Doha Bank, Q. P. S. C, Rep. by its Senior Manager (Legal & Recovery), Mohammed Amin Hakim v. MIPL, Through its Managing Director, Mahendra Patwari
2021-09-27
N.SATHISH KUMAR
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : (Prayer: Petition filed under Section 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to appoint a Sole Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the petitioner and the respondent in terms of the Arbitration Agreement/Work Order dated 06.03.2018 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.) 1. This original petition has been filed to appoint a Sole Arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the petitioner and the respondent in terms of the Arbitration Agreement/Work Order dated 06.03.2018. 2. Despite service of notice, none appeared for the respondent. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner and the respondent have entered into an agreement and the respondent agreed for supply and installation of Digital LED Screen and brandings on Facade of petitioner's branch at Chennai and the total value of the work order was Rs.99,75,022/-. Further, it was agreed by the respondent that if any permission or license is required from the Chennai Municipal Corporation for operating Digital Screens, the same will be obtained by them. 3.1. According to the petitioner, after installation two Digital Screens, the Chennai Traffic Police and the Chennai Municipal Corporation raised objection on the operation of the Digital Screens, since no license was obtained. Though the petitioner sent several letters to the respondent to obtain necessary license, the respondent evaded to respondent the same. Hence the petitioner asked the respondent to pay the amount paid by them. As there was no response from the respondent, the petitioner has come with this writ petition seeking for appointment of Sole Arbitrator to resolve the dispute between them. 4. It is to be noted that, in Clause 28 of the Agreement dated 06.03.2018, entered into between the petitioner and respondent, it has been stated as follows. 28. Governing Law and Arbitration. (i) This agreement is made under and shall be governed by and construed for all purposes in accordance with the Applicable Laws of India. (ii) The Courts of Chennai shall have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising out of or in connection with the Agreement (including dispute relating to any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with this agreement) and each party submits to the (exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts in Chennai. Doha Bank shall have the right to initiate any legal proceeding against you in any other court, as it may deem fit.
Doha Bank shall have the right to initiate any legal proceeding against you in any other court, as it may deem fit. (iii) Any dispute or claim arising out of this Agreement shall be referred to the satisfaction of Doha Bank then such legal dispute or difference arising out of or connected with or relating to this agreement shall be referred to arbitration under Arbitration and conciliation Act 1996 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force. The arbitration shall be referred to one arbitrator who will be a retired Judge of any High Court in India. The venue of Arbitration will be Mumbai. Clause 28(3) of the above agreement clearly states that the venue of Arbitration will be at Mumbai. 5. In this context, the Honourable Supreme Court, in the judgment in BGS SGS Some JV. Vs. NHPC Ltd reported in 2020(1) CTC 681 , has held as follows. 84. On a conspectus of the aforesaid Judgments, it may be concluded that whenever there is the designation of place of Arbitration in an Arbitration Clause as being the "Venue" of the Arbitration proceedings, the expression "Arbitration proceedings" would make it clear that the "venue' is really the 'seat' of the Arbitral proceedings, as the aforesaid expression does not include just one or more individual or particular hearing, but the Arbitration proceedings as a whole, including the making of an Award at the place. This language has to be contrasted with language such as "Tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts or the parties" where only hearings are to take place in the "venue", which may lead to the conclusion, other things being equal that the venue so stated is not the "seat" of Arbitral proceedings, but only a convenient place of meeting. Further, the fact that the Arbitral proceedings shall be held" at a particular venue would also indicate that the parties intended to anchor arbitratl proceedings to a particular place, signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the Arbitral proceedings. This coupled with there being no, other significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is merely a "venue" and not the "seat" of the Arbitral proceedings, would then conclusively show that such a clause designates a " seat" of the Arbitral proceedings.
This coupled with there being no, other significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is merely a "venue" and not the "seat" of the Arbitral proceedings, would then conclusively show that such a clause designates a " seat" of the Arbitral proceedings. In an international context, if a supranational body of Rules is to govern the Arbitration, this would further be an indica that "the venue" so stated, would be the seat of the Arbitral proceedings. In a national context, this would be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996 as applying to the "stated venue", which then becomes the "seat" for the purposes of Arbitration." 6. Having regard to the above Judgment of the Apex Court and also considering the fact that the parties agreed to the Venue at Mumbai, this court is of the view that appointing Arbitrator by this court is contrary to the Judgment of Apex Court in BGS SGS Some JV. Vs. NHPC Ltd reported in 2020(1) CTC 681 and also to the agreement entered into between the parties. 7. Such view of the matter, this original petition is dismissed as not maintainable. However, liberty is granted to the petitioner to seek remedy before the Bombay High Court. No costs.