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2021 DIGILAW 254 (ORI)

Smt. Pallishree Mohanty v. State Of Odisha

2021-06-18

K.R.MOHAPATRA

body2021
ORDER K.R. Mohapatra, J. - This writ petition has been filed for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus to direct the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) to register the General Power of Attorney (for short, 'GPA') (Annexure-4) and issue certificate in terms of Section 32 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (for short, 'Stamp Act'). 2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts for proper adjudication of this case are that Plot No.1B/16 in Sector-10 of Abhinaba Bidanasi, Cuttack (for short, 'the case land') was allotted in favour of the Petitioner vide Allotment letter No.6321 dated 27.03.2002 (Annexure-1) and delivery of possession of the same was made by the Cuttack Development Authority (for short, 'CDA') in her favour vide order No.1319 dated 14.01.2003 (Annexure-2). After approval of the plan, a two storied building has already been constructed over the case land. The Petitioner at present is staying in United States of America (USA). Due to certain compulsions, the Petitioner is not in a position to come to India frequently for which she executed a GPA in the name of her husband, namely, Sri Himansu Sekhar Mohanty in respect of the case land on 16.08.2013 (Annexure-4) before the Assistant Consular Officer, Consulate General of India at New York. In spite of repeated requests of the Petitioner, lease deed in respect of the case land was not executed in her favour for which the Petitioner through her GPA filed W.P.(C) No.7018 of 2019, which was disposed of on 08.04.2019 with a direction to the Secretary, CDA (OP No.2) to dispose of the application of the Petitioner for execution of the lease deed in respect of the case land within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of the said order. However, the Secretary CDA (OP No.2), vide his letter No.6697/CDA dated 11.05.2019 (Annexure-4 series) intimated the attorney of the Petitioner, namely, Sri Himansu Sekhar Mohanty that since the GPA was executed outside India, i.e., at New York by the Petitioner, it was required to be registered before the competent authority, namely, District SubRegistrar, Cuttack. Hence, he was requested to register the document/instrument and submit the same before the CDA for taking further action on the application. Hence, he was requested to register the document/instrument and submit the same before the CDA for taking further action on the application. It is further contended in the writ petition that the Petitioner and her family members are suffering from acute financial stringency and the Petitioner is also required to repay some personal loans for which she has taken financial assistance from a prospective purchaser of the case land, namely, Abinash Samal. As the deed of transfer could not be executed within a reasonable time and in the meantime two years have already elapsed, the prospective purchaser is pressing hard to return the advance money, but the Petitioner is not in a position to repay the same. 2.1 After taking return of the document from CDA, the Petitioner ascertained that the GPA under Annexure-4 is required to be submitted before the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) for issuance of necessary certificate in terms of Section 32 of the Stamp Act. Accordingly, the Petitioner has already submitted the original document before the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) to do the needful. Till date, the Collector, Cuttack has not taken any action on the same for which the aforesaid relief is sought for. 3. The Opposite Party No.3, Collector and District Magistrate, Cuttack filed his counter affidavit stating inter alia that under Section 31 of the Stamp Act, the Collector is required to determine the duty, if any, to be paid on the instrument only when a person applies for the same. When an application is brought to the notice of the Collector under Section 31 of the Stamp Act, the Collector shall certify by endorsement on such document that the stamp duty (stating the amount) with which the instrument is chargeable has been paid under Section 32 of the Stamp Act. The Petitioner, in the instant case, has not filed any application as required under Section 31 of the Stamp Act. Had it been submitted in terms of Section 31 of the Stamp Act it could have been adjudicated and considered for issuance of certificate under Section 32 of the said Act. The Petitioner, in the instant case, has not filed any application as required under Section 31 of the Stamp Act. Had it been submitted in terms of Section 31 of the Stamp Act it could have been adjudicated and considered for issuance of certificate under Section 32 of the said Act. It is further contented that proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act envisages that it is not obligatory on the part of the Collector to endorse any instrument executed out of India and brought before the Collector after expiration of three months from the date of its first receipt in India. The certificate issued under Section 32 of the Stamp Act shall be recognized under Section 33 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. But, due to non-compliance of the aforesaid provision of the Stamp Act, the case of the Petitioner needs no consideration and a prayer is made for dismissal of the writ petition. 4. Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the Petitioner reiterating the averments made in the writ petition made his legal submissions to the effect that an instrument executed out of India should be presented before the concerned District Collector within three months from the date when it is first received in India. Although applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, 'Limitation Act') to Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act is not specifically provided under the Stamp Act itself, but in view of the language and tenor of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the Stamp Act. Thus, the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) has the power to consider and issue certificate under Section 32 of the Stamp Act, if an application under Section 31 along with the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is presented before him beyond the three months as stipulated under proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act. He accordingly prayed for such a direction. 4 .1 He further submitted that unlike Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, there is any restriction in the provisions under Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act, which would exclude the applicability of the provisions under Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. 4 .1 He further submitted that unlike Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, there is any restriction in the provisions under Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act, which would exclude the applicability of the provisions under Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. He made an alternate argument that Section 31 of the Stamp Act itself does not specify any period of limitation to make an application to the Collector for adjudication with regard to adequacy of stamp duty paid on instrument. Section 32 of the Stamp Act comes into operation after adjudication with regard to the duty chargeable on the instrument. If the instrument is brought before the Collector within three months (State amendment) from the date when it is first received in India, the applicant would be entitled to a certificate to the effect that the instrument so produced has been properly stamped. In support of his case, Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the Petitioner, placed reliance on a decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of M.P. Rajeswaran Nair -v- The District Collector and others, reported in 2009 SCC Online Ker 2436, which reads thus:- '7. This is all the more so, since under Section 31 an unexecuted document can also be brought for adjudication. The limitation prescribed under proviso to Section 32 applies only in respect of documents brought after the expiry of one month from the date of its execution. Therefore, for attracting the limitation under the proviso to Section 32, the document has to be one which has been executed. That itself shows that two sections are not interdependent. Further, Section 32 becomes applicable only after the Collector determines either the instrument is fully stamped or stamp duty is payable or the instrument is not chargeable with duty at all. Therefore, the question of application of Section 32 arises only after adjudication under Section 31. That itself shows that two sections are not interdependent. Further, Section 32 becomes applicable only after the Collector determines either the instrument is fully stamped or stamp duty is payable or the instrument is not chargeable with duty at all. Therefore, the question of application of Section 32 arises only after adjudication under Section 31. Further, if the limitation under the proviso to Section 32 is held to be applicable to Section 31 also, then even if an instrument is properly stamped and it is disputed after one month from its execution, it would become impossible for a person to get an adjudication as to the proper stamp duty by the Collector, which cannot be the intention of the law maker while incorporating the limitation in the proviso to Section 32. This is further evident from the language of the proviso. The words 'nothing in this Section shall authorise the Collector to endorse' puts an embargo only on the endorsement and not on the adjudication under Section 31. Therefore, clearly the limitation prescribed under the proviso to Section 32 is not application to adjudication of the proper stamp duty under Section 31.' 4 .2 Pursuant to the direction of this Court in W.P.(C) No.7018 of 2019, which was disposed of on 08.04.2019, the authority under CDA vide its letter No.6697 dated 11.05.2019, directed the Petitioner to register the document and then submit the same to take further action. In that process, more than two years had elapsed. Thereafter, the Petitioner had to run from pillar to post and ultimately came to learn that she has to file an application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act to get a certificate from the Collector under Section 32 of the Stamp Act with regard to adequacy of the stamp on the instrument. Further, the Petitioner due to restriction of pandemic of COVID-19 is unable to come to India to execute a fresh GPA to get the lease deed executed in her favour and transfer of the case land in favour of Sri Abinash Samal following due procedure of law. As such, the Petitioner is in a precarious condition and unless prayer made in the writ petition is granted, she will suffer irreparable loss. 5 . As such, the Petitioner is in a precarious condition and unless prayer made in the writ petition is granted, she will suffer irreparable loss. 5 . Miss Samapika Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel made her submissions referring to the counter affidavit and contended that the provision of Section 29(2) of the limitation Act is not applicable to the case at hand. It is her submission that on a conjoint reading of Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act makes it clear that the instrument is to be brought before the Collector of the district under Section 31 of the said Act and if the Collector after adjudication finds that the document has been properly stamped, he shall make an endorsement to that effect and issue certificate accordingly under Section 32 of the Stamp Act. Proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act envisages that it is not obligatory on the part of a Collector to endorse the instrument, which is executed or first executed out of India and brought before him after expiration of three months from the date it is first received in India. Admittedly, the Petitioner has not yet produced the instrument along with an application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act for issuance of a certificate under Section 32 of the Stamp Act. Thus, Collector, Cuttack is not authorised to entertain any application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act intended to be filed by the petitioner in view of proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act. Limitation provided in the proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 is different from the period prescribed under the Schedule in the Limitation Act. Thus, in view of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will not apply to the Stamp Act. She also relied upon the case law in the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Co., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470 and case law in the case of M/s. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 2019 SC 505 and submitted that the provision of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable to the special statute where a period of limitation other than the Schedule of the Limitation Act has been provided. Union of India, reported in AIR 2019 SC 505 and submitted that the provision of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable to the special statute where a period of limitation other than the Schedule of the Limitation Act has been provided. Giving an illustration of Section 125 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, Miss Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel placed reliance on the case law in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and Ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 2061 and submitted that where limitation other than the Schedule of the Limitation Act has been provided in any special statute, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will not be made applicable to such provisions of the special law. Hence, she contended that the claim of the Petitioner being hopelessly time barred the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) has no jurisdiction to adjudicate and endorse the instrument presented by the Petitioner. 6 . Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for CDA, although did not file counter affidavit, but assisted the Court in making his legal submissions. It is his submission that since no direction has been sought for against the CDA-opposite party No.2, it did not feel necessary to file counter affidavit. It is his submission that the Stamp Act and the Rules framed there under do not provide either application or exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act to it. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that subject to provisions contained under Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act (both inclusive) every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 5 of the Limitation Act enables a party to file an appeal or application with a petition seeking condonation of delay and the Court is competent to condone the delay in case sufficient cause is assigned to the satisfaction of the said Court. A plain reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes it clear that period of limitation provided in a special or local law shall be the period of limitation as if it is prescribed under the Schedule of the Limitation Act. A plain reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act makes it clear that period of limitation provided in a special or local law shall be the period of limitation as if it is prescribed under the Schedule of the Limitation Act. But the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive) shall be subject to the extent to which and insofar as they are not expressly excluded by said special or local law. The said provision came under interpretation before the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the celebrated case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1099 (Vidya Charan Sukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel). Interpreting the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act with reference to an Election Appeal preferred under 116(A) of the Representation of People Act, 1951, the majority view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that if the requirements of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are satisfied, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act will be made applicable to the local or special Act. It came up for consideration again in the reported case of Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 5 , wherein at paragraphs-8 and 9, it has been observed as follows:- '8. xxx xxx xxx A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application; (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. 9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. 9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under:- (i) In such a case Section-3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule; (ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as an to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.' After a thorough analysis, at paragraph-10 it is held as follows: '10.........It is now well settled that a situation where in a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied. As laid down by a majority decision of the Constitution bench of this Court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla Vs. Khubchand Baghel and Ors. ( AIR 1964 SC 1099 ), when the first schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can be said that under the first schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period. While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.' In the case of Popular Construction Co. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider applicability of the Limitation Act to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in view of language employed in Section 34(3) of the said Act, wherein at paragraphs-6 and 8, it has been held as follows:- '6. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to consider applicability of the Limitation Act to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in view of language employed in Section 34(3) of the said Act, wherein at paragraphs-6 and 8, it has been held as follows:- '6. On an analysis of the section, it is clear that the provisions of Section 4 to 24 will apply when : (i) There is a special or local law which prescribes a different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application; and (ii) The special or local law does not expressly exclude those sections. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 8. Had the proviso to Section 34 merely provided for a period within which the court could exercise its discretion, that would not have been sufficient to exclude Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act because 'mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section-5.' Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra) had the occasion to consider the applicability of Limitation Act with reference to Section 125 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, wherein at paragraph-32 it has been held as follows:- 'In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by this Court for entertaining an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal beyond the period of 120 days specified in Section 125 of the Electricity Act and its proviso. Any interpretation of Section 125 of the Electricity Act which may attract applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing an appeal against the decision or order of the Tribunal and proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory.' It was his submission that in view of the language and tenor of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 125 of the Indian Electricity Act, 2003, limiting the scope specifically, the statutory period to invoke the said provisions, the provisions of Limitation Act would not be applicable in such cases. But in the instant case, there is no such prohibition or restriction under Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act. But in the instant case, there is no such prohibition or restriction under Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act. As such, Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply to the case at hand in full force. He also reiterated an alternate argument raised by Mr.Nayak, learned counsel for the Petitioner and submitted that the Petitioner may make an application for adjudication with regard to adequacy of stamp on the instrument before the Collector along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which can be considered in accordance with law. 7. Taking into consideration the rival contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, the question that crops up for consideration is whether the provisions of Limitation Act can be made applicable to Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act. 8. Section 31 of the Stamp Act makes provision for adjudication with regard to adequacy of stamp duty paid on the instrument. It provides that when a person brings an instrument to the Collector and applies to have his opinion as to the duty (if any) with which it is chargeable and pay fees as directed, the Collector shall determine the duty (if any) with which such instrument is chargeable. Section 32 of the said Act makes provision for issuance of certificate by the Collector. It provides that when an instrument is brought to the Collector under Section 31, which in his opinion, one of a description chargeable with duty the Collector shall certify by endorsement on such instrument that the full duty (stating the amount), with which it is chargeable has been paid. When he is of the opinion that the instrument is not chargeable with duty, the Collector shall certify in the manner as provided that such instrument is not so chargeable. Sub-section (3) of Section 32 is relevant for our consideration, which reads as follows:- '32. When he is of the opinion that the instrument is not chargeable with duty, the Collector shall certify in the manner as provided that such instrument is not so chargeable. Sub-section (3) of Section 32 is relevant for our consideration, which reads as follows:- '32. Certificate by Collector- (1) xx xx xx (2) xx xx xx (3) Any instrument upon which an endorsement has been made under this section, shall be deemed to be duly stamped or not chargeable with duty, as the case may be; and, if chargeable with duty, shall be receivable in evidence or otherwise, and may be acted upon and registered as if it had been originally duty stamped : Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the Collector to endorse - (a) Any instrument executed or first executed in India and brought to him after the expiration of one month from the date of its execution or first execution, as the case may be; (b) Any instrument executed or first executed out of India and brought to him after the expiration of three months after it has been first received in India; or (c) Any instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding then naye paise, or any bill of exchange or promissory note, when brought to him, after the drawing or execution thereof, on paper not duly stamped. 9. On a close scrutiny of Sections 31 and 32 of the Stamp Act, it is apparent that proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 makes it clear that the Collector is not authorized to endorse any instrument executed or first executed out of India and brought to him after expiration of three months after it was first received in India. In the instant case, there is no dispute to the fact that the GPA in question was executed by the Petitioner on 16.08.2013 before the Assistant Consular Officer, office of Consulate General of India at the Embassy of India in New York, USA. Although the date on which it was for the first time received in India is not available in the writ Petition, but it is not in dispute that the document was presented before the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) for issuance of a certificate after expiration of three months from the date when it is first received in India. 10. Although the date on which it was for the first time received in India is not available in the writ Petition, but it is not in dispute that the document was presented before the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) for issuance of a certificate after expiration of three months from the date when it is first received in India. 10. Thus, the question for consideration is as to whether the delay in presentation of an instrument can be condoned by the Collector for issuance of a certificate under Section 32 of the Stamp Act. 11. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that subject to provisions contained under Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. However, Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that, an appeal or any application, (other than an application under Order XXI Code of Civil Procedure, 1908) may be admitted after prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant, as the case may be, satisfies the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making application within such period as provided under the Schedule to the Limitation Act. But, no period of limitation to make an application under Section 31 is provided in the Schedule of the Limitation Act. Section 31 of the Stamp Act also does not provide any period of limitation to make such an application. It is only the proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act provides that Collector is not authorised to make an endorsement if the instrument executed out of India is brought before him after expiration of three months of its first receipt in India. It impliedly stipulates that in the aforesaid contingency an application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act should be made within the period provided in proviso to Section 32(3). Kerala High Court in the case of M.P.Rajeswaran Nair (supra) relying upon a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Y.A.A.V.R. Sethuraman Chettiar vs K.K.R.M.R.M. Ramanathan reported in AIR 1946 Madras 437, at paragraph-10 took a view as under:- '10. Kerala High Court in the case of M.P.Rajeswaran Nair (supra) relying upon a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Y.A.A.V.R. Sethuraman Chettiar vs K.K.R.M.R.M. Ramanathan reported in AIR 1946 Madras 437, at paragraph-10 took a view as under:- '10. As held in that judgment if an executed instrument is produced for adjudication as to proper stamp under Section 31, after one month of its execution, the other consequences applicable to production of an insufficiently stamped instrument before a person in charge of a public office under other provisions of the Kerala Stamp Act would necessarily follow and after adjudication of the proper stamp, if the Collector finds that the same is insufficiently stamped he has to proceed further against that instrument under those provisions. In other words, if an executed instrument is produced before the Collector under Section 31, within one month, even if the Collector finds that the instrument is insufficiently stamped, the instrument would not attract penalty, and the Collector shall make the endorsement under Section 32, if the party pays the deficit stamp whereas if it is produced after one month, it would, and the Collector cannot make the endorsement which is the effect of the limitation prescribed under the proviso to Section 32, instead the Collector has to, after adjudication of the proper stamp, proceed either under Sections 33 and 39 read with Section 41 or under Section 40 read with Section 41.' Interpreting relevant provisions of the Stamp Act, Kerala High Court held that if a person seeks adjudication beyond the time limit prescribed under Section 32 of the Stamp Act, the Collector has to first decide whether the instrument is duly stamped for which no period of limitation is provided and if the same is not duly stamped, the Collector shall impound the instrument and require payment of the additional duty chargeable on the instrument together with the prescribed penalty^ if any. However, the issue involved in the instant case is completely different. Unless a certificate is issued under Section 32 of the Stamp Act, the adjudication of application under Section 31 will be meaningless. As such, the restriction provided in proviso (b) to Subsection (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act clearly applies to this case. 12. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act read as follows:- '29. Savings. Unless a certificate is issued under Section 32 of the Stamp Act, the adjudication of application under Section 31 will be meaningless. As such, the restriction provided in proviso (b) to Subsection (3) of Section 32 of the Stamp Act clearly applies to this case. 12. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act read as follows:- '29. Savings. (1) xx xx xx (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.' It makes a provision that when a special or local law prescribes period of limitation different from the period prescribed in the Schedule of the Limitation Act, the provision of Section 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule. However, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will only apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Popular Construction Co. (supra) had the occasion to deal with applicability of the Limitation Act in view of the provision under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act makes it clear that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant is prevented by sufficient cause from making an application within a period of three months as provided under Sub-section (3), it may entertain an application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. Thus, this special Act specifically puts a restriction to applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in view of language employed under the proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) as aforesaid. Accordingly, discussing the said provision Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act has no application to the said provisions. Thus, this special Act specifically puts a restriction to applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in view of language employed under the proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) as aforesaid. Accordingly, discussing the said provision Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act has no application to the said provisions. In view of the above, no application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act can be entertained after the extended period of 30 days provided therein. 13. Likewise, in the case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting the applicability of the Limitation Act to the Indian Electricity Act, 2003 held that in view of proviso to Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 any interpretation to attract the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 29(2) thereof will defeat the object of the legislation, namely, to provide special limitation for filing appeal or against the decision of the Tribunal and the proviso to Section 125 will become nugatory. 13.1 Such is not the case at hand. As discussed earlier, although no period of limitation is prescribed to make an application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act, but in view of the proviso (b) to Sub-section (3) of Section 32 of the said Act it becomes imperative on the part of the applicant to make an application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act within a period of three months from the date, when an instrument executed out of India, is first received in India. There is no restriction under the aforesaid provision to receive any application beyond the period of three months, as stipulated in Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or in Electricity Act, 2003. Thus, in view of the discussions made above and in view of the ratio decided in the case of Vidya Charan Sukla (supra) and Mukri Gopalan (supra), I am of the considered opinion that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is squarely applicable to the case at hand. Thus, in view of the discussions made above and in view of the ratio decided in the case of Vidya Charan Sukla (supra) and Mukri Gopalan (supra), I am of the considered opinion that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is squarely applicable to the case at hand. The Application under Section 31 of the Stamp Act along with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the cause for such delay can be received and adjudicated by the Collector for issuance of a certificate of endorsement under Section 32 of the Stamp Act, when an instrument is brought before the Collector after three months of its first receipt in India. 14. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed to the extent stated above and it is directed that in the event the Petitioner makes an application within a period of two months under Section 31 of the Stamp Act along with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act enclosing the instrument in original for which the certificate of endorsement is sought for under Section 32 of the Stamp Act, the Collector, Cuttack (OP No.3) shall receive and adjudicate the same in accordance with law giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. 15. As the restrictions due to resurgence of COVID- 19 situation are continuing, learned counsel for the parties may utilize a printout of the order available in the High Court's website, at par with certified copy, subject to attestation by the concerned Advocate, in the manner prescribed vide Court's Notice No. 4587 dated 25th March, 2020 as modified by Court's Notice No. 4798 dated 15th April, 2021.