JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. 1. The unsuccessful petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 6447/2015 has instituted this intra court appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, so as to impugn the judgment dated 19-06-2019 rendered by the learned Single Judge in that W.P. (C) whereby the main pleas sought for by the appellant/petitioner in W.P. (C) herein for treating the period of suspension from service as duty, for all purposes including full pay and allowances, etc, have been rejected. 2. Heard Sri. Peeyus A. Kottam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioner in the W.P. (C) and Sri. Asok M. Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) appearing for respondents in the WA/respondents in the W.P. (C). 3. The appellant/petitioner, while working as Lineman at the Electrical Major Section, Koothattukulam of the KSEB, was arrested by the Vigilance Police authorities concerned, viz. Vigilance & Anti Corruption Bureau (VACB), Ernakulam, on the allegations that he has accepted bribe from a consumer for allegedly reducing the bill amount, etc. Thereupon, he was placed under suspension from service by orders of the Executive Engineer concerned as per proceedings dated October 2001. The sanction for prosecuting him in terms of the provisions contained in the Prevention of Corruption of Act was also duly obtained as per office proceedings dated 20-12-2002. Later, the appellant was reinstated in service as per order dated 07-03-2003. Subsequently, the appellant faced trail before the Court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur in the Calendar Case concerned viz. C.C No. 12/2003 and the said criminal court as per judgment dated 30-03-2006 in C.C No. 12/2003, wherein it has been found that no evidence has been brought out to substantiate the charge against the accused that he had demanded and accepted bribe from PW-2 to reduce the electricity bill and for the reconnection of his electric connection and that accordingly, the petitioner was acquitted of the alleged offences in terms of Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In this connection, it is brought to our notice that the main Prosecution Witness, PW-2, from whom the bribe was alleged to have been received by the accused had turned hostile. 4. In this connection, it is brought to our notice that the main Prosecution Witness, PW-2, from whom the bribe was alleged to have been received by the accused had turned hostile. 4. After the pronouncement of the judgment dated 30-03-2006 by the court of Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur in C.C No. 12/2003, the competent authority of the Board had issued Ext.P1 proceedings dated 29-08-2006, wherein it has ordered that so as to regularise with period during which the petitioner had remained under suspension from service viz. period from 19-10-2001 to 14-03-2003, the Board has ordered in Ext.P1 proceedings dated 29-08-2006 that the said period from 19-10-2001 up to 28-03-2002 shall be regularised as eligible leave and the petitioner was directed to submit leave applications to the competent authorities concerned in order to take further steps in that regard. Further it has also been ordered as per Ext.P1 that further proceedings against the petitioner will also stand dropped, presumably in view of the acquittal by the criminal court. Later, the Chief Engineer, Human Resource Management (HRM) of the respondent Board had issued Ext.P2 proceedings for examining the leave applications of the petitioner and ordered that based on the leave available to his credit, the period from 19-10-2001 Forenoon to 28-03-2002 Afternoon shall be treated as if he was on commuted leave for 161 days as per Rule 84 Part I KSR and for further period from 29-03-2002 up to 14-03-2003, the said period of 351 days, shall be regularised as if he was on leave without allowances, etc. It has also been ordered in the last paragraph of Ext.P2 that the abovesaid leave without allowance period for 351 days from 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003 will not count for any service benefits and that necessary entries in that regard should be made in the service book of the appellant, etc. 5. It has also been ordered in the last paragraph of Ext.P2 that the abovesaid leave without allowance period for 351 days from 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003 will not count for any service benefits and that necessary entries in that regard should be made in the service book of the appellant, etc. 5. Thereafter, consequential orders were also passed in pursuance of Ext.P2 ordering that, since based on the leave actually available to the credit of the appellant, the aforementioned period of 351 days from 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003 is regularised as leave without allowances, recovery will have to be made for the said period inasmuch as the petitioner was not entitled for any pay and allowances during that period and that therefore, the excess subsistence allowance drawn by the petitioner during the pendency of the impugned criminal proceedings while he was on suspension from service, will have to be refunded by him. By then, the appellant had retired from service on 31-03-2003 and gratuity amount was also paid to him. Hence it was ordered that, the said excess amounts drawn by him by way of subsistence allowance, will have to be recovered from the DCRG and the said amount was also recovered from his DCRG. 6. Being aggrieved by Ext.P2 and the consequential orders as aforestated, the petitioner had preferred writ proceedings, as W.P. (C) No. 3481/2008 before this Court. This Court as per Ext.P3 judgment dated 04-03-2014 had finally disposed of W.P. (C) No. 3481/ 2008 finding that the decision taken in Ext.P2 is illegal and ultra-vires. This Court has held in Para No. 5 of internal Page No. 6 of Ext.P3 judgment that the decision in Ext.P2 to the effect that the abovesaid period of leave without allowances for 351 days w.e.f. 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003, etc. will not count for any service benefits, cannot be countenanced as no reasons were taken therein for justifying such a drastic order. This Court also held that Ext.P2 order has been passed without adverting to the crucial findings made by the criminal court in the abovesaid judgment of acquittal. Further various other omissions were also notified by this Court in Ext.P3 judgment. This Court held in categorical terms that the steps taken by the respondent Board authorities to even recover amounts from the DCRG already paid to the appellant, who by then retired from service, is illegal and unjust. Further various other omissions were also notified by this Court in Ext.P3 judgment. This Court held in categorical terms that the steps taken by the respondent Board authorities to even recover amounts from the DCRG already paid to the appellant, who by then retired from service, is illegal and unjust. In that view of the matter, this Court had quashed Ext.P3 therein/Ext.P2 herein as unsustainable. 7. Apart from quashing Ext.P3 therein/Ext.P2 herein, this Court had also quashed Ext.P5 therein (proceedings dated 14-02-2007 issued by R3 therein/Executive Engineer concerned) and Ext.P6 therein (order dated 28-09-2007 issued by the Chief Engineer concerned) and further ordered that, the excess amount so recovered from the petitioner from his DCRG, etc. shall be immediately returned to him, etc. 8. It is common ground that, thereafter the respondent Board authorities have duly refunded the said amounts recovered from the DCRG as ordered in Ext.P3 judgment by this Court. Thereafter, the petitioner has contended before the respondents that the abovesaid period of suspension from service should be treated as duty for all purposes including full pay and allowances and that the matter should be reconsidered and the petitioner had filed a representation dated 01-08-2014 in that regard before the competent authority of the respondents. The petitioner had moved this Court again by filing W.P. (C) No. 22223/2014. This Court as per Ext.P4 judgment dated 26-08-2014 had finally disposed of W.P. (C) No. 22223/2014, without getting into the merits of the case, by directing that the 2nd respondent therein/Chief Engineer, Human Resource Management should consider and pass orders on Ext.P8 therein, in accordance with law, after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner within six weeks, etc. 9. Thereafter the 2nd respondent herein [Chief Engineer (HRM)] has issued Ext.P5 proceedings dated 30-12-2014 after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, ordering that in the cases of this nature, the period of suspension from service may be regularised as duty for all purposes including the full pay and allowances, only in a case where it is found that the suspension from service is wholly unjustified and that he is acquitted of blame by the criminal court in the judgment of acquittal as envisaged in Rule 57 of Part I KSR, etc. That in the instant case, it cannot be said that the petitioner's acquittal by the criminal court would amount to an acquittal of blame or that he is fully exonerated so as to entitle him for treating his suspension period as duty for all purposes especially for full pay and allowances, etc. and has accordingly rejected the plea of the petitioner in terms of Ext.P5 order. 10. The petitioner seeks quashment of the decision at Ext.P5 and also seeks mandamus to direct the respondents to treat the abovesaid period of suspension from service as duty for all purposes including for full pay and allowances, etc. 11. At the outset, it has to be borne in mind that the petitioner has not challenged Ext.P1 proceedings dated 29-08-2006 issued by the 2nd respondent [Chief Engineer (HRM)] either in Ext.P3 writ proceedings [W.P. (C) No. 3481/2008] or in Ext.P4 writ proceedings [W.P. (C) No. 22223/2014] or in the present writ proceedings viz. W.P. (C) No. 6447/2015. True that, after the conclusion of the arguments, counsel for the appellant has now filed I.A for amendment of the pleadings in the present W.P. (C). 12. We have not allowed the said amendment plea for the simple reason that the petitioner has never challenged Ext.P1 proceedings in the previous two rounds of writ litigative proceedings and therefore he is barred by the well established elementary principles flowing from the doctrine of res-judicata, constructive res-judicata in re-agitating such issue and that too, in the intra-court appeal proceedings of the third round of writ litigative proceedings. It is well established that even in public law proceedings in judicial review, the elementary principles of res-judicata, constructive res-judicata are certainly applicable. Therefore the plea made at this belated stage so as to incorporate challenge as at Ext.P1 cannot be countenanced by us. 13. The basic order in this case, which regulates the suspension period of the petitioner is the one at Ext.P1. The competent authority of the respondent Board has found that the said period can be regularised only as eligible leave, which is subject to the leave that is available to the actual credit of the leave account of the incumbent like the appellant. The competent authority of the respondent Board has found that the said period can be regularised only as eligible leave, which is subject to the leave that is available to the actual credit of the leave account of the incumbent like the appellant. The consequential decision taken by the respondents in pursuance of Ext.P1 more particularly, in terms of Ext.P2 herein, Ext.P3 writ proceedings as well as the consequential proceedings in the said previous writ proceedings as Ext.P5 therein and Ext.P6 therein, has been interfered and interdicted by this Court by Ext.P3 judgment. This Court has categorically found that the decision taken by the respondents so as to even order for recovery from the DCRG on account of the alleged excess pay said to have been received by the appellant by way of subsistence allowance, was quashed by this Court. On that aspect of the matter, it is common ground that the respondents, as a matter of fact have complied with Ext.P3 judgment and have in fact refunded the said recovered amount from the DCRG to the petitioner. 14. That apart, it is also pertinent to note that the matters relating to regularisation of period of suspension from service consequent to criminal proceedings is dealt within Rule 57 of Part I KSR. 15. It may also be relevant in this context to note that even in cases where the suspension from service is on account of pending disciplinary proceedings and Sub Rule 3 of Rule 56 of Part I KSR would clearly mandate that only where the authority competent to order reinstatement of the incumbent is of opinion that the suspension was wholly unjustified, the officer shall, subject to the provisions contained in Sub Rule 8 thereof be paid the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been suspended, etc. The issue relating to regularisation of suspension period consequent to suspension from service of an incumbent on account of pending criminal proceedings is covered by Rule 57 Part I KSR. The issue relating to regularisation of suspension period consequent to suspension from service of an incumbent on account of pending criminal proceedings is covered by Rule 57 Part I KSR. Rule 57 Part I KSR reads as follows (See Page 99): “Rule 57 - An officer who is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge, or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours, or is undergoing imprisonment, shall be deemed to be under suspension with effect from the date of commencement of the detention or imprisonment, as the case may be, and shall not be allowed to draw any pay and allowances during such period of suspension other than any subsistence allowance and other allowances that may be granted in accordance with Rule 55, until he is reinstated in service. An adjustment of his pay and allowances for such periods should thereafter be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of blame or (if the proceedings taken against him were for his arrest for debt) of its being provided that the officer’s liability arose from circumstances beyond his control.” 16. It has been held by this Court in decisions as in Gangadharan vs. State of Kerala, 2009 (1) KLT 713 : ILR 2009 (1) Ker 554, that in a criminal case, where there is no evidence against the accused and he has been acquitted by the criminal court then such as case will come into the expression “acquitted of blame” appearing in Rule 57 of Part I KSR. In such a case, the incumbent will be entitled to get pay and allowances for the period of suspension undergone by him by treating such period as duty for all purposes. This Court has also held in decisions as in Santhosh Kumar S. vs. State of Kerala, ILR 2007 (3) Ker 101, that the proper consideration for exercise of the discretion under Rule 57 of Part I KSR is to determine as to whether the delinquent accused has been acquitted of blame by the criminal court and in that regard whether the finding of the criminal court would amount to mere acquittal as contemplated by the provisions of Cr.P.C. or is amount to exonerate the petitioner of the blame as contemplated in Rule 57 Part I KSR. In the case in Mohammed Easa Sahib vs. D.I.G. of Police, 1990 (2) KLT 462 : 1990 (2) KLJ 467 , it has been held by this Court that in terms of Rule 57 Part I KSR, full amount of pay and allowances during the period of suspension only in the event of officer being acquitted of blame and the expression ‘acquitted of blame’ occurring in Rule 57 Part I KSR means some thing more than mere acquittal. It will be pertinent to refer to paragraph Nos. 13, 14, 17 and 20 of the decision of this Court in Mohammed Easa Sahib's Case 1990 (2) KLT 462 , which read as follows: “13. The expression “acquitted of blame” was the subject matter of consideration by a Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in General Manager vs. Swaroopraj, AIR 1959 Raj. 55 . An assistant Station Master who was suspended on charges of corruption was acquitted by the Special Judge and thereafter reinstated in service. He claimed payment of the full salary and allowances relying on R.2043 S. III Para.1 of the Railway Establishment Code, which is identical with the latter part of R.57. Wanchoo, C.J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench observed: “The words acquitted of blame cannot mean the same thing as the word acquitted. The officer who has to make the adjustment under this paragraph has to satisfy himself that the employee has been acquitted of blame and not merely acquitted by the court. xxx xxx xxx Three contingencies can always arise in such cases of acquittal by Courts. In the first place, the Court may say that it is acquitting the man honourably having found that the case against him is false. In such a case the man is acquitted of blame by the Court itself and it is the duty of the officer making adjustment to allow him the full amount of his salary and allowances. Secondly, there may be a case where the Court says that it is only giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused. In such a case when the officer, who has to make adjustment, comes to the conclusion that the man has not been acquitted of blame his view can admit of no doubt. Secondly, there may be a case where the Court says that it is only giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused. In such a case when the officer, who has to make adjustment, comes to the conclusion that the man has not been acquitted of blame his view can admit of no doubt. There may, however be a third case in which the Court may neither say that the case against him is false, nor does it say that the man has been acquitted on the ground of benefit of the doubt. In such a case again it is for the officer making the adjustment to read the judgment and come to his own conclusion whether it is a case of honourable acquittal or acquittal of blame or not. If he comes to the conclusion that it is a case of acquittal of blame, he must allow the full salary and allowances. If on the other hand, he comes to the conclusion that it is not a case of acquittal of blame, he has discretion to pass such orders as seem to him to be just in the circumstances of the case.” It is therefore the opinion of the court that a mere acquittal giving the benefit of doubt is not tantamount to an “acquittal of blame.” It is left to the concerned authority to decide whether or not the government servant has been acquitted of blame and if he comes to the conclusion that he has not been so acquitted, that view cannot be open to review. 14. I must at once take note of a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Dattatraya Vasudeo Kulkarni vs. Director of Agriculture, 1984 (3) S.L.R. 83, where that court dealt with the same expression “acquitted of blame” occuring in R.152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. Actually it is not the decision in Dattatraya’s case that really deals with the question, but the one dated November 27, 1974 in Madhukar Baburaoji Dhote vs. State of Maharashtra, Special Civil Application No. 209 of 1968, decided by Tulzapurkar, J. (as he then was) and Shimpi, J. which is referred to, extracted and followed therein. Actually it is not the decision in Dattatraya’s case that really deals with the question, but the one dated November 27, 1974 in Madhukar Baburaoji Dhote vs. State of Maharashtra, Special Civil Application No. 209 of 1968, decided by Tulzapurkar, J. (as he then was) and Shimpi, J. which is referred to, extracted and followed therein. Dhote’s case dealt with R.156(a) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, which corresponds broadly to R.57 of Part I of the K.S.R. After referring to the decisions in Union of India vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325, Viraji vs. State of Gujarat, 1971 (2) S.L.R. 743 and Jagmohanlal vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 Punjab 422, it was held in Dhote’s case that the concept of “honourable acquittal” or “full exoneration” may be inappropriate qua the result of a criminal prosecution. The court referred to R.156(a) and stated: “Under this provision, therefore, what the State Government had to consider was whether the petitioner had been “acquitted of blame” and considerations whether there had been a full exoneration or not would be thoroughly irrelevant. Even when he was acquitted on the basis of benefit of doubt being given to the petitioner all the same he was acquitted of the charges levelled against him and he must be held to have been ‘acquitted of the blame’. In other words, on a proper interpretation of R.156(a) we are clearly of the view that concepts of ‘honourable acquittal’ or ‘full exoneration’ are irrelevant and immaterial.” 15. xxx xxx xxx 16. xxx xxx xxx 17. It is true that the expressions “honourably acquitted” and “fully exonerated” are more appropriate to disciplinary proceedings. The expression with which we are concerned is “acquitted of blame” and not merely “acquitted.” The expression “acquitted of blame” must, in the circumstances, mean something more than a mere acquittal. It must be such an acquittal that leaves no doubt or trace about the guilt or culpability of the accused officer. Evidently what is intended is absence of any element of blame attaching to the officer, despite the prosecution. Unless this be the intent, the words “of blame” become meaningless. 18. xxx xxx xxx 19. xxx xxx xxx 20. It must be noted here that the scheme of R.56, 56A and 56B is not to grant full pay and allowances unless the officer was fully exonerated of the charge or unless the suspension was wholly unjustified. Unless this be the intent, the words “of blame” become meaningless. 18. xxx xxx xxx 19. xxx xxx xxx 20. It must be noted here that the scheme of R.56, 56A and 56B is not to grant full pay and allowances unless the officer was fully exonerated of the charge or unless the suspension was wholly unjustified. In all other cases, the officer is paid only such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances as may be determined by the competent authority in his discretion. R.57 follows in the wake of these rules and must bear a construction which is in accord with the scheme of these rules. R.57 automatically deems an officer to be under suspension when he is detained in custody for over forty-eight hours. I do not think it was intended to place such an officer in a higher pedestal than those dealt with under the earlier rules. That apparently is the reason why something more than a bare acquittal is insisted on, namely an acquittal of blame. There are cases where, though morally convinced of the guilt, the criminal court is unable to convict the accused for want of evidence beyond reasonable doubt or for some procedural irregularity. To attract R.57, the verdict which resulted in the acquittal should have been of such a nature as to exculpate the officer of all blame in relation to the charge. Cases can be conceived, where a person is detained, based on wrong identity; or where a case has been wrongly foisted on him; or where he is acquitted on establishing a clean alibi; and others. In the circumstances, I am at one with the Rajasthan High Court that in cases of acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt and the like, it is for the authority to consider whether the officer has been acquitted of blame and appropriately to make adjustment of the pay and allowances for the period of suspension. I respectfully express my dissent from the contrary view taken by the Bombay and Karnataka High Courts in the decisions referred to.” 17. In the instant case, it is common ground that the appellant was acquitted by the criminal court mainly on account of the fact that the main Prosecution Witness, PW-2, from whom the alleged bribe was accepted by the accused, had turned hostile. In the instant case, it is common ground that the appellant was acquitted by the criminal court mainly on account of the fact that the main Prosecution Witness, PW-2, from whom the alleged bribe was accepted by the accused, had turned hostile. In the light of these aspects, we are not in a position in any manner to find fault with the 2nd respondent in having rendered the decision at Ext.P5 rejection order dated 30-12-2014 that the petitioner cannot be granted the benefit of treating the such suspension period as duty for all purposes including full pay and allowances, as it cannot be said that the petitioner has been acquitted of the blame by virtue of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the criminal court concerned. Therefore, we are constrained to reject the main contention urged by Sri. Peeyus A. Kottam, learned counsel appearing the appellant for quashment of Ext.P5 order and for the consequential reliefs in that regard. As indicated hereinabove the root of the matter is at Ext.P1 which has been unchallenged by the petitioner all throughout. 18. The main adverse impact of Ext.P1 had led on Ext.P2 herein etc, and which led to recovery of the so called alleged excess subsistence allowances due to the petitioner by recovering the same from his DCRG. Such recovery has already been interdicted by this Court as per Ext.P3 judgment and the said amount has already been refunded to the petitioner. Hence, there is no dispute between the parties on that issue at all. In view of the finality attained at Ext.P1, we are not in a position to hold that the subsequent decision taken by the Board at Ext.P5 that abovesaid period cannot be treated as duty for all the purposes, is liable for interdiction. The petitioner has already retired from service as early as on 31-03-2003. 19. However, after hearing both sides, we are of the considered view that in one aspect of the matter there is substance in the submissions made by Sri. Peeyus A. Kottam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. In the penultimate paragraph of Ext.P1, it appears that the abovesaid period, which is treated as one spent on leave without allowances that is for the period of 351 days from 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003 has not been reckoned for the purpose of pensionary benefits of the appellant. Peeyus A. Kottam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. In the penultimate paragraph of Ext.P1, it appears that the abovesaid period, which is treated as one spent on leave without allowances that is for the period of 351 days from 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003 has not been reckoned for the purpose of pensionary benefits of the appellant. Presumably this may be on account of the observations in the last paragraph of Ext.P2. Exhibit P2 herein has already been quashed by this Court as per Ext.P3 judgment. However, this aspect of the matter as to whether the said period should be reckoned for the purpose of pensionary benefits has not been decided. Rule 26 Part III KSR deals with aspects as to whether time spent on leave is to be reckoned for qualifying service for the purpose of pension, etc. Rule 26 has been amended as per SRO No. 918/2009 published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No. 2029 dated 05-11-2009. The said amendment has been made prospectively from 05-11-2009 onwards. Before the said amendment made effective from 05-11-2009 Rule 26 of Part III KSR reads as follows: “Rule 26: Time passed on leave of all kinds with or without allowances will count as qualifying service unless otherwise specified.” Rule 26 of Part III KSR as it now appears to the statute book order w.e.f. 05-11-2009 reads as follows: “Rule 26: (a) Time passed on leave of all kinds without allowances shall not count as qualifying service. (b) Time passed on leave of all kinds with allowances shall not count as qualifying service, except the period of Leave Without Allowances availed of under Rule 88, Part I Kerala Service Rules, on medical certificate, Leave Without Allowances availed of under Rule 91 A, Part I, Kerala Service Rules for study purposes subject to the condition laid down in proviso to Rule 33(b)(2), Part I, Kerala Service Rules and Leave Without Allowances up to 60 days taken under the proviso to Rule 102, Part I, Kerala Service Rules in continuation of maternity leave.” 20. It can be seen from a mere reading of the un-amended provisions contained in Rule 26 that rule making authorities clearly stipulated that time passed on leave of all kinds with or without allowances will count as qualifying service for the purpose of pension unless otherwise specified. It can be seen from a mere reading of the un-amended provisions contained in Rule 26 that rule making authorities clearly stipulated that time passed on leave of all kinds with or without allowances will count as qualifying service for the purpose of pension unless otherwise specified. The respondents do not have any case that either the Government or the competent authority of the KSEB has taken any general norm stipulating to the contrary so as to take away the benefit contained in the operative portion of Rule 26 that time passed on leave of all kinds with or without allowances will count as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. 21. Of course, the 2nd respondent had observed in the last paragraph of Ext.P2 that the said LWA period of 351 days will not count for any service benefits. It is prima facie seriously open to doubt as to whether in a case where either the Government or the Board has not issued any general norm specifying the exception to Rule 26, whether the competent disciplinary authority in any individual case can make such an order so as to say that the said LWA period will not count for any service benefits, in cases where the suspension period has occurred prior to the amendment made effective from 05-11-2009. That apart, Ext.P2 has already been quashed by this Court as per Ext.P3. It is only as per the amended provisions of Rule 26 made effective prospectively from 05-11-2009 it has been stipulated in Clause (a) thereof, that the time passed on leave of all kinds with allowances shall count as qualifying service for pension and as per Clause (b) thereof that time passed on leave of all kinds without allowances shall not count as qualifying service, subject to the exemptions mentioned therein. In the instant case the petitioner had retired from service as early as on 31-03-2003. The entire suspension period from 19-01-2001 up to 14-03-2003 is long before the coming into force of the said amended provisions of Rule 26, which has coming into force prospectively only on 05-11-2009. Hence in the instant case, the amended provision of Rule 26 as it existed in statute book prior to 05-11-2009 would squarely cover the case of the petitioner. Hence in the instant case, the amended provision of Rule 26 as it existed in statute book prior to 05-11-2009 would squarely cover the case of the petitioner. Hence it is only to be ordered that, the said LWA period of 351 days from 29-03-2002 to 14-03-2003 shall count as qualifying service for the purpose of grant of pension. In order to remove any ambiguity we also order that the entire period of suspension from service viz. 19-10-2001 up to 14-03-2003, shall be treated as service for the purpose of pensionary benefits in the case of the petitioner. The impugned order at Exts.P1 and P5 will stand modified to the limited extent as above. 22. Further it is ordered that in case the petitioner's pensionary benefits have been sanctioned and disbursed on the premise that the said period in question shall not count for qualifying service for pension, etc, then the competent authority of the respondents will immediately sanction revised pensionary benefits due to the petitioner by reckoning the said period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension and the differential amount by way of arrears of pension, gratuity, etc. should be paid to the petitioner without any further delay, at any rate, within an outer time limit of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. 23. The upshot of the above discussion is that main reasonings and conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge in the instant writ proceedings are not liable for any interdiction at the hands of the appellate court. However, the directions and orders passed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment in W.P. (C) in this case will stand modified to the limited extent as above. 24. With these observations and directions, the Writ Appeal will stand finally disposed of.