesaid dismissed workmen since the year 1997 for atleast at a time when the complaint was raised before the Labour authorities and hence the reference order secured through the intervention of the said Union is illegal, null and void etc 27. After hearing both sides we are of the firm view that the abovesaid contention has not been raised in clear terms by the appellant either as grounds in the writ petition or atleast in the writ appeal. For that purpose, it may be pertinent to refer to the grounds urged in the WP(C) {See page 25 of the paper book of this Writ Appeal}. However, in para B of the grounds urged in the present writ appeal, there is a contention that the abovesaid cancellation of registration would show that the respondent Union has been defunct and was not having the sufficient number of members as prescribed by the Trade Unions Act, in terms of Sec.9A thereof, etc. But, we would proceed to deal with the abovesaid contention of the appellant on merits as well. 28. There is no dispute that R-2 Union was having the requisite statutory registration in terms of the provisions contained in the Trade Unions Act, 1926. Said registration was in force at the time when Ext.P-10 complaint given by the Union before the labour authorities on 16.11.2015 at the time of failure of conciliation and at the time of Ext.P-11 reference order issued by the Government on 15.3.2016 and at the time of registration of industrial dispute on the files of the Labour Court concerned and at the time of completion of pleadings and even thereafter. It is common ground that Ext.P-7 cancellation order is issued on 2.6.2018 ordering that the registration of said trade union is cancelled on account of non filing of the returns as stipulated in Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act. It is common ground that Ext.P-7 cancellation order is issued on 2.6.2018 ordering that the registration of said trade union is cancelled on account of non filing of the returns as stipulated in Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act. Therefore, at best the cancellation of registration as per Ext.P-7 can have prospective effect from 2.6.2018. Since, the trade union was having valid registration, till 1.6.2018, the proceedings from the stage of the raising of complaint before the Labour authority, the issuance of reference order and registration of industrial dispute by the Labour Court etc cannot be said to be vitiated merely because the trade union lost its registration on 2.6.2018. 29. Further, it can be seen from the pleadings as well as a mere reading of Ext.P-7 registration cancellation order and the proceedings referred to therein would show that the registration of union was cancelled on the sole ground that the union had not submitted the returns before the authorities concerned, as mandated in Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act. 30. Sec.5 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, reads as follows: 5. Application for registration.-(1)Every application for registration of a Trade Union shall be made to the Registrar, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the rules of the Trade Union and a statement of the following particulars, namely:- (a) the names, occupations and addresses of the members making the application; (aa) in the case of a Trade Union of workmen, the names, occupations and addresses of the place of work of the members of the Trade Union making the application; (b) the name of the Trade Union and the address of its head office; and (c) the titles, names, ages, addresses and occupations of the office-bearers of the Trade Union. (2) Where a Trade Union has been in existence for more than one year before the making of an application for its registration, there shall be delivered to the Registrar, together with the application, a general statement of the assets and liabilities of the Trade Union prepared in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. 31. Sec.10 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, reads as follows: “10. Cancellation of registration. 31. Sec.10 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, reads as follows: “10. Cancellation of registration. - A certificate of registration of a Trade Union may be withdrawn or cancelled by the Registrar- (a)on the application of the Trade Union to be verified in such manner as may be prescribed; or (b) if the Registrar is satisfied that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake, or that the Trade Union has ceased to exist or has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision, or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter provision for which is required by section 6; (c) if the Registrar is satisfied that a registered Trade Union of workmen ceases to have the requisite number of members: Provided that not less than two months' previous notice in writing specifying the ground on which it is proposed to withdraw or cancel the certificate shall be given by the Registrar to the Trade Union before the certificate is withdrawn or cancelled otherwise than on the application of the Trade Union.” 32. Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, reads as follows: “13. Incorporation of registered Trade Unions. - Every registered Trade Union shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold both movable and immovable property and to contract, and shall by the said name sue and be sued. ” 33. Sec.27 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, reads as follows: “27. Dissolution.- (1)When a registered Trade Union is dissolved, notice of the dissolution signed by seven members and by the Secretary of the Trade Union shall, within fourteen days of the dissolution be sent to the Registrar, and shall be registered by him if he is satisfied that the dissolution has been effected in accordance with the rules of the Trade Union, and the dissolution shall have effect from the date of such registration. (2) Where the dissolution of a registered Trade Union has been registered and the rules of the Trade Union do not provide for the distribution of funds of the Trade Union on dissolution, the Registrar shall divide the funds amongst the members in such manner as may be prescribed.” 34. (2) Where the dissolution of a registered Trade Union has been registered and the rules of the Trade Union do not provide for the distribution of funds of the Trade Union on dissolution, the Registrar shall divide the funds amongst the members in such manner as may be prescribed.” 34. Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, reads as follows: 28 Returns. - (1)There shall be sent annually to the Registrar, on or before such date as may be prescribed, a general statement, audited in the prescribed manner, of all receipts and expenditure of every registered Trade Union during the year ending on the 31st day of December next preceding such prescribed date, and of the assets and liabilities of the Trade Union existing on such 31st day of December. The statement shall be prepared in such form and shall comprise such particulars as may be prescribed. (2)Together with the general statement there shall be sent to the Registrar a statement showing changes of office-bearers made by the Trade Union during the year to which the general statement refers, together also with a copy of the rules of the Trade Union corrected up to the date of the despatch thereof to the Registrar. (3) A copy of every alteration made in the rules of a registered Trade Union shall be sent to the Registrar within fifteen days of the making of the alteration. (4) For the purpose of examining the documents referred to in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the Registrar, or any officer authorised by him, by general or special order, may at all reasonable times inspect the certificate of registration, account books, registers, and other documents, relating to a Trade Union, at its registered office or may require their production at such place as he may specify in this behalf, but no such place shall be at a distance of more than ten miles from the registered office of a Trade Union. 35. 35. A bare reading of Sec.5 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, more particularly sub section (2) thereof, would make it clear that it is envisaged therein that where a trade union has been in existence for more than one year before the making of an application for its registration, then there shall be delivered to the Registrar, together with the application, a general statement of the assets and liabilities of the trade union prepared in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. The said provision as per Sec.5(2) would make it clear that even the Parliament has taken cognizance of the fact that a trade union could really be in existence even prior to its registration. Therefore, cancellation of the registration by itself will not necessarily imply that the trade union has ceased to have in existence. Cessation of the existence of a trade union is to be determined otherwise, as discussed above. Moreover, Ext.P-7 order directing cancellation of registration is ordered only on the sole ground of violation of provisions contained in Sec.28 of the Act inasmuch as, returns in terms of Sec.28 thereof has not been filed within the requisite time. 36. A reading of clause 'b' of Sec.10 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, would make it clear that if the Registrar is satisfied that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake, or that the Trade Union has ceased to exist or has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision, or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter provision for which is required by section 6, etc. In the instant case, a reading of Ext.P-7 would make it clear that the cancellation of registration solely on the account that there has been contravention of Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, inasmuch as, returns were not filed within time and not on any other ground like cessation of the existence of trade union, etc. In the instant case, a reading of Ext.P-7 would make it clear that the cancellation of registration solely on the account that there has been contravention of Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, inasmuch as, returns were not filed within time and not on any other ground like cessation of the existence of trade union, etc. Hence, it is clear like the daylight that merely because Ext.P-7 order of cancellation has been issued on 2.6.2018, the same does not mean that the trade union was defunct since the year 1997 or thereafter, or that the trade union never had the requisite strength or membership since the year 1997 or at the time of abovesaid period in question. At best, it can be inferred from Ext.P-7 that, since the trade union had not filed the returns in time and had not provided those materials to the Deputy Registrar of Trade Unions, it can only mean that the trade union has not satisfied the officials concerned about their records and about timely filing of returns, and at worst it could even lead to the inference that the union may not be having any such records. That, does not necessarily imply or mean that the trade union was defunct long ago, or that the trade union never had the requisite number of workmen at the relevant time etc. Such inference cannot be made merely on account of issuance of Ext.P-7. So, the abovesaid contentions of the petitioner that Ext.P-7 will lead to the situation that the trade union was defunct since the year 1997, and the trade union never had the requisite strength since then or at the relevant time, etc stands overruled. Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act deals with Incorporation of registered Trade Unions. Every registered Trade Union shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire and hold both movable and immovable property and to contract, and shall by the said name sue and be sued etc. Sec.14 of the Trade Unions Act makes it clear that the following acts namely: The Societies Registration Act, 1860, The Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, the Companies Act, 1956 shall not apply to any registered Trade union and the registration of any such Trade Union under any such Act shall be void etc. Sec.14 of the Trade Unions Act makes it clear that the following acts namely: The Societies Registration Act, 1860, The Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, the Companies Act, 1956 shall not apply to any registered Trade union and the registration of any such Trade Union under any such Act shall be void etc. Sec.27 of the Trade Unions Act deals with dissolution of trade union. Prima facie we would hold that, merely on account of cancellation of registration of trade union as per an order like Ext.P-7, on the ground that the union had not submitted returns in time, which amounts to contravention of Sec.28 of the abovesaid Act, etc will not lead to the situation that the trade union on account of such cancellation of registration, will cease to exist. Cessation of registered trade union may be conceived subject to satisfaction of conditions in Sec.27, which deals with dissolution. Nobody has a case that R-2 trade union has been dissolved in the manner known to law. Hence, there is no question of holding that the trade union has ceased to exist merely on account of cancellation of registration as per Ext.P-7. However, at best on account of such cancellation of registration, it may amount to losing incorporated status of a registered trade union on account of its registration being cancelled, as a body corporate, on account of registration of trade union as can be seen from Sec.13 of the abovesaid Act. 37. Hence it is only to be held that at best Ext.P-7 order of cancellation of registration would amount to the registered trade union losing its status as a body corporate, in terms of Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act. If that be so, so long as Ext.P-7 order of cancellation of registration is not altered in the manner known to law, it may amount to the trade union losing its status as a body corporate and thus it has to be treated in law as an association of persons. 38. If that be so, so long as Ext.P-7 order of cancellation of registration is not altered in the manner known to law, it may amount to the trade union losing its status as a body corporate and thus it has to be treated in law as an association of persons. 38. Some of the afore cited decisions pointed out by the learned Senior Amicus Curiae would lead to the following position: In the case in Bombay Union of Journalists v. The Hindu, Bombay [ AIR 1963 SC 318 = (1962) 3 SCR 893 = 1961 (2) LLJ 436 ] the Apex Court has held in para 16 that subsequent withdrawal or support will not take away the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. That, in para 6 of Workmen of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. v. Management of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd. [ AIR 1970 SC 737 = 1970 (2) LLJ 132 ] it has been held by the Apex Court after placing reliance on abovesaid decision on Bombay Union of Journalists's case supra that the test of an industrial dispute is whether at the date of reference when the dispute was taken up and supported by a union or by an appreciable number of workmen. Further, in para 13 of the decision in Binny's case supra, Their Lordships of the Apex Court however seen no reason to hold that the dispute which had already been referred by the Government, should cease to be one in respect of a portion of it, merely because the Union did not choose to represent the case of a particular dismissed employee, etc. Further in the case in Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. U.P. State Industrial Tribunal & Ors. [ AIR 1960 SC 1328 = 1960 (2) LLJ 37 ] it has been held in para 4 thereof that though it has been urged that the association that sponsored the case of the respondent workmen therein, was an unregistered body and that made the reference invalid and that, both the courts had held it rightly that it is not necessarily that the registered body should sponsor a workman's case to make it an industrial dispute, and once it is shown that a body workmen, while acting through the union had sponsored a workman's case it becomes an industrial dispute. Further, in paragraphs 8 & 9 of the decision in Pradip Lamp's case supra, the Apex Court has held that though the dispute was not sponsored by the recognized union, but it cannot be said for that reason alone that it does not amount to industrial dispute, and further that, though the cause of workmen was espoused by any union which is unregistered, the fact that these cases are not taken up by the recognized union does not mean that they were not industrial disputes and that the decisions of the Apex Court have clearly laid down that espousal of dispute if a reference is made even by minority union having membership of substantial amount of workmen is sufficient to make such a dispute an industrial dispute. The said position has also been reiterated in the decision in Workmen of Indian Express Newspaper Private Ltd.'s case supra. So, in the light of these categorical position of law, we are not prepared to accept the contention of the writ appellant that merely on account of Ext.P-7 order cancellation, the industrial dispute which was registered earlier to the industrial disputes become untenable for its continued prosecution etc. 39. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that the writ petitioner/writ appellant has not challenged and has not sought for the quashment of Ext.P-11 order of reference made by the Government as early as on 15.3.2016. Therefore, without challenging the order of reference made by the Government in Ext.P-11, there is no question of the appellant raising the contention that the industrial dispute referred in Ext.P-11 is not maintainable, etc. 40. The abovecited decisions of the Apex Court would show in clear terms that it is not necessary that the Trade Union that is espousing the cause of workmen for raising industrial dispute should be necessarily a registered Trade Union as understood in the Trade Unions Act, 1926, etc. Hence, the Labour Court and the learned Single Judge have not committed any illegality or unreasonableness in taking the views they have rendered as per the impugned orders. Moreover it is also to be noted that, in the instant case eventhough the admitted case of the Management is that the same is one of dismissal of individual workman concerned, and hence it is certainly covered by the provisions contained in Sec.2A of the ID Act. Moreover it is also to be noted that, in the instant case eventhough the admitted case of the Management is that the same is one of dismissal of individual workman concerned, and hence it is certainly covered by the provisions contained in Sec.2A of the ID Act. The Division Bench of this Court in the case in Kerala State Co-operative Employees Front v. Chandramathi Amma [ 1996 (1) KLT 540 (DB)], has held that the provisions contained in Clause (b) of Section 18(3) of the ID Act which envisages all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute necessarily implies that some persons other than the original parties to the dispute can be summoned in order that the award may become enforceable and binding on those parties. The scope of impleadment of additional parties in industrial disputes has been dealt with in detail by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforecited decision. The individual workmen themselves sought for impleadment as additional parties/additional workmen in the above industrial dispute by filing application for impleadment which has been allowed by the Labour Court as per the impugned Ext.P-1 order. The Labour Court as per the impugned Ext.P-1 order as well as the learned Single Judge as per the impugned judgment in the above WP(C) have categorically held that the said impleadment of contesting respondent workmen is legally correct and justified, inasmuch as the case actually is one of the dismissal of these individual workmen. Hence, there cannot be any two views that the said workmen are necessary and proper parties to the proceedings in the above industrial dispute on the file of the Labour Court concerned. We are of the firm view that the Labour Court while rendered the impugned order at Ext.P-1 and the learned Single Judge while rendering the impugned judgment have not committed any illegality or impropriety in holding that the impleadment of affected contesting respondent workmen is in order, and would come in the scope and ambit of Sec.18 of the ID Act. Apart from Sec.18 of the ID Act, it can also be seen from Sec.10(8) of the ID Act that no proceedings pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute shall lapse merely by reason of the death of any of the parties to the dispute being a workman, and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall complete such proceedings and submit its award to the appropriate Government. The said provision is a pointer that in cases of death of one of the affected workman, the legal representative concerned will be at liberty to seek for impleadment as an additional party by resort to the provision contained in Sec.18 of said Act. Therefore, the impleadment of the affected additional contesting respondent as additional workman in the industrial dispute ordered by the Labour Court as per the impugned Ext.P-1 order cannot be faulted at all. 41. Further that, prima facie, we would also venture to observe that even in a case where the registered trade union has ceased to exist on account of dissolution etc, after the reference order of the Government under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act or after the registration of the industrial dispute, will not lead to a situation of the cause of the workmen being thrown out and provision for impleadment of the workmen or impleadment of another union to whom they may get membership after the cessation of the former union, etc would be proactively contemplated. As rightly held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, since the Industrial Dispute Act is a major piece of labour and social welfare legislation engrafted by the Parliament, such statutes are to be construed in favour of the beneficiaries of the legislation for advancing remedies and for suppressing the mischief. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that there cannot be any two views and that the present dispute relates to dismissal of individual workmen and is fully covered by the provisions of Sec.2A of the ID Act. The workmen could have easily and directly approached the Labour Court after following the preliminary formalities as can be seen from the provisions contained in Sec.2A of the said Act. The workmen could have easily and directly approached the Labour Court after following the preliminary formalities as can be seen from the provisions contained in Sec.2A of the said Act. Instead of that, the workmen had chosen the more rigorous method of getting their cause championed through a trade union which was duly registered at that time, and had succeeded get the matter referred by the Government in terms of Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act. Merely because the registration of trade union is subsequently cancelled long after the reference order made by the Government and the registration of industrial dispute by the Labour Court, is no ground to hold that the very proceedings initiated for redressal of legally justiciable grievances of the workmen should be thrown out altogether, so as to deprive them of any remedy whatsoever. Such an approach, if permitted by the Courts, would be amounting to even totally depriving the reasonable opportunity to the workmen to get their disputes adjudicated and determined through a competent forum in the manner known to law. The contentions of the appellant, if allowed, would amount to countenancing such pleas which are thoroughly unsustainable and untenable. Therefore, we do not see any illegality or impropriety in the considered decisions rendered by the Labour Court as per Ext.P-1 as well as by the learned Single Judge as per the impugned judgment in the WP(C). The appellant has not made out any grounds for invoking the public law remedy of judicial review and superintendence, and hence the impugned judgment of the Single Judge and the impugned order passed by the Labour Court will not require any interference in this intra court appellate proceedings. Accordingly, the appeal will stand dismissed. 42. It may be borne in mind that the worst case scenario of dissolution in a matter like this as far as the trade union concerned is that, the Union has ceased to exist in the manner known to law as conceived in the provisions as in Sec.27 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, whereby registered granted to the Union is cancelled as per Sec.10(b) of the said Act, on the ground it has ceased to exist, etc. In such a case, if the Union has ceased to exist in the manner known to law, after the matter has been referred by the State Government in terms of Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act, to the Labour Court, etc then it goes without saying that the cessation of the legal existence of the Union is only from the date of such cessation which is after the reference order, and that such cessation cannot have any retrospective effect. Then, in such a case, going by the intention of the legislature as envisaged in Sec.10(8) of the ID Act, cessation of the legal existence of the Union can be taken at par with the death of a party, and Sec.10(8) thereof clearly and unequivocally mandates that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, in relation to industrial dispute shall lapse merely by reason of death of any of the parties to the dispute being workmen and the Labour Court etc shall complete such proceedings etc. The said principles could be imported even to the case of legal cessation of a union that has ceased to exist in the manner known to law after the reference, and in such a case the provision for impleadment as envisaged in Sec.18(3)(b) of the ID Act, could be appropriately invoked for ensuring that additional parties like the workmen are placed on record before the Forum as workmen etc so that the proceedings could be taken to its logical conclusion. 43. Moreover it has to be borne in mind that, if the union has ceased to exist in the manner known to law only after the case is referred by the Government under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act, then the cessation take place only prospectively from that day and corresponding the loosing of the corporate body status of the union as envisaged in Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act will also come into play only prospectively from that date. Before that day the union continues to have its corporate body status in terms of Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act and there is no question of retrospectively taking away the corporate body status of the union. Before that day the union continues to have its corporate body status in terms of Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act and there is no question of retrospectively taking away the corporate body status of the union. In other words, the actions taken as per the provisions of the ID Act at a time when the Union had continued to enjoy its corporate body status cannot be said to be in any manner vitiated merely because the Union loses its corporate body status much later after the date of reference under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act. 44. Moreover, it is also to be noted that after the amendment Sec.2A of the ID Act renumbered as Sub Section (1) thereof with effect from 15.9.2010 and Sub Section (2) of Sec.2A mandates that, notwithstanding anything contained in Sec.10 thereof, any such workman as is specified in Sub Section (1) may make an application direct to the Labour Court or the Tribunal for adjudication of dispute referred to therein, after the expiry of 45 days from the date he has made application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt of such application, the Labour Court or the Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute, as if the dispute has been referred by the Government in accordance with the provisions of the ID Act, and all the provisions of the ID Act shall then apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to industrial dispute referred to by the appropriate Government. Further, Sub Section (3) of Sec.2A stipulates that the application referred in Sub Section (2) thereof shall be made to the Labour Court or the Tribunal before the expiry of 3 years from the date of discharge/dismissal/retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in Sub Section (1) etc. 45. In the instant case according to the appellant, the contesting respondents 15 to 18 workmen were dismissed from service on 14.9.2015. That, the 3rd respondent was dismissed from service vide order dated 28.4.2015 and the 4th respondent was dismissed from service vide order dated 8.1.2015. 45. In the instant case according to the appellant, the contesting respondents 15 to 18 workmen were dismissed from service on 14.9.2015. That, the 3rd respondent was dismissed from service vide order dated 28.4.2015 and the 4th respondent was dismissed from service vide order dated 8.1.2015. Further, from the pleadings and materials it is seen that Ext.P-2 complaint has been given on behalf of above workmen through their Union, as per Ext.P-10 dated 16.11.2015 etc and Ext.P-11 reference has been made by the Government under Sec.10(1)(c) of the ID Act on 15.3.2016. In the instant case, a mere reading of Ext.P-7 registration cancellation order dated 2.6.2018 would make it clear like the daylight that the registration of the Union has been cancelled not on the ground of cessation of the Union, and not on the ground that the Union has ceased to exist in the manner known to law, but only on the limited ground that the Union has not filed returns in terms of Sec.28 of the Trade Unions Act, etc. Hence at any rate, in such a case on account of cancellation of registration, only the corporate body status of the union may be lost and not the very existence of the Union as an unregistered union. Such a cancellation as per Ext.P-7 cannot be even remotely lead to the situation to hold that the Union has lost its legal existence as a unregistered union right from the commencement of proceedings of raising complaint before the labour authority as per Ext.P-10 dated 16.11.2015. In this case, the Union's corporate body status in terms of Sec.13 may be lost on and with effect from the issuance of Ext.P-7 order on 2.6.2018 onwards, and from that day onwards, the Union is stated to be in existence in law, as unregistered trade union. In this case, the Union's corporate body status in terms of Sec.13 may be lost on and with effect from the issuance of Ext.P-7 order on 2.6.2018 onwards, and from that day onwards, the Union is stated to be in existence in law, as unregistered trade union. In such a case, assuming for a moment, the extreme contention of the appellant that in a case like his, on account of the Ext.P-10 registration cancellation order, issued on 26.11.2015, the Union will lose its corporate body status and that it is a defunct union right from the commencement of the proceedings as in Ext.P-10 dated 16.11.2015 is assumed as correct and tenable, then it is only to be held that the court exercising judicial review and superintendence is not totally helpless in the matter, as otherwise it will lead to the result that the dismissed workmen will be without any remedy. This is all the more so, as going by the implications of the hyper technical contentions of the appellant is that Sub-Section (3) to Sec.2A of the ID Act stipulates a the period of limitation of 3 years from the date of dismissal, etc for instituting application directly to the Labour Court/Tribunal by the dismissed workmen in terms of Sub Section (2) thereof, and the said period is also over and further that the civil court's jurisdiction is also barred, etc. If that be so, the appellant's contention would imply that the workmen who have chosen the arduous process of getting their cause championed through a trade union despite their competence to set in motion the proceedings directly before the Labour Court in terms of Sub Sections (2) & (3) of Sec.2A etc. Should the courts exercising judicial review be helpless in such a manner that the workmen would be without any remedy whatsoever? The answer could only be an emphatic no. Should the courts exercising judicial review be helpless in such a manner that the workmen would be without any remedy whatsoever? The answer could only be an emphatic no. In such a case we do not have any doubt that the courts exercising the prerogative power of judicial review and superintendence would take into account the principles of exclusion of time as importable from the provisions as in Sec.14 of the Limitation Act, so that the period upto the date of judgment of the Court in a case like this could be excluded so that the workmen could directly invoke their remedy before the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal as the case may be in terms of the provisions contained in Sec.2A of the ID Act, more particularly Sub Sections (2) & (3) thereto. That being so, the abovesaid hyper technical contentions of the appellant cannot be of any avail as ultimately the workmens' right to seek remedy in respect of their legally justiciable grievances has to be duly recognized and enforced in the manner known to law. In other words, the abovesaid contentions of the appellant are, to say the least, highly hyper technical in nature. It cannot be even said for a moment that the appellant has suffered any grave injustice on account of the impugned order passed by the Labour Court at Ext.P-1 as well as the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in this WP(C). The appellant has not made out any case in that regard. On the other hand, if the hyper technical contentions of the appellant are accepted for argument sake, then it would lead to even depriving the workmen of their precious legal remedies well recognized and mandated in the ID Act, and it may even lead to bar of the civil court jurisdiction, in the result that they may be without any remedy at all. Such a scenario would be nothing but, grave miscarriage of justice on the workmen and that has to be avoided at any cost in a matter like this. In other words, the contentions of the appellant are not tenable or sustainable so as to call for any interdiction for the considered order passed by the Labour Court at Ext.P-1 or well considered views rendered by the learned Single Judge dismissing the WP(C) of the appellant in this case. In other words, the contentions of the appellant are not tenable or sustainable so as to call for any interdiction for the considered order passed by the Labour Court at Ext.P-1 or well considered views rendered by the learned Single Judge dismissing the WP(C) of the appellant in this case. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeal will stand dismissed.