JUDGMENT : The petitioner in WP(C) No.25635/2015 has filed the instant Writ Appeal under Sec.5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, so as to impugn the judgment dated 19.11.2020 whereby the said writ petition has been dismissed. 2. Heard Smt.Sindhu Santhalingam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the W.A./petitioner in the WP(C) and Sri.Ashok M.Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) appearing for the respondents in the W.A./respondents in the WP(C). 3. The prayers in the abovesaid WP(C) No.25635/2015 are as follows: {See page 40 of the paper book of this W.A.} “1. Call for the entire records pertaining to the issuance of Exhibit P-6, P-8 and P-10 Order and Issue a Writ of Certiorari, any other Order, writ or direction to quash the same. 2. Issue a Writ of Mandamus, any other Order, writ or direction, directing the 2nd Respondent to reconsider Exhibit P-9 appeal preferred by the Petitioner, with specific consideration of the grounds pleaded by this Petitioner in appeal. 3. Such other reliefs that this Honourable Court deem fit and proper to grant in the interest of justice. 4. Award costs of the proceedings.” 4. The learned Single Judge after hearing both sides has rendered the impugned judgment on 19.11.2020 whereby the above WP(C) was dismissed on the ground that the appellant/petitioner has not made out the grounds so as to invoke the public law remedy to interdict with the impugned disciplinary proceedings rendered in this case. Further that, it cannot be said that the impugned penalty order at Ext.P-8 rendered by the 3rd respondent Chief Engineer is on the basis of “no legally acceptable evidence on record” and that the submissions of the appellant/petitioner regarding the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidential materials to justify the finding of guilt in the impugned proceedings are beyond the scope and ambit of the public law remedy of judicial review, and that the impugned penalty of barring of two increments with cumulative effect imposed on the appellant/petitioner cannot be said to excessive or unreasonable etc. It is these findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that is under challenge in this intra court appeal. 5. It is these findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment that is under challenge in this intra court appeal. 5. The appellant while serving as Assistant Executive Engineer was initially suspended from service as per Ext.P-1 order 25.11.2011 issued by the 3rd respondent for initiating disciplinary proceedings, and later he was served with the impugned Ext.P-2 memo of charges and statement of allegations dated 24.12.2011 for initiating major penalty proceedings against him. The appellant had submitted Ext.P-3 explanation thereto. Further, it appears that the competent authority among the respondents has conducted a detailed enquiry as contemplated for major penalty proceedings in this case and an enquiry officer was appointed in the matter to conduct the detailed enquiry in respect of the various allegations raised in Ext.P-2 memo of charges and statement of allegations. The enquiry officer, after granting sufficient opportunity to the appellant, has submitted Ext.P-6 enquiry report dated 8.4.2013 in the matter, a copy of which was also served on the appellant by the disciplinary authority, who has also issued Ext.P-5 show cause notice dated 9.10.2013 directing the appellant to show cause as to why the findings in Ext.P-6 enquiry report shall not be accepted and as to why the proposed penalty of barring of two increments with cumulative effect shall not be imposed on the appellant/petitioner. The appellant has submitted Ext.P-7 explanation thereto. Later, the 3rd respondent disciplinary authority has issued the impugned Ext.P-8 order dated 30.4.2014 ordering that the findings of guilt arrived at by enquiry officer at Ext.P-6 are confirmed and that taking a lenient view, instead of the proposed penalty of barring of two increments with cumulative effect, a lesser penalty of barring of one increment with cumulative effect is imposed on the appellant and that the period of suspension will be regularized by treating as eligible leave, if any etc. 6. Being aggrieved by Ext.P-8 order, the appellant has preferred Ext.P-9 appeal before the appellate authority concerned (Chairman and Managing Director of the KSEB) who has issued the Ext.P-10 appellate order dated 2.12.2014 rejecting the said appeal and holding that the punishment imposed on the appellant is not excessive, as it is only a minor penalty. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the W.A./petitioner in the WP(C) has made various submissions in the matter, mainly re-iterating the submissions made before the learned Single Judge. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the W.A./petitioner in the WP(C) has made various submissions in the matter, mainly re-iterating the submissions made before the learned Single Judge. It is pointed out that there are no legally justifiable evidence to connect the appellant with the charge of any grave supervisory lapse or dereliction of duty, and that even going by the admitted case projected by the disciplinary authority both in Ext.P-2 memo of charges as well as in Ext.P-6 enquiry report, the officer subordinate to the appellant, viz the Assistant Engineer concerned was more responsible for the delay in question and transmitting the bills from the section level of which he was the head to the sub division level of which the appellant was the head. Further it is pointed out that, no reasons are forthcoming from the respondents as to why not even a little finger has been moved to take any action as against the Assistant Executive Engineer concerned about whose irregularities, various allegations are disclosed in Ext.P-6 etc. Yet another contention raised by Smt.Sindhu Santhalingam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the impugned penalty of barring of one increment with cumulative effect as ordered in Ext.P-8 is very grave and further that, the finding by the appellate authority in Ext.P-10 appellate order dated 2.12.2014 that the imposed penalty of barring of one increment with cumulative effect is only a minor penalty, is a wrong legal understanding of the matter. As regards the second aspect of the matter, it is pointed out that the stand taken by the respondents in Ext.P-2 memo of charges as if the same has been issued in accordance with the provisions contained in the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, [for short “KCS(CCA) Rules”] is absolutely wrong inasmuch as, the respondent KSEB authorities have not adopted the KCS(CCA) Rules for regulating the disciplinary affairs in respect of the employees and services under the Board and as a matter of fact, the respondent KSEB authorities have separately framed statutory regulations called the KSEB Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations which has been notified as per Board Order B.O.No.R.Dis.23208/1968 as early as on 31.1.1969, which governs even now. 8. 8. In that regard it is pointed out that, though the penalty of withholding of increments/promotions is enumerated as item 'iii' under Regulation 11 (1) and that going by the provisions contained in Regulation 17 which is the procedure for imposing minor penalties, or the penalties enumerated as items 'i' to 'iv' under Regulation 11 (1) have treated as minor penalties. However, it is pointed out that the Apex Court in the celebrated decision in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab [(1991) Supp (1) SCC 504] has considered the inclusion of similar penalty of barring of increment including that with cumulative effect as minor penalty, but has held therein as per provisions contained in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules. But, the Apex Court held that it is extremely difficult to countenance the contention that the actual effect and impact of the penalty of barring of increments with cumulative effect is only having the effect of minor penalty and that the penalty of reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay has been classified as major penalty, and that the finding in the impugned judgment of the High Court in that case to the effect that in a case where increments are withheld with or without cumulative effect, the government employee is never reduced to a lower stage of time scale of pay and cannot be countenanced and that if the abovesaid reasoning of the High Court as per the impugned judgment is given acceptance, it would empower the disciplinary authority to impose under the garb of stoppage of increments in the matter of earning future increments in the time scale of pay even permanently without explicitly stating so, and that their Lordships of the Apex Court have no hesitation to hold that the penalty order of impugned therein would come within the scope and ambit of major penalty, and that imposing such a penalty of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, it is substantially having the effect and impact of major penalty, by following the procedure for minor penalty imposition and without following the detailed enquiry for major penalty is illegal and ultra vires, etc. It will be pertinent to refer to paras 2 to 4 of the decision of the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab [1991 Supp (1) SCC 504] which read as follows: “2. It will be pertinent to refer to paras 2 to 4 of the decision of the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab [1991 Supp (1) SCC 504] which read as follows: “2. The only question that needs decision is whether stop-page of two increments with cumulative effect is a major penalty'? Admittedly Rules 8 and 9 envisage conducting an enquiry into misconduct after giving an opportunity to the delinquent employee in the manner prescribed therein and on establishing the charge to pass an appropriate order imposing a major penalty prescribed in either clauses V to IX or minor penalty under clauses I to IV of Rule 5 of the Rules. If it is a minor penalty indisputably the need to conduct regular enquiry has been dispensed with. Rule 5 prescribes the penalties thus: "5. Penalties:--The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons. and as hereinafter provided be imposed on a Government employee, namely: MINOR PENALTIES (i) Censure; (ii) withholding of his promotions; (iii)recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence of breach of orders; (iv) withholding of increments of pay; MAJOR PENALTIES (v) reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the Government employee will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay; (vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the Government employee to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post or service from which the Government employee was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration that grade, post or service; (vii) compulsory retirement; (viii) removal from service which shall be a disqualification for future employment under the Government; (ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Government'. 3. Clauses VI to IX are not relevant to the facts of the case. 4. 3. Clauses VI to IX are not relevant to the facts of the case. 4. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter undoubtedly is a minor penalty within the meaning of Rule 5(iv). But sub-rule (v) postulates reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period with further directions as to whether or not the Government employee shall earn increments of pay during the period of such reductions and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is an independent head of penalty and it could be imposed as punishment in an appropriate case. It is one of the major penalties. The impugned order of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect whether would fall within the meaning of Rule 5(v)? If it so fails Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules require conducting of regular enquiry. The contention of Shri Nayar, learned counsel for the State is that withholding two increments with cumulative effect is only a minor penalty as it does not amount to reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay. We find it extremely difficult to countenance the contention. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule 5(iv) of the Rules. But when penalty was imposed withholding two increments i.e. for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order, by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time-scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years' increments would not be counted in his time-scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words are the skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. The words are the skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule 5(v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division Bench in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., I.L.R. 1985 2 P & H. 193, P.C. Jain, A.C.J. speaking for the division bench, while considering similar question, in paragraph 8 held that the stoppage of increments with cumulative effect, by no stretch of imagination falls within clause (v) of Rule 5 or in rule 4.12 of Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held that under clause (v) of Rule 5 there has to be a reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay by the competent authority as a measure of penalty and the period for which such a reduction is to be effective has to be stated and on restoration it has further to be specified whether the reduction shall operate to postpone the future increments of his pay. In such cases withholding of the increments without cumulative effect does not at all arise. In case where the increments are withhold with or without cumulative effect the Government employee is never reduced to a lower stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held that clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts of that case. With respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the back of the mind, it would always be so, the result will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. If the reasoning of the High Court is given acceptance, it would empower the disciplinary authority to impose, under the garb of stoppage of increments, of earning future increments in the time scale of pay even permanently with expressly stating so. This preposterous consequences cannot be permitted to be permeated. Rule 5(IV) does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose penalty of withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be without jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be per se void. This preposterous consequences cannot be permitted to be permeated. Rule 5(IV) does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose penalty of withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be without jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be per se void. considering from this angle we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the impugned penalty without enquiry is per se illegal.” 9. It is further pointed out that presumably in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra, the State of Kerala has, subsequently w.e.f. 27.5.2002, amended the provisions contained in the KCS(CCA) Rules which is applicable for government servants, as items 'v' to 'ix' of Rule 11(1) of the KCS(CCA) Rules, whereby the penalty of withholding of increments with cumulative effect has been classified now as a major penalty for which the detailed enquiry in terms of Rule 15 of the KCS(CCA) Rules is mandatory. In this regard it is pointed out that the abovesaid finding made by the appellate authority in the impugned Ext.P-10 appellate order to hold that the impugned penalty of barring of one increment with cumulative effect imposed on the appellant is inconsequential as it is only a minor penalty going by the KSEB Regulations, is a legally wrong understanding of the matter inasmuch as, the Apex Court has clearly held in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra that a penalty of such a nature of stoppage/withholding of increment with cumulative effect is indeed a major penalty. 10. 10. As regards the first aspect of the matter it is argued that, there is no clarity as to the manner and method in which the penalty ordered as per Ext.P-8 by the disciplinary authority is to be enforced inasmuch as, the penalty is worded as “barring of one increment with cumulative effect” and the period for which the withholding of increment with cumulative effect is to be sustained is not even mentioned, which give rises to capriciousness and arbitrariness in the enforcing authority, and the subordinate officials cannot be blamed for any such confusion inasmuch as, the lack of clarity is caused by the penalty order issued by the 3rd respondent disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority which has to be only branded as improper or unreasonable, etc. As regards the second limb of said argument, Sri.Ashok M.Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) appearing for the respondents would point out that though it is true that the respondents have wrongly cited in Ext.P-2 memo of charges dated 24.12.2011 that the same has been issued as per the KCS(CCA) Rules, as a matter of fact, the KCS(CCA) Rules have not been made applicable to the KSEB employees, and that separate regulations have been framed by the Board as per the KSEB Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations which has been notified as Board Order B.O.No.R.Dis.23208/1968 as early as on 31.1.1969, a copy of which has been made available with the memo dated 27.1.2021 filed by the Standing Counsel for the respondent Board in this appeal. Further it is pointed out that, it is true that after the rendering of the judgment dated 13.9.1990 of the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra, though the State of Kerala has amended the provisions contained in Rule 11(1) of the KCS(CCA) Rules w.e.f. 22.5.2002, whereby the penalty of withholding of increments with cumulative effect has been classified now as a major penalty, such steps to amend the KSEB Regulations have not been taken so far. But, it is pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB that it is beyond any dispute that though the impugned imposed penalty in this case is a minor penalty as per the KSEB Regulations, as a matter of fact the 3rd respondent disciplinary authority has followed the rigorous procedure of conducting a detailed enquiry which is applicable in the case of major penalty proceedings in this case as well, which is evident from the materials on record, and which fact is also not in any manner disputed by the appellant. Hence it is pointed out that, though the impugned imposed penalty of barring of one increment with cumulative effect is treated still as a minor penalty in terms of the KSEB Regulations, the respondent Board authorities very cautiously and guardedly and in full deference to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra have followed the more rigorous procedure of detailed enquiry applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, no illegality and impropriety can be established in that regard by the appellant for not having followed detailed enquiry procedure for major penalty. 11. After hearing both sides, we are of the firm view that the abovesaid submissions of the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB are tenable and sustainable inasmuch as, there is no dispute by the appellant in this case and as a matter of fact, the rigorous procedure of detailed enquiry contemplated for major penalty proceedings has in fact to be followed in this case, though the penalty imposed as per Ext.P-8 is styled as minor penalty going by the Board Regulations. Hence, it is only to be held that the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra has been substantively followed in this case as far conduct of detailed enquiry procedure is concerned. 12. As regards the first aspect of the matter regarding the alleged lack of clarity in the penalty order ordered as per Ext.P-8, Sri.Ashok M.Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB appearing for the respondents would invite this Court's attention to the provisions contained in the abovesaid KSEB Regulations. 12. As regards the first aspect of the matter regarding the alleged lack of clarity in the penalty order ordered as per Ext.P-8, Sri.Ashok M.Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB appearing for the respondents would invite this Court's attention to the provisions contained in the abovesaid KSEB Regulations. It will be pertinent to refer to items 'i', 'ii', 'iii' & 'iv' of Regulation 11(1) of abovesaid KSEB Regulations produced along with the memo dated 27.1.2021 (given on pages 5 & 6 thereof) filed by the Standing Counsel for the KSEB and the said relevant provisions read as follows: “11. The Nature of Penalties:- 1. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Board employee namely: (i) Censure. (ii) Fine (The penalty of fine as such shall be imposed only on members of the subordinate services holding posts, the starting pay of which is Rs. 75 or less. The infliction of very heavy fines and frequent infliction of small fines shall be avoided.) (iii) Withholding of increments or promotion. NOTE: (1) Withholding of increments or promotion referred to may be either permanent or temporary for a specified period. (2) Temporary period of withholding of increments or promotion shall not be less than six months and not more than three years. If the period is not specified in the order, it will be deemed to be six months. (3) Withholding of promotion shall not entail loss of seniority in that grade. (4) An officer whose promotion is withheld, shall, if and when promoted to a higher grade or higher time scale subsequently, on promotion, take his place at the bottom of the higher grade or higher time scale. (iv) (a) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Board or a State Government or the Central Government or to a local authority by negligence or breach of orders. (b) Recovery from pay to the extent necessary of the monetary value equivalent to the amount of increments ordered to be withheld where such an order cannot be given effect to. Explanation: In case of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect, the monetary value equivalent to three times the amount of increments ordered to be withheld may be recovered.” 13. (b) Recovery from pay to the extent necessary of the monetary value equivalent to the amount of increments ordered to be withheld where such an order cannot be given effect to. Explanation: In case of stoppage of increment with cumulative effect, the monetary value equivalent to three times the amount of increments ordered to be withheld may be recovered.” 13. It is pointed out that withholding of increments or promotion is enumerated as item 'iii' under Regulation 11(1) of the KSEB Regulations. Note 1 thereof stipulates that withholding of increments or promotion referred to may be either permanent or temporary for a specified period. Note 2 holds that temporary period of withholding of increments or promotion shall not be less than six months and not more than three years. If the period is not specified in the order, it will be deemed to be six months. In that regard, the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB would also submit that though some of the aspects regarding the effectuation of penalty of withholding of increments temporarily for a specified period have been dealt with Notes 1 & 2 appended under Regulation 11 (1) (iii) of the KSEB Regulations, the aspects regarding the effectuation of the penalty of withholding of increments with cumulative effect are not adequately dealt with therein. In that regard, the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB would invite this Court's attention to some of the provisions of the KCS(CCA) Rules, where Note 2 has been appended under Regulation 11 (1) (iii), wherein Regulation 11 (1) (iii) deals with the penalty of withholding of increments or promotion temporarily for a specified period. Note 2 appended under Regulation 11 (1) (iii) says that temporary period of withholding of increments or promotion shall not be less than six months and not more than three years. If the period is not specified in the order, it will be deemed to be six months. Further that, temporary withholding of increments shall mean withholding of increments without cumulative effect and it shall not have the effect of postponing future increments. It is pointed out that though the abovesaid provisions of KCS(CCA) Rules are not statutorily applicable in the instant case, some of the provisions therein would throw light to the cardinal aspect that temporary withholding of increments shall mean that withholding of increments without cumulative effect. It is pointed out that though the abovesaid provisions of KCS(CCA) Rules are not statutorily applicable in the instant case, some of the provisions therein would throw light to the cardinal aspect that temporary withholding of increments shall mean that withholding of increments without cumulative effect. That is, it shall not have the effect of postponing future increments. 14. Further, the Note appended under Rule 11(1)(vA) of the KCS(CCA) Rules which deals with withholding of increments with cumulative effect has also been brought to our notice and the said Note thereunder reads as follows: “The minimum period of permanent barring of increment shall not be less than one year and the maximum period shall not be more than three years. Permanent barring of increment shall mean withholding of increment with cumulative effect namely, it shall have the effect of postponing future increments.” 15. On the basis of said Note, it is submitted by Sri.Ashok M.Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent KSEB that though the said KCS(CCA) Rules are not statutorily applicable, the abovesaid provision by way of Note appended to Rule 11(1)(vA) would also throw light as to the minimum period and the maximum period in the matter of barring of increments and the Note says that the minimum period of permanent barring of increment shall not be less than one year and the maximum period shall not be more than three years. Permanent barring of increment shall mean withholding of increment with cumulative effect namely, it shall have the effect of postponing future increments. In the light of abovesaid provisions, the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB would point that though some of the clarifications available in KCS(CCA) Rules are not highlighted in the KSEB Regulations, the abovesaid provisions contained in the KCS(CCA) Rules would throw light to the cardinal aspect that permanent barring of increments shall mean withholding of increment with cumulative effect and shall have the effect of postponing future increments, and that the minimum period of permanent barring of increments shall not be less than one year and the maximum period shall not be more than 3 years. It is pointed out that ordinarily grant of increments is once in a year, and that is the logic as to why it has been understood that the minimum period of permanent barring of increment shall not be less than one year inasmuch as, permanent barring of increments shall mean withholding of increment with cumulative effect and shall have the effect of postponing future increments, and if the penalty is barring of one increment with cumulative effect, then it has to be understood that it can be effectuated only if it is suffered atleast for a minimum period of not less than one year inasmuch as, the increments are ordinarily once in a year. In the light of these aspects, Sri.Ashok M.Cherian, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent KSEB would point out that indisputably the penalty imposed as per Ext.P-8 by the disciplinary authority is barring of one increment with cumulative effect. Further that, it is beyond any dispute that the increments are due only once in a year and therefore since the said punishment is barring of one increment with cumulative effect, it can only be permanent barring of increment which shall mean withholding of increment with cumulative effect and it shall have the effect of postponing future increments and since said penalty is to be enforced and then it has to be only held that what is involved is barring of one increment with cumulative effect for a period of one year, which is the minimum period concerned. 16. After hearing both sides we are of the view that the abovesaid submission made on behalf of the respondent KSEB authorities would merit acceptance before this Court. What is imposed as per Ext.P-8 is barring of one increment with cumulative effect. True that, there is some lack of clarity in the wording of that penalty order and the KSEB Regulations inasmuch as, it has been unhappily worded. But, since the penalty is barring of one increment with cumulative effect, it can only mean permanent barring of increment so as to imply withholding of increment with cumulative effect, namely that shall have the effect of postponing future increments and since increment is earned only once in a year, the said penalty can be enforced only if it is construed as one for one year. Since, the disciplinary authority has not stated otherwise, it will be improper and illegal for the Court to hold that the said penalty of barring of one increment with cumulative effect is for the maximum period of upto 3 years, etc. So, the only reasonable interpretation of the understanding and effectuation of the impugned Ext.P-8 penalty order of barring of one increment with cumulative effect is that, it is the permanent barring of one increment for the period of one year. 17. However, yet another contention is also raised before us by Smt.Sindhu Santhalingam, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant. The same is that, even going by the case of the respondents as per Ext.P-10 is that, the penalty imposed as per Ext.P-8 is only a minor penalty. It is pointed out that, though there may not be any technical violation of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra inasmuch as, major penalty enquiry procedure has been followed in the instant case, the approach made in Ext.P-10 appellate order as if the penalty imposed as per Ext.P-8 which is barring of one increment for one year with cumulative effect, is only a minor penalty, is against the spirit and substance of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra, and therefore the respondents themselves concede in Ext.P-10 that going by the proved charges what was intended to be imposed was only a major penalty. If that be so, the imposed penalty as per Ext.P-8 is in substance a major penalty going by the dictum in Kulwant Singh Gill's case supra, hence at any rate even if it is admitted for argument sake that the findings are otherwise justified, it would warrant only a lesser penalty which is in substance a minor penalty, which is lesser in impact and gravity than the one imposed in Ext.P-8, and that this aspect of the matter has not been considered either in Exts.P-8 or P-10 or by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, etc. 18. As regards the said contention, we do not propose to make any findings in this appeal in the nature of the orders that we are proposing in the matter for disposal of the main matter in this appeal. 18. As regards the said contention, we do not propose to make any findings in this appeal in the nature of the orders that we are proposing in the matter for disposal of the main matter in this appeal. Smt.Sindhu Santhalingam, learned counsel appearing for the writ appellant has made submissions that the impugned Ext.P-10 appellate order deserves interdiction. Since the plain and simple mandate contained in Clauses '(a)' to '(e)' of Regulation 32 (2) of the aforesaid KSEB Regulations have been flagrantly violated by the appellate authority inasmuch as, no consideration has been made to anyone of the five explicit parameters enumerated in Clauses '(a)' to '(e)' of Regulation 32 (2). Further it is pointed out that the said decision making process of the appellate authority at Ext.P-10 would be plain derogation of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions as in R.P.Bhatt v. Union of India & Ors. [ (1986) 2 SCC 651 ] which is followed by this Court in umpteen number of decisions including the recent decision in Sudhakaran K.P. v. KSRTC [2014 (2) ILR Ker 795], etc. 19. After hearing both sides we are persuaded to take the view that the impugned Ext.P-10 appellate order would deserve interdiction as a mere reading of said order would indicate that there has not been any proper or even minimal consideration of various relevant aspects as made out in Ext.P-10 rejection of the appeal. In that regard, it is pertinent to refer to Regulation 32 of the abovesaid KSEB Regulations which deals with consideration of appeals in disciplinary matters, and the same reads as follows: (See pages 18 & 19 of the memo dated 27.1.2021 filed by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent KSEB in this case) “32. Consideration of appeals: 1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of regulation 10 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm and revoke the order accordingly. Consideration of appeals: 1) In the case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of regulation 10 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm and revoke the order accordingly. 2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in regulation 11(1) the appellate authority shall consider, a) Whether the facts on which the order was based have been established; b) Whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; c) Whether the procedure prescribed in those regulations has been complied with, and if not whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provision of the constitution or in failure of justice, d) Whether the findings are justified; and e) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate, pass orders, i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. Provided that, i) The appellate authority shall not impose any enhanced penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which made the order appealed against is competent in the case to impose. ii) No order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty; and iii) If the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in items (v) to (ix) of regulation 11(1) and an inquiry under regulation 16 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of regulation 19 itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry and after giving the appellant an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such penalty, pass such orders as it may deem fit. 3) In the case of an appeal against any order specified in regulation 25, the appellant authority shall consider all the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it may deem just and equitable.” 20. 3) In the case of an appeal against any order specified in regulation 25, the appellant authority shall consider all the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it may deem just and equitable.” 20. While construing broadly analogous provisions contained in Rule 27(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, [for short “CCS(CCA) Rules”] the Apex Court has held in the decision in R.P.Bhatt's case supra in paras 3 to 5 thereof as follows: “3. Having heard the parties, we are satisfied that in disposing of the appeal the Director-General has not applied his mind to the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the relevant provisions of which read as follows : 27(2). In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 or enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Rules, the appellate authority shall consider (a) whether the procedure laid down in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such noncompliance has resulted in the violation of any provisions of the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice; (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and (c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed is adequate, inadequate or severe; and pass orders- (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 4. The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) implies due application of mind'. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such noncompliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. 5. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. 5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director-General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such noncompliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director-General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of cause (c) of Rule 27(2), viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director-General is liable to be set aside.” 21. It has been explained by the Apex Court in para 6 of R.P.Bhatt's case supra that it is not the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India or of the rules of natural justice that in every case the appellate authority should in its orders state its own reasons except where the appellate authority disagrees with the findings of the disciplinary authority. However, the Apex Court has clearly held that since the rule making authority themselves has made a statutory provision as in Rule 27(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, whereby it has been made the obligatory on the appellate authority to consider various parameters of the matter and then pass orders in such appeals. The word 'consider' appearing in Rule 27(2) of the said Rules was held to imply “due application of mind” and that it is clear upon the terms of said Rule 27(2) that the appellate authority is required to consider the various parameters mentioned in Clauses 'a' to 'c' of Rule 27(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, etc and since there was no indication in the impugned appellate order that the appellate authority was satisfied as to the various parameters mentioned in Rule 27(2), it was found that the appellate order would deserve interdiction on that ground, etc. 22. 22. In R.P.Bhatt's case supra, the Apex Court has considered two Constitution Bench decisions referred to therein, viz, State of Madras v. A.R.Srinivasan [ AIR 1966 SC 1827 ] and Som Datt Datla v. Union of India [ AIR 1969 SC 414 ]. In both these cases it has been held that it is not necessary to record detailed reasons in every case and though the proceedings are quasi-judicial, but having regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conducted, an obligation cannot be imposed on the State to record reasons in every case. In Som Datt Datla v. Union of India [ AIR 1969 SC 414 ] the provisions contained in the Army Act were considered and it was held therein as follows: “Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule either expressly or by necessary implication, there is no legal obligation that the statutory tribunal should give reasons for its decision.” 23. Later, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case in S.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India [(1990) 4 SCC 564] has also dealt with a case involving the provisions in the Army Act, 1950, and the Rules framed thereunder. The challenge therein was made as against the Chief of the Army Staff confirming the findings and sentence recorded by the General Court Lordship and the order of the Union Government dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Sec.164(2) of the Army Act. In that case, the appellant therein was an officer in the rank of Major, and the officer was commanding a military unit. While he was attending a training, another officer was in charge of said unit. The said officer had given a contingent bill of Rs.16,280/-which was returned by the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA). Later, after taking charge the appellant had submitted another contingent bill of Rs.7029.57/-. In view of the difference, the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA) reported the matter to the headquarters for investigation and the Court of Enquiry blamed the appellant for certain lapses. The General Officer Commanding who considered the report recommended only 'severe displeasure' to be recorded of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Central Command be awarded to the appellant. In view of the difference, the Controller of Defence Accounts (CDA) reported the matter to the headquarters for investigation and the Court of Enquiry blamed the appellant for certain lapses. The General Officer Commanding who considered the report recommended only 'severe displeasure' to be recorded of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Central Command be awarded to the appellant. Whereas, the Commanding-in-Chief did not agree with the said opinion and then memo of charges was served in respect of three charges, of which charges one and three were held proved and the delinquent officer was awarded the sentence of dismissal from service. Thereupon, the appellant therein had filed petition before the Chief of Army praying not to confirm the sentence and the same was rejected. He filed post confirmation petition before the Union Government under Sec.164(2) of the Army Act, which was also rejected. The issue that was considered by the Apex Court was whether it was the incumbent who was the Chief of Army Staff or the Union Government to record the reasons to the orders passed by them which arises in terms of the provisions contained in the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The issues that were raised in that case are as follows: “i. Is there any general principle of law which requires an administrative authority to record the reasons for its decisions; and ii. If so, does the said principle apply to an order confirming the findings and sentence of a court martial and post-confirmation proceedings under the Act?” 24. After considering the various legal positions in various countries the Constitution Bench in S.N.Mukherjee's case supra has held in para 36 thereof as follows: “36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.” 25. In the case in Divisional Forest Officer & Ors. v. Madhusudhan Rao [ (2008) 3 SCC 469 ], the Apex Court has considered a case in which enquiry was conducted and the delinquent was awarded with penalty of barring of 5 increments with cumulative effect and the suspension period was treated as leave. In the appeal filed before the Conservator of Forests, the penalty was enhanced to dismissal from service. The revision was then filed before the Chief Conservator of Forests, who modified the order to the extent of removal from service. The Apex Court held therein that “though the appellate or revisional authority need not give detailed reasons about agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum, but in our view, in the interests of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. No detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum.” 26. No detailed reasons are required to be given, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order affirming the views of the lower forum.” 26. Later, the Apex Court in the case in Chairman, Disciplinary Authority, Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Jagdish Sharan Varshney & Ors. [ (2009) 4 SCC 240 ] has explained the various aspects regarding the dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench in S.N.Mukherjee's case supra as well as in the earlier decision in State of Madras v. A.R.Srinivasan [ AIR 1966 SC 1827 ]. It is profitable to refer to paras 6 to 12 of the decision of the Apex Court in Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank's case supra [ (2009) 4 SCC 240 ], which read as follows: “6. The view we are taking was also taken by this Court in Divl. Forest Officer v. Madhusudhan Rao (vide SCC para 20 : JT para 19), and in M.P. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India (vide SCC para 6 : AIR para 6), etc. 7. In the present case, since the appellate authority's order does not contain any reasons, it does not show any application of mind. 8. The purpose of disclosure of reasons, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of S.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India, is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities. Unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not? Also, giving of reasons minimizes chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation. 9. No doubt, in S.N.Mukherjee's case, it has been observed (SCC p.613, para 36) "36. Also, giving of reasons minimizes chances of arbitrariness. Hence, it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation. 9. No doubt, in S.N.Mukherjee's case, it has been observed (SCC p.613, para 36) "36. ....The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge." The above observation, in our opinion, really means that the order of affirmance need not contain an elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the original authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need not be given in an order of affirmance. To take a contrary view would mean that appellate authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they agree with the view of the lower authority. 10. For the same reason, the decision of this Court in State of Madras vs. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827 (vide AIR para 15) has also to be understood as explained by us above. 11. Hence, we agree with the High Court that reasons should have been contained in the appellate authority's order, but we cannot understand why the High Court has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority, in addition to setting aside the appellate order. 12. Hence, this appeal is partly allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court to the extent that it has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the appellate authority to decide the appeal filed by respondent No.1 afresh in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of being heard to respondent No.1 and also by passing a speaking order. The said appeal shall be decided very expeditiously. No order as to costs.” 27. The said appeal shall be decided very expeditiously. No order as to costs.” 27. A reading of the said decision of the Apex Court in Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank's case supra would make it clear that the Apex Court after discussing the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in S.N.Mukherjee's case supra has held in para 8 of Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank's case supra that the purpose of disclosure of reasons as held by the Constitution Bench in S.N.Mukherjee's case supra is that people must have confidence in the judicial or quasi-judicial authorities and unless reasons are disclosed, how can a person know whether the authority has applied its mind or not and that giving of reason minimizes chances of arbitrariness and hence it is an essential requirement of the rule of law that some reasons, at least in brief, must be disclosed in a judicial or quasi-judicial order, even if it is an order of affirmation. The Apex Court has also explained in para 9 of Rani Lakshmi Bai Kshetriya Gramin Bank's case supra about the aspects arising out of para 36 of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in S.N.Mukherjee's case supra. It has been held therein that the said observation in S.N.Mukherjee's case supra would mean that the order of affirmance need not contain any elaborate reasoning as contained in the order of the original authority, but it cannot be understood to mean that even brief reasons need not be given in an order of affirmance and to take a contrary view would mean that appellate authorities can simply dismiss appeals by one line orders stating that they agree with the view of the lower authority, etc. 28. This Court has also applied the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in R.P. Bhatt's case supra [ (1986) 2 SCC 651 ] in the decision in Sudhakaran K.P. v. KSRTC [2014 (2) ILR Ker 795] where broadly analogous provisions in the case contained in Rule 31 of the KCS (CCA) Rules regarding consideration of statutory appeals as per Rule 31(2) thereof have been considered. 29. 29. During the course of hearing we had requested both sides to ascertain the case law position and submit as to whether there had been any decision of the Apex Court which deals with provisions as in Rule 27(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules or any corresponding provisions in the State CCA Rules regarding the consideration of statutory appeal and whether the Apex Court has rendered any subsequent decision so as to over rule the dictum laid down earlier in R.P.Bhatt's case supra, etc. Both sides have apprised this Court that they have not been able to find out any reported decision of the Apex Court which has, in any manner clearly and categorically overruled the abovesaid dictum laid down by the Apex Court in R.P.Bhatt's case supra in paras 3 to 5 thereof. 30. The abovesaid various decisions of the Apex Court would clearly show that though the order of affirmation passed by the appellate authority need not contain elaborate reasonings as contained in the original order, it cannot imply or mean that even brief reasons need not be given by the appellate authority in the order of affirmance. So that it cannot imply that the appellate authority can simply dismiss appeal by one line orders stating that they agree with the view of the lower authority, etc. Now, coming to the facts of this case, it can be seen from a reading of the impugned Ext.P-10 appellate order dated 2.12.2014 that most of the provisions therein are devoted mainly to state the various details regarding the memo of charges, the allegations raised therein about the conduct of enquiry, etc, the only portion in Ext.P-10 which deals with the grounds for rejection of the appeal is contained in the penultimate paragraph of Ext.P-10 given on internal page 3 thereof (See page 120 of the paper book of this Writ Appeal) and the same reads as follows:- “The undersigned has examined the appeal petition in detail with the connected records of the case and came to the conclusion that there occurred a lapse on the part of Sri.Sibi Thomas, Assistant Executive Engineer in processing the work bill of a particular contractor which is clearly revealed in the Enquiry Report. This caused delay in passing of the bill. However the disciplinary authority imposed only a minor punishment upon him. So there is no need to review earlier decision.” 31. This caused delay in passing of the bill. However the disciplinary authority imposed only a minor punishment upon him. So there is no need to review earlier decision.” 31. A reading of Ext.P-10 order would thus indicate that the appellate authority has not given a minimal consideration of the various contentions urged by the appellant in Ext.P-9 appeal or in the parameters enumerated in Clauses '(a)' to '(e)' of Regulation 32(2) of the KSEB Regulations. A reading of Ext.P-9 appeal memorandum filed by the appellant would show that various grounds and contentions have been urged therein, more particularly in internal pages 2 & 3 thereof. Not even a minimal consideration has been bestowed by the appellate authority in Ext.P-10, so as to show that atleast brief reasons have been given by the appellate authority about the requisite satisfaction for the rejection of the appeal. Hence, we are of the firm view that the impugned Ext.P-10 appellate order would deserve interdiction at the hands of this Court and Ext.P-9 appeal is only to be remitted to the appellate authority concerned viz., the Chairman and the Managing Director of the 1st respondent KSEB for consideration and decision afresh. 32. The learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment in this WP(C) has clearly stated that the contentions of the petitioner that there is no minimal legally justifiable evidence on record in the disciplinary enquiry proceedings so as to connect the petitioner with the alleged charges are untenable. Further that the substance of the submissions of the petitioner is on the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence in that regard. After hearing both sides, we have no reason to disagree with the said findings in the impugned judgment in the WP(C). It is well established that it is beyond the realm of public law remedy to examine the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence in disciplinary proceedings. So those findings of the learned Single Judge are not in any manner interfered with. However, the appellant will be at liberty to raise submissions regarding the sufficiency of evidence, etc before the appellate authority in the appeal that is now remitted, as those matters are within the province of that authority. So those findings of the learned Single Judge are not in any manner interfered with. However, the appellant will be at liberty to raise submissions regarding the sufficiency of evidence, etc before the appellate authority in the appeal that is now remitted, as those matters are within the province of that authority. It is also made clear that it is open to the appellant to raise all contentions available in law to be raised in the above statutory appeal, other than on the matters decided by us herein above in this appeal. 33. We also make it clear that one of the cardinal contentions of the appellant that, even going by the case of the disciplinary authority, only a minor penalty was imposed and that therefore a penalty which is much lesser in gravity and impact than the one imposed as per Ext.P-8 should have been imposed inasmuch as, the penalty imposed as per Ext.P-8 which is in substance, a major penalty, etc is not decided by us, and that aspect of the matter should also be duly considered and decided by the appellate authority in the abovesaid remit. 34. Accordingly, it is ordered that the impugned Ext.P-10 appellate order will stand set aside and quashed. Ext.P-9 appeal will stand restored to the file of the appellate authority and will stand remitted to the said authority for consideration and decision afresh. The appellant is permitted to submit any additional submissions in the matter before the appellate authority, especially regarding the aforesaid contention that only a penalty lesser than the one imposed as per Ext.P-8 would have been imposed in this case, etc. The appellate authority will afford reasonable opportunity of being heard to the appellant either in person or through his authorised representative/counsel if any, if he chooses to do so, and then should advert to the various contentions raised by the appellant in Ext.P-9 appeal as well as the various contentions available to the appellant and urged before the appellate authority, and should also have due regard to the various parameters specifically enumerated as Clauses '(a)' to '(e)' of Regulation 32(2) of the KSEB Regulations and then should pass orders afresh on Ext.P-9 appeal without much delay, preferably within a period of 2 months, at any rate within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.25635/2015 will stand modified as above. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeal will stand finally disposed of.