JUDGMENT : 1. The Special Judge, Anti Corruption Bureau, Greater Bombay vide judgment and order dated 4th February, 2012 in Special Case No.31 of 2010, convicted and sentenced, the appellant as under: (i) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.500/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 15 days for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘Act’ for short) and ; (ii) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.500/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 15 days for the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act, against which this appeal is preferred. 2. Briefly stated, prosecution’s case is that the complainant had applied for authorization/batch, to the Regional Transport Office (RTO) for which police verification report was needed. In May, 2009, complainant enquired with the local police station about the verification report. He was informed that papers were sent to CID Branch, Bombay. Whereupon he visited CID office. He was directed to contact accused. Accordingly, accused, gave his contact number to complainant and asked him to meet on 10th June, 2009. On this date, he was told that his file/papers were missing and may have to reconstruct the file afresh but for which accused demanded Rs.300/- from him. On 11th June, 2009, complainant narrated the facts to the officer, Anti Corruption Bureau and filed written complaint. To verify the demand, officer asked complainant to contact the accused on his cell phone. Speaker of mobile phone was activated. Thus, after verifying the demand and upon drawing verification and pre-trap panchanama, raiding party proceeded to Mulund where the complainant and the accused were to meet. At Shri Krishna Vilas Hotel, Mulund, Complainant and the accused had tea together. Complainant enquired about the report where after accused gave report/papers to him and demanded Rs.300/-. After paying Rs.300/- upon pre-decided signal, raiding party caught hold the accused. Since trap was laid in the hotel, Shivgan officer took the accused to the nearest police station where tainted currency notes were recovered from the accused. Post-trap panchanamas were drawn. After completing investigation, final report was filed. 3. The Additional Commissioner, Special Crime Branch, Mr. Dumbre granted previous sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on 12th March, 2010. 4. Post-trap panchanamas were drawn. After completing investigation, final report was filed. 3. The Additional Commissioner, Special Crime Branch, Mr. Dumbre granted previous sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 on 12th March, 2010. 4. The Trial Court upon appreciating the prosecution’s evidence, convicted the appellant as aforesaid and hence, this appeal. 5. Heard Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 6. Questions, fall for my consideration are; (a) Whether previous sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre, Additional Commissioner, Special Crime Branch on 12th March, 2010, Exhibit 19 was “authority competent” to remove accused from his office ? (b) If Mr. Dumbre was not competent to grant the sanction, was it, an ‘error’, ‘omission’ or ‘irregularity’ within the meaning of Sub-section (3) of Section 19 read with Explanation (a) appended thereto; AND (i) Whether appellant/accused had objected to competency of Mr. Dumbre to grant sanction at the earlier stage in the proceedings ? ; AND (ii) Whether such an error, omission, irregularity had occasioned failure of justice ? ; (c) Whether prosecution has proved beyond the reasonable doubt, that accused demanded and accepted Rs.300/-, as illegal gratification for issuing character report to the complainant ? 7. Before answering aforesaid questions, it may be stated that the appellant is a ‘constable’ within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Maharashtra Police Act. It reads as under: “(4) Constable means police officer of the lowest grade.” 8. Bombay Police (Punishments and Appeals) Rules, 1956 (“Rules” for short) regulates the punishments of police officers and all below the rank of Inspector of Police in the State of Bombay and appeals there from. Rule 3 of the said Rules enumerates punishments to be imposed upon any police officer. Rule 5 refers to designation of police officer having authority to punish; rank of officer, who can be punished and kind of punishment to be imposed and restrictions subject to which designated officer is authorised to punish. Herein, Commissioner of Police, Bombay is an appointing authority of the appellant and also officer designated to punish the appellant. For quick reference, relevant entry in the Schedule I under Rule 5 of the said Rules is re-produced below: “IMAGE” 9. Mr. Herein, Commissioner of Police, Bombay is an appointing authority of the appellant and also officer designated to punish the appellant. For quick reference, relevant entry in the Schedule I under Rule 5 of the said Rules is re-produced below: “IMAGE” 9. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant, relying on the rules, would contend that the Commissioner of Police being an appointing authority and authority to punish the appellant, was all alone “Competent” to grant previous sanction under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act. He would submit, herein, Mr. Dumbre, Additional Commissioner, Special Crime Branch, who had granted sanction was lower in rank than that of Commissioner of Police and, therefore, was not competent to grant sanction. Mr. Joshi would submit, Commissioner of Police is post “and his rank is of Director General of Police, Additional Director General of Police”; whereas Additional Commissioner is a post, in the rank ‘Deputy Inspector General of Police’. Mr. Joshi would, therefore, lay emphasis on the expression “rank” and “post” of authority. Submission is, that Commissioner being authority to remove the appellant from his office in terms of Rule 5 of the said Rule, he alone and no other authority was competent to grant sanction in terms of Section 19(1)(c) of the Act. Therefore, Mr. Joshi would submit that the Additional Commissioner, whose rank is of, Deputy Inspector General of Police was not authority within the Rule 5 of the said Rules to impose punishment of dismissal. As a corollary previous sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre Under Section 19(1)(c) of the Act was illegal and as such, cognizance could not have been taken on the basis of such sanction. Mr. Joshi, therefore, submits that prosecution fails on this ground alone. 10. Next submission of Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant, is that Mr. Dumbre, Additional Commissioner, being superior officer within the meaning of Section 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had actively supervised the, investigation in this case, as could be clearly seen from the letter dated 29th June, 2009. Vide this letter, Mr. Dumbre, Additional Commissioner, Anti Corruption Bureau, sought opinion in respect of, voice spectographic, test of the accused. It is, therefore, submitted, sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre being, “the judge in his own cause”, resulted in apprehension of bias against the appellant and such an apprehension of appellant was not unreasonable. 11. Mr. Vide this letter, Mr. Dumbre, Additional Commissioner, Anti Corruption Bureau, sought opinion in respect of, voice spectographic, test of the accused. It is, therefore, submitted, sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre being, “the judge in his own cause”, resulted in apprehension of bias against the appellant and such an apprehension of appellant was not unreasonable. 11. Mr. Joshi would, therefore, contend that sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre was per-se illegal being, not a authority competent, to remove the appellant from the office and further Mr. Dumbre being a judge in his own cause ought not to have granted it, as it had caused prejudice to the appellant. He submitted, these defects in the sanction were incurable and not just; referable to error, omission or irregularity but had occasioned, failure of justice. 12. Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, supported the conviction, sentence and sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre. He made following submissions: (i) Mr. Dumbre had granted previous sanction being authorised by the Commissioner of Police in terms of standing orders dated 3rd April, 1993 and 6th June, 2002. He submits vide these standing orders, Commissioner of Police delegated the powers to the Additional/ Joint Commissioner to grant the sanction. He submits, even assuming Mr. Dumbre was not competent to grant the sanction but combined reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of this Act makes the position clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding, sentence and order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or rather altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under Sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, failure of justice has in fact being occasioned thereby; (ii) He further submits that Clause (b) of Section 3 is also relevant. It shows that no Court shall stay the proceedings under the Act on the ground of any error, omission, or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in failure of justice. It shows that no Court shall stay the proceedings under the Act on the ground of any error, omission, or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in failure of justice. (iii) He would also submit that sub-section (4) postulates that in determining under sub-section (3) whether absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. (iv) He would also submit that Explanation appended to the Section for the purpose of Section 19, error includes competency and the authority to grant sanction. (v) That Mr. Dumbre was not Investigating Officer, but had an occasion to supervise the investigation, being superior officer in the Anti Corruption Bureau and, therefore, he was not judge in his own cause and further even assuming sanction granted by Mr. Dumbre was referable to irregularity or omission but it had not occasioned failure of justice. (vi) That even otherwise, demand of illegal gratification and acceptance by the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, now the onus is on the appellant to prove that error, omissions and irregularity had occasioned failure of justice. 13. Mr. Pethe, further submits, that once the demand is proved and tainted currency notes were recovered, it is to be presumed that the accused accepted money as the motive or reward under Section 7, which presumption in this case has not been rebutted by the appellant. Mr. Pethe in support of his submission relied on following judgments: (1) Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka (2001) 2 Supreme Court Cases 577; (2) State of M.P. v. Bhooraji and Others (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 679; (3) Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 607; (4) State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy (2004) 7 Supreme Court Cases 763; (5) Srimati Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra Narayan Roy and Ors. Indian Appeals Vol.LXXIII 246. On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor seeks dismissal of the appeal. 14. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 reads as under: "19. Indian Appeals Vol.LXXIII 246. On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor seeks dismissal of the appeal. 14. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 reads as under: "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.— (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,— (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation. —For the purposes of this section,— (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” The effect of Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the PC Act is of considerable significance as noted in Prakash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 ). Vide Sub-section 19(3), the stress is on “failure of justice” and that too “in the opinion of the Court”. In Sub-section (4), the stress is on raising the plea at the appropriate time as held in Paul Varghese v. State of Kerala (2009 (1) SCC 953). Thus, significantly, the “failure of justice” is relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. Therefore, mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered fatal unless it has resulted in failure of justice or failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. In paragraph 9, the Hon’ble Apex Court further held “Whether sanction is necessary or not has to be considered on the factual scenario. The question of sanction involves two aspects, i.e., one relating to alleged lack of jurisdiction and other relating to prejudice.” 15. So far, as competency/authority of Mr. Dumbre is concerned, in this case, power to impose major punishment of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement upon the appellant is subject to the Bombay Police (punishments and appeals) Rules, 1956 and in the frst schedule appended thereto, kinds of punishments, which can be imposed upon the members of the police force and the authority, which is competent to impose such punishments are stipulated. Indisputably, Additional Commissioner of Police was not appointing authority of the appellant and, therefore, he was authority competent to remove him from his office. Question is answered accordingly. 16. Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would justify, competency of, Mr. Dumbre to grant sanction by relying on standing order dated 6th June, 2002. Indisputably, Additional Commissioner of Police was not appointing authority of the appellant and, therefore, he was authority competent to remove him from his office. Question is answered accordingly. 16. Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would justify, competency of, Mr. Dumbre to grant sanction by relying on standing order dated 6th June, 2002. I have perused it. This standing order makes reference to amended provisions of Sections 25 and 26 and taking recourse to this amended provisions, Commissioner of Police has delegated powers to the Additional Commissioner of Police to punish police inspectors, assistant police inspector, sub-inspector and all officers below the sub-inspector including the constables. However, vide this standing order, Additional Commissioner has been empowered to impose punishments, other than the punishment enumerated in Rule 3(1)(ia), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1) (iii), which in order, refers to compulsory retirement; removal from service, which does not disqualify from the failure of employment in department other than police department; and dismissal, which disqualifies from few employment in Government services. Therefore, power to dismiss the appellant was not delegated by the Commissioner of Police. Thus, reliance placed on the standing orders was misplaced. Resultantly, the contention of the prosecutor that Mr. Dumbre was, authority competent, to remove the appellant from the service is rejected. I, therefore, hold that Mr. Dumbre was not competent to grant sanction and, therefore, previous sanction granted on 12th March, 2010 at Exhibit 19 on the basis of which the Trial court took the cognizance, was perse illegal. 17. Mr. Joshi in the course of the arguments has also referred to Article 311 of the Constitution of India. A plain reading of this article itself, has created a safe-guard, by which it, has been laid down that no person, who is member of civil services or of the Union or of an Indian service or civil service of a State or holds civil post in the Union or a State, shall dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to it by which he was appointed. In support of this contention, Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on judgment of this Court in the case of Balu Dasu Rathod v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2019 All MR (Cri) 4480). In support of this contention, Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant has relied on judgment of this Court in the case of Balu Dasu Rathod v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2019 All MR (Cri) 4480). In this case, Police Sub-Inspector (PSI) was facing the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 8, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act and the process was issued on the complaint wherein sanction was accorded by the Additional Commissioner of Police, Thane. Whereas, appointing authority was Director General of Police, Maharashtra State. In the circumstances, accused in the cited case sought discharge. In the context of this fact, the learned Judge of this Court (Coram: S.S.Shinde, J.) held that, “unless there is previous sanction by the Competent Authority, the Special Trial Court can not take cognizance of the offence.” Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka (2015 AIR SC 3060). Next judgment relied on by Mr. Joshi, learned counsel for the appellant, was of this Court in the case of Laxman Nanabhau Bangar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2019 All MR Criminal 2523). In this case two constables were prosecuted for the offences punishable under the PC Act and the sanction was accorded by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI. Constables were convicted and in appeal, issue of valid sanction was raised on behalf of the convicted constables. Referring to schedule 1 to above stated Rule 5, the learned Judge of this Court (Coram: P.N.Deshmukh, J.) held that Commissioner of Police, Bombay, has authority to punish subject to restrictions to which the officers specified in column 1 is authorised to punish. That since in the cited case, sanction was granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, on the ground of his in competency, sanction was held illegal and accordingly, conviction was quashed and set aside. 18. Mr. Pethe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor fairly submits that the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Laxman Bangar (Supra) has not been challenged by the State. 19. Judgment in the case of Laxman Bangar (Supra) and the facts of the case in hand are nearly same. Thus, for the reasons stated above, I hold that sanction accorded by Mr. Dumbre was illegal. 20. Now, the question is whether defect in the sanction accorded by Mr. 19. Judgment in the case of Laxman Bangar (Supra) and the facts of the case in hand are nearly same. Thus, for the reasons stated above, I hold that sanction accorded by Mr. Dumbre was illegal. 20. Now, the question is whether defect in the sanction accorded by Mr. Dumbre was just an error and/or irregularity and not fatal to the prosecution. AND Whether such an error had caused and resulted into failure of justice? To answer this question, let me now refer to letter dated 29th September, 2009 addressed by Mr. Dumbre to Director, Forensic Science Laboratory, vide which he sought opinion in respect of voice spectographic test of the appellant. Contents of this letter indeed show that Mr. Dumbre had apprised facts and particulars of the investigation to the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory. It shows, Mr. Dumbre was actively monitoring the investigation. Therefore, in the circumstances, next question is whether Mr. Dumbre was judge in his own cause while according sanction and whether it had occasioned to failure of justice. 21. ‘Nemo judex in causa sua’ is Latin phrase that means literally “No one is judge in their own cause”. It is the principle of natural justice that no person can be a judge in a case in which he had an interest. Legal effect of the breach of principle of natural justice is normally to stop the proceedings and render any judgment invalid. In other words, decision arrived at by such process and the order grounded on such decision can not possibly by regarded as valid and binding. 22. In the case of Paul Varghese (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held, question of sanction involves two aspects; (i) One relating to alleged lack of jurisdiction; (ii) Other relating to prejudice. Admittedly, in the case at hand, Mr. Dumbre, who had actively supervised the investigation had accorded the sanction. In the circumstances, appellant would certainly entertain serious apprehension that the decision of Mr. Dumbre to grant sanction may not have been free from real bias and might have influenced his decision, while according sanction. Admittedly, in the case at hand, Mr. Dumbre, who had actively supervised the investigation had accorded the sanction. In the circumstances, appellant would certainly entertain serious apprehension that the decision of Mr. Dumbre to grant sanction may not have been free from real bias and might have influenced his decision, while according sanction. In the case of Rattan Lal Sharma (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School, Hari Ram Ratanlal Sharma v. Managing Committee ( AIR 1993 SC 2155 ), it was stated “ the test of bias is whether a reasonably intelligent man, fully apprises of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias, and that the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment, the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” In the King v. Justices of Sunderland (1901(2) 2 KB 357), it was held, where a person at an earlier stage had supported an application or a procedure, which subsequently comes to be adjudicated upon, such a person would naturally be disqualified to act as an adjudicator. 23. Thus, taking into consideration principles laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it is to be held that since grant of sanction removes protective umbrella, which shields public servant from the prosecution, the authority, who has to take a decision whether to grant or not to grant sanction for prosecution is required to be free from possibility of bias against the public servant. (“Dhirendra Kishan v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and others (1999 Criminal Law Journal 3405.) 24. Thus, in consideration of the facts of the case, in my view, previous sanction granted on 12th March, 2010 by Mr. Dumbre was not, just, referable to ‘error’, ‘omission’ or ‘irregularity’ and since circumstances suggest that sanction possibly was not free from bias, in my view, the State in the given facts and circumstances cannot rely on Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the PC Act. 25. In my considered view, defects in sanction were not curable and were not referable only to error, omission or irregularity. 25. In my considered view, defects in sanction were not curable and were not referable only to error, omission or irregularity. The defects were ‘fatal’ to prosecution, which caused failure of justice. 26. In the result, appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment is quashed and set aside. Appellant’s bail bonds stand cancelled and sureties are discharged. Fine, if any, paid be refunded to appellant. 27. As the appeal itself is disposed of, nothing survives in the application therein and same is also disposed of.