JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is filed challenging the dismissal of claim petition under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”, for short). 2. The case put forth by the Tribunal was that the claimant and his wife were proceeding on a motorcycle and since a dog suddenly came across their path, the claimant lost control and both of them fell off the motorcycle and as a result of this fall, the claimant and his wife sustained grievous injuries and ultimately his wife succumbed to the same. 3. The claimant contending that his wife was working as a medical assistant on a salary of Rs.4,000/- per month initiated proceedings under Section 163A of the MV Act. 4. The Tribunal has by the impugned order dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the claimant had borrowed the vehicle and since the accident had occurred when he was riding this borrowed motorcycle, he had stepped into shoes of the owner and was therefore himself liable to pay the compensation. 5. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the claimant would be disentitled to compensation for the death of a pillion rider, who was his wife, on the premise that he had borrowed the vehicle and was riding the motorcycle and was himself responsible for the accident. 6. A brief overview of the provisions of the MV Act would be necessary in order to answer this question. 7. The MV Act, which is a law relating to motor vehicles, realising the fact that occurrence of accidents arising out of the use of motor vehicles is unavoidable provides not only for providing of insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks but also for payment of compensation to victims of accidents arising out of the motor vehicle. 8. The scheme of the MV Act creates a liability to pay compensation to victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in four different ways. 9. 8. The scheme of the MV Act creates a liability to pay compensation to victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in four different ways. 9. The first liability to pay compensation to victims is created under Section 140 of the MV Act, whereby, on the principle of no fault, a liability is created on the owner of a motor vehicle or the owners of motor vehicles (when more than one vehicle is involved) to pay compensation, whenever a death or a permanent disablement has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. 10. The liability to pay compensation under Section 140 is however limited to a fixed sum of Rs.50,000/- in case of death and Rs.25,000/- in cases of permanent disablement. If a claim is raised under Section 140, the claimant is not required to plead or prove that the death or permanent disablement had occurred due to the wrongful act of either the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or for that matter of any person. Section 140 also makes it clear that a claim under that section cannot be defeated on the ground that the person who was killed or suffered a disablement was responsible for the accident. 11. Thus, if a victim of an accident were to opt to make a claim under Section 140, the question as to who was responsible for the accident would not be of any consequence or relevance and the victim would be entitled for a fixed sum of compensation. 12. To put it differently, the victim of an accident would be entitled to a fixed sum of compensation, whether the owner was at fault or the victim himself was at fault. The objective which stands out from Section 140 is that the law mandates that the victim of a motor vehicle accident is bound to get compensation from the owner without reference to the person responsible for the accident. This establishes without a shadow of doubt that the MV Act is a piece of legislation which has been framed to ensure a victim is granted compensation whenever he suffers a motor vehicle accident. 13. This establishes without a shadow of doubt that the MV Act is a piece of legislation which has been framed to ensure a victim is granted compensation whenever he suffers a motor vehicle accident. 13. The only other thing that is striking in Chapter X of the MV Act is that the right to claim compensation under Section 140 is in addition to the right of a victim to claim compensation under any other provision of the Act, except the right to claim under Section 163A of the Act. This means that if a person makes a claim under Section 140, he can also make a claim under Section 166 but cannot make a claim under Section 163A. 14. The second liability for payment of compensation is under Section 161, which is titled as a “Special provision payment of compensation in respect of hit and run cases”. 15. Section 161 (2) starts off with a non obstante clause which mandates that the General Insurance Corporation of India formed under the said Act and the insurance companies carrying on the business of general insurance in India are obliged to provide for payment of compensation in respect of death or grievous hurt to persons resulting from hit and run accidents. The amount payable as compensation is stipulated to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the scheme framed. 16. Section 161 (3) states that in respect of death of any person, a sum of Rs.25,000/- is required to be paid and in cases of grievous hurt, a fixed sum of Rs.12,500/- is required to be paid. 17. The notable feature of this provision is that even when the motor vehicle which caused the accident is unknown and as a consequence the insurer is not even in the picture, nevertheless, the compensation of a fixed sum is still required to be paid to a victim of a motor vehicle accident. This compensation, most notably, is to be paid by contribution from all the insurance companies in India who are engaged in the business of general insurance. 18. Thus, even when the basic element of indemnity to an owner of motor vehicle which is required to be provided by an insurer under the Act is not even in existence, the insurance companies are nevertheless made liable to pay a fixed compensation. 18. Thus, even when the basic element of indemnity to an owner of motor vehicle which is required to be provided by an insurer under the Act is not even in existence, the insurance companies are nevertheless made liable to pay a fixed compensation. This, in a sense, creates an obligation on the Insurers to pay compensation even when they have not insured any person whose use of the motor vehicle caused the accident. 19. This provision reemphasises and reinforces the overarching objective of the law, which is to ensure that the victims of a motor vehicle accident are compensated, even if by a small measure, by payment of fixed sums of compensation from contributions of all the insurance companies. The fact that the payment of compensation is made liable to be paid under special provisions indicates that the legislature intended to create special liabilities on the insurance companies. 20. The third liability created for payment of compensation is under Section 163A of the Act. This provision is also titled as “Special provisions for payment of compensation”. The use of the term ‘Special provisions’ connotes special significance since the legislature by inserting Section 163A in 1994, was creating a unique and extraordinary liability for payment of compensation by means of a special provision. 21. Section 163A starts off with a non-obstante clause. This clause declares that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force or an instrument having the force of law, the owner of the vehicle or the authorised insurer, shall be liable to pay compensation as indicated in the second schedule, in the case of death or permanent disablement due to an accident which arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. This compensation is required to be paid to the legal heirs of a victim. 22. A plain reading of this provision would mean that no matter what is stated in any other provisions of the MV Act or for that matter any other law, whenever an accident occurs due to the use of a motor vehicle which results in the death or permanent disablement of a person, the heirs of that person (in case of death) or the victim (in case of permanent disablement), would have to be paid compensation as indicated in the second schedule. 23. 23. In other words, whenever an accident occurs due to the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death or disablement, the legal heirs of the victim or the victim will have to be paid compensation as indicated in the second schedule and this compensation is required to be paid by the owner or the authorised insurer. 24. As the section starts off with a non-obstante clause, the normal and general principles governing the claim for compensation under the MV Act or for that matter any other law can have no application. Furthermore, since the lawmakers have used the word “special provisions for payment of compensation” in this section, this provision has to be read and understood without reference to the general principles governing tort law. 25. This would mean that a special liability is created whenever an accident occurs resulting in the death or disablement and this extraordinary liability created cannot be escaped by recourse to the general principles governing the payment of compensation to accidents arising out of the use of Motor Vehicles act. 26. In order to ensure that this liability is not avoided, Sub-section (2) of Section 163A makes it clear that in a claim under Section 163(1) the claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or disablement was due to the wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. 27. This would simply mean that in a proceeding for compensation under Section 163A, the person responsible for the accident, whether it is the owner or for that matter any other person would be completely irrelevant. This use of the expression of any other person would also bring within its ambit the victim of the accident since it is the clear intent of the law that the person responsible for the accident is irrelevant for purpose of payment of compensation to the victims or the legal heirs of the victim. 28. This use of the expression of any other person would also bring within its ambit the victim of the accident since it is the clear intent of the law that the person responsible for the accident is irrelevant for purpose of payment of compensation to the victims or the legal heirs of the victim. 28. The use of the term any other person used in this sub section would indicate that the element of human error in an accident would be of no consequence at all and all that is required for compensation to be paid is that there should be a motor vehicle accident resulting in death or permanent disablement and this would create a special liability to pay compensation on the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer to the legal heirs or the victim of the accident. 29. Three factors are to be noticed on a comparative reading of Sections 140 and 163A. The first factor is the lack of a non obstante clause in Section 140. The second factor is the use of the term “special provisions” and the third factor is the absence of the word “authorized insurer” in Section 140. These three factors would indicate that the liability to pay compensation under Section 163A is an extraordinary liability and this would mean that this liability cannot be controlled or limited by the operation of any other provisions of the Act. The liability created under Section 163A will have to be therefore construed independently and distinctly and should only be in the manner expressed in the section. 30. The objective behind creating this special liability would be obvious if the second schedule is read. This special liability is created is only in respect of those class of victims whose annual income is less than Rs.40,000/- per annum. In other words, the legislature wanted to afford a special cover for those classes of victims who were not affluent and who would be in a real crisis in the event of an accident. This special liability is created is only in respect of those class of victims whose annual income is less than Rs.40,000/- per annum. In other words, the legislature wanted to afford a special cover for those classes of victims who were not affluent and who would be in a real crisis in the event of an accident. The Legislature intended that when these class of people decided to seek for compensation, it would not be necessary for them to establish as to who was responsible for the accident and all that is required to be pleaded and proved is the occurrence of the accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle resulting in the death or permanent disablement. Once these two factors are established, the liability of the owner of the vehicle or that of the authorised insurer to pay compensation as per the second schedule is automatic. 31. The language employed in Section 163A makes it abundantly clear that the only thing that will have to be established in a claim under Section 163A is that an accident occurred due to the use of a motor vehicle and this had resulted in death or permanent disablement. If these two factors, namely an accident and a death or permanent disablement are established, the liability to pay compensation would be attracted notwithstanding whatever was stated in any other provision of the Act or for that matter any other law. 32. Since the section clearly states that the owner or the authorised insurer is required to pay compensation, it is plain and obvious that the owner is required to pay the compensation and if he has obtained an insurance policy, that insurer is required to pay compensation. 33. In view of the wording of the section, no other issue except the factum of the accident or the death or permanent disablement can be determined in a claim under Section 163A and the moment that the above two facts are established, the owner of the vehicle, when he has failed to obtain an insurance policy, he would be liable to pay compensation. If on the other hand he has secured an insurance policy, the authorised insurer would be liable to pay the compensation. 34. If on the other hand he has secured an insurance policy, the authorised insurer would be liable to pay the compensation. 34. This would be clear from a reading of Section 149 of the Act, which states that if after a person has been issued with a certificate of insurance, in respect of a liability under Section 147 (1) (b) or under the provisions of Section 163A, an award is obtained against the person (insured), then it is the duty of the insurer to satisfy the compensation as if he were the judgment debtor to the extent of the sum assured along with costs and interest. 35. The use of the specific term Section163A in Section 149 makes it clear that every policy of insurance issued under Section 147 would also have to encompass the liability to pay compensation under the special provision of Section 163A apart from the liability under Section 147 (1) (b). This clearly indicates that the liability under Section 147 (1) (b) and Section 163A has been considered as two distinct liabilities and each of them would operate independent of each other. 36. Thus, if as a result of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, death or permanent disablement occurs, the victim or the heirs of the victim would be entitled to compensation as indicated in the second schedule. The insurer which has issued a policy in terms of Section 147 would become liable for compensation payable under Section 163A of the MV Act apart from the liability under Section 147 (1) (b) of the MV Act. 37. It is to be noticed here that by virtue of the fact that the liability created under Section 163A is titled as a special provision and does away with the need to determine the question of negligence, the moment the accident and the consequential death or permanent disablement is established in a claim under Section 163A, the insurer is bound to pay the compensation. No other questions would have to be entered into in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. The situation, would however, be different, if the claim was under Section 166 as narrated below. 38. The fourth liability to pay compensation under the Act is under Section 165 and Section 166. No other questions would have to be entered into in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. The situation, would however, be different, if the claim was under Section 166 as narrated below. 38. The fourth liability to pay compensation under the Act is under Section 165 and Section 166. Under Section 165, the Claims Tribunal is required to adjudicate upon claims of compensation in respect of accidents involving the death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or in respect of damages to any property of a third party. 39. The Legislature has deliberately used the word “adjudicate” in Section 165 and this term is conspicuously absent in Section 140 and Section 163A thereby meaning it is only in claims under Section 166 that there is a requirement for an adjudication of a claim for compensation. In other words, it is only in a proceeding under Sections 165 and 166 that an inquiry as contemplated under Section 168 is required to be undertaken by the Tribunal and an adjudication would have to be made as to who was at fault and a determination should also be made regarding the compensation payable and further specify the person who is required to pay the compensation. The Tribunal is also empowered to specify the amount which is required to be paid by the insurer or owner or the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. 40. Thus, only if the claim is made under Chapter XII of the Act, adjudication would be contemplated or deemed permissible for determination of the “fault” factor in an accident and a consequential determination of the compensation payable and the person who is required to pay the said compensation. 41. It is therefore clear that on a collective reading of the provisions relating to liability to pay compensation, it is only in a proceeding under Chapter XII i.e., on an application under Section 166, that the Tribunal can get into the question of determining who was at fault and specify not only the compensation payable but more importantly specify whether the insurer or the owner or the driver or all of them are liable to pay the compensation. 42. 42. As a corollary, in a proceeding under Section 163A, the Tribunal can only proceed to decide whether the accident arose due to the use of a motor vehicle and if the answer to the said question is affirmative, then it would have to direct the owner or the authorised insurer to pay the compensation. The question of who was at fault or negligent is a factor which would be completely outside the purview of a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. 43. The next question that would arise is what is the limit and extent of liability of the insurer in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. 44. Chapter XI of the MV Act deals with the statutory requirement of providing insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks. Section 146 makes it a necessity for every motor vehicle to have a policy of insurance in compliance of the provisions of Chapter XI and it bars any person from permitting the use of the vehicle unless there is a policy of insurance in force, subject to the exceptions carved out in the section. 45. Section 147 mandates the requirements of the policies and the limits of its liability. As far as the requirements of the policy is concerned, Sub-section (1) mandates that in order to comply with the requirement of the chapter, the policy is required to be issued by an authorised insurer and the policy should cover (a). any liability incurred by the insured in respect of any death or bodily injury to any person, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or (b). damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle. 46. This is, however, subject to two exceptions that are carved out in the proviso. The first exception is that the policy need not cover the liability of any employee of the insured and the second exception is that the policy is not required to cover any contractual liability. Thus, apart from the above mentioned two exceptions, the insurer is required to cover the liability incurred by the insured in respect of any death or bodily injury to any person arising out of the use of the vehicle. 47. Sub-section (2) however qualifies this liability to the limits mentioned therein. Thus, apart from the above mentioned two exceptions, the insurer is required to cover the liability incurred by the insured in respect of any death or bodily injury to any person arising out of the use of the vehicle. 47. Sub-section (2) however qualifies this liability to the limits mentioned therein. Sub-section (2)(a) states that the limit of the liability in so far as death or bodily injured would be to the amount of liability incurred. Sub-section (2)(b) states that in cases of damage to any property of a third party, the limit of the liability would be Rs.6,000/-. 48. Sub-section (3) stipulates the manner, procedure and form of the policy that would have to be followed by the Insurer, while Sub-section (4) prescribes the procedure that the Insurer is required to follow in cases where a cover note is issued but not followed up by issuance of a policy of insurance. 49. Sub-section (5) which begins with a non-obstante clause declares that an insurer issuing a policy under Section 147 shall be liable to indemnify the insured in respect of any liability that the policy purports to cover. 50. Section 149 of the Act casts a duty on the insurers to satisfy the judgements and awards made against the persons insured in respect of third party risks. This section states that if after a certificate of insurance is issued to the insured, a judgment or award in respect of any liability covered under Section 147(1) (b) or under Section 163A is obtained, then the insurer though entitled to avoid or to cancel the policy, is bound to pay the person entitled to the benefit under the decree. 51. Thus, if an insurer has issued a policy in conformity with Section 147 (1)(b), the insurer will have to satisfy the compensation awarded under Section 163A or under Section 140 or Section 166. Since Section 149 expressly states that the insurer would be liable to pay the compensation under Section 147 (1)(b) or under Section 163A, the special liability created under Section 163A cannot be overcome or disregarded by the Insurer. 52. In other words, since the liability created under Section 147 (1)(b) and Section 163A are independent of each other, the liability to pay compensation under Section 163A cannot be subject to the limitations set under Section 147 (1)(b). 52. In other words, since the liability created under Section 147 (1)(b) and Section 163A are independent of each other, the liability to pay compensation under Section 163A cannot be subject to the limitations set under Section 147 (1)(b). The liability to pay compensation as prescribed under Section 163A being a special liability created under the Act would prevail and would stand alone. It is to be stated here that in Section 149 the legislature has expressly mentioned both Section 147 (1)(b) and Section 163A and it is, therefore, clear that the limitations of liability contemplated under Section 147 (1)(b) cannot be applied to the liability prescribed under Section 163A. In other words, the special liability created under the special provision of Section 163A would be independent and would not be relatable to the liability created under Section 147 (1)(b). 53. In view of the nonobstante clause used in Section 163A and the specific mention of Section 163A in Section 149, the liability to pay compensation under Section 163A, being titled as a special provision, nothing contained in Section 147 (1)(b) would apply to the liability created under Section 163A. The conclusion therefore would be that the special liability created under Section 163A cannot be diluted or affected by any other provisions of the MV Act. 54. It is therefore clear that whenever an accident occurs arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, the insurer would be liable to pay the compensation as provided under Section 163A and this liability being a special liability created under the statute it cannot be saddled with the limitations provided regarding the liability stipulated under Section 147 of the MV Act. 55. To put it differently, the special liability under Section 163A cannot be diluted or superseded by the limitations or the extent of a liability created under any other provisions of the MV Act and this liability is a ‘stand alone’ liability and the insurer is mandated to cover this liability. 56. Viewed from this background it will have to be now seen whether the Insurer can exonerate itself of the liability under Section 163A by stating (a). that the rider of the vehicle was responsible or (b). that the owner of the vehicle, being the rider, cannot be granted compensation for his own fault or (c). 56. Viewed from this background it will have to be now seen whether the Insurer can exonerate itself of the liability under Section 163A by stating (a). that the rider of the vehicle was responsible or (b). that the owner of the vehicle, being the rider, cannot be granted compensation for his own fault or (c). that the borrower of the vehicle, having stepped into the shoes of the owner, no liability would be created for the mistake of the borrower (d). that the pillion rider cannot claim compensation for the negligence of the owner or the rider of the motor vehicle. 57. As stated above, Section 163A is a stand alone provision whereby a special provision has been made for payment of compensation under a structured formula basis. Since this is a special liability created under the statute, the liability will have to be as stipulated in Section 163A of the Act. The liability created under Section 163A would stand attracted the moment there is an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle and there is a consequential death of disablement. No other factor would be germane to a proceeding under Section 163A and the moment this special liability is attracted, the owner or the authorised insurer (when the vehicle is insured) will have to satisfy the liability and they cannot be permitted to raise any plea, either regarding the negligence or the entitlement of the claimant. 58. It is for this precise reason that Section 163A (2) states that the claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement occurred due to the wrongful act of neglect of or default of the owner of the vehicle or the vehicle or of any other person. Thus, even if there was neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person, the special statutory liability under Section 163A would still be attracted. 59. Thus, the question as to who was riding the vehicle or who was responsible for the accident or the relationship of the victim in relation to the motor vehicle and its owner becomes completely irrelevant as far as the liability to pay compensation under Section 163A is concerned. 60. 59. Thus, the question as to who was riding the vehicle or who was responsible for the accident or the relationship of the victim in relation to the motor vehicle and its owner becomes completely irrelevant as far as the liability to pay compensation under Section 163A is concerned. 60. It therefore follows that (a) whether the owner was driving the vehicle or (b) whether the vehicle was borrowed and was being driven by any another person or (c) whether the accident occurred due to a wrongful act of the rider or (d) whether the rider can take advantage of his wrong, all become immaterial in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. 61. Similarly, the status of the victim vis-à-vis the vehicle would also be irrelevant and whether the victim was an occupant of the vehicle or was outside the vehicle would also be of no consequence. The only thing that is necessary for a claim under Section 163A is that the victim should have suffered an accident which had resulted in death or permanent disablement and these two incidents should be relatable to the use of the motor vehicle. 62. To put it in simple words, if an accident occurs due to the use of a motor vehicle, the victim will be entitled to compensation as per the second schedule if the accident and the resultant death or permanent disablement is established and this compensation would have to be paid by the owner or in cases where the vehicle is insured, by the insurer. No other question would arise for determination in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. 63. It is to be stated here that since the concept of “fault” is irrelevant in a proceeding under Section 163A, the question of disentitling the claimant on the ground that he was a tort feasor would not be available to either the owner or the insurer. The claimant can therefore also seek for compensation if the victim of the accident is related to him or if he is dependent on the victim. 64. A three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakant Tiwari Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., and another (2020) 7 SCC 386 has held as follows: “12. The claimant can therefore also seek for compensation if the victim of the accident is related to him or if he is dependent on the victim. 64. A three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Chandrakant Tiwari Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., and another (2020) 7 SCC 386 has held as follows: “12. In this view of the matter, it is not relevant that the person insured must be the driver of the vehicle but may well have been riding with somebody else driving a vehicle which resulted in the death of the person driving the vehicle. The High Court, therefore, is clearly wrong in stating that it was necessary under Section 163A to prove that somebody else was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently, as a result of which, the death of the victim would take place. 13. Further, it is also clear, as has been pointed out hereinabove, that so far as the driving licence aspect of the case is concerned, it was squarely given up be the insurance company before the MACT, but then utilised by the High Court to disentitle the claimant to relief. On this ground also, the High Court is incorrect.” 65. As held by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned case, in a case arising out of under Section 163A, it is not necessary to plead or establish that the death or disablement was due to the negligence or default of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. 66. This would thus indicate that the negligence or default on the part of any person in relation to the motor vehicle was irrelevant and cannot be taken into consideration. 67. Another three judge bench of the Apex Court in the case of Shivaji and Others Vs. Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Co Ltd. AIR 2018 SC 3705 has held as follows: “5. Having regard to the above position, the civil appeal will have to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court absolving the insurer is set aside and the order of the Tribunal is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.” 68. Having regard to the above position, the civil appeal will have to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court absolving the insurer is set aside and the order of the Tribunal is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.” 68. In this case, the Apex Court has held that the Insurer cannot be permitted to raise the plea of negligence and if that was permitted, a proceeding under Section 163A would become on par with a proceeding under Section 166. This thus makes it clear that the requirements in a proceeding under Section 163A can be governed only by limitations found in the said provision and limitations prescribed under other provisions of the Act cannot be imported. 69. Another three Judges bench of the Apex Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Limited Vs. Sunil Kumar and Another AIR 2017 SC 5710 has held at paragraphs 8 and 9 as follows: “8. From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under Section 163A of the Act on the basis of the structured formula is in the nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by Section 163A(2). Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the Insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by Section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the Insurer and/or to understand the provisions of Section 163A of the act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of Section 163A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time. In fact, to understand Section 163A of the Act to permit the Insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention. 9. In fact, to understand Section 163A of the Act to permit the Insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the act it is not open for the Insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the Victim.” 70. In this case, the Apex Court has clearly held that if an insurer is permitted to raise the defence of proof of negligence in a proceeding under Section 163A, it would defeat the legislative objective of providing compensation to victims without subjecting them to long drawn out litigation. Thus, the Insurers are forbidden from raising any plea regarding negligence. Further since Section 163A (2) stipulates the neglect or default of the owner or any other person is irrelevant for deciding a claim under Section 163A, the Insurer cannot bring up the neglect of any person connected with the accident. 71. The learned counsel for the Insurer however sought to place reliance on the decision of the 2 judge bench of the Apex Court in the case of Ramkhiladi and others Vs. The United India Insurance Company and others AIR 2020 SC 527 to contend that the claimant, being a borrower of the motorcycle, could not claim compensation for his own negligent act which resulted in the death of his wife. 72. As could be seen from the abovementioned decisions rendered by bench of 3 Judges, the Insurer is forbidden from raising the plea of negligence and the negligence of either the owner of the vehicle or of any other person would be irrelevant in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act. Further more, in the case of Ram Khiladi (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a claim for compensation for the death of the rider of the motorcycle raised only against the owner and insurer of the motorcycle and in that context the Apex Court held that the rider of the motorcycle had stepped into the shoes of the owner and since a owner could not claim compensation against his own insurer, the claim could not be entertained. However, in this case, the claim is by the pillion rider and hence, the said decision cannot be made applicable. 73. In this case, since admittedly the accident has occurred due to use of a motorcycle it would be irrelevant as to who was the rider of the vehicle and the victim of the accident would have to be compensated as per the compensation set out as per ScheduleII of Section 163A of the Act. 74. In view of the matter, the dismissal of the claim petition cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. 75. The claim petition filed by the claimant is allowed and the claimant would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,55,600/- towards his compensation as per the Second Schedule and the claimant would also entitled to be a sum of Rs.9,500/- as general damages as set out in clause (3) of Schedule-II. 76. Thus, in all the claimant is entitled to Rs.4,62,830/- (Rs.4,65,100/-) with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition till the deposit. 77. The Insurance Company is directed to deposit the compensation amount with interest within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.