JUDGMENT : These two second appeals arise out of a suit for recovery of possession and a suit for permanent injunction. 2. The suit property in both the suits is one and the same. O.S.No.2 of 1999 was filed by the respondents herein seeking the relief of permanent injunction restraining the original appellant herein from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit property. O.S.No.604 of 1999 was filed by the original appellant for recovery of possession from the respondents. Both the suits were tried together. The first respondent herein examined himself as P.W.1 and five other witnesses were examined on his side. Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.13 were marked. The original appellant examined himself as D.W.1 and three other witnesses were examined on his side. Ex.B.1 to Ex.B.6 were marked. After a consideration of the evidence on record, the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 20.11.2001 dismissed O.S.No.2 of 1999 and allowed O.S.No.604 of 1999. Aggrieved by the same, the respondents herein filed A.S.No.113 of 2002 and A.S. No.121 of 2002 before the I Additional Sub Court, Tirunelveli. By the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.09.2002, the injunction suit was decreed and the suit for recovery of possession was dismissed. The original appellant had also filed cross appeal and that was also dismissed. Challenging the same, the present second appeals were filed and they were admitted on 25.07.2003 on the following substantial questions of law:- “1) Whether the findings of the lower appellate Court are initiated by its failure to consider the absence of any evidence that the respondents are in enjoyment of the suit property on the basis of lease arrangement between the appellant's father and the respondents especially when P.W.2 to P.W.5 speak only about the enjoyment and not with reference to any lease agreement? (2) Whether the lower appellate Court is right in holding that the respondents are the lessees of the vacant site in the absence of any pleading with reference to the terms of the lease, period of the lease, date of commencement of the lease and the nature of the lease especially when the burden of proof is only upon the respondents who claim on the basis of alleged lease? (3) Whether the lower appellate Court is right in inferring the possibility of lease between the appellant's father and the respondents after having found that there are no documentary evidence evidencing the lease? (3) Whether the lower appellate Court is right in inferring the possibility of lease between the appellant's father and the respondents after having found that there are no documentary evidence evidencing the lease? (4) Whether the lower appellate Court is right in granting a decree for injunction especially when it is established that the respondents trespassed in the suit property on the basis of the ex-parte order obtained against the appellant with the assistance of police and in the circumstances the respondents' possession is unlawful?" 3. During the pendency of the second appeals, the original appellant passed away and his legal representatives were brought on record. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no dispute that the suit property belongs to the appellants. The first respondent herein was doing “Pandhal" business and he was permitted to stack his bamboos on the suit property. The suit property was permitted to be used during the festival occasion every year. During the festival period, the respondents were also allowed to put up a tea shop. The dispute however arose between the parties some time in the year 1998, when the original appellant wanted to put up a compound wall enclosing the suit property. The firm contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants is that the respondents were allowed to enjoy the suit property only as a licensee and that there was no lease arrangement between the parties at any point of time. The respondents ought to have surrendered the premises, the moment the license was revoked. There is no necessity to issue any formal notice of revocation. The institution of the suit itself can be construed as a notice of revocation. According to the appellants, the trial Court correctly approached the issues and the first appellate Court without any justification reversed the said decision. The conclusion of the first appellate Court is perverse. The learned counsel called upon this Court to answer the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellant and set aside the impugned judgment and decree and restore the decision of the trial Court. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the original appellant was never consistent in his stand. The respondents initiated litigation by filing an injunction suit. The stand of the original appellant was that the respondents herein were encroachers. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the original appellant was never consistent in his stand. The respondents initiated litigation by filing an injunction suit. The stand of the original appellant was that the respondents herein were encroachers. But this theory of trespass was given up in O.S.No.604 of 1999 filed by him. The original appellant shifted his stand and contended that the respondents herein were permissive occupants. The witnesses on the side of the plaintiffs as well as the original appellant had deposed that the respondents were in occupation of the suit property for several years. Therefore, the first appellate Court concluded that this established the existence of lease arrangement between the parties. It is not necessary that a lease should be in writing. It can also be oral. The statutory definition of lease as per the Transfer of Property Act states that the lease can be implied also. According to the learned counsel, the appellants must have received rents periodically and that is how, the respondents herein were in occupation of the suit property for a very long number of years even prior to the filing of the suit. This being a pure question of fact does not call for any interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of C.P.C. 5. Once it is seen that the relationship between the parties is one of lessor and lessee, to terminate the same, notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Properties Act is mandatory. While any short fall in the notice period can be excused and the termination notice will not be rendered invalid on that account. But ejectment suit must be preceded by a notice of termination unless there is contract to the contrary or there has been a waiver by the respondents. In this case, the respondents have not waived the requirement of issuing notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore the first appellate Court rightly reversed the decision of the trial Court and the same does not call for any interference. 6. I carefully considered the rival contentions and went through the evidence on record. 7. There is no dispute that the suit property belongs to the appellants. The only question that has to be gone into is whether the respondents are in occupation of the suit property as lessees or as licensees. 6. I carefully considered the rival contentions and went through the evidence on record. 7. There is no dispute that the suit property belongs to the appellants. The only question that has to be gone into is whether the respondents are in occupation of the suit property as lessees or as licensees. The expression “lease" has been defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as follows:- “105. Lease defined.— A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms." On the side of the respondents herein, as many as 13 documents were marked. Ex.A.1 is a receipt issued by Tirunelveli Corporation. It does not assist in coming to any conclusion as regards the nature of relationship between the parties. None of the documents marked by the respondents can lead to the conclusion that there was any lease arrangement between the parties. We are left only with the oral evidence adduced by both the parties. The appellants' stand is that the respondents were permitted to occupy the suit property. Of course as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, the appellants had originally taken a plea that the respondents are encroachers. Later, he admitted that the respondents were licensees. I am of the view that when the respondents had taken the stand that they are lessees and not licensees, then the burden certainly lay on them to prove the same. It is true that when both the parties have adduced evidence, the burden of proof really lapses into insignificance. The only question which I am called upon to answer is whether based on the evidence on record, the inference of the trial Court that the respondents are licensees is correct or whether the finding of the first appellate Court that the respondents are lessees is correct. The respondents had pleaded that they were paying ground rent to the original appellant and that there was also a written agreement between the parties. The respondents had pleaded that they were paying ground rent to the original appellant and that there was also a written agreement between the parties. The respondents would claim that the original appellant induced them to part with the said document on the plea that a revised agreement is to be entered into. If that be so, the respondents could have marked a photocopy of such document. No such photocopy was marked. The first appellate Court had reversed the finding of the trial Court on the sole ground that the respondents were found to be in occupation of the suit property for almost 20 years even prior to the institution of the suit. In my view, mere length of period of occupation cannot be determinative of the issue. In the case of lease arrangement, there is something called payment of premium or periodical rent. The respondents have not marked any receipt indicating payment of rent to the original appellant. Of course, the other witnesses examined on the side of the plaintiffs as well as D.W.4 examined on the side of the original appellant herein have admitted that the respondents have been in occupation of the suit property for a very long time. This in my view is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the arrangement between the parties was one of lease. Therefore, I answer the substantial questions of law in favour of the appellants. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants informs the Court that the appellants herein would not press their claim for payment of damages for use and occupation for the entire period. 9. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the decision of the trial Court is restored. These second appeals are allowed. No costs.