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2021 DIGILAW 255 (RAJ)

Liladhar Swami v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur

2021-02-02

MANOJ KUMAR VYAS, SABINA

body2021
ORDER : 1. Petitioner has filed the writ petition challenging order dated 02.06.2016, whereby, he was imposed penalty of removal from service. 2. Facts of the case, in brief as stated in the writ petition, are that the petitioner was appointed as Judicial Magistrate with effect from 10.03.2008. Petitioner was placed under suspension vide order dated 24.07.2013. Memorandum dated 17.08.2013 was served on the petitioner by the Enquiry Judge and petitioner submitted his reply to the said Memorandum on 09.11.2013. Enquiry Judge vide report dated 30.01.2016 held that the charge levelled against the petitioner was duly proved. Petitioner submitted representation dated 26.03.2016. Vide order dated 02.06.2016, petitioner was removed from service. 3. Notice was issued to respondents. Respondent No.1 in its reply has submitted that the petitioner had been removed from service after following due process of law. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Enquiry Judge had no power to proceed against the petitioner. Charge sheet could have issued against the petitioner by the competent authority, but in the present case, it had been issued by Enquiry Judge and not by Disciplinary Authority. 5. Learned counsel has further submitted that first proviso to Rule 23(2) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1958') was liable to be struck down to the extent it did not provide right to appeal against the order of removal from service. 6. Learned counsel has further submitted that the charge levelled against the petitioner was not established during enquiry. In-fact, Lok Adalats had been duly held with regard to the bills-in-question. In this regard, learned counsel has placed reliance on Para No. 13 of the writ petition. Impugned order was a non-speaking order. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that Ghanshyam Singh was the Chairman of the Bar Association, Railmagra and he had a prejudice against the petitioner and due to this reason, petitioner had been falsely involved in this case. In this regard, learned counsel has made reference to Para No. 12 of the writ petition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Chand Jain Vs. In this regard, learned counsel has made reference to Para No. 12 of the writ petition. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Chand Jain Vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana & Another, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1395, wherein it was observed that it was imperative for the High Court to take steps to protect its honest officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and litigants. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next placed reliance on Para No. 3 of the judgment of this Court in Sukhraj Singh Vs. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1988 (1) Rajasthan LR 613, which reads as under: "3. The petitioner has further alleged that from a perusal of his Annual Confidential Reports it would be revealed that he was an officer of outstanding ability and unquestionable integrity. However, to his surprise he was served with a communication dated August 16, 1986 whereby certain adverse remarks for the year 1985 were communicated to him. Against this communication dated August 16, 1986 the petitioner submitted a representation dated September 1, 1986 vide Ex. 1. While the said representation was, pending the petitioner was served with a memorandum dated January 27, 1987, issued under the signatures of Shri G.M. Lodha, as the disciplinary authority proposing an inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (here in after referred to as 'the Disciplinary Rules') on the charges of allegations enclosed therewith. A copy of the memorandum dated January 27, 1987, along with the statement of charges and statement of allegations has been submitted & marked as Ex. 2 along with enclosures 1 and 2. The petitioner thereupon submitted an application dated February 6, 1987 (Ex. 3) seeking permission to inspect certain records. The petitioner inspected the record on March 24, 1987, and thereafter submitted an application dated April 3, 1987 (Ex. 4) before the Disciplinary authority mentioning therein that the records asked for inspection by the petitioner had not been made available in original and as such the original documents may be made available for inspection and photostat copies of such documents may be given to the petitioner. 4) before the Disciplinary authority mentioning therein that the records asked for inspection by the petitioner had not been made available in original and as such the original documents may be made available for inspection and photostat copies of such documents may be given to the petitioner. Despite this the original documents were not made available for inspection and the petitioner moved another application on April 22, 1987 (Ex. 5) requesting therein that it may be recorded that the charges fail and inquiry be dropped........." 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has next placed reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in Ghanshyam Giri Vs. Rajasthan High Court & Another (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 637/2012 decided on 20.09.2017), wherein, it was held as under: "In the present case as admittedly the copy of the resolution of the Full Court was not made available to the petitioner, the same apparently was in violation of the resolution itself as well as express provisions of Rule 16(10A) of the Rules, 1958 and results in causing prejudice to the petitioner, who being unaware of the opinion of the Full Court did not make any representation qua the said opinion of the Full Court. The rest of the issues sought to be raised by the petitioner pertaining to the findings of the Inquiry Judge, on account of the fact that the Full Court apparently formed the opinion that the petitioner acted with corrupt motive also, go into oblivion at this stage. In view of the fact that the opinion of the Full Court was not communicated to the petitioner and petitioner could not make any representation qua the said opinion, further the Full Court rejected the representation and the State acting on the opinion of the Full Court has ordered for dismissal of the petitioner, the order of dismissal stands vitiated. It is well settled law that once the order of punishment is set aside on the ground that the inquiry has not been properly conducted, the matter has to be remitted back to the disciplinary authority to take up the inquiry from the point it stood vitiated and conclude the same afresh. It is well settled law that once the order of punishment is set aside on the ground that the inquiry has not been properly conducted, the matter has to be remitted back to the disciplinary authority to take up the inquiry from the point it stood vitiated and conclude the same afresh. Therefore, the matter has to be remitted back and is required to be dealt with from the stage where the Full Court had directed issuance of notice to the petitioner along with copy of inquiry report as well as copy of Full Court resolution and then proceed with the matter in accordance with the provisions of Rule 16(10A) and 16(10B) of the Rules, 1958. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is disposed of, the order dated 8/12/2011 (Annex. 9) dismissing the petitioner from service is quashed and set aside, the matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to take up the inquiry afresh, the petitioner shall be supplied the resolution of the Full Court and an opportunity to make a representation, thereafter, the disciplinary authority shall take final decision on the charges framed against the petitioner. Since in the meantime the petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation, he shall not be entitled for any consequential advantages at this stage and the same shall abide by the ultimate result of the disciplinary proceedings. No order as to costs." 11. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 has opposed the petition and has submitted that the petitioner was removed from service after following due process of law. So far as first proviso to Rule 23(2) of the Rules of 1958 is concerned, it has been ordered on the administrative side by the Acting Chief Justice vide order dated 17.03.2015 that the order dated 01.10.2013, whereby, committee was constituted to hear appeals under first proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958, was withdrawn. 12. Learned counsel has further submitted that as per Resolution dated 20.06.1996, the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall have the power to issue charge sheet and to conduct enquiry under Rule 16 and 17 of the Rules of 1958. The said Resolution was not under challenge, therefore, it could not be said to be a case of conflict of resolution and the rules. The said Resolution was not under challenge, therefore, it could not be said to be a case of conflict of resolution and the rules. Resolution had been passed by the Full Court. 13. Learned counsel has further submitted that need of integrity in judiciary is much higher than in other institutions. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arun Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Jharkhand & Another (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 190 of 2018 and other connected matter decided on 27.02.2020), wherein it was held as under: "Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesars wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty." 14. First proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958 reads as under: "23. Appeals against order imposing penalties: (1) xxxxxxxxxxxxx (2) xxxxxxxxxxxxx [Provided that a member of the [Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and the] Rajasthan Judicial Service against whom an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14 except the penalty of removal or dismissal from service is made by an authority other than the Government may appeal to a [Committee consisting of three Judges of the Rajasthan High Court nominated by the Chief Justice.]]" 15. With regard to the aforesaid rule, order dated 17.03.2015 was passed by the Acting Chief Justice and the operative part of the same reads as under: "In the legal position, as set out above, it is declared that all the departmental appeals pending under the first Proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 23 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958 before the Committee of the three Hon'ble Judges, nominated by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice on 01.10.2013, are not maintainable, and shall be dismissed accordingly, with liberty to the Judicial Officers-appellants, to seek the remedies available to them, in accordance with law, including writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and in such case, they may submit their explanation for the time spent, in pursuing the appeal under the first Proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 23 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, to explain the laches, if any, in filing the writ petition. The order dated 01.10.2013 of the then Hon'ble Chief Justice appointing the Committee to hear the Appeals under the Proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 23, is hereby withdrawn." 16. Thus, the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the discriminatory treatment was being given to the officers, who had been awarded punishment of removal or dismissal from service vis-a-vis officers, who had been awarded other punishments enumerated under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 does not survive in view of order dated 17.03.2015 passed by the Acting Chief Justice. 17. 17. Vide Resolution dated 20.06.1996, it was resolved as under: "On due consideration of the matter it is Resolved to further amend with immediate effect the Resolution of Full Court dated 30.10.1971 as under:- "(I) Sub-clause (i) of Clause (3) of the delegation of powers in Resolution dated 30.10.1971, shall be deleted and substituted by the following: "(i) The Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall have the power to issue charge sheet and to conduct enquiry under Rule 16 & 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 and to submit the Enquiry Report to the Chief Justice for placing it before the Full Court." (II) sub-clause (ii) of Clause (3) of the delegation of powers in Resolution dated 30.10.1971 shall be deleted and substituted by the following:- "(ii) The Enquiry Report submitted by the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice shall be placed before the Full Court. The Full Court after considering the Report, may agree or disagree with it and may exonerate the delinquent officer or may impose suitable punishment on him following the procedure prescribed by the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958." The pending enquiries shall also be governed by this Resolution and Judges nominated by the Chief Justice as Disciplinary Authorities in those enquiries shall submit their report to the Chief Justice for being placed before the Full Court for consideration." 18. Thus, as per the above Resolution, the Administrative Judge or the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice had the power to issue charge sheet and conduct enquiry under Rule 16 and 17 of the Rules of 1958. In terms of the above Resolution, enquiry was to be conducted by the Judge nominated by the Chief Justice. 19. In view of Resolution dated 20.06.1996, there is no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that charge sheet issued by the Enquiry Judge was liable to be set aside as it had not been issued in accordance with law. Rather, from the Resolution dated 20.06.1996 passed by the Full Court, it is evident that the Enquiry Judge, who had been nominated by the Chief Justice of this Court, was authorised to issue the charge sheet. The said Resolution is not under challenge. 20. Rather, from the Resolution dated 20.06.1996 passed by the Full Court, it is evident that the Enquiry Judge, who had been nominated by the Chief Justice of this Court, was authorised to issue the charge sheet. The said Resolution is not under challenge. 20. Petitioner was posted as Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, Railmagra, District Rajsamand and was holding the charge of Chairman, Taluka Legal Services Committee, 21. Railmagra and following charge was framed against him: "1. That you, Mr. Liladhar Swami while posted as Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) and Judicial Magistrate, Railmagra District Rajsamand, as per order No.:F. 1/3(1) RALSA/Estt./2005/47 dated 07.04.2005 issued by Rajasthan Legal Services Authority, being the senior most judicial officer, was holding the charge of Chairman, Taluka Legal Services Committee, Railmagra. You were entrusted with a budget of Rs. 30,000/- for Mega Lok Adalat for the year 2012-13. That you, without incurring expenses, procured fictitious bills No. 126 dated 23.01.2011 of Rs. 2200, No. 137 dated 02.05.2012 of Rs. 2200 & No. 156 dated 01.07.2012 of Rs. 2000 of Datar Printing Press and No. 133 dated 19.05.2012 of Rs. 2800, No. 137 dated 18.07.2012 of Rs. 2900 & No. 151 dated 14.09.2012 of Rs. 2900 of Mewar Tent House, for pamphlets & tents and presented the Fully Vouched Contingent bills to the treasury. That when the bills were cleared by the treasury, you tried to obtain payment of the cheque of Rs. 15200/-. That the above acts and conduct on your part tantamount to gross misconduct and an act unbecoming of a judicial officer and thereby you have failed to maintain integrity, dignity and decorum of the office, which amounts to violation of provisions of Rule 3 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct Rules), 1971 and which is punishable under rule 16 of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958." 22. Thus, allegation against the petitioner was that he had presented fictitious bills for encashment to the treasury without incurring expenses for Lok Adalats. Petitioner submitted his response to the charge framed against him and denied the allegations levelled against him. It was the case of the petitioner that on 12.02.2013, he had received a communication from the bank that no account was available in the name of Datar Printing Press, rather the account was available in the name of Gaffar Ali. Petitioner submitted his response to the charge framed against him and denied the allegations levelled against him. It was the case of the petitioner that on 12.02.2013, he had received a communication from the bank that no account was available in the name of Datar Printing Press, rather the account was available in the name of Gaffar Ali. He also learnt that there was no account in the name of Mewar Tent House, whereas, the account was in the name of Kailash Nayak. The bills-in-question had been prepared by the officials and he had relied upon the bill so prepared by the officials. It was further pleaded by the petitioner that on coming to know that the bills had been wrongly prepared, he immediately approached the treasury and got the encashment of the bills stopped. No amount was, thus, encashed and no pecuniary advantage had accrued to the petitioner. 23. Six witnesses were examined by the department before the Enquiry Judge. The petitioner was granted full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Petitioner did not lead any evidence in his defence. Enquiry Judge, after going through the material on record, observed as under: "Taking totality of circumstances, it is evident that the official of the court had obtained bills which were forged, fabricated, fake and false bills were sent, for encashment to the treasury. The bills issued by the tent house and printing press were counter signed and verified by the delinquent officer. He also signed treasury bill, knowing fully well that on such dates no camp or lok adalat was held. Delinquent Officer had also written letter that amount be paid in cash to Class-IV employee of the court and later when entire episode came to light he had written a letter that no payment be made and cheque be not encashed. Though no pecuniary advantage has accrued to the delinquent official and it cannot be also said in definite manner that official himself had procured forged and fabricated bills, but from all attending circumstances, it is evident that forged and fabricated bills were presented by the delinquent officer for encashment and furthermore, the officer has led no evidence that on the purported dates, qua which bills were raised Legal Services Committee Camp or lok adalat was held. No pamphlet, no poster have been got exhibited to say or prove that in fact the said material was got printed. No pamphlet, no poster have been got exhibited to say or prove that in fact the said material was got printed. No photograph has also been placed on record to show that tents were installed and any goods were brought from tent house for holding of camps. Therefore, from the attending circumstances, only inference which can be drawn is that the delinquent officer was privy to preparation of forged and fabricated bills and on basis thereof false treasury bill was presented for encashment of the amount. Furthermore, attempt was also made for encashment of the cheque and for receiving the amount by way of cash by authorizing Ghanshyam Vaishnav, Class-IV employee. However, when raising of false bill came to light and letter DE5 was written by the tent owner, then only delinquent officer had addressed letter to the treasury that no payment be made. Thus, in the present case, involvement of the delinquent officer and misconduct on his part is writ large. Therefore, the delinquent officer is held guilty of the charge framed against him." 24. Thereafter, copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner and he submitted his representation/reply (Annexure-5) to the same. The representation submitted by the petitioner was considered by the Full Court in its meeting held on 07.05.2016 and it was resolved to recommend imposition of penalty of removal from service on the petitioner. In view of the recommendations made by the Full Court, impugned order of removal from service dated 02.06.2016 was passed by the State against the petitioner. 25. Thus, in the present case, impugned order of removal from service has been passed after holding enquiry against the petitioner in accordance with law. Petitioner had been given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the department and lead his defence. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on contentions mentioned in Para No. 13 of the petition relating to the bills-in-question. It has been averred in the said para that Lok Adalats had been held during the period of the bills-in-question and the petitioner has tried to explain that expenditure had been incurred vis-a-vis period of the bills-in-question. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on contentions mentioned in Para No. 13 of the petition relating to the bills-in-question. It has been averred in the said para that Lok Adalats had been held during the period of the bills-in-question and the petitioner has tried to explain that expenditure had been incurred vis-a-vis period of the bills-in-question. However, there is no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner as it is the case of the petitioner in his reply submitted to the charge sheet that the bills had been wrongly prepared and presented for encashment and on coming to know about the said fact, payment of the bills was got stopped from the treasury. Thus, it is the admitted case that the bills-in-question were prepared with regard to expenditure which had not been, in-fact, incurred. In this factual background, there is also no force in the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has been falsely involved in this case by Chairman, Bar Association. 27. The law regarding judicial review is well settled. In Central Industrial Security Force & Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali, (Civil Appeal No. 2148 of 2015 decided on 14.12.2016), it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under: "The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 , this Court held as follows: 7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations." 28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Council Neemuch Vs. Mahadeo Real Estate & Others, (2019) 7 MLJ 306 (SC) has held as under: "16. This Court recently in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission Vs. Abdul Halim had again an occasion to consider the scope of interference under Article 226 in an administrative action. "31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error or law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan V. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari. 32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by a writ Court. 32. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by a writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, the same may be regarded as perverse. 33. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken, which ha led to manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect." 17. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law, i.e., when the error is apparent on the fact of the record and is self evident. The High Court would be empowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the decision impugned is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that the test is not what the court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken. Not only this but such a decision must have led to manifest injustice." 29. In the present case, the findings of the Enquiry Judge are based on evidence recorded during enquiry proceedings. It has been duly noticed by the Enquiry Judge that, although, no pecuniary benefits had accrued to the petitioner but the fact remains that he was privy to preparation of forged and fabricated bills and the said bills were also presented before the treasury for encashment. Attempt was also made for encashment of the cheque and for receiving the amount by way of cash. However, when the matter came to light, then the petitioner wrote to the treasury that no payment be made. Petitioner being a judicial officer was expected to discharge his duties honestly. Attempt was also made for encashment of the cheque and for receiving the amount by way of cash. However, when the matter came to light, then the petitioner wrote to the treasury that no payment be made. Petitioner being a judicial officer was expected to discharge his duties honestly. However, in the present case, charge levelled against the petitioner was duly established during enquiry proceedings. The representation submitted by the petitioner was duly considered by the Full Court and after due deliberations, penalty of removal from service, was recommended against the petitioner. 30. After going through the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that present case does not invite judicial review. 31. Hence, no ground for interference is made out. 32. Dismissed.