JUDGMENT : 1. Aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed against him for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’ for short), the appellant has preferred the above appeal. 2. The appellant was prosecuted in Special Case No.36/2007 on the file of the Special Court and III Additional District & Sessions Judge, Mysuru for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act on the basis of the charge sheet filed by Lokayukta police, Mysuru in Crime No.11/2006 of their Police Station. 3. The said case was registered against the appellant on the basis of the complaint of PW.3 Nagendra Prasad as per Ex.P6. It was alleged in the complaint that the appellant being the Revenue Inspector in Hullahalli, Nada Kacheri, Nanjanagudu Taluk demanded illegal gratification of Rs.500/-to issue agriculturist’s certificate to his aunt Chinnamma. On receiving the complaint, PW.4 registered the first information report as per Ex.P7 against the appellant. He said to have conducted the entrustment mahazar as per Ex.P1 in the presence of PWs.1 and 2 the mahazar witnesses. Thereafter, PW.4 conducted alleged trap proceedings. 4. During the trap proceedings, the appellant said to have received bait money MO.5 and kept the same in his shirt pocket. On receiving pre-arranged signal, the trap squad caught hold of the appellant and he produced the bait money from his shirt pocket and the same was recovered. The appellant gave explanation as per Ex.P3. PW.4 submitted the records for grant of sanction. PW.5 the then Deputy Commissioner of Mysuru District granted sanction as per Ex.P11 to prosecute the appellant. 5. On receiving pre-arranged signal, the trap squad caught hold of the appellant and he produced the bait money from his shirt pocket and the same was recovered. The appellant gave explanation as per Ex.P3. PW.4 submitted the records for grant of sanction. PW.5 the then Deputy Commissioner of Mysuru District granted sanction as per Ex.P11 to prosecute the appellant. 5. The trial Court on taking cognizance of the offences, tried the accused for the following charges; “That, you accused being a public servant working as Revenue Inspector in Nada kacheri, Hullahalli, Nanjangud Taluk, demanded Rs.500/-from C.W.1 Nagendraprasad, who, on behalf of CW.4 Smt.Chinnamma, when enquired about Agricultural Certificate on 10.07.2006, for issuing the said Certificate and forced him to give the said amount on 11.07.2006 in the Office, and on 11.07.2006, pursuant to the said demand, you accused accepted a sum of Rs.500/-from CW.4 in your Office as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for showing official favour as noted above and thereby you have committed an offence punishable under Sec.7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and within the cognizance of this Court. That you accused being a public servant as stated above, on the aforesaid date, time and place and by misusing your official position as public servant and by corrupt or illegal means, obtained pecuniary advantage to an extent of Rs.500/-for yourself from CW.1 Nagendraprasad as a motive for the act referred to above and thereby you are guilty of criminal misconduct within the meaning of Sec.13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is punishable under Sec.13(2) of the said Act, and within the cognizance of this Court.” 6. The trial Court on hearing the parties, by the impugned judgment and order convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act and sentenced him to simple imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.10,000/-with default sentence. 7. The trial Court based the conviction on the following grounds: (i) In Ex.P3 the explanation that the appellant has admitted recovery of bait money from his custody. 7. The trial Court based the conviction on the following grounds: (i) In Ex.P3 the explanation that the appellant has admitted recovery of bait money from his custody. But he failed to give plausible explanation for the same; (ii) In such event the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act to the effect that money was accepted as illegal gratification arises; (iii) The evidence of PW.3 regarding demand and acceptance was corroborated by the evidence of PW.2 the shadow witness; & (iv) The evidence of PW.5 shows that the sanction was issued on due application of mind. 8. Sri V.Manjunath Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellant seeks to assail the impugned order of conviction and sentence on the following grounds: (i) As on the date of trap, no work of PW.3 or Chinnamma was pending with the appellant and therefore the question of he demanding illegal gratification for showing any official favour does not arise; (ii) The prosecution claims to have recorded the demand of the appellant at the time of trap in voice recording device, but that was not produced along with the charge sheet; (iii) Chinnamma for whose benefit the agricultural certificate was allegedly sought, though was cited as charge sheet witness was not examined; (iv) The Investigating Officer suppressed the material facts in the file relating to the application of Chinnamma which would have gone in favour of the appellant and the trial Court lost sight of the said fact; (v) The evidence of PW.5 shows that all the relevant records were not made available to him for the purpose of considering whether sanction has to be granted or not and that prejudiced the appellant; (vi) Mere fact of recovery of bait money itself does not lead to raising of the presumption unless the basic fact that work of Chinnamma pending with the appellant was proved; & (vii) The presumption if any under Section 20 of the PC Act stood rebutted by evidence of DWs.1 and 2 and the trial Court has failed to consider the same. 9. In support of his arguments, he relies upon the following judgments: (i) V.Venkata Subbarao vs. State Rep. 9. In support of his arguments, he relies upon the following judgments: (i) V.Venkata Subbarao vs. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, A.P. (2006) 13 SCC 305 (ii) State of Karnataka v. Ameer Jan (2007) 11 SCC 273 (iii) Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 622 (iv) B.Jayaraj v. State of A.P. (2014) 13 SCC 55 (v) Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Punjab (2017) 8 SCC 136 (vi) Rakesh Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2012) 13 SCC 552 10. Per contra, Sri Venkatesh R.Arabatti, learned Special Public Prosecutor seeks to justify the impugned order of conviction and sentence on the following grounds: (i) The appellant in his explanation Ex.P3 admitted that there was delay in preparing the agricultural certificate and receipt of bait money. However, he claimed that he received the said amount towards tax of the property, which was not his job; (ii) Having regard to the explanation under Ex.P3 it is not open to the appellant at this stage to contend that no work was pending with him and it was necessary to examine Chinnamma; (iii) The moment the appellant admitted receipt of bait money and recovery of the same from his custody, the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act arises about his criminality and he failed to rebut the said presumption; (iv) The evidence of DWs.1 and 2 shows that they were interested in acquittal of the appellant and therefore their evidence was not trust worthy; (v) The evidence of PW.5 shows that he had issued sanction on due application of mind; (vi) Having regard to Section 19(3) of the PC Act, the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court cannot be reversed by this Court on the ground of validity of sanction. 11. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the following judgments: (i) State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G.Jain (2013) 8 SCC 119 (ii) State by Police Inspector v. T.Venkatesh Murthy AIR 2004 SC 5117 12. Having regard to the rival contentions of the parties, the questions that arise for consideration are: (i) Whether sanction order Ex.P11 issued by PW.5 has caused failure of justice to the appellant? (ii) Whether the trial Court was justified in holding that the appellant demanded and received the bait money MO.5 for showing official favour to PW.3? Reg. Sanction Order: 13. (ii) Whether the trial Court was justified in holding that the appellant demanded and received the bait money MO.5 for showing official favour to PW.3? Reg. Sanction Order: 13. There was no dispute that at the relevant time, the petitioner was working as Revenue Inspector in Hullahalli Village, Nada Kacheri of Nanjangud Taluk. It was also not disputed that the Deputy Commissioner was the Competent Authority to issue sanction to prosecute him in the case. As per the prosecution, PW.5 the Deputy Commissioner of Mysuru District was the Competent Authority and he issued Sanction Order as per Ex.P11 to prosecute the accused. 14. The only contention of the learned Counsel for the accused is that sanction order Ex.P11 was issued without application of mind. PW.5 deposed that along with the requisition for issuing sanction order, Lokayukta DGP had sent him the FIR, complaint, mahazars and statement of the witnesses. He further deposed that on verification of those documents, he was satisfied that the accused committed offence and therefore, he issued the sanction order. In his cross-examination, no where it was suggested that all the relevant records were not placed before him. Only an attempt was made to show that Ex.P11 was not prepared by him and he has mechanically signed the order prepared by his subordinates which he denied. 15. For the first time, before this Court an attempt was made to say that voice recording device, file of Chinnamma and the explanation of the accused were not sent to PW.5, therefore, PW.5 had no opportunity to examine the entire material, therefore, the sanction order is vitiated. 16. Section 19(3) of the PC Act, bars the Appellate Court from reversing the finding or sentence or order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of absence, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction order unless in the opinion of the Court, the failure of justice has been occasioned thereby to the accused. 17. It was for the appellant to show that there was failure of justice due to any error or omission or irregularity in the sanction order. As already pointed out, the Sanctioning Authority was not confronted in his cross-examination with the questions raised in the appeal. 18. 17. It was for the appellant to show that there was failure of justice due to any error or omission or irregularity in the sanction order. As already pointed out, the Sanctioning Authority was not confronted in his cross-examination with the questions raised in the appeal. 18. Perusal of the judgment in Ameer Jan’s case relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant shows that the sanction order was defective and therefore the conviction was held vitiated. The appellant himself in his explanation Ex.P3 admitted that Chinnamma had filed application for issuance of agriculturist certificate and he was the person in charge to process the said file. His only contention was that by the time the trap was laid, he had performed his part of work and the file had passed from his custody. In view of his own admission in Ex.P3 that the work was pending in his office, even assuming that the file was not placed before PW.5 that itself does not vitiate the sanction order. 19. In Mahesh G.Jain’s case referred to supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the adequacy of the material placed before the Sanctioning Authority cannot be gone into by the Court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. It was further held that an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner and there should not be a hyper technical approach to test its validity. It was held that when there is an order of sanction by the Competent Authority indicating application of mind, the same should not be lightly dealt with. It was held that if the sanction order prima-facie shows the consideration of the relevant material by the Sanctioning Authority, the Court cannot go behind that. 20. In the light of judgment in Mahesh G.Jain’s case and the accused not eliciting from PW.5 in his cross-examination about any material irregularity or incorrectness in granting the sanction order, it cannot be said that the sanction order was passed mechanically without application of mind. Therefore, the judgment in Ameer Jan’s case is not applicable. Reg. Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification: 21. The accused did not dispute that PW.3 had approached him on behalf of Chinnamma to pursue the application of Chinnamma for grant of agriculturist’s certificate. The whole file relating to the application of Chinnamma was marked as Ex.P8. Therefore, the judgment in Ameer Jan’s case is not applicable. Reg. Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification: 21. The accused did not dispute that PW.3 had approached him on behalf of Chinnamma to pursue the application of Chinnamma for grant of agriculturist’s certificate. The whole file relating to the application of Chinnamma was marked as Ex.P8. That contains her application dated 22.05.2006. The said application shows that Chinnamma had applied for agriculturist’s certificate for the purpose of registration of tractor purchased by her with the transport authority. PW.2 was the shadow witness, PW.3 was the complainant, PW.4 was the Investigating Officer who registered the case, conducted the trap and other investigation. PWs.2 and 3 in their evidence deposed that after the entrustment mahazar, as per the instruction of Investigating Officer, PW.3 approached the accused in his office and PW.2 accompanied him. They further deposed that the accused demanded illegal gratification and received the phenolphthalein coated money MO.5(a). 22. PWs.1 to 4 in their evidence further deposed that to explain the possession of the money, the accused submitted his explanation Ex.P3 to the Investigating Officer. The accused also did not dispute the submission of Ex.P3 before the Investigating Officer. In Ex.P.3, accused himself admits that there was delay in attending the application of Chinnamma. He also admits the acceptance of the bait money, but he states that he received that towards land revenue, water tax etc. 23. Learned counsel for the accused submits that to raise the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act the prosecution shall prove the demand and acceptance, then only the presumption of guilt arises. Secondly he submits that presumption, if any, under Section 20 stood rebutted by the facts that the file of Chinnamma was already cleared by the accused, therefore no work of Chinnamma was pending to show any official favour and the evidence of DWs.1 and 2 showed that the accused received the amount towards land revenue and water tax. Thus he claimed that the accused successfully rebutted the presumption. 24. Section 20 of PC Act reads as follows: “20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.- 1. Thus he claimed that the accused successfully rebutted the presumption. 24. Section 20 of PC Act reads as follows: “20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.- 1. Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn.” 25. Section 20 of the PC Act contains two parts. First one is that the prosecution shall prove that the accused accepted the gratification; the second one is that the valuable so received should be other than legal remuneration. Then the presumption that he accepted that as illegal gratification arises. 26. The terms ‘gratification’ and ‘legal remuneration’ are defined in Section 7(b) and (c) of the PC Act. Section 7(b) defines gratification as not only pecuniary gratification but gratifications estimable in money. Then the presumption that he accepted that as illegal gratification arises. 26. The terms ‘gratification’ and ‘legal remuneration’ are defined in Section 7(b) and (c) of the PC Act. Section 7(b) defines gratification as not only pecuniary gratification but gratifications estimable in money. Section 7(c) defines legal remuneration as follows: “7(c) “Legal remuneration”. The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.” 27. Further the ‘motive or reward for doing’ is defined under Section 7(d) of the PC Act as follows: “7(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.” 28. In his explanation under Ex.P3 the accused clearly admitted that he accepted the money. Therefore, the only question was whether he received that as legal remuneration. Section 20 of the PC Act excludes only legal remuneration. 29. According to the accused, he received Rs.500/-towards land revenue or tax. As per Section 7(c) of the PC Act to call it as a legal remuneration, he should have been entitled to lawfully demand that and he must have been permitted by the Government to accept the same. According to the accused himself Government had not authorized him to demand or receive land revenue or the water tax. 30. According to the accused himself DW.1 was the officer authorized by the Government to receive tax or revenue. Accused examined DW.1 the village accountant to show that DW.1 had authorized him to receive the tax on his behalf. DW.1 authorizing him to collect the land revenue or water tax does not save the accused from the operation of Section 20 of the PC Act. By the evidence of DW.1 the presumption that the amount was received as illegal gratification was not rebutted. It is no doubt true that the burden of rebutting the presumption is not on par with the burden of prosecution proving the charge. However, the said defence and evidence led to rebut the presumption should be acceptable. 31. By the evidence of DW.1 the presumption that the amount was received as illegal gratification was not rebutted. It is no doubt true that the burden of rebutting the presumption is not on par with the burden of prosecution proving the charge. However, the said defence and evidence led to rebut the presumption should be acceptable. 31. If at all the file of Chinnamma was pending for want of payment of land revenue and water tax, the accused being the Government Officer should not have cleared that as contended by him. To overcome that accused tried to establish that DW.1 had prepared pre-receipt as per Ex.D1 expecting the payment of land revenue and tax, therefore the presumption was rebutted. 32. The contention that DW.1 prepared the receipt Ex.D1 even before payment or tendering all the arrears of land revenue and water tax was highly unbelievable. Nothing was elicited in the evidence of DW.1 to show that there was any rule or norm authorizing a Government servant to prepare and issue a receipt even before the dues are paid or tendered. Apart from that DW.1 himself in his evidence admitted that accused did not give him the amount mentioned in Ex.D1. He also admits that after the accused was trapped, he did not make any attempt to submit Ex.D1 to the Investigating Officer or to give his statement in that regard. Further in Ex.P3 there was no reference to Ex.D1. Considering all these aspects, it becomes clear that DWs.1 and 2 were the partisan witnesses and Ex.D1 is a doubtful document. 33. So far as the other defence that the work of Chinnamma was not pending, it is useful to refer to Section 7(d) of the PC Act. A ‘motive’ or ‘reward for doing’ does not always indicate a pending work. A person receiving gratification as a motive or reward even if he is not in position to do that work comes within the expression ‘a motive or reward for doing’. According to the accused himself the file of Chinnamma had not passed his office. As per Ex.P8 itself, the office of the accused received the application of Chinnamma on 27.05.2006. 34. In Ex.P3 accused himself states that there was delay in processing the application. The only explanation in Ex.P3 was that since the applicant was not available to do the needful the delay was caused. As per Ex.P8 itself, the office of the accused received the application of Chinnamma on 27.05.2006. 34. In Ex.P3 accused himself states that there was delay in processing the application. The only explanation in Ex.P3 was that since the applicant was not available to do the needful the delay was caused. If that is the case, it was open to the accused to return the file on that ground. 35. In N.Vijayakumar’s case relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant it was held that mere recovery by itself does not prove the charge of prosecution against the accused and the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe. 36. As discussed above, the accused has not received the amount as legal remuneration. He was not authorized or empowered to receive land revenue or tax. He admits the acceptance of the amount, but fails to prove that such receipt was towards legal remuneration. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the basic fact of acceptance was not proved is not applicable. 37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the acceptance of the money is established, the accused has to rebut the said presumption by acceptable evidence. The explanation given by the accused in this case regarding acceptance of the amount and the evidence led in that regard was not acceptable. Therefore, the trial Court rightly drew the presumption under Section 20 of PC Act. 38. The trial Court on sound appreciation of the evidence and application of law has convicted the appellant. This Court does not find any ground to interfere with the same. 39. Sri V.Manjunath Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aged more than 70 years and he is suffering age related ailments, therefore, he seeks to reduce the sentence of imprisonment. 40. The trial Court has imposed sentence of simple imprisonment of one year for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act as well as under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The minimum sentence prescribed for the offence under section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act itself is one year. Therefore, such request cannot be considered. The appeal is dismissed. The minimum sentence prescribed for the offence under section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act itself is one year. Therefore, such request cannot be considered. The appeal is dismissed. ORDER Learned counsel for the appellant files application under Section 389(1) of Cr.P.C. seeking suspension of sentence to enable the appellant to prefer an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Since the order is appealable one, it would be just and appropriate to suspend the order of sentence to afford an opportunity to the appellant to prefer appeal. Therefore, application is allowed. The order of sentence passed by the trial Court and confirmed by this Court is hereby suspended and the appellant is granted bail in the above case subject to the following conditions: (i) The appellant shall execute personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/-and furnish two sureties in the like sum to the satisfaction of the trial Court for his appearance before the Court whenever required; and (ii) He shall deposit fine amount, if not already deposited, before the trial Court within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order.