JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. (Prayer: Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with Order XXXVI Rule 9 of O.S. Rules against order of this Court dated 30.08.2019 passed in O.P.No.413 of 2009 on the original side of this court.) 1. The limited challenge in this appeal is to a part of the order impugned passed on a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by which certain directions have been issued to the National Stock Exchange for reconstituting an arbitral tribunal and for a further decision on the counter-claim that had been carried to the reference by the first respondent herein. 2. The appellant refers to a judgment reported at (2018) 11 SCC 328 (Kinnari Mullick vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani) and to the reliance therein on a judgment of this court reported at (2009) 1 MLJ 199 (M.M.T.C. vs. Vicnivass Agency). 3. In Kinnari Mullick, an arbitral award was set aside merely on the ground that it did not contain any reasons in support thereof. In the intra-court appeal, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court upheld the order but remanded the matter before the arbitral tribunal for giving reasons and, if necessary, hearing the matter further. It was the modification made by the Division Bench which was carried before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred to Section 34(4) of the Act and observed that there was no power vested in the arbitration court to remand the matter. The Supreme Court accepted the view expressed by this court in Vicnivass Agency and held that when an award had been challenged but not set aside, the court could adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of the arbitral tribunal would eliminate the ground for setting aside the arbitral award; but such procedure could be resorted to by the court only upon a request in such regard by a party to the proceedings. 4. 4. Thus, Section 34(4) of the Act involves the three conditions which have all to be complied with before the matter is sent back to the arbitral tribunal for the purpose of eliminating the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award: the pendency of a petition challenging the award, an application being made by a party to the proceedings to adjourn the challenge to give the tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as would eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award, and the due consideration of such application by the court and the court finding it appropriate so to do. 5. In the present case, it was the first respondent who challenged the award. The grievance of the first respondent herein was the rejection of the counter-claim that was taken to the reference of the three-member arbitral tribunal constituted by the National Stock Exchange. The petition under Section 34 of the Act was allowed upon the court perceiving the rejection of the counter-claim to be opposed to public policy and contrary to substantive provisions of law. The operative part of the order is found at the final paragraph in the judgment rendered on August 30, 2019: “15. In the result, the Award of the learned Arbitrators with regard to the Counter Claim alone is set aside. The Original Petition is disposed of directing the National Stock Exchange to reconstitute the Arbitral Tribunal within one month from the date of receipt of copy of this Order to decide the loss on account of unauthorised sale of shares afresh on merits, and on such reconstitution, the learned Arbitrator(s) shall dispose of the matter within four (4) months from that date. No costs.” 6. There is no dispute that the arbitration court had due authority to consider whether the rejection of the counter-claim by the arbitral tribunal was appropriate or not. However, upon the arbitration court having found that the rejection of the counter-claim by the arbitral tribunal was opposed to public policy and contrary to substantive provisions of law, the arbitration court could not have gone on to prescribe how the counter-claim or the substance thereof had to be adjudicated upon. There is a clear departure as to the authority of the arbitration court under the 1996 Act from the position as it prevailed under the previous avatar of 1940. There is a clear departure as to the authority of the arbitration court under the 1996 Act from the position as it prevailed under the previous avatar of 1940. In addition, Section 5 of the Act of 1996 expressly prohibits any more intervention in arbitration matters by court than specifically provided by the statute. 7. Accordingly, even though it was within the power of the arbitration court to set aside the award to the extent that it rejected the counter-claim, the further directions issued by the arbitration court were not within the bounds of such court’s authority. That is the legal proposition enunciated in Kinnari Mullick and in Vicnivass Agency. 8. As a consequence, the directions contained in the operative part of the order impugned beginning the second sentence of paragraph 15 till the penultimate sentence stand set aside. It will be open to the parties to pursue their remedies in accordance with law. O.S.A.No.39 of 2021 is disposed by modifying the order impugned as indicated above. C.M.P.No.1078 of 2021 is closed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.