Research › Search › Judgment

Uttarakhand High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 258 (UTT)

Indra v. Dharam Pal Singh

2021-05-07

RAVINDRAMAITHANI

body2021
JUDGMENT Ravindra Maithani, J. - The instant Second Appeal is preferred against judgment and decree dated 15.01.2004 passed in the First Appeal No. 356 of 1983,Smt. Indra Vs. DharamPal Singh, by the Court of First Additional District Judge, Haridwar (in short "the appeal"), by which the judgment and decree dated 26.08.1983 passed in Original Suit No. 83 of 1982, Dharampal Vs. Raja Ram by the Court of First Additional Civil Judge, Roorkee (Shaharanpur)(for short "the suit") has been confirmed. 2. Facts necessary for the disposal of the instant appeal, briefly stated, are as follows; The respondent filed the suit against Raja Ram for specific performance. During the pendency of the suit, Raja Ram died, therefore, his daughter Smt. Indra was substituted. Initially, the appeal was filed by Smt. Indra Devi in this Court, but, after her death, her legal representatives have now been substituted as appellants. It is the case of the respondent that Late Raja Ram agreed to sale his half share admeasuring 7 Bigha, 10 biswa 17 biswansi,17 KachvansiPukhta situated in Khasra No.184 Village MaujaSethpur, ParganaManglore, Tehsil Roorkee, ZilaShaharnpur(for short "the suit land") to him for a consideration of Rs.23,000.An agreement of sale was executed on 4.7.1980 (for short 'the agreement') and Rs. 4,500 as advance were paid by the respondent to Late Raja Ram. The remaining amount was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. It was agreed between the parties that the sale deed would be executed within two years since then. Late Raja Ram did not execute the sale deed. A notice was given on 27.04.1981 by the respondent to him but he gave a wrong reply on 01.05.1981. Again, a notice dated 16.6.1982 was given to Late Raja Ram by the respondent requiring him to appear for execution of the sale deed but despite service, he did not appear on 3.7.1982, the date fixed in the notice, for execution of the sale deed. On these grounds the suit was filed seeking specific performance of the agreement and related reliefs. 3. Late Raja Ram filed written statement in the suit. According to him, he never executed any agreement of sale in favour of the respondent; in the month of July, 1980, the wife of Raja Ram, namely, Smt. Atari was seriously ill and for her treatment, Raja Ram was short of money, therefore, he took Rs. 3. Late Raja Ram filed written statement in the suit. According to him, he never executed any agreement of sale in favour of the respondent; in the month of July, 1980, the wife of Raja Ram, namely, Smt. Atari was seriously ill and for her treatment, Raja Ram was short of money, therefore, he took Rs. 3,000 as loan from the respondent. The respondent agreed to advance the loan of Rs. 3,000 on the condition that in the next two years, Raja Ram would return him Rs. 4,500 and as a security of the loan, a mortgage deed was executed. It is the case of Raja Ram that after advancing loan, respondent took him to court where certain documents were executed. He was asked to sign those documents and if by playing fraud, an agreement of sale has been executed by the respondent, Raja Ram is not bound by it. 4. After exchange of pleadings, the following issues were framed in the suit: "1. Whether defendant has executed the disputed agreement deed in favour of plaintiff dated 4.7.80 for Rs. 23000/-? 2. Whether defendant had received Rs. 4500/- as advance? 3. Whether defendant has taken a loan of Rs. 3000/- by execution Rahnnama? 4. Whether the suit is barred by Sections 14& 20 of Specific Relief Act? 5. Whether defendant was not owner of disputed property dated 4.07.80? 6. Whether plaintiff is entitled for any other relief?" 5. Parties led evidence in the suit. On issue Nos. 1 and 2, the Court concluded that Late Raja Ram executed the agreement of sale infavour of the respondent for Rs.23000/- and received Rs.45000/- as an advance. The Court also held that the appellants could not prove that Rs.3000 was taken as a loan from the respondent. On issue No. 4, it was held that the suit is not barred by Sections 14 and 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short 'SR Act'). On issue No. 5, the Court held that it is not open to Raja Ramto take the plea that he was not owner of the suit land at the time of the agreement. In view of the findings recorded, the Court of the first instant decreed the suit with costs, on 26.08.1983. The judgment and decree dated 26.08.1983 passed in the suit was challenged by the appellants. In view of the findings recorded, the Court of the first instant decreed the suit with costs, on 26.08.1983. The judgment and decree dated 26.08.1983 passed in the suit was challenged by the appellants. It was decided on 15.01.2004 and by the judgment and decree dated 15.01.2004 passed in the appeal, the judgment and decree passed in the suit has been confirmed. Aggrieved by it, the instant Second Appeal has been filed. 6. The instant second appeal was admitted on 04.02.2004 on the following two substantial questions of law; (i) Whether burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to prove execution of agreement to sell when illiterate defendant demonstrate misrepresentation and fraud in view of A.I.R. 1990 Allahabad page 75 A.I.R. 1996 Allahabad 253? If yes impugned judgement and decree vitiate. (ii) Whether suit is barred by principle of estoppels and waiver in getting the relief of specific performance in view of non-filing of suit for more than a year after specific denial of agreement by the defendant in reply notice narrating therein circumstances of fraud and misrepresentation? 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that, in fact, substantial questions of law on which the second appeal has been admitted are not the actual substantial question of law which arises in the instant second appeal. He would submit that the Court can reformulate the substantial questions of law. Reference has been made to Section 100 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "CPC") and its proviso is as hereunder; "100. Second appeal. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." 9. Section 100 of CPC provides that a second appeal may be entertained by the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Section 100 of CPC provides that a second appeal may be entertained by the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. What is substantial question of law, it has come up for discussion multiple times before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of Gurnam Singh Vs. Lehna Singh, (2019) 7SCC 641 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 13.1 held as hereunder; "13.1. The suspicious circumstances which were considered by the learned trial court are narrated/stated hereinabove. On reappreciation of evidence on record and after dealing with each alleged suspicious circumstance, which was dealt with by the learned trial court, the first appellate court by giving cogent reasons held the will genuine and consequently did not agree with the findings recorded by the learned trial court. However, in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court, by the impugned judgment and order has interfered with the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court. While interfering with the judgment and order passed by the first appellate court, it appears that while upsetting the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, the High Court has again appreciated the entire evidence on record, which in exercise of powers under Section 100 CPC is not permissible. While passing the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court has not at all appreciated the fact that the High Court was deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC and not first appeal under Section 96 CPC. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain second appeal under Section 100 CPC after the 1976 Amendment, is confined only when the second appeal involves a substantial question of law. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. The existence of "a substantial question of law" is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. As observed and held by this Court in KondibaDagadu Kadam [KondibaDagadu Kadam v. SavitribaiSopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 ], in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the first appellate court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; or (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Supreme Court; or (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. It is further observed that the trial court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in second appeal." (emphasis supplied) 10. In the case of Municipal Committee Vs. Punjab State Electricity Board, 2010(13) SSC 216 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically dealt with Section 100 and 103 CPC to hold that perversity is a substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Court, observed as hereunder [It may be noted that this case has not been referred to in the case of Gurnam Singh (supra)]; "26. Thus, it is evident that Section 103 CPC is not an exception to Section 100 CPC nor is it meant to supplant it, rather it is to serve the same purpose. Even while pressing Section 103 CPC in service, the High Court has to record a finding that it had to exercise such power, because it found that finding(s) of fact recorded by the court(s) below stood vitiated because of perversity. More so, such power can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and with circumspection, where the core question involved in the case has not been decided by the court(s) below. 27. More so, such power can be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and with circumspection, where the core question involved in the case has not been decided by the court(s) below. 27. There is no prohibition on entertaining a second appeal even on a question of fact provided the court is satisfied that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing an erroneous approach to the matter i.e. that the findings of fact are found to be perverse. But the High Court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of fact in a routine and casual manner by substituting its subjective satisfaction in place of that of the lower courts. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [ (1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR 1992 SC 1604 ] ;Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan [ (1999) 6 SCC 343 : AIR 1999 SC 3067 ] and Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali [ (2010) 12 SCC 740 : AIR 2010 SC 2679 ] .)" 11. The word 'perversity' has been discussed in the case of Basalingappa Vs. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418 and according to it, perversity means 'against the weight of evidence'. Therefore, in view of the legal position, a second appeal may be admitted only on the substantial question of law and if finding is erroneous and based on inadmissible evidence, which means that if it is perverse it is also a substantial question of law. This Court has recorded these observations in view of the proposed substantial question of law. The Court can very well in the second appeal reformulate the substantial questions of law and as suggested by learned counsel for the appellants and admitted by learned counsel for the respondent, the following substantial questions of law are for consideration in the second appeal; 1. Whether it has wrongly been held that at the relevant time, based on the rate of land, late Raja Ram had agreed to sell the suit land for Rs. 23,000. 2. Whether in the instant case, the decree for specific performance cannot be granted in view of Section 18 and 20 of SR Act. 12. Whether it has wrongly been held that at the relevant time, based on the rate of land, late Raja Ram had agreed to sell the suit land for Rs. 23,000. 2. Whether in the instant case, the decree for specific performance cannot be granted in view of Section 18 and 20 of SR Act. 12. Learned Counsel for the appellants would submit that while examining the validity of a document, surrounding circumstances are also to be seen as held by this Court in First Appeal No. 3441 of 2001 (Old No.89 of 1989) Smt. Shakuntala Rani (Deceased) and another Vs. Om Prakash Kohli. Learned counsel would also submit as follows; (i) The scribe of the deed has not been examined, (ii) Witness are relatives, (iii) Contents not proved. (iv) In the agreement of sale, two years time has been granted for execution of the deed which creates doubt about the authenticity of the agreement because a purchaser would like to purchase the property at the earliest and similarly a vendor would like to sell his property at the earliest. (v) The appellate Court erred in law while observing at page 14 Para 1 of the judgment that the land at the relevant time was valued at Rs. 2000 per Bigha. It is argued that Rs.8000 cost of 4 Bigha was told by Raja Ram for KachaBigha not for puccabigha; in one puccabigha there are three kachabig has and in the instant case, the land which was agreed to be sold was allegedly seven puccabigha, which makes out more than twenty two kachabigha. (vi) Why should Raja Ram sell22 bigha land for Rs. 23,000/- and if 7 bigha was kacha, why the respondent agreed to purchase a land of Rs.14,000/- for Rs.23,000/-. Therefore, it is argued that the impugned judgment and decree is bad for this reason alone. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the onus was upon the appellants to establish and prove as to what was the rate of land at the relevant time; the appellants were required to prove it by evidence. DW1 Raja Ram at one place told that he sold 4 kachabigha for Rs.8,000/- (at page 5 of the statement). DW1 Raja Ram at one place told that he sold 4 kachabigha for Rs.8,000/- (at page 5 of the statement). But, in the subsequent lines, he has also admitted to have sold Rs.5 Bigha land, without referring whether it was kacha or puccabigha, therefore, it is argued that the judgment and decree is not bad. The execution of agreement has been proved. The value is not an issue. Late Raja Ram had sold land to many persons. 15. Undoubtedly, in the case of Smt. Shakuntala Rani (supra) decided by this Court on 04.12.2020, this Court discussed the law on the point of authenticity of a document. The surrounding circumstances under which a document is written also become relevant. In the case of Smt. Shakuntala(supra),this Court observed; 18. A question might arise that even if a document is proved to have been authored or signed by some person, can the case be decided merely on this basis, or the court may have to look beyond it. It is a question of testing the veracity of oral evidence vis--vis documentary evidence. Even if it is proved that the contents are authored by some person, the question still remains as to the correctness of the contents. A document should pass the test of "righteousness of the transactions". This phrase has been used in the context of a will and quoted from the judgment passed in the case of Fulton Vs. Andrew, (1875) LR 9 7HL 448 and referred to in the case of H. VenkatachalaIyengar Vs. B. N. Thimmajamma and others, 1959 (Supp. 1) SCR 426. 19. In the case of W. Scott Fulton (supra), it was observed that "those who take a benefit under a will, and have been instrumental in preparing and obtaining it, have thrown open them the onus of showing the righteousness of the transaction". 20. In the case of H. VenkatachalaIyengar (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down various tests with regard to correctness of a will. How to prove a will, there are different procedure. Even the rules may be different, but a document has to qualify the test of "righteousness of transaction." In para 20, in the case of H. VenkatachalaIyengar (supra), the Hon'ble Court observed as hereunder:- "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Even the rules may be different, but a document has to qualify the test of "righteousness of transaction." In para 20, in the case of H. VenkatachalaIyengar (supra), the Hon'ble Court observed as hereunder:- "20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to the unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said disposition may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter."" 16. It is a case of the appellants that Late Raja Ram (original defendant) took Rs.3000 loan from the respondent and issued a rehennama for securing the loan. During the course of argument, reference has been made to rukka which according to learned counsel for the appellants is rehennama. It is a case of the appellants that Late Raja Ram (original defendant) took Rs.3000 loan from the respondent and issued a rehennama for securing the loan. During the course of argument, reference has been made to rukka which according to learned counsel for the appellants is rehennama. But, when the attention of learned counsel for the appellants was drawn to the statement of DW1 Raja Ram at Page 3 bottom lines, where he has stated that he had got a rukka executed from the respondent and after repaying the loan he had taken the rukka back and set it ablaze. Learned Counsel for the appellants would submit that these are not the pleadings and evidence without pleadings cannot be read. This argument perhaps has less strength. It is pleaded case of the appellants that Late Raja Ram had taken a loan of Rs. 3,000 from the respondent and in lieu thereof he had mortgaged his property. But, fraudulently, the respondent got an agreement of sale executed from him. The pleaded case was demolished by DW1 Raja Ram himself when he states that though he had executed a rukka (rehennama) but after repaying the loan, he had taken the rukka back. If the rehennama was returned by the respondent to late Raja Ram, which according to Raja Ram, he had destroyed by putting it to fire, how come the second document i.e. the agreement of sale, which is in question, came into existence. There is no reply to it by the appellants. These are attending circumstances. Whether scribe was examined or not or witnesses are relatives, it does not make the document doubtful. 17. The issue is with regard to the price of the land. In page 5 of his statement, DW1 Raja Ram has stated that he had sold 4 kachabighaland for Rs.8000/- and the learned Appellate Court below on the basis of it, held that late Raja Ram had agreed to sell the suit land for Rs. 23,000. This has been questioned on the ground that it was kacha Bighanot puccabigha and the agreement of sale in the instant case is with regard to more than 7 puccabigha, which comes out to be about 22KachaBigha. But, this is not as such pleaded. 23,000. This has been questioned on the ground that it was kacha Bighanot puccabigha and the agreement of sale in the instant case is with regard to more than 7 puccabigha, which comes out to be about 22KachaBigha. But, this is not as such pleaded. In page 5 bottomlines, Raja Ram has further stated that he sold 5 bigha land for 10,000/-.He did not qualify this 5 bighaeither as Kacha or puccaBigha. Moreover, the statement of DW1 Raja Ram was recorded on 2.8.1983 and according to him, he sold 4 KachaBighaland, about 15 months prior to giving of statement. It means that in the year 1982, he sold 4 Bigha land for a Rs. 8000/-. 18. In the instant case, the agreement of sale was executed on 4th July, 1980. Price of land in a village may not be uniform even at one given point of time for the simple reason that it is the location or usefulness of the land which also determines its price. A land near Motor Road may fetch more price than a land which is adjacent to a forest where even agricultural crop may not be possible or which may be flooded with water during rainy season, etc. The appellants never pleaded categorically as to what was the price of land at the relevant time; the appellants did not even establish or prove as to what was the price of land, which was adjacent to the land in question. The appellants did not file any other sale deed of the adjacent land to the suit land. Therefore, this Court is of the view that based on the evidence of DW1 Raja Ram, it has been rightly held that late Raja Ram had agreed to sell the suit land for Rs. 23,000. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 19. Second substantial question of law relates to as to whether in the instant case, specific performance cannot be granted in view of the Section 18 and 20 of SR Act. Learned Counsel for the appellants would submit that Raja Ram was a farmer. Apart from the suit land, he is left with no other land and it would be inequitable if the specific performance of contract is enforced in the instant case. Instead, it is argued that that equity demands that the consideration which was allegedly paid by the respondent may be returned to him. Apart from the suit land, he is left with no other land and it would be inequitable if the specific performance of contract is enforced in the instant case. Instead, it is argued that that equity demands that the consideration which was allegedly paid by the respondent may be returned to him. Section 18 and 20 of the SR Act are as hereunder; "18. Non-enforcement except with variation.Where a plaintiff seeks specific performance of a contract in writing, to which the defendant sets up a variation, the plaintiff cannot obtain the performance sought, except with the variation so set up, in the following cases, namely: (a) whereby fraud, mistake of fact or mis-representation, the written contract of which performance is sought is in its terms or effect different from what the parties agreed to, or does not contain all the terms agreed to between the parties on the basis of which the defendant entered into the contact; (b) where the object of the parties was to produce a certain legal result which the contract as framed is not calculated to produce; (c) where the parties have, subsequently to the execution of the contract, varied its terms. 20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.- (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance- (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation I.- Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation II.- The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party. 20. Insofar as execution of agreement of sale is concerned, it is not in dispute now. This is not a question of law as such framed for disposal. 21. What is being argued on behalf of the appellants is that if specific performance is ordered, it will give unfair advantage to the respondent over the appellants and it would also cause greater hardship to the appellants. In support of his case, learned counsel placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the case of ParakunnanVeetill Joseph's Son Mathew, v. NedumbaraKuruvila's Son and others, AIR 1987 SC 2328 DamacherlaAnjaneyulu and another vs. DamcherlaVenkataSeshaiah and another, AIR 1987 SC 1641 Janardhanam Prasad Vs. Ramdas, (2007) 15 SCC 174 and Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Shariff, (2011) 12 SCC 658 . 22. In the case of Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that the Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also be entered into the judicial verdict. 23. In the case of Damacherla (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that in case, specific performance is granted, it would result in special hardship. Accordingly, the relief was altered. 24. In the case of Janardhanam Prasad (supra), the Hon'ble Court observed as hereunder; "18. Furthermore, the appellant is in possession of the said land. 23. In the case of Damacherla (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that in case, specific performance is granted, it would result in special hardship. Accordingly, the relief was altered. 24. In the case of Janardhanam Prasad (supra), the Hon'ble Court observed as hereunder; "18. Furthermore, the appellant is in possession of the said land. He had dug a well. He had made improvement on the suit land. Digging of well as also making improvements was within the notice of the respondent. The witnesses examined on his behalf had categorically admitted the same. In that view of the matter too, in our opinion, it was a fit case where the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act should not have been exercised and, instead, monetary compensation could be granted. (See M. Meenakshi v. Metadin Agarwal [ (2006) 7 SCC 470 ].). 19. This question was yet again considered in Jai NarainParasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf [ (2006) 7 SCC 756 ] wherein it was held that for balancing the equities in a given case, compensation can be awarded in lieu of grant of decree of specific performance of contract." 25. In the case of VimaleshwarNagappaShet(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section 20 of the SR Act confers discretionary power and it is also well settled that the value of property escalates in urban areas very fast and it would not be equitable to grant specific performance after a lapse of long period of time. 26. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that it is not a case in which the provision of Section 18 and 20 of the SR Act are attracted. It is submitted that Late Raja Ram sold many lands during his lifetime not before the instant agreement of sale but also after the instant suit was decreed by the Trial Court. Thereafter, also Raja Ram sold many lands and repeatedly, he kept on selling his land, therefore, there is no equity in his favour. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the principles of law as laid down in the cases of Prakash Chandra Vs. Narayan, (2012) 5 SCC 403 Surya NarainUpadhyaya Vs. Thereafter, also Raja Ram sold many lands and repeatedly, he kept on selling his land, therefore, there is no equity in his favour. 27. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the principles of law as laid down in the cases of Prakash Chandra Vs. Narayan, (2012) 5 SCC 403 Surya NarainUpadhyaya Vs. Ram Roop Pandey and Others, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 542 Ramathal v. Maruthathal and others, AIR 2018 SC 340 and Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Limited, AIR 2012 SC 2035 . 28. In the case of Prakash Chandra (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder; "17. The question as to whether the grant of relief for specific performance will cause hardship to the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, being a question of fact, the first appellate court without framing such an issue ought not to have reversed the finding of the trial court while concurring with it on all other issues with regard to the appellant's entitlement to relief for specific performance of contract. 18. The High Court in the second appeal failed to notice that the respondent had not taken any defence of hardship and no such issue was framed and in the absence of any such evidence on record, the first appellate court held that he would be landless should the decree for specific performance be granted." 29. In the case of Surya NarainUpadhyaya (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as hereunder; "4. Though the decree for specific performance is a discretionary power, yet the court is not bound to grant such a relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary, but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles of law and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Therefore, the discretion should be properly exercised keeping in view the settled principles of law as envisaged in Section 20 of the Act. This case demonstrates that the High Court took irrelevant consideration into account to refuse to grant the decree for specific performance. It also committed manifest illegality in reversing the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellant court, namely the appellant has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract." 30. It also committed manifest illegality in reversing the concurrent finding of facts recorded by the trial court as well as the first appellant court, namely the appellant has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract." 30. In the case of Ramathal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the factum of escalation of prices and held that it cannot be a ground for denying the relief of specific performance. In para 22, the Court has observed as hereunder; "23. The buyer has taken prompt steps to file a suit for specific performance as soon as the execution of the sale was stalled by the seller. From this discussion, it is clear that the buyer has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract at all stages. Moreover, it is the seller who had always been trying to wriggle out of the contract. Now the seller cannot take advantage of their own wrong and then plead that the grant of decree of specific performance would be inequitable. Escalation of prices cannot be a ground for denying the relief of specific performance. Specific performance is an equitable relief and granting the relief is the discretion of the court. The discretion has to be exercised by the court judicially and within the settled principles of law. Absolutely there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgments of the courts below, which has judicially exercised its discretion and the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same." 31. In the case of Narinderjit Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the question of escalation of price and hardship and observed as hereunder; "25. We are also inclined to agree with the lower appellate court that escalation in the price of the land cannot, by itself, be a ground for denying relief of specific performance. In K. Narendrav. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. [ (1999) 5 SCC 77 ] this Court interpreted Section 20 of the Act and laid down the following propositions: (SCC p. 91, para 29) "29. In K. Narendrav. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. [ (1999) 5 SCC 77 ] this Court interpreted Section 20 of the Act and laid down the following propositions: (SCC p. 91, para 29) "29. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognised in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant." (emphasis supplied) 26. In the present case, the appellant had neither pleaded hardship nor produced any evidence to show that it will be inequitable to order specific performance of the agreement. Rather, the important plea taken by the appellant was that the agreement was fictitious and fabricated and his father had neither executed the same nor received the earnest money and, as mentioned above, all the courts have found this plea to be wholly untenable." 32. Late Raja Ram was examined as DW2 in the suit. At page 5 of his statement, he has categorically stated that post the agreement in the instant case, he sold land to various persons. He was having huge chunk of land which he admitted at page 3 of his statement. The factum of hardship, etc. has neither been pleaded nor proved by the appellants. This Court does not see any hardship to the appellants or it is also not established or shown that in case, specific performance is ordered, it would give unfair advantage to the respondent. Therefore, this Court is of the view that instant is not a case in which specific performance may not be granted in view of Section 18 and 20 or the SR Act. Therefore, this Court is of the view that instant is not a case in which specific performance may not be granted in view of Section 18 and 20 or the SR Act. Second substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 33. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that there is no merit in the second appeal and it deserves to be dismissed. 34. The second appeal is dismissed.