JUDGMENT : 1. The unsuccessful defendant in the suit is the appellant. The respondents are the plaintiffs. 2. This appeal is against the decree and judgment in O.S.No.581 of 2007 dated 09.09.2011 on the file of the Court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Nellore. The respondents laid the suit against the appellant for eviction from the shop room mentioned in the plaint schedule, to pay arrears of rent with interest at 18% per annum from the date of the suit till realization as well as for damages at Rs.20,000/-per month, for use and occupation from 01.06.2007 till the shop room is delivered to them. 3. The plaint schedule shop room is described being of 20 ankanams RCC building in ground floor of the premises bearing Door number 445 in Ward No.14 of Nellore City. It shall be referred to hereinafter as ‘the suit shop room’ for convenience. 4. The respondents laid the suit claiming that the appellant had taken the suit shop room from Sri R.Bheemraj Singh, S/o. Sri Manchikalapati Ramachandra Singh in the year 1998 on lease for running business on a monthly rent of Rs.9,000/-. They further contended that the tenancy is month to month and that the appellant committed default in paying rents from 01.04.2001 onwards since disputes arose between the appellant and Sri Bheemraj Singh. They also contended that the tenancy of the appellant was terminated by them issuing a notice dated 01.05.2007 under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and that they sought the appellant to pay arrears of rent from 01.04.2001 while requesting to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit shop room by midnight of 31.05.2007. 5. Their contention is also that they sought damages for use and occupation at Rs.20,000/-per month from 01.06.2007 and that a reply notice was issued by the appellant dated 21.05.2007 with false averments claiming that he became the tenant of suit shop room under an unregistered lease deed dated 16.10.1996 on a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/-for godown purpose and that the period of lease was from 16.10.1996 to 15.10.1997 upon paying an advance of Rs.5,00,000/-to Sri Bheemraj Singh, which was refundable at the time of vacating the premises without interest. 6. 6. In those circumstances, according to the respondents, in as much as the first respondent is intending to start his own software consultancy in the suit shop room being an engineering graduate and qualified, they sought the relief against the appellant. Thus, they contended that this premises is required for their bona fide use and occupation particularly, for the first respondent and since the appellant defaulted in paying rents continuously. On account of his continuous occupation of this premises, the respondents claimed that, he is liable to pay damages at Rs.20,000/-per month on account of location of this premises in a commercial locality in heart of the city. 7. The appellant resisted the claim of the respondents mainly on the ground that the tenancy was initially for a period of 11 months under an unregistered rental document dated 16.10.1996 at Rs.3,000/-per month, being the rent, at which time an advance of Rs.5,00,000/-was paid to be refunded at the time of vacating the premises, which would not carry any interest and that the appellant should indicate his intention six months in advance to vacate either to Sri R.Bheemraj Singh or his sons. He further contended that on account of this advance, it was also agreed that there would not be change in rental structure. Thus, he contended that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 8. The appellant also contended that other family members of Sri Bheemraj Singh are not the parties, on whose instructions the quit notice was not issued under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act and therefore, the quit notice is bad. He further contended that the claim of the respondents is basing on the Will of Sri M.Ramachandra Singh, father of Sri Bheemraj Singh and that this Will is forged and fabricated by the respondents for the purpose of this case. He further contended that he is not in arrears in paying the rents since he had already paid Rs.55,195/-towards property tax demand issued by the Municipal Corporation of Nellore by the date of filing of the suit and that when a demand notice was issued to him as an occupier of this premises to pay Rs.2,96,765/-by the municipal corporation, he was constrained to approach this Court in W.P.No.15244 of 2007. He also denied that he is liable to pay any damages contending that his tenancy is for an undeterminable period having linked to refund of Rs.5,00,000/-. Thus, he denied the claim of the respondents. 9. Basing on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Judge settled the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit as pleaded by the defendant? 2. Whether the defendant is liable to be evicted from the plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to receive a sum of Rs.3,24,000/-from defendant as arrears of rent? 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to receive the damages from the defendant as prayed for? 5. To what relief? 10. At the trial, on behalf of the respondents, the first respondent was examined as P.W.1 and Ex.A1 to Ex.A6 were relied on. Though they sought to examine P.W.2, since he did not turn up to face cross-examination, after filing his affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, the trial Court eschewed his evidence. The appellant examined himself as D.W.1 and another witness as D.W.2 to prove Ex.B4 lease agreement dated 16.10.1996, since he being the attestor to it. The appellant also relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B8 to support his contention. 11. Basing on the evidence and the material, learned trial Judge rejected the contention of the appellant holding issue No.1 to the effect that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, whereby he is liable to be evicted from the suit shop room. In that process, the trial Court rejected the defence of the appellant basing on Ex.B4 lease agreement disbelieving it. Learned trial Judge also held that the respondents are entitled for arrears to an extent of Rs.74,197/-while granting interest at 12% and at 6% for different periods, while further awarding damages at Rs.20,000/-per month for use and occupation of the premises from 01.06.2007 till the date of delivery of possession. 12. It is against this decree and judgment, the present appeal is preferred by the appellant. Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for Sri T.D.Phani Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents addressed arguments. 13. Now, the following points arise for determination: 1. Whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain this dispute relating to tenancy between the respondents and the appellant of the suit shop room? 2. Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for Sri T.D.Phani Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents addressed arguments. 13. Now, the following points arise for determination: 1. Whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain this dispute relating to tenancy between the respondents and the appellant of the suit shop room? 2. Whether the respondents are entitled for arrears of rent and payable by the appellant including damages for use and occupation as claimed? 3. Whether the respondents are entitled for relief of eviction of the appellant from the suit shop room? 4. To what relief? 14. POINT No.1: The appellant admitted being the tenant of the suit shop room claiming that he has been in its occupation by virtue of Ex.B4 rental agreement or an unregistered lease deed dated 16.10.1996 on a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/-. 15. It is also his contention that this lease is for undeterminable period since it is linked to refund of Rs.5,00,000/-paid as advance to Sri R.Bheemraj Singh, the predecessor of the respondents with whom he claimed that he entered into this lease transaction. 16. The respondents are contending that the appellant had obtained this premises in the year 1998 on a monthly rent of Rs.9,000/-and tenancy being month to month. They denied this unregistered lease deed dated 16.10.1996 being a forged document produced by the appellant to support his claim in this case and that Sri Bheemraj Singh had never entered into such transaction with the appellant nor received Rs.5,00,000/-as advance there under. 17. On this premise of rent being Rs.3,000/-per month, Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant invited attention of this Court to Section 32(C) of A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, contending that when the rent of the building in a municipal corporation in the state is less than Rs.3,500/-per month, the above Act alone applies and therefore, the suit as filed could not have been maintained. 18. In order to establish this defence, necessarily the appellant has to prove that the lease of the suit shop room was on such premise and particularly to establish the unregistered lease deed dated 16.10.1996. 19. In order to prove Ex.B4 unregistered lease deed, at the trial the appellant relied on his own testimony as D.W.1 and that of D.W.2-an alleged attestor to it. 20. 19. In order to prove Ex.B4 unregistered lease deed, at the trial the appellant relied on his own testimony as D.W.1 and that of D.W.2-an alleged attestor to it. 20. The appellant as D.W.1 deposed in support of such claim. However, in cross-examination for the respondents, he stated that this document was executed by Sri Bheemraj Singh in favour of his wife Smt.Nirmala. Contents of Ex.B4 did not support his version. 21. Ex.B4 is dated 16.10.1996 prepared on two stamp papers of Rs.50/-each. The lessee in terms thereof is M/s.Nirmala Agencies, represented by its proprietor Sri Singareddy Narasimha Reddy (appellant). Terms and conditions as seen in the defence of the appellant are set out in Ex.B4. D.W.2 Sri T. Srinivasulu Reddy and one Sri G.Srinivasulu, attested the same and it was scribed by one Sri Modili Subrahmanyam of Lakshmipuram, Nellore Town. 22. Before institution of the suit, notices were exchanged in between these parties. Ex.A4 is the quit notice dated 01.05.2007 served on the appellant determining the tenancy with effect from the midnight of 31.07.2007 requesting him to handover peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop room to the respondents. The claim of the respondents set out in Ex.A4, apparently is the basis for their claim in the plaint as to ownership as well as the tenancy of the appellant on month to month basis at Rs.9,000/-being the rent per month and tenancy being terminable at will. Ex.A5 is the reply issued on behalf of the appellant through his advocate dated 21.07.2007, where a similar defence as set out in the written statement by him is seen. However, at the trial, in his deposition as D.W.1, he stated that a copy of ‘rental kharar’ executed by Sri Bheemraj Singh is filed. 23. On behalf of the appellant, P.W.1 was cross-examined and in the course of his cross-examination, the attention of P.W.1 was not invited to Ex.B4 unregistered lease deed or copy of rental kharar, referred in examination-in-chief of the appellant as D.W.1 or going by his version in cross-examination, referring to the unregistered lease agreement between Smt.Nirmala and Sri Bheemraj Singh. On the other hand, the suggestions to P.W.1 on behalf of the appellant in cross-examination indicated a different stand. On the other hand, the suggestions to P.W.1 on behalf of the appellant in cross-examination indicated a different stand. In the sense, the alleged claim of the appellant as to payment of Rs.5,00,000/-as advance is set out differently suggesting that Sri Bheemraj Singh had collected Rs.5,00,000/-from him when the suit shop room was leased out on a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/-and that there was an understanding between them regarding this Rs.5,00,000/-to the effect that it did not carry any interest till refunded, whereby it was agreed that there would not be increase in the rent. Further suggestion to P.W.1 on behalf of the appellant was that Sri Bheemraj Singh was to be given three months advance intimation for refund of this sum of Rs.5,00,000/-and that the appellant should vacate the premises within three months. 24. Thus, a totally different version was suggested to P.W.1 on behalf of the appellant differing either from the contents of Ex.B4 unregistered lease agreement or contents of Ex.A5 reply notice or the defence set up in the written statement. 25. These instances are pointed out now to indicate the inconsistent version presented by the appellant in his defence. These inconsistencies should be looked into from the angle of the claim of the respondents, who denied Ex.B4 unregistered lease agreement. 26. One of the circumstances relied on in the course of trial on behalf of the respondents to question Ex.B4 agreement is the round seal appearing on the stamp papers used with inscription March. The document itself shows as if it was purchased by Sri Bheemraj Singh on 16.10.1996 from stamp vendor in District Court premises, Nellore. It was suggested to D.W.1 on behalf of the respondents at the trial that these stamp papers themselves are fake, which he denied. 27. Admittedly, the appellant has started electronic goods business in the name and style ‘M/s.Nirmala Agencies’, at Nellore, in the year 1970. The suit shop room was taken on lease by him as an additional accommodation. Possibly, he is using it as a godown. In cross-examination for the respondents, he admitted that he has been maintaining accounts since the year 1970 relating to business and that he has been filing income tax returns therefor since the year 2000. His version further reflected that the rents paid by him for this shop room were shown in these books of accounts. In cross-examination for the respondents, he admitted that he has been maintaining accounts since the year 1970 relating to business and that he has been filing income tax returns therefor since the year 2000. His version further reflected that the rents paid by him for this shop room were shown in these books of accounts. He also offered at the trial to produce these books of accounts as well as income tax returns. However, he did not choose to produce any of them for the reasons best known. No explanation was offered at the trial, in those circumstances for failing to produce these books of accounts. 28. The trial Court had drawn an adverse inference on account of failure of the appellant to produce these books of accounts and income tax returns and a finding recorded by the trial Court in the judgment under appeal is that purposely they have been suppressed and if the rent was Rs.3,000/-per month from the date of Ex.B4, viz., 16.10.1996, these books of accounts should reflect necessary entries. 29. Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant seriously assailed these findings on the ground that learned trial Judge placed the burden on the appellant though the legal burden is always on the respondents to establish that the rent agreed to be paid was at Rs.9,000/-per month since the year 1998. Several contentions are advanced on this premise on behalf of the appellant. Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents mainly contended on this score that when the parties lead evidence at the trial, the question of burden of proof pales to insignificance and even otherwise, in terms of Section 114 of Evidence Act, as rightly held by the learned trial Judge, when material documents were not produced at the trial, it amounted to serious suppression of fact. Thus, Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents supported the findings of the learned trial Judge. 30. In terms of Section 101 of Indian Evidence Act, legal burden to establish a fact on which a party sets out the foundation of his/her claim is on such person, where a party desires the Court to give judgment, of his/her legal right or liability, necessary facts are to be proved which he/she asserts. This legal burden in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act remains constant and it never shifts. 31. This legal burden in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act remains constant and it never shifts. 31. However, Section 102 of Evidence Act states that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person, who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. There are two illustrations appended to Section 102 of Evidence Act. It is rather desirable to extract what Section 102 of Evidence Act speaks, for convenience: “102. On whom burden of proof lies.—The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Illustrations (a) A sues B for land of which B is in possession, and which, as A asserts, was left to A by the will of C, B’s father. If no evidence were given on either side, B would be entitled to retain his possession. Therefore the burden of proof is on A. (b) A sues B for money due on a bond. The execution of the bond is admitted, but B says that it was obtained by fraud, which A denies. If no evidence were given on either side, A would succeed, as the bond is not disputed and the fraud is not proved. Therefore the burden of proof is on B. 32. This section speaks of ‘onus probandi’. It does not remain constant. In contra distinction to Section 101 of Evidence Act, it shifts from one course to another depending on the facts proved and established by the parties. 33. A number of rulings are relied on by both the parties in this context. KUNDAN LAL RALLARAM v. CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, BOMBAY, AIR 1961 SC 1316 is relied on for both the parties in this context. 33. A number of rulings are relied on by both the parties in this context. KUNDAN LAL RALLARAM v. CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, BOMBAY, AIR 1961 SC 1316 is relied on for both the parties in this context. The pertinent observations in this ruling are in para – 5 as under: “……………………… The rules of evidence pertaining to burden of proof are embodied in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act, the phrase "burden of proof" has two meanings -one the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case; the former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings and is unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is not constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favour. The evidence required to shift the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence, i.e., oral or documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or fact. ………………………………………. The defendant may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again to the plaintiff. He may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other sections of the Evidence Act. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, "The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case." …………………. Illustration (g) to that section shows that the Court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. …………………… Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence but also by presumptions of law or fact.” 34. Similar view relating to operation of Sections 101 and 102 of Evidence Act is taken in RANGAMMAL v. KUPPUSWAMI AND OTHERS, AIR 2011 SC 2344 , ANIL RISHI v. GURBAKSH SINGH, (2006)5 SCC 558. 35. Similar view relating to operation of Sections 101 and 102 of Evidence Act is taken in RANGAMMAL v. KUPPUSWAMI AND OTHERS, AIR 2011 SC 2344 , ANIL RISHI v. GURBAKSH SINGH, (2006)5 SCC 558. 35. In MOHAMMED IBRAHIM AND OTHERS v. MOHAMMED ABDUL RAZZAK, 2007(5) ALT 510 it is stated in para – 25 as under: “It is settled proposition of law that burden of proof is generally on plaintiff. Decision should rest on rule as to burden of proof under law and also the admitted or proved circumstances of the case. The strict meaning of the word 'onus probandi' is that if no evidence is given by the party on whom the burden is cast the issue must be found against him and only then the other party has the onus of rebuttal. The first principle of the Evidence Act is that a party who is to prove an allegation must do so. The Court cannot imagine evidence in the absence of it. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and is not assisted by any weakness, real or apparent in the case of the defendant. The defect in evidence of the party on whom the onus of proof lies cannot be cured by criticism of the evidence of the other party.” 36. Basing on these rulings Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended as stated above and that the respondents miserably failed to establish their claim. 37. NARAYAN BAGAVANT RAO GOSAVI BALAJIWALE v. GOPAL VINAYAK GOSAVI AND OTHERS, AIR 1960 SC 100 , ARMUGAM v. SUNDARAMMAL, AIR 1999 SC 2216 , SMT.REBTI DEVI v. RAM DUTT AND ANOTHER, AIR 1998 SC 310 , MAHANT NARAYANA DOSSJEE VARU v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, TIRUMALA TIRUPATHI DEVASTHANAM, TIRUPATHI, AIR 1959 AP 64 are relied on by Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents in support of the proposition canvassed about effect of burden of proof when the parties have to let-in evidence in proof of facts. 38. The burden in given context of this case, when the respondents have sought eviction of the appellant from the suit shop room is on them. It is in terms of Section 101 of Evidence Act. However, in this process, they are entitled to rely on the material on record including the nature of defence set up by the appellant. 38. The burden in given context of this case, when the respondents have sought eviction of the appellant from the suit shop room is on them. It is in terms of Section 101 of Evidence Act. However, in this process, they are entitled to rely on the material on record including the nature of defence set up by the appellant. When the appellant has specifically claimed his tenancy in terms of Ex.B4 unregistered lease agreement and on a monthly rent of Rs.3,000/-, it is for him to establish the same. It is in terms of Section 102 of Evidence Act. Upon establishing these facts by the appellant, then the burden shifts to the respondents to rebut the same in support of their claim and in order to discharge their legal burden. Therefore, proof of such defence set up by the appellant is significant and is material. If the appellant fails to establish his defence and when it is rejected, the consequential corollary is acceptance of the claim of the respondents against him. 39. Therefore, viewed from such perspective on account of operation of these legal principles relating to burden of proof, it is but proper that the appellant proved and established his defence. 40. Apart from the inconsistencies pointed out above in his defence, failure of the appellant to produce the books of accounts since the year 1996 from the date when he allegedly claim that this tenancy commenced and thereafter, the income tax returns, is a strong and decisive circumstance staring at him. As rightly contended for the respondents, the reason for suppressing these books of accounts and income tax returns has not been explained by the appellant. Had they been produced, on account of the statement of the appellant at the trial that payment of rent was also included in their entries, Rs.3,000/-per month being the rent, would have been established. 41. It was a great opportunity for the appellant to substantiate his defence, which he did not make use of. Thus, it is a serious omission fatal to his defence. Rightly, Section 114(g) of Indian Evidence Act is invoked by Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents to characterize this suppression as a serious material omission affecting the credibility of the defence. Thus, it is a serious omission fatal to his defence. Rightly, Section 114(g) of Indian Evidence Act is invoked by Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents to characterize this suppression as a serious material omission affecting the credibility of the defence. Thus, the best evidence, which the appellant could have produced at the trial to support his defence was not placed at the disposal of the trial Court for evaluation. 42. Admittedly, no receipts as to payment of rent were produced at the trial. The version of the appellant is that on account of credibility and the friendship between himself and Sri Bheemraj Singh though whenever rents were paid, no receipts have been issued. If this statement of the appellant is accepted, at its face value, omission to produce the books of accounts bearing entries as to payment of this money towards rent every month appears more pronounced and significantly. 43. D.W.2 a sales executive at Nellore claimed that the appellant is their family friend. His version projected as if he arranged the suit shop room for the appellant from Sri Bheemraj Singh, who happened to be his another friend. He also described Sri Bheemraj Singh as proprietor of Jaihind Sweet Stall, which he claimed that it is located opposite to Chandra Bhavan Hotel, Trunk Road, Nellore. His testimony is reflective of his presence during Ex.B4 transaction and stated that he along with Sri G.Srinivasulu attested Ex.B4. Thus, he vouched for the terms of Ex.B4 at the trial and stated that Sri Modili Venkata Subrahmanyam @ Murali Krishna, scribed this document. 44. Learned trial Judge rejected the testimony of D.W.2 on the ground that he is an interested witness to favour the appellant. Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant contended that this rejection is improper and on account of his status as an attestor to Ex.B4, his testimony should have been appreciated, proving this transaction. Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents supported the finding recorded by learned trial Judge in this respect in rejecting the testimony of D.W.2. 45. In cross-examination for the respondents, this witness stated that the appellant used to visit his father, who was then working in Irrigation Department as a Draftsman. 46. In cross-examination for the respondents, D.W.2 stated that he did not know the proprietor of Jaihind Sweet Stall. 45. In cross-examination for the respondents, this witness stated that the appellant used to visit his father, who was then working in Irrigation Department as a Draftsman. 46. In cross-examination for the respondents, D.W.2 stated that he did not know the proprietor of Jaihind Sweet Stall. When this statement is considered with his statement earlier in examination-in-chief that he knew Sri Bheemraj Singh, proprietor of Jaihind Sweet Stall, the inference to draw is that on this crucial aspect, he gave a false version in his examination-in-chief. This witness also stated that Sri Bheemraj Singh was residing at Moolapet and that he did not know about advance amount usually paid and if towards many months’ rent. Though he claimed that Rs.5,00,000/-was paid as advance by the appellant to Sri Bheemraj Singh, his version further is that he did not remember the date of payment of advance. According to the appellant as D.W.1, he had cash of Rs.5,00,000/-with him, which he paid as advance to Sri Bheemraj Singh. However, D.W.1 stated that he did not have documentary proof to support such version. 47. When the version of D.W.2 is found to falter on a crucial aspect of position and status of Sri Bheemraj Singh, as referred to supra, his testimony as such cannot be relied on. It is clear that he is found to speak something false, un-hesitantly. Rightly his testimony was rejected by the learned trial Judge. 48. The appellant did not choose to examine other attestor or the scribe in support of his defence in this context and to prove Ex.B4. It is again a fatal omission and reason for their non-examination is not explained. 49. Thus, when the very foundation of the defence of the appellant in the shape of Ex.B4 is shrouded in suspicion, in these circumstances, and when there is no acceptable proof in this respect, it cannot be the basis for the learned trial Judge to consider his claim. Highly interested testimony of D.W.1, viz., of the appellant, proved to be highly inconsistent and the testimony of D.W.2 is unreliable. These factors are sufficient to disbelieve the defence so set up by the appellant. 50. Learned trial Judge observed that Ex.B4 could have been subjected to examination by a hand-writing expert and the appellant did not take recourse to it. These factors are sufficient to disbelieve the defence so set up by the appellant. 50. Learned trial Judge observed that Ex.B4 could have been subjected to examination by a hand-writing expert and the appellant did not take recourse to it. This finding as rightly pointed out by Sri N.Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant is not proper. Since the objection of the respondents in this context is that their father did not execute Ex.B4 and it is a rank forgery, it is for them to subject this document for examination by a hand-writing expert. It is not for the appellant. This view is fortified by one of the observations in JALAGADUGULA ESWARA RAO AND OTHERS v. DAVALA SURYA RAO, 2011(1) ALT 652 relied on for the appellant, wherein in para-11, it is stated as under: “------ When a document is said to be forged and when a party has specifically denied the signature or the thumb impression on that particular document, such party should certainly have an opportunity to send the document to the handwriting expert for comparison of the disputed signatures or the thumb impression with admitted signatures or the thumb impressions. Of course, the evidence of the expert is also not conclusive.” 51. Nonetheless, this omission on the part of the respondents, in given facts and circumstances of the case cannot be the strength of the appellant. 52. Therefore, when Ex.B4 unregistered agreement is not proved and established, defence of the appellant based there on, falls to ground. 53. Thus, when the claim of the appellant that the rent paid for this premises was only Rs.3,000/-per month is not proved and established, the objection of the appellant in terms of Section 32(c) of A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act cannot apply. The rent as contended for the respondents for this premises thus has to be accepted at Rs.9,000/-per month. Thereby the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. Rightly, the learned trial Judge held in this context in favour of the respondents and against the appellant. The same has to be confirmed now. Thus, this point is answered. 54. Thereby the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of this nature. Rightly, the learned trial Judge held in this context in favour of the respondents and against the appellant. The same has to be confirmed now. Thus, this point is answered. 54. POINT No.2: The claim of the respondents that the arrears of rent payable from 01.04.2001 till 31.05.2007 by the appellant was partly rejected by the learned trial Judge while discussing issue No.3 observing that the default in payment of rents from 01.04.2001 till death of Sri Bheemraj Singh, cannot be believed. Sri Bheemraj Singh died on 06.07.2006. The relevant observations in para – 21 (i) of the judgment of the trial Court in this context are as under: “------- If really the defendant did not pay rents to late Bheemraj Singh since 1.4.2001, late Bheemraj Singh would have taken steps against him for recovery of rents, and would not have maintained silence till his death. Moreover, according to PW-I, disputes started between the defendant and late Bheemraj Singh, as such the defendant did not pay any rents to late Bheemraj Singh from 1.4.2001 onwards. If that is so, late Bheemraj Singh would not have kept quiet, and he would have definitely taken steps for recovery of rents or for eviction of the defendant from the schedule premises. Hence, the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendant committed default in payment of rents since 1.4.2001 till the death of late Bheemraj Singh cannot be believed.” 55. These findings are not questioned or challenged by the respondents by means of cross-objections or raising any objection in the course of hearing in terms of Order 41 Rule 22 CPC while supporting the decree of the trial Court. Therefore, these findings are binding on the respondents. 56. Learned trial Judge considered the arrears due for the period subsequent to the demise of Sri Bheemraj Singh. As rightly observed by the learned trial Judge, neither in written statement or in his evidence, the appellant stated that he paid rents regularly every month to the respondents, after the death of Sri Bheemraj Singh. The entire testimony of the appellant as D.W.1 is with reference to payment of property taxes of Rs.30,392/-and Rs.24,803/-as well as Rs.9,761/-to the municipal corporation whenever demands were raised. 57. The entire testimony of the appellant as D.W.1 is with reference to payment of property taxes of Rs.30,392/-and Rs.24,803/-as well as Rs.9,761/-to the municipal corporation whenever demands were raised. 57. Learned trial Judge also considered that though the claim of the respondents towards arrears of rent stood at Rs.3,24,000/-they are entitled for recovery of rent from July 2006 till termination of tenancy, i.e. 31.05.2007 @ Rs.9,000/-per month. Thus, in all it was held that Rs.74,197/-alone was payable by the appellant with interest at 12% per annum and 6% per annum for different periods. These findings are based on record and the material. No material or circumstances are brought out in the course of hearing in this appeal to differ with this observations and findings of the trial Court on behalf of the appellant. 58. With reference to claim for damages for use and occupation, learned trial Judge has chosen to award at Rs.20,000/-per month. In this context, it is pertinent to note that in the written statement, there is no specific denial of quantum of damages so claimed. Except an abstract statement as to principles on which damages can be awarded, the written statement is not in such a standard form requirement specific denial of this fact, which the appellant is disputing. It is a serious omission, which cannot be ignored. Added to it, in his examination-in-chief, the appellant as D.W.1 did not specifically state that this claim for use and occupation at Rs.20,000/-per month is either improper or being on high side or did not fit in, with the ground realities. Thus, his testimony is completely silent in this regard. It is only on account of suggestion to him on behalf of the respondents, a bare denial of this claim is seen, in his cross-examination. 59. The testimony of the appellant as D.W.1 makes clear that the suit shop room is in a commercial area of high potentiality and value in central part of Nellore City. He described it as ‘number one commercial area’ in Nellore city. The very fact that he has his regular business premises of M/s.Nirmala Agencies to the adjoining south of the suit shop room is a circumstance of reckoning. He described it as ‘number one commercial area’ in Nellore city. The very fact that he has his regular business premises of M/s.Nirmala Agencies to the adjoining south of the suit shop room is a circumstance of reckoning. Therefore, when this premises is commanding such potentiality commercially, which admittedly the appellant is exploiting to his benefit as an additional accommodation, he cannot have any grievance in fixing up this sum of Rs.20,000/-towards damages for use and occupation. 60. Evidence was let-in by the respondents through P.W.1, producing Ex.A6 a certified copy of the lease deed entered into between M/s.Viswanadha Enterprises and Indian Bank, dated 27.03.2004 in respect of a premises of 3,515 sq.feet for Rs.22,847-50 ps per month, to substantiate their claim. Learned trial Judge has taken into consideration this instance as an appropriate indicator and accepted such version of the respondents. The contention of the appellant in this context is that there is no proof offered with reference to Ex.A6 and therefore, reliance placed by the learned trial Judge in this context is improper. Ex.A6 is a public document. In case of production of public documents, in the absence of any specific denial at the trial of the same, by the opposite party when it was introduced in the evidence, it can as such be accepted. 61. In this appeal, an attempt is made on behalf of the respondents to substantiate their claim by producing another registration extract of lease deed entered into between Sri Chunduru Venkata Subrahmanyam and M/s.Aditya Birla Nuvo Limited, dated 12.08.2011, in additional evidence. Lease of a commercial premises under this document initially was taken on monthly rent at Rs.70,000/-from 28.09.2011 to 11.08.2014 and with incremental increase thereon, it was agreed at Rs.92,575/-from 12.08.2017 to 11.08.2020. Attempt of the respondents by producing this document is to project the potentiality of the area where the suit shop room is located. However, the document sought to be relied on by the respondents relates to a post decretal event. In respect of the commercial potentiality of the suit shop room, the evidence of the appellant as D.W.1 itself is sufficient and it is demonstrating this fact. In such an event, it is unnecessary to receive this document produced along with A.S.M.P.No.1883 of 2012 filed under Article 21 Rule 27 CPC in additional evidence. Therefore, A.S.M.P.No.1883 of 2012 is dismissed being unnecessary and without costs. 62. In such an event, it is unnecessary to receive this document produced along with A.S.M.P.No.1883 of 2012 filed under Article 21 Rule 27 CPC in additional evidence. Therefore, A.S.M.P.No.1883 of 2012 is dismissed being unnecessary and without costs. 62. Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents relied on GURNAM SINGH AND OTHERS v. SURJIT SINGH AND OTHERS, (1975) 4 SCC 404 . However, there is justification for the learned trial Judge to record the findings towards damages payable for the premises for use and occupation by the appellant at Rs.20,000/-per month with effect from 01.06.2007 till date of delivery of possession. In the course of trial, it appears that the appellant had deposited Rs.45,144/-as if it was towards arrears of rent. 63. Learned trial Judge has also taken into consideration the amounts paid by the appellant in all Rs.85,297/-during pendency of the suit towards property tax (Rs.40,153/-+ Rs.45,144/-). 64. The claim set forth by the appellant basing on Ex.B4 of payment of Rs.5,00,000/-towards advance stood rejected in view of the findings recorded on point No.1. Therefore, he is not entitled to claim any set off, with reference to payment of arrears of rent or towards damages for use and occupation on such score. Thus, this point is answered confirming the findings of the trial Court in granting arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. 65. POINT No.3: Having regard to nature of the suit, which is based on Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, it is not necessary to consider the claims urged relating to bona fide requirement for personal use and occupation or deliberate default of the appellant in paying the rents, in supine indifference. These defences could be raised in any claim for eviction in terms of A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. 66. Ex.A4 legal notice by which the tenancy sought to be determined by the respondents apparently was not a serious subject matter of objection or criticism in the trial Court. The only one defence raised was that, all the legal heirs of Sri Bheemraj Singh did not join to issue this quit notice. It is rather settled proposition that when the property belonged to a joint family, if a member takes recourse to this action for the purpose and benefit of the family, it cannot be questioned by the tenant. The only one defence raised was that, all the legal heirs of Sri Bheemraj Singh did not join to issue this quit notice. It is rather settled proposition that when the property belonged to a joint family, if a member takes recourse to this action for the purpose and benefit of the family, it cannot be questioned by the tenant. As seen from the judgment under appeal, JALAL AND SONS AND ANOTHER v. SEETA BAI(DIED) BY LRS AND OTHERS, 2002(2) ALD 547 was relied on in the trial Court, where a similar question was considered, holding to the same effect. 67. Attempt was also made in the course of trial, questioning the Will of Sri Ramachandra Singh, father of Sri Bheemraj Singh (Ex.A1) dated 26.09.1970 conferring life estate to Sri Bheemraj Singh and after him, the vested reminder to respondents 1 to 3. Attempt was also made in the course of trial basing on Ex.B8 a certified copy of the sale deed dated 04.04.2002, the original of which was executed by Sri Bheemraj Singh and the respondents herein in favour of one Mohammed Nazir Ahmed selling away another property of the family. This sale deed transaction did not reflect Ex.A1 Will and therefore, according to the appellant, the claim so set up by the respondents for the suit shop is improper and irregular. 68. Tenancy of the premises is not disputed fact and the appellant admittedly is a tenant of the same. Ownership of the premises vested with the respondents is not disputed and going by the nature of defence set up by the appellant Sri Bheemraj Singh was his landlord during his lifetime. Thereafter, the respondents stepped into his shoes in the position of owners of this property in whose favour this tenancy of the appellant continued. In these circumstances, the estoppel in terms of Section 116 of Evidence Act operates and comes into play whereby the appellant cannot be permitted to deny the title of the respondents. 69. Therefore, the contentions of the appellant on this score cannot stand. 70. Hence, the appellant is liable to be evicted from the suit shop room and accordingly, the findings recorded by the trial Court stand confirmed in this respect. Thus, this point is answered. 71. POINT No.4: In view of the findings on all the above points, this appeal has to be dismissed with costs throughout. 70. Hence, the appellant is liable to be evicted from the suit shop room and accordingly, the findings recorded by the trial Court stand confirmed in this respect. Thus, this point is answered. 71. POINT No.4: In view of the findings on all the above points, this appeal has to be dismissed with costs throughout. It appears that in view of the interim orders of this Court in A.S.M.P.No.2332 of 2011, dated 28.10.2011 and its subsequent modification by the order in A.S.M.P.No.1184 of 2012 dated 05.12.2012 certain amounts were deposited towards damages. They shall be taken into account and consideration while arriving at the damages for use and occupation payable by the appellant to the respondents. For all such payments made by the appellant, the respondents shall give credit. 72. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs, confirming the decree and judgment of the trial Court in O.S.No.581 of 2007 dated 09.09.2011 on the file of the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Nellore. The appellant is granted time till 15.07.2021 to vacate and hand over peaceful vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondents. In case of default by the appellant to do so, the respondents are at liberty to resume the execution proceedings for delivery of the property in their favour by the appellant. Interim stay granted earlier stands vacated. A.S.M.P.No.1883 of 2012 is dismissed and without costs. All pending petitions, stand closed.