ORDER : 1. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing FIR No. 0375 dated 12.09.2017 registered at Police Station- Telibandha, District-Raipur (C.G.) on the basis of a complaint made by respondent No. 2- Prahalad Agrawal against them for offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. 2. The brief facts as projected by the petitioners are that petitioner No. 1- Dilip Chhabaria is a car designer and Managing Director of Dilip Chhabaria Design Private Limited (commonly known as 'DC Design') (for short “the Company”), a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. Petitioner No. 2-Kanchan Chhabaria is Chief Executive Officer and petitioner No. 3 is Director of the Company. The respondent No. 2, who is a director of Vandana Industries and resident of VIP road, Raipur, approached DC Design Pvt. Ltd., Pune Branch in the year 2007-08 to modify a car into a limousine, which was duly done to his satisfaction. The respondent No. 2 again approached the Company to modify a car namely Honda City with registration No. CG 04 CT 7777, Engine No. L-15A71228612 and Chasis No. MAKGM253J-AN113713 into a Bugatti Veyron look alike. Since, Honda City cannot be suitable for modification, therefore, representative of the Company suggested respondent No. 2 that the Honda City could not be modified as a Bugatti look as per the specifications desired as the dimensions of manual Honda City car was not suitable for the modification of automatic drive car and in turn, respondent No. 2 accepted the same and Honda City would be replaced by Honda Civic bearing registration No. MH 43 R 1139, Engine No. R1811969890 and Chasis No. MAKFD162L6N002962 as per requirement and satisfaction of respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 2 accepted the same and requested representative of the Company to do the needful. The said Honda Civic car was delivered to respondent No. 2 and he accepted the same without any objection and in the year 2013, he sent the said vehicle for servicing and repairs due to a noise in the wheels of the modified vehicle, which was duly rectified by the petitioners and respondent No. 2 accepts the same after repairing. The said Honda Civic car was delivered to respondent No. 2 and he accepted the same without any objection and in the year 2013, he sent the said vehicle for servicing and repairs due to a noise in the wheels of the modified vehicle, which was duly rectified by the petitioners and respondent No. 2 accepts the same after repairing. After three years in the year 2015, respondent No. 2 contacted the Company to resale the vehicle, since the vehicle was three years old, therefore, respondent No. 2 requested to purchase the vehicle or to resale the same at the best available resale price as he was going through financial crises. Representative of the Company informed respondent No. 2 that the car could not be returned or resold for more than 50 lacs after using the same for three years Therefore respondent No. 2 started using other mode for pressurizing the representative of the Company, by sending notice under Section 160 of the Cr.P.C. through Police Station (Annexure P/4) to the Managing Director and founder of the Company on 16/01/2010. 3. On request by respondent No. 2, it was agreed between respondent No. 2 and the company that final price Rs. 50 lacs will be paid by the Company to respondent No. 2, out of which, Rs. 45 lacs was paid in advance and remaining amount i.e. Rs. 5 lacs will be paid after resale of the said vehicle. This was only done as a onetime accommodation in view of keeping the relationship with respondent No. 2. In July, 2016, respondent No. 2 again sent a car namely Honda CRV for some repairing and modifications, which was duly completed to the satisfaction and approval of respondent No. 2 with delivery receipt and customer satisfaction note signed by respondent No. 2 for Honda CRV was also filed with petition. 4. The respondent No. 2 lodged a complaint at Police Station- Telibandha and got registered as FIR No. 0375 dated 12.09.2017 against the petitioners alleging that the petitioners had not modified his vehicle bearing registration No.CG04 CT7777 and given another vehicle in place of his vehicle which he has already returned to the Petitioners . Thus, it was alleged that they have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. 5. Thus, it was alleged that they have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that there is no specific allegation against the petitioners, who are the Director and top of management, still they have been roped in the false FIR, which is, prima facie, illegal and it is nothing but to harass them which amounts to abuse of process of law. He would further submit that the petitioners have purchased Honda Civic and the same was given to respondent No. 2, which is reflected from Annexure P/7. The contents of the FIR clearly reflect that cause of action arose and the commission of offence, if at all, has taken place at Pune, where the car was modified, therefore, respondent No. 1 has no territorial jurisdiction to register a numbered FIR against the petitioners at Raipur (C.G.) 6. He would further submit that respondent No. 2 has used his influence to get registered this false FIR and the only legal remedy available to petitioners is to approach by filing present petition. The respondent No. 1 without giving any thought to the nature of the offence registered the FIR against the petitioners despite the fact that the offence is of civil/consumer nature and registration of FIR is sheer misuse of power and abuse of process of law. He would further submit that there is no ingredient of Section 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C., but still FIR has been registered, which is abuse of process of law and this Court having jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. may quash the said FIR. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State/ respondent No. 1 would submit that they have filed their return, in which, they have contended that the respondent authorities have registered FIR on the basis of material collected during initial investigation, case diary, statements of Prahlad Agrawal and Shekhar Mahobia have been recorded and at present the matter is under investigation and after due investigation, the charge-sheet would be filed before the competent Court, therefore, there is no illegality or infirmity on the part of State authorities in registering the FIR against the petitioners, as such, it is prayed that his petition may kindly be dismissed. Learned State counsel would further submit that Superintendent of Police, Raipur vide its order dated 15.09.2017 has accorded permission to the Investigating Officer/ ASI Peer Mohammad and Head Constable 783- Parmeshwar Choudhary to go to Pune for investigation in the matter. He would further submit that this petition is hit by judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal, AIR 1992 SC 604 , in which, it has been held that in which type of category of cases, the High Court may in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can quash proceeding relating to cognizable offences when the continuation of proceedings are abuse of process of law. The present case does not fall within such category, as such Criminal petition is liable to be dismissed by this Court. He would further submit that the petitioners have neither applied for anticipatory bail nor regular bail before any of the court of law in the Chhattisgarh State. They have filed this petition directly as such also the petition is liable to be dismissed by this Court. 8. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has filed return and would submit that the vehicle bearing registration No. CG 04 CT 7777 has not been delivered to him and a sum of Rs. 88 lacs has been taken by the petitioners by making false promise. The document relating to vehicle No. CG04 ZX 7777 has wrongly been submitted before this Court to make submission that the vehicle No. CG04 CT 7777 has been returned to the petitioners, hence, the petitioners are trying to mislead the Court. He would submit that the vehicle No. CG 04 CT 7777 is still in possession of the petitioners and they have not delivered the same to respondent No. 2. The contents of the petition from para 6 to 8 are based on concocted grounds. He would further submit that the petitioners have taken money from respondent No. 2 by making false promise as is evident from (Annexure R/1). The contents of the petition from para 6 to 8 are based on concocted grounds. He would further submit that the petitioners have taken money from respondent No. 2 by making false promise as is evident from (Annexure R/1). The agreement executed between the petitioners and respondent No. 2 is as under:- eSa Jh fnyhi Nkfcz;k firk fnyhi ,p- Nkfcz;k] mez 65 o"kZ] lh-,e-Mh- fnyhi Nkfcz;k fMtkbZu Ák-fy- ;g Áekf.kr dj ns jgk gwa fd tks dkj CRV Ø- CG 04 ZX 7777 ,oa nwljh dkj Ø- CG 04 CT 7777 ftls ÁYgkn vxjoky fuoklh jk;iqj Mk;jsDVj oanuk b.MLVªht fy- jk;iqj ls eksMhQk; djus gsrq fy;k Fkk mlesa ls dkj Ø- CG 04 ZX 7777 dks eSa 15 vÁSy 2016 rd gj gky esa cukdj nwaxk ,oa dkj Ø- CG 04 CT 7777 ds ,ot esa geus vkidks tks xkM+h eksMhQk; dj fn;k Fkk og vkidks ilUn ugha vkus ij vkids }kjk okil Hkstus ls lqj{kkFkZ j[kk gwaA ftlds ,ot esa eSa vkidk iakp yk[k dk psd ekg vÁSy 2016 ls tuojh 2017 rd dk ns jgk gwaA mDr xkM+h tc fcd tk;sxh rks mldk iSlk vkidks okil dj fn;k tk;sxk ,oa dkj Ø- CG 04 ZX 7777 tks fd eSa cukds nwaxk mldk iSlk gesa iwjk ÁkIr gks pqdk gSA bl bdjkjukek ds i'pkr Hkh esjs }kjk dkj cukdj ugh fn;k x;k rks vki esjs fo:) dkuwuh dk;Zokgh dj ldrs gSaA 9. He would further submit that the petitioners are habitual offenders to make false promise and cheated their clients, therefore, the FIR has rightly been registered against the petitioners. The petitioners have tried to deviate from the factual matrix of the case and matter is still subjected to investigation. It is submitted that the petitioners have received an amount of Rs. 88 lacs from respondent No. 2 and vehicle No. CG 04 CT 7777 has not been returned by them, therefore, they have committed offence under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. Hence, it is prayed that the present petition may kindly be dismissed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted written synopsis on 28.06.2021 reiterating the averments already made in the petition. He placed reliance on the decisions of judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The relevant paras thereof are reproduced as under:- In Thermax Limited & others Vs. K.M. Johny & others, (2011) 13 SCC 412 :- “34. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted written synopsis on 28.06.2021 reiterating the averments already made in the petition. He placed reliance on the decisions of judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. The relevant paras thereof are reproduced as under:- In Thermax Limited & others Vs. K.M. Johny & others, (2011) 13 SCC 412 :- “34. The principles enunciated from the above quoted decisions clearly show that for proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Code, the complaint must disclose relevant material ingredients of Sections 405, 406, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. If there is a flavour of civil nature, the same cannot be agitated in the form of criminal proceeding. If there is huge delay and in order to avoid the period of limitation, it cannot be resorted to a criminal proceeding. 37. It is settled law that the essential ingredients for an offence under Section 420, which we have already extracted, is that there has to be dishonest intention to deceive another person. We have already quoted the relevant allegations in the complaint and perusal of the same clearly shows that no such dishonest intention can be seen or even inferred inasmuch as the entire dispute pertains to contractual obligations between the parties. Since the very ingredients of Section 420 are not attracted, the prosecution initiated is wholly untenable. Even if we admit that allegations in the complaint do make out a dispute, still it ought to be considered that the same is merely a breach of contract and the same cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction. Inasmuch as there are number of documents to show that appellant-Company had acted in terms of the agreement and in a bona fide manner, it cannot be said that the act of the appellant-Company amounts to a breach of contract. In Uma Shankar Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar & another, (2005) 10 SCC 336 :- “6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is made out much less offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC. In Uma Shankar Gopalika Vs. State of Bihar & another, (2005) 10 SCC 336 :- “6. Now the question to be examined by us is as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is made out much less offences under Sections 420/120-B IPC. The only allegation in the complaint petition against the accused persons is that they assured the complainant that when they receive the insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant out of that but the same has never been paid. Apart from that there is no other allegation in the petition of complaint. It was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant to agree so that the accused persons may take steps for moving the Consumer Forum in relation to the claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.” In Maksud Saiyed Vs. State of Gujarat & others, (2008) 5 SCC 668 :- “13.......The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.” In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited Vs. Rajvir Industries Limited & others, (2008) 13 SCC 678 :- “18. It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised, but some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court as for example State of Haryana Vs. It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised, but some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court as for example State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Others [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 ], Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Another Vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Another [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 ], Indian Oil Corp. Vs. NEPC India Ltd. and Others [ (2006) 6 SCC 736 ]. 19. In Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court held; “102 (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 20. We may also place on record that criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise abuse of the process of court.” In Sharon Michael & others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & another, (2009) 3 SCC 375 :- “16. The First Information Report contains details of the terms of contract entered into by and between the parties as also the mode and manner in which they were implemented. Allegations have been made against the appellants in relation to execution of the contract. No case of criminal misconduct on their part has been made out before the formation of the contract. There is nothing to show that the appellants herein who hold different positions in the appellant-company made any representation in their personal capacities and, thus, they cannot be made vicariously liable only because they are employees of the company.” In Pepsi Foods Ltd. & another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 :- “22. It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this court examined the extraordinary power under article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to the followed by the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guideline is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure, The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records annexed with the case with utmost satisfaction and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 12. Learned State counsel as well as counsel for respondent No. 2 would submit that the matter is under investigation, therefore, the validity of the allegations made in the FIR cannot be examined at this juncture. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 would submit that the petitioners have not returned vehicle No. CG 04 ZX 7777 modifying the same as Bugatti Car and they have already taken Rs. 88 lacs, thus, they have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. 13. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 would submit that the petitioners have not returned vehicle No. CG 04 ZX 7777 modifying the same as Bugatti Car and they have already taken Rs. 88 lacs, thus, they have committed offence punishable under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. 13. Before examining the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to examine whether on the basis of allegations contained in FIR and also the material collected by the prosecution, prima facie, the offence alleged against the petitioners, is made out or not, attracting the provisions of Sections 405, 406 & 420 of IPC. For ready reference, those provisions are extracted below:- “405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust. 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust. —Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 14. From facts of the case, averments made in the petition and reply filed by respondent No. 2, it is quite clear that the petitioners have nowhere disputed that vehicle No. CG 04 CT 7777 has been returned to respondent No. 2. From facts of the case, averments made in the petition and reply filed by respondent No. 2, it is quite clear that the petitioners have nowhere disputed that vehicle No. CG 04 CT 7777 has been returned to respondent No. 2. There is no pleading about returning of the said vehicle by them though there is specific averment in the FIR with regard to vehicle No. CG 04 CT 7777 that the said vehicle received from respondent No. 2 and same has not been returned to respondent No. 2, and no rejoinder has been filed by the petitioners refuting the specific allegation made by respondent No.2 with regard to non return of vehicle No. CG 04 CT 7777. This, prima-facie, establishes that the vehicle is still in possession of the petitioners. 15. The petitioners have not given any reply to the notice dated 16.01.2016 (Annexure P/4), which has been issued by Police Station- Telibandha, Raipur asking them to explain why the car after modification, has not been returned to respondent No. 2. In this notice wherein it has been specifically observed by Police Station-Telibandha with regard to the car which has been converted into Bugatti car is of different engine and chaises number which has been returned to them by the respondent No.2. These facts have not been properly explained by the petitioners in the petition. Thus, prima facie, there are sufficient material in the writ petition against the petitioners to establish criminal breach of trust by the petitioners as they have not returned the vehicle CG 04 CT 7777 to respondent No. 2 and thus, committed the offence under Sections 406, 420 & 34 of I.P.C. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that no ingredient of cheating is made out, which reflects from bare perusal of FIR. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that no ingredient of cheating is made out, which reflects from bare perusal of FIR. Prima-facie, the ingredient of offence under Section 420 of I.P.C. is reflected in the FIR, which has been lodged by respondent No. 2 at Police Station- Telibandha, which reads as under:- ^^eSa xksYMu Vkoj ds ikl OghvkbZih jksM rsyhcka/kk jk;iqj eas jgrk gwaW oanuk b.MLVªht jk;iqj eas Mk;jsDVj ds in ij inLFk gwa vkt fnukad 12&09&2017 dks Fkkuk rsyhcka/kk vkdj ,d fyf[kr vkosnu is'k dj jgk gwaA vkosnu udy tsy gSA Áfr] Jheku iqfyl v/kh{kd th dysDVj ifjlj] jk;iqj Nx] fo"k;&01& fnyhi Nkcfj;k 02& dapu gjfd'ku NkcfM+;k ,oa 03& cksfuVks fnyhi NkcfM+;k ds }kjk vekur esa [k;kur fd;k x;k gSA egksn; fuosnu gS fd eSa Ágykn dqekj vxzoky firk Jh fujatu vxzoky mez 54 lky Mk;jsDVj oanuk b.MLVªht fyfeVsM jk;iqj NRrhlx<+] lkfdu LdkbZ xksYMu Vkoj ds ikl] OghvkbZih jksM rsyhcka/kk jk;iqj dk fuoklh gwaA eSus viuh xkM+h gksUMk dkj ftldk uacj CG 04 CT 7777 gS ftldk batu uacj L-15A71228612 gS ftldk psfll uacj MAKGM253J-AN113713 gS ;g xkM+h eSa cqdkVh (bugatti) VkbZi cukus fn;k ftlds ,ot esa mlds ekax ds vuqlkj 88 yk[k :i;s psd fn;k gwa fnyhi NkcfM+;k }kjk xkM+h dks vHkh rd cuk ds ugha fn;k gS vkSj eq>ls xkM+h cukus dh dher 88 yk[k ys fy;k gS fnyhi NkcfM+;k }kjk esjh xkM+h ds cnys esa nwljh xkM+h cukdj Hkst fn;k Fkk eSus batu ,oa psfll uacj dks psd djus ij og xkM+h esjh ugha Fkh rks eSus og xkM+h okfil Hkst fn;k mlds ckn fnyhi NkcfM+;k esjs xkM+h dks cukdj ugha ns jgk gS vkSj viuh xyrhekurs gq, 45 yk[k :i;s eq>s okil dj fn;k gS ckdh 43 yk[k :i;s vkSj xkM+h vkt rd ugha okil fn;k gS vr% Jheku th ls ÁkFkZuk gS fd fnyhi NkcfM+;k ,oa ds fo:) /kks[kk/kM+h ,oa vekur esa [k;kur ds vijk/k ntZ dj mfpr dkuwuh dk;Zokgh djus dh d`ik djsaA** 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that it is purely contractual dispute, therefore, the registration of FIR is prima facie illegal .This submission cannot be accepted by this court as In the instant case, on a careful reading of the complaint/FIR, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the commission of an offence. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that it is purely contractual dispute, therefore, the registration of FIR is prima facie illegal .This submission cannot be accepted by this court as In the instant case, on a careful reading of the complaint/FIR, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose the commission of an offence. The ingredients of the offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC cannot be said to be absent on the basis of the allegations in the complaint/ F.I.R. It is well settled preposition of law that whether the allegations in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract that does not by itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing such proceedings 18. Thus, it is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that at the time of framing the charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged persons and at that stage also evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the commission of the crime. 19. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the petitioners are director of the Company and that they had no direct correspondence or dealing with respondent No.2 and has regular dealing with Pune office as such in absence of a specific allegation against the petitioners and further submission that Chhattisgarh Police has no jurisdiction as no cause of action arose at Chhattisgarh, still registration of FIR against them is abuse of process cannot be examined at this stage as stand taken by the petitioners seems to be their defence, which cannot be adjudicated by this Court while hearing this petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., as this is matter of evidence, which will be collected during investigation and evidence adduced before the Court. 20. 20. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of A.P. Vs. Golconda Linga Swamy & another, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , held as under:- “10. In all these cases there was either statements of witnesses or seizure of illicit distilled liquor which factors cannot be said to be without relevance. Whether the material already in existence or to be collected during investigation would be sufficient for holding the concerned accused persons guilty has to be considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the charge it can be decided whether prima facie case has been made out showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged persons. At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing possibility about the commission of the crime as against certainty. That being so, the interference at the threshold with the F.I.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances as held in R.P. Kapoor and Bhajan Lal cases (supra). 11. Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases. 12. So far as Criminal Appeal Nos. 1183/2003, 1193-1196/2003 and Criminal Appeals arising out of SLPs(Crl.) Nos. 2191/2003, 2632/2003, 2633/2003, and 3463/2003 are concerned, we find that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence without anything being added or subtracted from the recitals therein. Though the FIR is not intended to be an encyclopedia of the background scenario, yet even skeletal features must disclose the commission of an offence. The position is not so in these cases. Therefore, the High Court's interference does not suffer from any legal infirmity, though the reasonings indicated by the High Court do not have our approval.” 21. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar & others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , held as under:- “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., must make a just and rightful choice. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar & others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , held as under:- “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of allegations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused is. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so, because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed, by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position, that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charges levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 22. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of Telangana Vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani & others, (2017) 2 SCC 779 , held as under:- 15. We have referred to the said decisions only to stress upon the issue, how the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in a proceeding relating to quashment of FIR can be justified. We repeat even at the cost of repetion that the said power has to be exercised in a very sparing manner and is not to be used to choke or smother the prosecution that is legitimate. The surprise that was expressed almost four decades ago in Kurukshetra University case compels us to observe that we are also surprised by the impugned order.” 23. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, AIR 2021 SC 1918 , held as under:- “23. …........ The surprise that was expressed almost four decades ago in Kurukshetra University case compels us to observe that we are also surprised by the impugned order.” 23. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, AIR 2021 SC 1918 , held as under:- “23. …........ in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under : (i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; (ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; (iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; (iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). (v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; (vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; (vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; (viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; (ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; (x) Save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; (xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; (xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; (xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; (xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; (xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;” 24. From perusal of above judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of exercise of inherent power by the High Court, the only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of process of Court. The Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of putting a halt to the known procedure of law, it must use proper circumspection with great care and caution to interfere in the complaint/FIR/in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 25. The Criminal Procedure Code contains a detailed procedure for investigation, framing of charge and trial, and in the event when the High Court is desirous of putting a halt to the known procedure of law, it must use proper circumspection with great care and caution to interfere in the complaint/FIR/in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 25. From the above discussion, considering the facts, material place on record it is quite clear that vehicle, which was given to the petitioners, has not been returned after modification. This, prima facie, shows that the petitioners have intention to cheat respondent No. 2 and have already taken the entire amount of vehicle. This clearly shows that prima facie there is ingredient of cheating by the petitioners therefore, this Criminal Misc petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 26. From facts and material placed on record, it establishes the charges of prima facie cheating and misappropriation of property against the petitioners is made in the F.I.R. This Court vide order dated 06.10.2017 directed interim protection in favour of the petitioners which is being continued, stands vacated by dismissal of this petition. However, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed anything on merits of this case and facts have been considered for adjudication of the present Criminal Petition. The prosecution is directed to proceed further, in accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the observations made by this court while deciding criminal petition. 27. As an upshot, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.