Venkatesh S/o late Magadaiah v. Aladalaiah S/o late Magadaiah
2021-02-16
E.S.INDIRESH
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : This second appeal is preferred by the defendant in O.S No.765/2007 on the file of III Additional Civil Judge and JMFC at Tumakuru whereby suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed, and aggrieved by the same, the defendant has filed RA No.16/2015 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Tumakuru whereby the First Appellate Court by judgment and decree dated 30.11.2019 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 03.02.2015 in O.S No.765/2007 passed by the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the defendant has filed second appeal. 2. For the sake of convenience, parties in this appeal are referred to as per their status before the trial Court. 3. The suit is filed by the plaintiff for relief of declaration in respect of suit schedule property and claiming right in respect of suit schedule property based on the registered sale deed dated 20.12.2000 executed by H.R.Subba Rao in favour of the plaintiff and pursuant to the same revenue records have been mutated in favour of the plaintiff, thus, exercising rights insofar as suit schedule property. It is further stated in the plaint that the defendant has no right, title and interest insofar as suit schedule property is concerned and interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff has filed O.S No.765/2007 on the file of III Additional Civil Judge and JMFC at Tumakuru. The defendant has entered appearance and filed detailed written statement denying the plaint averments. It is the case of the defendant that the plaintiff and defendant are brothers and his father Magadaiah had seven children and plaintiff was Karta of the joint family and thereby, property has been purchased/acquired out of the joint family nucleus and thereby suit deserves to be dismissed. 4. The trial Court after considering the pleadings on record has formulated the issues for its consideration. In order to prove the case, plaintiff got examined as PW1 and examined two more witnesses as PW2 and PW3 and also produced five documents and same were marked as Exs.P1 to P5. The defendant was examined as DW1 and he has also examined one witness as DW2 and got marked documents as per Exs.D1 to 17. 5.
In order to prove the case, plaintiff got examined as PW1 and examined two more witnesses as PW2 and PW3 and also produced five documents and same were marked as Exs.P1 to P5. The defendant was examined as DW1 and he has also examined one witness as DW2 and got marked documents as per Exs.D1 to 17. 5. The trial Court after considering the material on record and oral and documentary evidence produced by the parties, by its judgment and decree dated 03.05.2015, decreed the suit of the plaintiff and thereby, ordered that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of suit schedule property and directed the defendant to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the suit schedule property. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, defendant has preferred appeal in R.A No.16/2015 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Tumakuru and the said appeal was resisted by the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court after re-appreciating the material on record, by its judgment and decree dated 30.11.2019 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Courts below, the defendant has preferred this appeal. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is the submission of Sri.Avin Tippanna, learned counsel for the appellant that the schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff out of the family nucleus and therefore, the schedule property is the joint family property of the plaintiff and defendant. He further contended that the trial Court has not framed proper issue insofar as burden of proof in respect of possession of suit schedule property and therefore, he contended that the both the Courts below have erred in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 7. Per contra, Sri.Umakanth, learned counsel for respondent justifies the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below. 8. I have perused the finding recorded by the Courts below as well as submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The perusal of the finding recorded by the trial Court would clearly indicate that the suit schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff by way of registered sale deed dated 20.12.2000 executed by on H.R.Subba Rao for valuable consideration and pursuant to the same mutation entries have been made in favour of the plaintiff.
The perusal of the finding recorded by the trial Court would clearly indicate that the suit schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff by way of registered sale deed dated 20.12.2000 executed by on H.R.Subba Rao for valuable consideration and pursuant to the same mutation entries have been made in favour of the plaintiff. However, in view of the interference made by the defendant who is none other than brother of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for declaration and consequential relief of permanent injunction against the defendant. The trial Court, after considering the fact that as per Ex.P5 which is registered sale deed dated 20.12.2000, held that the plaintiff has purchased suit schedule property from one H.R.Subba Rao, and arrived at a conclusion that the said property is self acquired property of the plaintiff and in this regard in his deposition DW1 admits as follows: The perusal of the admission made by defendant/appellant herein would clearly establish the fact that plaintiff and defendant have no joint family properties and in that view of the matter, the contention raised by the learned counsel for defendant that suit schedule property had been acquired by the plaintiff as per Ex.P5 is out of the joint family nucleus, is without any basis, and in this regard, the finding recorded by the trial Court is just and proper which requires no interference by this Court. I have also considered the finding recorded by the trial Court with regard to issue Nos.2 and 3 whereunder the trial Court, after considering the material on record, has arrived at a conclusion that the defendant alleged to have been considered to be as tenant as averred in the written statement however in view of the execution of the sale deed dated 20.12.2000 by H.R.Subba Rao in favour of the plaintiff herein and in view of the admission made by the defendant that there was no joint family funds for acquisition of the said property and in that view of the matter, the finding recorded by the trial Court is just and proper in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff.
I have considered the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court, whereunder the First Appellate Court has considered the factual aspect of the case on record and in view of the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court at paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment whereunder it has come to a conclusion that the defendant has failed to prove the fact that the income of the joint family was not proved with regard to purchase of the property by the plaintiff and further, the admission made by defendant would clearly establish the case that the plaintiff and defendant are residing separately and in that view of the matter, I do not find any material irregularity committed by the First Appellate Court in considering the case of the plaintiff in view of well-reasoned judgment by the Trial Court adverting to all the contentions raised by the parties and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff based on the sale deed Ex.P5 as well as admission made by DW1. I do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Accordingly, appeal is rejected. 9. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of LAXMIDEVAMMA AND OTHERS v. RANGANATH AND OTHERS reported in (2015) 4 SCC 264 , whereunder at paragraphs 13 and 16 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “13. Based upon oral and documentary evidences, the courts below have recorded concurrent findings that the plaintiffs are the owners of 'A' schedule property. While so, the High Court ignoring the material evidence, erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. … *** *** 16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs have established their right in 'A' schedule property. In the light of concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the 'A' schedule property for road and that she could not have full fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to plaintiffs' right cannot be granted.
While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the 'A' schedule property for road and that she could not have full fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C., concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” In the case of THULASIDHARA AND ANOTHER v. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS reported in (2019) 6 SCC 409 , at paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus: “7.2 As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 , in the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous being: (i) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; OR (ii) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court; OR (iii) Based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. It is further observed by this Court in the aforesaid decision that if First Appellate Court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in Second Appeal. It is further observed that the Trial Court could have decided differently is not a question of law justifying interference in Second Appeal. 7.3 When a substantial question of law can be said to have arisen, has been dealt with and considered by this Court in the case of Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434 . In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: 10. Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. 11.
In the aforesaid decision, this Court has specifically observed and held: 10. Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. 11. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. 12. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. 13. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. SUBRAMANIAN v S RAMASAMY ETC. reported in AIR 2019 SCC 3056, at paragraphs 8.1, 8.2 and 8.5 of the judgment, has observed thus: “8.1. …As per catena of decisions of this Court, while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court is not required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and to come to its own conclusion and the High Court cannot set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below when the findings recorded by both the Courts below were on appreciation of evidence. That is exactly what is done by the High Court in the present case while deciding the second appeals, which is not permissible under the law. 8.2 Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that as per catena of decisions of this Court and even as provided under Section 100 of the CPC, the Second Appeal would be maintainable only on substantial question of law. The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.
The Second Appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. The existence of ‘a substantial question of law’ is a sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. As observed and held by this Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam, in a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court, unless it finds that the conclusions drawn by the lower Court were erroneous…. *** *** *** 8.5 As observed hereinabove, while passing the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has re-appreciated the entire evidence on record as if the High Court was deciding the first appeal. By the impugned Judgment and Order, while exercising the powers under Section 100 of the CPC and on re appreciation of entire evidence on record, the High Court has set aside the findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below on blending of the suit properties with the joint family properties. The same is wholly impermissible. So far as the facts are concerned, the First Appellate Court is the final court and unless and until the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below are found to be manifestly perverse and/or contrary to the evidence on record, the High Court would not be justified in setting aside the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. It is not permissible for the High Court to re appreciate the entire evidence on record and come to its own finding when the findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the High Court while deciding the Second Appeals, is beyond the scope and ambit of exercise of its powers under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. High Court to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and come to its own finding when the findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on appreciation of evidence.
High Court to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and come to its own finding when the findings recorded by the Courts below, more particularly, the First Appellate Court are on appreciation of evidence. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the High Court while deciding the Second Appeals, is beyond the scope and ambit of exercise of its powers under Section 100 of the CPC.” Since the appellant has not made out a case for formulation of substantial question of law as is required under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure., the appeal stands dismissed at the stage of admission itself.