JUDGMENT : Sangeet Lodha, J. 1. This intra-Court appeal is directed against order dated 23.7.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby while admitting the writ petition preferred by the respondent challenging the order terminating his services, the effect and operation of the order impugned has been stayed. 2. Learned counsel appearing for appellants submitted that the appellant Institution is not 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and thus, not amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology : (2002) 5 SCC 111 , Telefilms Ltd. vs. UOI : (2005) 4 SCC 649 and K.K. Saksena vs. ICID : (2015) 4 SCC 670 . Learned counsel submitted that while admitting the petition and granting the interim relief, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the appellants regarding availability of alternative remedy of appeal under Section 19(2) of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 ('the Act of 1989'), has not been considered and the decisions of the Supreme Court cited in support of the contention by the appellants have also not been taken note of by the learned Single Judge. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331, CIT vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 , Assistant Collector of Central Excise vs. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260 , Bharat Bhushan Sonaji Kshirsagar vs. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa, (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 593, Public Service Tribunal Bar Association vs. State of U.P. & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 104 and State of U.P. vs. Sandeep Kumar Balmiki, (2009) 17 SCC 555 , learned counsel submitted that in view of the availability of efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 19(2) of the Act of 1989, the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The impugned order, which stands stayed by the learned Single Judge, was given effect to six months back and thus, the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge granting final relief by way of interim relief is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned order, which stands stayed by the learned Single Judge, was given effect to six months back and thus, the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge granting final relief by way of interim relief is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs. Church South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1 . Learned counsel urged that the learned Single Judge has arrived at the final conclusions regarding merits of the case without considering the preliminary objections first, which is fundamentally without jurisdiction. In support of the contention, reliance is placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Manubhai J. Patel & Anr. vs. Bank of Baroda & Ors.: (2000) 10 SCC 253 . Learned counsel submitted that while terminating the services of the respondent, he was paid six months salary through account transfer which has been accepted by him and thus, he is precluded from assailing the legality of the termination order. 3. On the other hand, counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the appellant Institution is imparting education and thus, discharging public duty and therefore, it does fall within the definition of 'Other Authority' and thus, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. It is submitted that the availability of alternative remedy cannot operate as absolute bar against the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by this Court. Learned counsel submitted that where the order passed is found to be ex facie without jurisdiction or violative of fundamental rights, the writ petition can always be entertained by this Court. Drawing the attention of this Court to the order impugned, learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge prima facie found the order to be without jurisdiction and violative of fundamental rights and thus, the admission of the writ petition and grant of interim relief, as prayed for, cannot be faulted with so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of intra-Court appeal jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent, however, all of a sudden without conclusion of the inquiry, the services of the respondent have been terminated invoking clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent, however, all of a sudden without conclusion of the inquiry, the services of the respondent have been terminated invoking clause (iii) of second proviso to Section 18 of the Act of 1989. Learned counsel submitted that when the proceedings against the respondent is admittedly governed by the statute and thus, the question of appellant Institution which is discharging public duties, being not amenable to writ jurisdiction, does not arise. Learned counsel submitted that the writ petition is still pending consideration before the learned Single Judge and it is always open for the appellant Institution to raise all available grounds before the learned Single Judge and there is absolutely no reason why the intra-Court appeal should be entertained by this Court against an interim order. In support of the contentions aforesaid, learned counsel has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Janet Jeyapaul vs. SRM University & Ors., 2015 (16) SCC 530 , Unni Krishnan, J.P. & Ors. vs. State of A.P. & Ors., 1993 (1) SCC 645 , Rajkumar vs. Director of Education & Ors., 2016 (6) SCC 541 , Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Ors. vs. U.O.I. & Ors., 2005 (4) SCC 649 , Marwari Balika Vidyalaya vs. Asha Shrivastava & Ors., Mariamma Roy vs. Indian Bank & Ors., 2009 (16) SCC 187 , Satwati Deswal vs. State of Haryana & Ors., 2010 (1) SCC 126 , Maharashtra Chess Association vs. U.O.I. & Ors. and Anoop Jaiswal vs. Government of India & Ors., 1984 (2) SCC 369 . 4. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 5. A perusal of the order impugned reveals that while admitting the petition and granting interim relief, the learned Single Judge has noticed the rival contentions including the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the appellant and expressed his prima facie opinion in the following terms: "17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the prima-facie opinion that the respondents' action is arbitrary and vindictive. Indisputably, the enquiry was pending and there was no compelling reason, requiring the respondent Society to take such an extreme action of terminating the petitioner, practically for the same reason, for which the enquiry officer was seized of the matter. 18. Indisputably, the enquiry was pending and there was no compelling reason, requiring the respondent Society to take such an extreme action of terminating the petitioner, practically for the same reason, for which the enquiry officer was seized of the matter. 18. That apart, prior approval of the Director (Education), which is precursor for taking action under Section 18 of the Act of 1989 read with Rule 39(h)(iii) of the Rules of 1993 is totally absent. 19. That being the position, the petitioner has made out a case worth interference by this Court in its extra ordinary jurisdiction. Violation of fundamental right is writ large and the order has been shown to be void ab-initio, having as the same has been issued without prior consent of the Director. 20. Hence, admit. Issue notice. Mr. Kamal Dave, learned counsel accepts notices on behalf of respondent No. 3 to 7. He seeks time to file reply to the writ petition. Time prayed for is allowed. Let notices be issued to respondent No. 1 and 2 only, returnable within a period of three weeks. 21. The order of termination of petitioner was passed six months ago, however, considering the fact that he had preferred the present writ petition (13.01.2020) immediately after he was served with the order of termination dated 06.01.2020 and the matter remained pending for consideration of stay application, which could not be taken up for consideration due to COVID-19, this Court feels that merely because six months have passed since petitioner was terminated, he cannot be denied the relief to which he is otherwise entitled to. 22. In view of the facts noticed above and in light of the discussion aforesaid, considering it appropriate, expedient and in the interest of justice, this Court hereby stay effect and operation of the order dated 06.01.2020 (Annexure-20)." 6. The learned Single Judge has not specifically over-ruled the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the appellant after due consideration. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while considering prima facie case in favour of the respondent also cannot be considered to be conclusive. It is true that the petition has been admitted but the admission of the petition and grant of interim relief does not preclude the appellant from pressing the preliminary objections raised at the time of hearing of the matter. It is true that the petition has been admitted but the admission of the petition and grant of interim relief does not preclude the appellant from pressing the preliminary objections raised at the time of hearing of the matter. This aspect of the matter stands settled by a decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. & Ors. vs. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam S.S. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC, 675, wherein the Court while considering the said issue, observed: "38. With respect to the learned Judge, it is neither the legal position nor such a proposition has been laid down in Suresh Chandra Tewari that once a petition is admitted, it cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It is no doubt correct that in the head-note of All India Reporter (p. 331), it is stated that "petition cannot be rejected on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal". But it has not been so held in the actual decision of the Court. The relevant para 2 of the decision reads thus: (Suresh Chandra Tewari case, AIR p. 331) "2. At the time of hearing of this petition a threshold question, as to its maintainability was raised on the ground that the impugned order was an appealable one and, therefore, before approaching this Court the petitioner should have approached the appellate authority. Though there is much substance in the above contention, we do not feel inclined to reject this petition on the ground of alternative remedy having regard to the fact that the petition has been entertained and an interim order passed." (emphasis supplied) Even otherwise, the learned Judge was not right in law. True it is that issuance of rule nisi or passing of interim orders is a relevant consideration for not dismissing a petition if it appears to the High Court that the matter could be decided by a writ-Court. It has been so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ-petition is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. It has been so held even by this Court in several cases that even if alternative remedy is available, it cannot be held that a writ-petition is not maintainable. In our judgment, however, it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that once a petition is admitted, it could never be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. If such bald contention is upheld, even this Court cannot order dismissal of a writ petition which ought not to have been entertained by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of availability of alternative and equally efficacious remedy to the aggrieved party, once the High Court has entertained a writ-petition albeit wrongly and granted the relief to the petitioner." (emphasis added) 7. It is noticed that while raising the preliminary objections, the appellant has not filed reply to the writ petition before the learned Single Judge as yet. Further, while granting the interim relief, the stay petition has also not been disposed of by the learned Single Judge and thus, after filing a reply to the writ petition, it is open for the appellant to make submissions for vacating the interim order at the time of consideration of the stay petition, which remains pending consideration. The appellant is also not precluded from making an application for vacating the interim order before the learned Single Judge, if so advised. 8. For the aforementioned reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the order impugned in exercise of intra-Court appeal jurisdiction. 9. The appeal is therefore, dismissed with the observations as above.