JUDGMENT : 1. This is a regular first appeal preferred under Section 96 CPC against the decree and judgment dated 18.02.1997 in O.S.No.35 of 1983 on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Chittoor. 2. The defendants are the appellants. The respondents are the plaintiffs. 3. The respondents laid the suit against the appellants to declare their right and title to the plaint schedule properties and to direct delivery of possession to them by the appellants, in default to deliver through process of Court. 4. The properties described in the plaint schedule shall be called hereinafter as „the suit lands?. They are located in Thavanampalle and Uttarabrahmanapale taluq of Chittoor District. The lands in Thavanampalle are S.Nos.39-2/ 43-2 together an extent of Ac.0-33 cents out of Ac.0-50/Ac.0-50 cents within specified boundaries; S.No.32-2, Ac.0-40 cents out of Ac.1-76 cents with a right in the cart track; and S.No.46-1, Ac.0-10 cents out of Ac.0-95 cents with 1/5th right in the well therein, its embankment, bailing facility and 5 H.P.motor pump etc., along with four (04) coconut trees with a right in the channel for drawing water. The lands in Uttara Brahmanapalli are in S.No.74 of Ac.0-20 cents and in S.No.75/1 of Ac.0-99 cents. 5. The parties are closely related. Smt. Ademma is admittedly was the absolute owner of the suit lands along with other lands, which she had acquired from her mother. Sri Gali Muthyalu Naidu was her husband. He died about 25 years prior to the institution of the suit. Smt. Ademma also died on 27.10.1981. Sri Gangaiah Naidu is the brother of Sri Gali Muthyalu Naidu. Smt. Annapurnamma is the wife of Sri Gangaiah Naidu. 6. Smt. G.Tholasamma-the 1st appellant and Smt. Narayanamma are daughters of Smt.Ademma and Sri G.Ramachandra Naidu, Sri Doraswamy Naidu and Sri Raghunatha Naidu are her sons by Sri Gali Muthyalu Naidu. Smt. Narayanamma had no issues. Sri Doraswamy Naidu and Sri Raghunatha Naidu pre-deceased Smt. Ademma. 7. The appellants 2 to 6 are the sons of the 1st appellant- Smt. Tholasamma. Sri Gorjala Rangaiah Naidu is the husband of the 1st appellant and the father of the appellants 2 to 6. The appellant No.7 is the son of Sri Doraswamy Naidu. The appellant No.8- Sri China Swamy Naidu, is the son of Sri Raghunatha Naidu. Sri China Swamy Naidu died during pendency of the suit leaving behind his son viz., the 9th appellant. 8. The appellant No.7 is the son of Sri Doraswamy Naidu. The appellant No.8- Sri China Swamy Naidu, is the son of Sri Raghunatha Naidu. Sri China Swamy Naidu died during pendency of the suit leaving behind his son viz., the 9th appellant. 8. The respondents 1 to 3 are the sons of G.Ramachandra Naidu and Smt. Padmavatamma. 9. Sons of Smt.Ademma and G.Mutyalu Naidu viz., Sri Ramachandra Naidu, Sri Doraswamy Naidu and Sri Raghunatha Naidu got divided their properties in or about the year 1971. It is also admitted that sons of Smt. Ademma and G.Muthyalu Naidu and Smt. Narayanamma-their daughter were well of and were in a financially sound position. The 1st appellant is a widow and her husband Sri Rangaiah Naidu died in or about 1981 or 1982. She and her family were not in such financially comfortable position like other children of Smt. Ademma and Sri Muthyalu Naidu. 10. Sri G. Ramachandra Naidu and his sons viz., the respondents have all been residing at Chittoor. The appellants have been the residents of Kakkalamitta of Bangarupalem taluq. The father of the respondents began jaggery business as a mundi merchant at Chittoor about 35 years prior to the institution of the suit and began to live at Chittoor away from their native village. 11. The case of the respondents as pleaded in the plaint was that Smt. Ademma out of love and affection and due to attachment which Sri Ramachandra Naidu had with her parents since he was attending to her welfare and necessities, executed a settlement deed on 09.05.1981 settling the suit lands in favour of the respondents conferring absolute rights. Their further case was that Smt. Ademma was staying with them at Chittoor and that though Smt. Ademma was inclined to settle all her properties in their favour, at the instance of their father, as advised by him to give away some properties to the 1st appellant and her sons, she also executed a Will in their favour bequeathing those properties other than the suit lands, belonging to her on 09.05.1981 itself. Their further case pleaded was that these two documents were registered on 12.05.1981 and the suit lands were also delivered in possession to them on the same day. Thus, they claimed that they were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of these lands. 12. Their further case pleaded was that these two documents were registered on 12.05.1981 and the suit lands were also delivered in possession to them on the same day. Thus, they claimed that they were in peaceful possession and enjoyment of these lands. 12. The respondents further pleaded that after registering these documents Smt. Ademma stayed with them at Chittoor and two weeks thereafter, the daughter of the 1st defendant took her to Kakkalamitta. The respondents further pleaded that a notice was issued to their surprise dated 22.05.1981, by Smt. Ademma to their father alleging fraud and coercion in execution of the settlement deed dated 09.05.1981, to which a suitable reply was issued on 05.06.1981 denying the allegations therein asserting genuine nature of the settlement deed and that Smt. Ademma had executed it with full knowledge of its contents. 13. The respondents further pleaded that the legal notice was manoeuvered by the appellants in the name of Smt. Ademma and that the thumb impression appearing of this notice is not of Smt. Ademma. They further claimed that during October, 1981 when their father went to the suit lands for getting ploughed, the appellants resisted on the ground that Smt. Ademma had executed a settlement deed in favour of the appellants 1 to 6 cancelling the settlement deed executed in favour of the respondents. Inspite of remonstration of their father that Smt. Ademma did not have such power to cancel this settlement deed and the cancellation document being void and illegal, when the appellants upon demise of Smt. Ademma forcibly occupied the suit lands, the respondents stated that they were constrained lay the suit for such reliefs. 14. On behalf of the 1st appellant, a written statement was filed denying the claim of the respondents that was adopted by the appellants 2 to 6. The specific contention of these appellants as pleaded in the written statement was that Smt. Ademma was living with them after demise of her husband. They further pleaded that upon death of Sri Muthyalu Naidu, his brother Sri Gangaiah Naidu, as manager of the joint family properties, was looking after its affairs and that there was partition of the properties about 14 years prior to the institution of the suit between Sri Muthyalu Naidu and Sri Gangaiah Naidu and that sons of Sri Muthyalu Naidu also got divided a year later by metes and bounds. They further pleaded that Smt. Ademma was often making plain that she would give away all her properties to the 1st appellant and her children and that the 1st appellant and her sons were in fact managing the lands belonging to Smt. Ademma, cultivating them on her behalf. After division among her sons, these appellants pleaded that Smt. Ademma used to stay either in their house or in the house of Sri Ananda Naidu (7th appellant). They further pleaded that Smt. Ademma died at their house. 15. The appellants 1 to 6 further pleaded that the alleged settlement deed dated 09.05.1981 was an outcome of fraud and was obtained by father of the respondents by misrepresentation taking advantage of old age and ignorance of Smt. Ademma. They further pleaded that father of the respondents in order to obtain the chosen properties of Smt. Ademma by means of settlement deed, had kept her under an impression that she was executing a Will bequeathing her properties in favour of the defendants 1 to 6. They further denied that the suit lands were delivered pursuant to this settlement deed, on the date of its registration and also questioned the alleged claim of their possession and enjoyment. 16. The appellants further pleaded that Smt. Ademma was 80 years old and taking advantage of her illiteracy, since she went to the house of the respondents on 07.05.1981 to have medical treatment since she was suffering from pain at the ear, this document was brought out. They also pleaded that a week later when Smt. Ademma returned to the village and informed the 1st appellant that she had executed a Will bequeathing all her properties to her and her children when she was staying at Chittoor and that the father of the respondents had promised to get the document from the Sub Registrar?s Office, Smt.Ademma sent the 4th respondent two (02) days later to get this document from Sri Ramachandra Naidu. 17. It was also pleaded by the appellants 1 to 6 that when Sri Ramachandra Naidu informed that he did not get this document, two (02) days later again Smt. Ademma had sent her 2nd son Sri China Swamy Naidu to get the document. 17. It was also pleaded by the appellants 1 to 6 that when Sri Ramachandra Naidu informed that he did not get this document, two (02) days later again Smt. Ademma had sent her 2nd son Sri China Swamy Naidu to get the document. The appellants 1 to 6 further pleaded that when Sri China Swamy Naidu met Sri Ramchandra Naidu and finding that Sri Ramachandra Naidu did not receive the document, went to Sub Registrar?s Office, where he came to know that not only a Will but also a settlement deed was executed by Smt. Ademma on which he applied for a copy and that he conveyed the same to Smt. Ademme to her utter surprise. 18. The appellants 1 to 6 further pleaded that on 21.05.1981 Sri China Swamy Naidu brought a copy of the settlement deed from which they came to know that Smt. Ademma was subjected to fraud by her son Sri Ramachandra Naidu in obtaining the settlement deed. The appellants 1 to 6 further pleaded that immediately Smt. Ademma came to Chittoor on 22.05.1981 and got issued a legal notice through her Advocate Sri Munaswami Naidu setting out fraud in obtaining the settlement deed dated 09.05.1981 and that it is vitiated. Denying the contents of the reply notice being false, they further pleaded that Smt.Ademma was always under the impression that she executed a Will relating to her properties bequeathing to appellants 1 to 6. 19. The appellants 1 to 6 further pleaded that Smt. Ademma out of free will and on her volition executed a settlement deed in their favour conveying her properties including the suit lands and the same was accepted by them. Thereafter, according to them, they began to enjoy this land in their own right and interest. They further pleaded that Smt. Ademma also got executed a cancellation deed of the settlement deed dated 09.05.1981 as well as the Will. They denied the alleged possession and enjoyment of the suit lands by the respondents and claimed that they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same either during lifetime of Smt.Ademma or thereafter in their own right to which the respondents cannot have any claim. 20. They denied the alleged possession and enjoyment of the suit lands by the respondents and claimed that they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the same either during lifetime of Smt.Ademma or thereafter in their own right to which the respondents cannot have any claim. 20. The appellants 7 to 9, while denying the claim of the respondents they pleaded in their separate written statement, that Smt.Ademma was very much attached to the 1st appellant and that she was openly proclaiming that she would give away all her properties to the appellants. They further pleaded that Smt.Ademma had never promised them to give any properties or they were expecting. They further stated that the alleged Will dated 09.05.1981 was a manipulation of Sri Ramachandra Naidu with an ulterior motive. 21. Basing on these pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial: “1. Whether the settlement deed dated 09.05.1981 said to have been executed by late Ademma is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 2. Whether the settlement deed said to have been executed by late Ademma in favour of the defendants 1 to 6 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiffs? 3. Whether the defendants 7 to 9 are necessary parties to the suit? 4. Whether the plaintiffs have title to the suit property? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the declaration prayed for? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for delivery of possession of the properties? 7. Whether the properties are not valued properly? 8. Whether the boundaries of the properties given are correct? 9. To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled?” 22. At the trial, the 1st respondent examined himself as P.W.1, one of the attestors to Ex.A1 settlement deed as P.W.2, P.W.3 being Sri Ramachandra Naidu-their father, and P.W.4 and P.W.5 to speak of delivery of possession of the property to them by Smt.Ademma. They relied on Ex.A1 to Ex.A4 in support of their contention. On behalf of the appellants, the 4th appellant was examined as D.W.1 who relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B7. D.W.2 an attestor to Ex.B6 settlement deed though was examined in-chief, did not turn up to face cross-examination and therefore his evidence was eschewed at the trial. 23. Basing on the material, learned trial Judge held that the respondents proved their claim against the appellants accepting Ex.A1 settlement deed. D.W.2 an attestor to Ex.B6 settlement deed though was examined in-chief, did not turn up to face cross-examination and therefore his evidence was eschewed at the trial. 23. Basing on the material, learned trial Judge held that the respondents proved their claim against the appellants accepting Ex.A1 settlement deed. Holding that it effected the transfer of title to the suit lands in favour of the respondents, declared their right and title to the suit lands. Consequently, delivery of possession was also directed in their favour. 24. It is against this decree and judgment, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 25. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the appellants, and Sri S.V.Muni Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted their respective arguments. 26. Now, the following points arise for determination: “1. Whether Ex.A1 settlement deed is an outcome of misrepresentation and fraud on Smt.Ademma by her son Sri Ramachandra Naidu and if it is void, which is not binding on the appellants? 2. Whether the respondents are entitled for declaration of their right and title to the suit lands as well as possession and against the appellants who have set up their right, interest to these lands by virtue of Ex.B6 settlement deed? 3. Whether the decree and judgment under appeal are proper and if require interference? 4. To what relief?” POINT No.1: 27. The respondents have sought the relief of declaration in the title suit. Hence, burden is on them being the plaintiffs to establish the same by cogent, satisfactory and acceptable evidence. They cannot rely on the laches or weakness in the case set up by the appellants, who are the defendants. The judgment of Hon?ble Supreme Court often quoted in this context in Moran Mar Basselios Cathlicas v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 is the authority for this proposition. The same is referred to in Chakicherla Audilakshmamma vs. Atmakuru Ramarao and others, AIR 1973 AP 149 by Division Bench of this Court when it was at Hyderabad reiterating the same principle. It is also reiterated in K.Venkatasubba Reddy vs. Bairagi Ramaiah (died) by L.Rs. 1999(3) ALD 317 . 28. The same principle is applied after considering the effect of Section 101 of the Evidence Act in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through L.Rs. and others vs. K.V.P.Shastri (dead) through L.Rs. and others, 2013(15) SCC 161 . 29. It is also reiterated in K.Venkatasubba Reddy vs. Bairagi Ramaiah (died) by L.Rs. 1999(3) ALD 317 . 28. The same principle is applied after considering the effect of Section 101 of the Evidence Act in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through L.Rs. and others vs. K.V.P.Shastri (dead) through L.Rs. and others, 2013(15) SCC 161 . 29. The fulcrum of the case of the respondents is Ex.A1 settlement deed dated 09.05.1981. Their contention is that Smt.Ademma had executed it on her own volition, free will and being conscious of its nature conferring the suit lands to them. The resistance of the appellants in relation thereto is that Smt. Ademma was always intending to confer all her properties including the suit lands to them in order to support them not only financially but also due to the fact they were attending to her care and necessities, who were cultivating these lands on her behalf. 30. Their further contention is that when Smt.Ademma went to Chittoor along with Sri Ramachandra Naidu, for getting treated for the ear lobe injury, when she stayed with him upon her expression of intention to execute a Will bequeathing all her properties to the appellants 1 to 6, Sri Ramachandra Naidu manipulated in such manner to obtain not only Ex.A1 settlement deed in respect of the suit lands but also a Will on the same day from her bequeathing her other properties to the appellants 1 to 6. Thus, their defence is that Ex.A1 is an outcome of fraud and misrepresentation played by Sri Ramachandra naidu on his mother Smt. Ademma. 31. In the context of this defence, where the execution of Ex.A1 settlement deed and it registration by Smt. Ademma are not disputed but an outcome of a tainted transaction, the burden of proof of genuine nature of Ex.A1 settlement deed initially rests on the respondents. 32. 31. In the context of this defence, where the execution of Ex.A1 settlement deed and it registration by Smt. Ademma are not disputed but an outcome of a tainted transaction, the burden of proof of genuine nature of Ex.A1 settlement deed initially rests on the respondents. 32. In Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami and another, (2011)12 SCC 220 in this context, it is held referring to earlier decision of Hon?ble Supreme Court in Subhra Mukherjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (2000)3 SCC 312 as under: “37.It is further well settled that a suit has to be tried on the basis of the pleadings of the contesting parties which is filed in the suit before the trial court in the form of plaint and written statement and the nucleus of the case of the plaintiff and the contesting case of the defendant in the form of issues emerges out of that. ….. xxx xxxx xxxx 29. It may be relevant at this stage to cite the ratio of the decision of this Court delivered in Subhra Mukherjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 312 : AIR 2000 SC 1203 ] , whether the document in question was genuine or sham or bogus, the party who alleged it to be bogus had to prove nothing until the party relying upon the document established its genuineness. This was the view expressed by this Court in Subhra Mukherjee v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [ (2000) 3 SCC 312 : AIR 2000 SC 1203 ] xxx xxxx xxxx 31. Application of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thus came up for discussion in Subhra Mukherjee case [ (2000) 3 SCC 312 : AIR 2000 SC 1203 ] and while discussing the law on the burden of proof in the context of dealing with the allegation of sham and bogus transaction, it was held that the party which makes the allegation must prove it. But the Court was further pleased to hold, wherein the question before the Court was “whether the transaction in question was a bona fide and genuine one” so that the party/plaintiff relying on the transaction had to first of all prove its genuineness and only thereafter would the defendant be required to discharge the burden in order to dislodge such proof and establish that the transaction was sham and fictitious.” 33. One of the learned single judges of then High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Duddumpuri Venkatarayudu v. Duddumpudi Rajagopal alias Tatabbai and another, 2012(2) ALD 659 in relation to a gift transaction evidence by a registered deed in the given facts and circumstances in similar context observed in para-33 as under: “33. Free will and being in a position to take an independent decision are sine qua non for an individual to bring into existence a valid contract. Since the transaction of a gift is the one not suggested by any consideration, the satisfaction of these two aspects is required to be much more. When the party was not in a position to take any decision, and was in a serious distress, any commitment procured from such person is prone to be treated as tainted with undue influence, or coercion. If the witness, after recovering from the distress, states that she did not know the contents of document when she signed it, a valid gift cannot be said to have been made even if the other requirements of law are satisfied. Therefore, the second substantial question of law is answered in favour of the defendant.” 34. In Vidyadhar vs. Mankikrao and another, it is observed in paras 19 and 20 as under “19. In Lal Achal Ram v. Raja Kazim Husain Khan [(1905) 32 IA 113 : ILR 27 All 271] the Privy Council laid down the principle that a stranger to a sale deed cannot dispute payment of consideration or its adequacy. This decision has since been considered by various High Courts and a distinction has been drawn between a deed which was intended to be real or operative between the parties and a deed which is fictitious in character and was never designed as a genuine document to effect transfer of title. In such a situation, it would be open even to a stranger to impeach the deed as void and invalid on all possible grounds. This was also laid down in Kamini Kumar Deb v. Durga Charan Nag [AIR 1923 Cal 521 : 37 Cal LJ 122] and again in Saradindu Mukherjee v. Kunja Kamini Roy [AIR 1942 Cal 514 : 46 CWN 798] . This was also laid down in Kamini Kumar Deb v. Durga Charan Nag [AIR 1923 Cal 521 : 37 Cal LJ 122] and again in Saradindu Mukherjee v. Kunja Kamini Roy [AIR 1942 Cal 514 : 46 CWN 798] . The Patna High Court in Jugal Kishore Tewari v. Umesh Chandra Tewari [ AIR 1973 Pat 352 : 1973 BLJR 255] and the Orissa High Court in Sanatan Mohapatra v. Hakim Mohammad Kazim Mohmmad [ AIR 1977 Ori 194 : 44 Cut LT 606] have also taken the same view. 20. The above decisions appear to be based on the principle that a person in his capacity as a defendant can raise any legitimate plea available to him under law to defeat the suit of the plaintiff. This would also include the plea that the sale deed by which the title to the property was intended to be conveyed to the plaintiff was void or fictitious or, for that matter, collusive and not intended to be acted upon. Thus, the whole question would depend upon the pleadings of the parties, the nature of the suit, the nature of the deed, the evidence led by the parties in the suit and other attending circumstances….” 35. In the same context, apart from the above rulings, on behalf of the appellants Allam Gangadhara Rao vs. Gollapalli Gangarao, AIR 1968 AP 291 is relied on. 36. Smt. Ademma was ordinarily a resident of Kakkalamitta village. She was not living at Chittoor along with the respondents, though they claimed likewise. By the date of Ex.A1, she was at Chittoor having had come down from her village. In the written statement of the 1st appellant, it is averred that on 07.05.1981, Smt. Ademma followed her son Sri Ramachandra Naidu, for treatment when she complained of pain in ear. It is also clear from the evidence on record and the stand of the parties in this matter manifested that Smt. Ademma wanted to confer all her personal properties to the appellants 1 to 6. The case of the appellants either in the pleadings or in their evidence is that she was expressing her desire to execute a Will in their favour creating a bequest in respect of all her properties. 37. The case of the appellants either in the pleadings or in their evidence is that she was expressing her desire to execute a Will in their favour creating a bequest in respect of all her properties. 37. Therefore, from the circumstances, it is clear that Smt.Ademma had an intention to create a bequest in favour of the appellants 1 to 6 of her properties. The purpose and object of Smt.Ademma for this purpose can well be culled out for the reason that the 1st appellant was a widow and that appellants 1 to 6 were not so affluent similar to her other children. The written statement of the respondents 7 to 9 further strengthens this inference since they clearly stated to that effect. They belonged to the same family and therefore, their version in this respect assumes any amount of significance. 38. Another circumstance to consider in this context is that upon the demise of Smt. Ademma, in usual course the succession opens conferring definite shares in favour of her children, who were alive by then or their successors in interest. When the position of the appellants 7 to 9 is of such importance, their stand in this case has any amount of impact. In a way their stand ruled out the possibility of conferring the properties by Smt.Ademma to others in exception to the appellants 1 to 6. 39. P.W.1-the 1st respondent deposed supporting their case in the pleadings. P.W.3- his father also deposed in this context. P.W.2 is one of the attestors to Ex.A1. 40. All these three witnesses deposed of execution of Ex.A1 on 09.05.1981. 41. As seen from Ex.A2 copy of the birth certificate of P.W.1, he was born on 22.11.1961. However, it is in the evidence of P.W.1 himself that he was 15 or 16 years old by the date of execution of Ex.A1. P.W.3 deposed in this context that all the respondents were attending school on the date of Ex.A1 and that none of them took part in the transaction relating to execution of Ex.A1. 42. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the appellants, referring to the evidence so available on record and age of P.W.1 strenuously contended that entire version of P.W.1 is false since neither he was present at the time of alleged execution of Ex.A1 nor he was aware of the transaction as such. 42. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the appellants, referring to the evidence so available on record and age of P.W.1 strenuously contended that entire version of P.W.1 is false since neither he was present at the time of alleged execution of Ex.A1 nor he was aware of the transaction as such. Even otherwise, Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the respondents 2 and 3 were undoubtedly minors by the date of Ex.A1 and when this settlement deed did not reflect in any manner that these minors were represented by their guardian as seen from the recitals in Ex.A1, this entire transaction of gift falls to ground, in as much as in terms of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, delivery of possession of subject matter of the gift is a sine qua non to effect the transfer. However, it appears, P.W.3 came out with such version advisedly that none of the respondents was present at the time of Ex.A1 transaction and he alone took active interest in this transaction. In view of this statement on record of P.W.3, no credence as such can be attached to the testimony of P.W.1. 43. Even otherwise, the evidence of P.W.1 with reference to execution of Ex.A1 is discrepant. According to him it was executed on 07.05.1981 by Smt. Ademma in the presence of P.W.2-Sri C.Krishnama Naidu, P.W.3 and Sri Muni Swamy @ Karreabba, who also figured as identifying witness to this document at the time of registration. The contents of Ex.A1 also reflect the position of P.W.2 and other attestors similarly. According to him, Ex.A1 was written in Sub Registrar?s Office at Greamspet, Chittoor. He further deposed that he, his father, Smt. Ademma, the scribe viz., Karanam of their Village Sri Jagannadham Pillai and both the attestors were present during that time. He also deposed that after reaching Sub Registrar?s Office, they purchased the stamp papers and whereupon Sri Jagannamdham Pillai scribed Ex.A1 as per instructions of Smt.Ademma. According to him, both the attestors came to their house on that day accidentally. P.W.1 further deposed about preparation of Ex.A1 and a Will and that they were presented to the Sub Registrar for registration on the same day. 44. According to him, both the attestors came to their house on that day accidentally. P.W.1 further deposed about preparation of Ex.A1 and a Will and that they were presented to the Sub Registrar for registration on the same day. 44. P.W.1 stated that they were in possession of the suit lands for about 10 years prior to the date of Ex.A1, while admitting that the recitals in Ex.A1 reflected that the possession was delivered to them on the date of Ex.A1. He also admitted that the recitals in Ex.A1 did not state that they were already in possession of the suit lands. He stated that Smt. Ademma was 75 or 80 years old when Ex.A1 was executed. His evidence reflected that Smt. Ademma delivered the suit lands, coming over there on the third day of execution of Ex.A1 and thus handed them over their possession. 45. P.W.3 while corroborating the version of P.W.1 about the manner in which Ex.A1 was prepared by Sri Jagannadham Pillai- Ex Karanam of their village to the instructions of Smt. Ademma stated that it was P.W.1 who had accepted possession on his behalf and on behalf of his two brothers, who were minors then from Smt. Ademma. Later, he too stated that such possession was given three days after execution of Ex.A1. While referring to intention of Smt. Ademma that she executed Ex.A1 in favour of the respondents, since they were serving her and attending to her instructions, he also referred to execution of Will by her in favour of the appellants 1 to 6. While confirming the presence of himself, the scribe and both the attestors at the time of Ex.A1 transaction and stating that upon subscribing her signatures, both the attestors attested Ex.A1, he stated that the stamp papers for the purpose of preparation of Ex.A1 were purchased by the scribe himself upon receiving money from him and that the scribe himself had procured the presence of both the attestors. 46. P.W.3 deposed that by the date of Ex.A1 transaction, Smt.Ademma was 70 to 75 years old and that, she was ailing for about 1 ½ years prior thereto and was bed ridden, who was not in a position to move. Further with reference to preparation of Ex.A1, P.W.3 stated that it was scribed and registered on 07.05.1981 and that the same attestors attested the Will of his mother. 47. Further with reference to preparation of Ex.A1, P.W.3 stated that it was scribed and registered on 07.05.1981 and that the same attestors attested the Will of his mother. 47. As seen from Ex.A1, the stamp papers were in fact purchased in the name of P.W.3 on 08.05.1981, which is specifically pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, when referring to testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3 questioning veracity in their version. 48. It was the scribe, according to P.W.3 who had handed over the stamp papers in the registrar?s office when he saw them for the first time. 49. The presence of P.W.2 at the time of Ex.A1 transaction as seen from the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3 stands to discrepancy. His availability and that of other attestors at the time of Ex.A1 transaction is differently deposed to by P.W.1 and P.W.3. 50. It is the testimony of P.W.2 that he figured himself as an attestor to Ex.A1 and as an identifying witness. He further stated that he also attested the Will executed by Smt. Ademma. According to him, the contents of Ex.A1 were read over to Smt. Ademma which she held to be correct and whereupon she applied her thumb impressions on all the pages of Ex.A1. He also stated that Smt. Ademma informed the Sub Registrar when Ex.A1 as well as the Will were presented for registration that she executed them wilfully out of her free will. 51. As seen from the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3, who claimed that they were present during Ex.A1 transaction, these factors are omitted. In the sense, reading over the contents of Ex.A1 and the Will to Smt. Ademma, admitting the same and in the presence of Sub Registrar admitting the execution of these documents as if out of her free will. The reason for this omission which is quite important, is not explained at the trial. 52. P.W.2 sought to explain his presence at the time of this transaction stating that he was at the house of P.W.3 by then. According to him stamp papers were already available by the time he reached the house of P.W.3. He did not state in cross-examination that stamp papers were not purchased after they reached the Sub Registrar?s Office. This version of P.W.2 differs from the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3. According to him stamp papers were already available by the time he reached the house of P.W.3. He did not state in cross-examination that stamp papers were not purchased after they reached the Sub Registrar?s Office. This version of P.W.2 differs from the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.3. He did not state the position of the respondents if they were minors by the time Ex.A1 was executed. He further stated that Smt. Ademma explained him the purpose of executing Ex.A1 in favour of the respondents on account of their conduct in attending to her welfare and her needs. Similarly, according to D.W.2, she explained the purpose of executing Will in favour of the 1st respondent and her children, even though they were not looking after her. 53. Though P.W.2 stated that the scribe prepared Ex.A1 even without a draft, according to him, Smt. Ademma had instructed the scribe in this respect who had also referred records in that process. 54. P.W.1 and P.W.3 are highly interested witnesses and who have any amount of interest in the outcome of this litigation. Not only their evidence but also that of P.W.2 make out that P.W.2 is related to the wife of P.W.3. It is the suggested defence of the appellants that he is a cousin of P.W.3?s wife. He appears at the jaggery business of P.W.3 according to P.W.1 and evidence of P.W.3 also suggested that P.W.2 is a regular visitor to his business premises. Thus, close association of P.W.2 with P.W.3 is evident. Therefore, he cannot be deemed an independent witness. 55. In terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, when execution of a document of this nature viz., a gift, which is a compulsorily attestable document in terms of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, in the context of highly interested nature of P.W.2 it would have been more appropriate had the respondents examined Sri Muni Swamy @ Karreabba, another attestor to Ex.A2. Thus, the omission to examine another attestor adds to the suspicion surrounding the execution of Ex.A1 by Smt. Ademma, if by free consent and on her own. 56. With reference to delivery of possession of this property, there is testimony of P.W.4 and P.W.5 on record. Thus, the omission to examine another attestor adds to the suspicion surrounding the execution of Ex.A1 by Smt. Ademma, if by free consent and on her own. 56. With reference to delivery of possession of this property, there is testimony of P.W.4 and P.W.5 on record. PW.1 and P.W.3 deposed differently as to delivery of possession of these lands by Smt. Ademma as if she had taken them to these lands and upon showing, signifying such delivery after three days of this transaction. However, Ex.A1 reflected that the property was delivered on the same day and going by the version of P.W.1 they were already in possession of these lands for about 10 years prior to this transaction. 57. P.W.4, from the testimony on record, proved to be an unreliable witness, who could not even state whether the respondents were minors by the date of delivery of possession or Ex.A1 transaction. Though he claimed that he owned lands in the neighbourhood of the suit lands, which were sold away later on, he could not give the extent of the suit lands or their S.Nos. 58. P.W.5 claimed that there are two plots in between his lands and the suit lands. His version that these lands were given in possession by Smt. Ademma and that his further version that the appellants have been in possession of these lands for the last 12 years by the date he deposed in the court (he deposed at the trial on 01.07.1994), makes his testimony to favour the appellants. 59. Though number of contentions were advanced by Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the appellants, that the gift under Ex.A1 was not complete on account of want of proof as to delivery of the subject matter of the gift to the appellants in terms of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act; delivery of possession of the subject matter of the gift, cannot by itself assumes importance. Though it has collateral effect in considering the veracity of the claim of the respondents basing on Ex.A1, it cannot by itself be taken as the prime requirement to reject the gift. 60. Delivery of possession of the suit lands in terms of Ex.A1 is not only inconsistent but also discrepant, thus, suffering from want of credibility. 61. Though it has collateral effect in considering the veracity of the claim of the respondents basing on Ex.A1, it cannot by itself be taken as the prime requirement to reject the gift. 60. Delivery of possession of the suit lands in terms of Ex.A1 is not only inconsistent but also discrepant, thus, suffering from want of credibility. 61. These circumstances relating to execution of Ex.A1 are considered upon analysis of the oral evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5, in the context of discharge of burden of proof on the appellants for this purpose and if it has the effect of discharging the primary burden on them, in view of the nature of the defence set up by the appellants. 62. As already stated, Smt.Ademma had an intention to bequeath her properties to the appellants 1 to 6. After visiting Chittoor, during which period not only execution of Ex.A1 but also Will by her took place, she returned to Kakkalamitta village. There is discrepant evidence as to how she reached this village. As seen from the plaint, it was the daughter of the 1st appellant, who had taken her to this village, while the evidence of P.W.3 is that it was the 1st appellant, who had taken her to the village. Even with reference to her stay after these transactions at Chitoor, there is discrepant evidence. In the sense P.W.1 stated that she was with them at Chittoor after these transactions for about a week and thereafter the 1st appellant took her to the village, since Smt.Ademma expressed her desire to see the appellants 2 to 6. According to P.W.3, four or five days later the 1st appellant took their mother to the village. 63. It is the version of the appellants that after reaching their village, Smt.Ademma informed them that she had executed a Will conferring the properties to the appellants 1 to 6 and that this document was not received by her. As per the evidence on record, she sent D.W.1 (4th appellant) to P.W.3 where he was informed that the document was not received from the office of the Sub Registrar. As per the evidence on record, she sent D.W.1 (4th appellant) to P.W.3 where he was informed that the document was not received from the office of the Sub Registrar. Later on, the 8th appellant was sent, according to the version of the appellants by her, who received similar response from P.W.3 about this document, whereupon, the 8th appellant enquired at Sub Registrar?s Office, Chittoor and that his enquiry revealed that not only Will but also a settlement deed was executed by Smt.Ademma and that, a copy of such settlement deed was obtained by him. Thus, the appellants had set out that the fraud played by P.W.3 was exposed to them including Smt.Ademma. Thus, they contended that it was by misrepresenting to Smt. Ademma as if she was executing a Will in favour of the appellants 1 to 6, P.W.1 made her to execute the documents including Ex.A1 settlement deed. 64. Ex.B1 (copy of which is Ex.A2) is the notice dated 22.05.1981 issued by Smt.Ademma from office of Sri Muniswamy Naidu, Advocate, Chittoor to P.W.3 questioning Ex.A1 transaction stating that he played fraud in obtaining Ex.A1. P.W.1 and P.W.3 admitted receipt of Ex.B1 legal notice by P.W.3 after Ex.A1 transaction. Denying the allegations in Ex.B1, a reply was issued in Ex.A3 through his Advocate by P.W.3 on 05.06.1991. 65. According to the version of P.W.1 and P.W.3, upon receiving Ex.B1 legal notice, P.W.3 contacted Smt.Ademma about it, on which she denied having had got issued this legal notice, expressing ignorance. 66. The learned trial Judge in his judgment observed that in the backdrop of this instance, the appellants should have examined Sri Muniswamy Naidu, Advocate at Chittoor, who had issued Ex.B1 notice and in the absence of such effort, this circumstance sought to be projected by the appellants, has no effect. 67. It has to be noted that P.W.1 and P.W.3 admitted receipt of Ex.B1 notice issued by Smt. Ademma through her Advocate. Ex.A3 reply was also issued thereto from the office of his Advocate, by P.W.3. The contents of reply notice clearly state that it was in response to Ex.B1 legal notice got issued by Smt.Ademma. When such material is available on record, it is rather a far-fetched observation of the learned Judge that Sri Muniswamy Naidu, Advocate, Chittoor should have been examined as a witness on behalf of the appellants. The contents of reply notice clearly state that it was in response to Ex.B1 legal notice got issued by Smt.Ademma. When such material is available on record, it is rather a far-fetched observation of the learned Judge that Sri Muniswamy Naidu, Advocate, Chittoor should have been examined as a witness on behalf of the appellants. There was no necessity for the appellants to have had examined the learned Advocate on their behalf, in view of this circumstance. 68. When version of P.W.1 and P.W.3 that after receipt of Ex.B1 when P.W.3 approached Smt. Ademma in that regard, when she had in clear terms denied to have had instructed Sri Muniswamy Naidu, Advocate to issue such notice, as rightly contended for the appellants, every effort could have been made by P.W.3 to get a notice issued to Sri Muniswamy Naidu, Advocate, including the appellants, questioning Ex.B1 legal notice on behalf of Smt.Ademma. Apparently no effort was made in that direction. 69. When serious allegations were made against P.W.3 by Smt.Ademma in that legal notice, who is none other than his mother and when the avowed claim of the respondents at the trial was that she had any amount of love and affection for them that made her to execute Ex.A1, since they were attending to her welfare and necessities, this process of questioning issuance of Ex.B1 legal notice could have been possibly the easiest way of rebutting the claim of the appellants. Silence on the part of the respondents or P.W.3 in this respect clearly indicated that their version in this context is false. These are the circumstances to hold that P.W.3 had never met Smt. Ademma upon receiving Ex.B1 legal notice nor enquire her nor she responded to such queries in the manner they sought to project. 70. Not only issuing Ex.B1 legal notice inviting a response from P.W.3 under Ex.A3 as a reply questioning this transaction covering Ex.A1 but also in anticipation of litigation, she filed a caveat petition in Subordinate Judge?s Court at Chittoor as seen from Ex.B3, office copy of the same. However, P.W.3 feigned ignorance of this caveat petition. It would have been more appropriate if the appellants had produced a certified copy of this caveat petition in support of their claim. It being a certified copy of the record maintained in the Court, it would have received required importance. However, P.W.3 feigned ignorance of this caveat petition. It would have been more appropriate if the appellants had produced a certified copy of this caveat petition in support of their claim. It being a certified copy of the record maintained in the Court, it would have received required importance. There is an allegation of fraud in this caveat petition filed by Smt.Ademma against P.W.3 and the respondents 1 to 3. 71. Thereafter, according to the appellants, Smt. Ademma had executed Ex.B4 on 24.09.1981 in the nature of a registered deed cancelling Ex.A1 settlement deed. Similarly, according to the appellants, she executed Ex.B5 on the same day cancelling the Will alleged to have had been executed by her on 09.05.1981. On the same day, according to the appellants, she executed Ex.B6 settlement deed in favour of the appellants 1 to 6. 72. The contents of Ex.B4-cancellation deed of Ex.A1 are akin to the defence set up by the appellants in their written statement and explaining the circumstances under which, she was coaxed to execute Ex.A1 by misrepresentation. 73. P.W.3 admitted in cross- examining that Smt. Ademma had executed Ex.B4 cancellation deed relating to Ex.A1 and Ex.B6 settlement deed in favour of the appellants 1 to 6. According to him, he came to know about these transactions before filing the suit. It was on the occasion when the appellants allegedly prevented him and his sons from ploughing the land after death of Smt. Ademma. 74. In the presence of admission of P.W.3 of execution of these documents by Smt. Ademma, who went to the extent of stating that his mother had cancelled Ex.A1 by such deed, it is not necessary that any one connected with these transactions should have been examined at the trial. Admitted facts need not be proved in terms of Section 58 of the Evidence Act. The learned trial Judge found fault with the nature of evidence let in by the appellants holding that there is no evidence except that of D.W.1 to prove these disputed facts. The learned counsel for the respondents also argued in this appeal on the same lines specifically pointing out that none of the attestors or the scribe connected to Ex.B4 to Ex.B6 transactions was examined at the trial and therefore it is fatal to the defence of the appellants. 75. The learned counsel for the respondents also argued in this appeal on the same lines specifically pointing out that none of the attestors or the scribe connected to Ex.B4 to Ex.B6 transactions was examined at the trial and therefore it is fatal to the defence of the appellants. 75. These contentions nor the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge, do not stand on account of the clear admission of P.W.3 in this context referred to supra. Even otherwise, since the burden of proof in a title suit is on the respondents, this omission, if at all it has to be considered so on the part of the appellants, is a lapse or laches in leading their defence. This factor cannot in any manner support the claim of the respondents nor enable them to contend that this weakness in the defence is their strength. 76. The nature of Ex.B4 cancellation deed requires attention now. Smt.Ademma had executed it. Thus, the recitals in Ex.B4 are in the nature of statements of Sri Ademma explaining the circumstances under which she was made to execute Ex.A1 settlement deed. These recitals further prove that she had an intention to cancel the document so executed in favour of the respondents. When these recitals bear such importance and which stand in the nature of prior statements of Smt. Ademma, who is no more, they cannot as such be brushed aside. These statements and circumstances established the situation in which Smt.Ademma was found and being under the complete influence of P.W.3-Sri Ramachandra Naidu. He, on his own showing too, had taken active role in obtaining Ex.A1 and was in a position of active confidence in relation to Smt.Ademma. Thus, he was in a position to influence her will and decisions attracting application of Section 111 of the Evidence Act. Thereby, the burden to prove for the respondents as to nature of Ex.A1 settlement deed being not tainted for want of good faith and obtained by misrepresentation is more pronounced. (vide Yarlagadda Venkanna Choudary (dead) and another v. Daggubati Lakshminarayana (dead) and others, 1996(1) ALD 641 ). 77. Thereby, the burden to prove for the respondents as to nature of Ex.A1 settlement deed being not tainted for want of good faith and obtained by misrepresentation is more pronounced. (vide Yarlagadda Venkanna Choudary (dead) and another v. Daggubati Lakshminarayana (dead) and others, 1996(1) ALD 641 ). 77. Contentions are advanced on behalf of the respondents that Ex.B4 cannot as such has any significance since unilateral cancellation of registered document is not permissible in the eye of law and particularly in view of the ruling of Full Bench of this Court when it was at Hyderabad in Yanala Malleshwari vs. Smt. Ananthula Sayamma, 2006(6) ALD 623. It is also the contention of the respondents that in view of Rule-26 of A.P.Registration Rules, a document of nature of Ex.B4 has no legal validity. 78. On behalf of the appellants, it is contended that the transactions covered by Ex.B4 was prior to introducing amended Rule 26(k) (w.e.f. 02.06.2014). Reliance is placed in this context on behalf of the appellants in Smt. P. Veda Kumari and others v. The Sub-Registrar, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad and others, 2017(6) ALD 79 . 79. Effect of Rule 26(k) of Amended Rule of A.P.Registration Rules, having regard to nature of dispute in this context, is unnecessary. Nor its effect needs to be considered. 80. Added to it, in Satya Pal Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, 2016(10) SCC 767 , one of the observations of the Hon?ble Supreme Court is that the judgment in Yanala Malleshwari (10 supra) not of universal application and that it is only with reference to express provisions contained in A.P. Registration Rules. 81. Thus, during her lifetime, Smt.Ademma by means of her statements in Ex.B4 in the nature of recitals, explained the manner by which Ex.A1 settlement deed was obtained by P.W.3. The recitals which are the statements of Smt. Ademma were made by her in proximal point of time to Ex.A1 transaction. Admittedly, she died on 27.10.1981. When these statements were made by her during her lifetime, they are sufficient to hold the tainted nature of Ex.A1 transaction. The learned trial Judge did not consider the true effect of contents of Ex.B4 and was merely carried away by the deficiency in the nature of evidence set up by the appellants in proof of Ex.B6 settlement deed. When these statements were made by her during her lifetime, they are sufficient to hold the tainted nature of Ex.A1 transaction. The learned trial Judge did not consider the true effect of contents of Ex.B4 and was merely carried away by the deficiency in the nature of evidence set up by the appellants in proof of Ex.B6 settlement deed. Therefore, the recitals in Ex.B4 drive the last nail into the contention of the appellants and these recitals support to hold that Ex.A1 settlement deed suffers from such malice. 82. Thus, the evidence and material placed by the appellants is sufficiently discharging the burden placed on them to hold that Ex.A1 settlement deed was obtained by P.W.3 in the name of his sons by misrepresentation and playing fraud on Smt. Ademma. 83. Therefore, in the backdrop of these circumstances, the evidence adduced by the appellants, is not establishing in preponderance of probabilities that it was a settlement deed voluntarily executed by Smt.Ademma, conscious of its nature out of her free will and volition. Therefore, in terms, Ex.A1 settlement deed suffers from an illegality and is void. Thereby, the respondents cannot rest their claim to the suit lands. Thus, there is no valid transfer of right, title and interest by means of Ex.A1 settlement to the respondents. 84. Thus, this point is answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. POINT No.2: 85. In view of findings on point No.1, the respondents are not entitled for the relief of declaration of their right, title and interest to the suit properties. Consequently, they are not entitled for possession of these properties. 86. Reasons are assigned while discussing point No.1 as to the effect of Ex.B4 to Ex.B6. There is only evidence of D.W.1 on record to prove Ex.B6. Attempt by the appellants to examine D.W.2 at the trial was not successful, since he did not appear to face cross-examination, which had ultimately lead to eschewing his evidence. In spite of these lapses in the defence, the appellants are entitled to question the claim of the respondents in the manner they have set up in this case. Statements of Smt.Ademma in the nature of recitals in Ex.B4 themselves apart from the contents of Ex.B1 legal notice, have lent assistance to their contention. Thus, this point is answered. POINT No.3: 87. Statements of Smt.Ademma in the nature of recitals in Ex.B4 themselves apart from the contents of Ex.B1 legal notice, have lent assistance to their contention. Thus, this point is answered. POINT No.3: 87. The learned trial Judge had misdirected himself in misplacing the burden of proof on the appellants, unmindful of the fact that the settled position of law in a title suit is that it is for the plaintiffs to establish their claim to right and title without depending or drawing assistance from lapses or deficiencies in the case set up by the defendants. The entire tenor of the judgment makes out that the learned trial Judge had driven the appellants to prove their case basing on Ex.B6 than considering the effect of Ex.A1 in the light of the material on record. The approach of the learned trial Judge cannot be appreciated and it is faulty. Interference is required with the decree and judgment of the trial Court for the reasons assigned in point No.1 supra. Thus, this point is answered. POINT No.4 88. In view of findings on points 1 to 3, this appeal has to be allowed setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court. Consequently, the suit has to be dismissed. 89. In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the decree and judgment in O.S.No.35 of 1983 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Chittoor dated 18.02.1997. Consequently, the suit is dismissed. Having regard to the close relationship among these parties, they are directed to bear their own costs throughout. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.