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2021 DIGILAW 268 (AP)

L. v. Subba Reddy Petrol Bunk VS Indian Oil Corporation Limited

2021-04-20

U.DURGA PRASAD RAO

body2021
ORDER : It is a remand matter. In W.A.No.107/2020, a Division Bench of this Court passed order on 21.08.2020 as follows: “11. In view of foregoing considerations, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set-aside. On filing a detailed reply by the respondent to the contentions as advanced, the learned Single Judge shall hear and decide the Writ Petition as per Law. While disposing appeal, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the case, however, learned Single Judge may decide it as per own wisdom. The finding recorded herein above is only to consider the dismissal of the Writ Petition for want of having an efficacious alternative remedy, and not to the merits. 12. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is allowed and disposed of restoring W.P.No.41129 of 2018 to its file. On restoration, Writ Petition be placed for hearing before appropriate Single Judge as per roster” That is how the W.P.No.41129/2018 which was dismissed by a learned single Judge of this Court vide order dated 01.11.2019 has been restored to file for fresh consideration. 2. In W.P.No.41129/2018, the petitioner challenged the termination order dated 09.10.2018 passed by 2nd respondent terminating the dealership of retail outlet held by the petitioner. The petitioner was a dealer of the 1st respondent company from 1968 and his dealership agreement was renewed from time-to-time and the last renewal was made on 09.10.2015 valid up to 2030. 3. According to the petitioner, the three dispensing units installed at his filling centre for supply of petrol and diesel were giving constant trouble since 2016 and as per the terms of the agreement, the petitioner used to give complaints but they were not attended properly. It was elaborately stated in paragraph Nos.4 to 9 of the writ petition affidavit as to how many times the petitioner used to make complaints about faulty functioning of the dispensing units and the visit of Engineers of the respondent Corporation and their finding the variation in the stock etc. without rectifying the defects etc. It was elaborately stated in paragraph Nos.4 to 9 of the writ petition affidavit as to how many times the petitioner used to make complaints about faulty functioning of the dispensing units and the visit of Engineers of the respondent Corporation and their finding the variation in the stock etc. without rectifying the defects etc. (a) While so, the further case of the petitioner is that on 14.06.2018 some of the officials of the respondent Corporation visited the retail outlet of the petitioner during his absence and sealed the pumps and stocks and called him to the outlet and on his visit they obtained his signatures on the inspection report as if he was present at the time of inspection. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 18.06.2018 clearly stating therein that the respondent officials were not evincing interest in rectifying/repairing the faulty DUs and they have also not resumed supplies to retail outlets and requested them to supply the oil. (b) As against the said letter, the respondent issued a letter dated 10.07.2018 stating that they received a complaint that despite suspension of supplies to his R.O., the petitioner procured some products from some unauthorised stores and sold them to general public without any authorisation from the respondent Corporation. It was further stated that to investigate the complaint a team of officers from Vijayawada D.O. visited the petitioner outlet on 14.06.2018 and observed what transpired there and called for the explanation. The petitioner denied having procured the products unauthorizedly and sold them in his outlet. The petitioner submitted an explanation dated 18.07.2018 and when there was no restoration of supplies, he filed W.P.No.27451/2018. The writ petition was disposed of on 07.09.2018 directing the respondent to consider the explanation and pass orders on merits. (c) The petitioner’s grievance is that despite the said order, his representations were not considered. Therefore, the petitioner visited the office of 2nd respondent on 03.10.2018 to enquire about the same. The respondents informed him that as per the directions of Hon’ble High Court, they fixed the hearing to that date i.e., 03.10.2018 and asked him certain general questions which he replied negatively. Though the authorities tried to convince him to admit the allegations, he did not do so. The respondents informed him that as per the directions of Hon’ble High Court, they fixed the hearing to that date i.e., 03.10.2018 and asked him certain general questions which he replied negatively. Though the authorities tried to convince him to admit the allegations, he did not do so. Thereupon the officials have furnished him a copy of the test report results submitted by the Vijayawada Terminal Laboratory, IOCL, Kondapally and obtained his signatures on papers stating that they would communicate the decision in due course. The said hearing was held by the Executive Director of the respondent Corporation. The petitioner was hoping that a further date would be given for enquiry, as the test reports were given to him only on 03.10.2018 so that in the meanwhile, he can discuss with his partners about the test report results and submit his explanation on the next date of hearing. However, the 2nd respondent passed impugned order date 09.10.2018 terminating the dealership of the petitioner which was forcibly served on the petitioner on the mid-night of 10.10.2018. The order reads as if the petitioner admitted his guilt which is palpably false. Had the petitioner admitted the guilt during the alleged enquiry on 03.10.2018, he would not have fought tooth and nail right from inception. (d) Further case of the petitioner is that on 03.10.2018 before the Executive Director, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh State Office (TAPSO) who heard the matter, the 2nd respondent along with the Sales Team was present to represent the case of the Corporation. Thus the 2nd respondent attended as one of the representatives of the respondent Corporation. However, the impugned order dated 09.10.2018 was passed by the 2nd respondent himself, which is legally unjust ant it amounts to violation of Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2012 (for short ‘MDG’) as amended with effect from 3.8.2018. (e) On the above main grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed to allow the writ petition. 4. Respondents filed a detailed counter denying the petition averments and inter alia contending thus: a) M/s. L.V. Subba Reddy petrol bunk is a partnership firm consisting of two partners i.e., Mr. M. Nageswara Rao (51% equity) and Mr. K. Prabhakar (49% equity) and the petrol pump was originally allotted to one Mr. L.V. Subba Reddy in the year 1968. Parties entered into Dealership Agreement dated 09.10.2015 in terms of the MDG applicable to RO dealerships. M. Nageswara Rao (51% equity) and Mr. K. Prabhakar (49% equity) and the petrol pump was originally allotted to one Mr. L.V. Subba Reddy in the year 1968. Parties entered into Dealership Agreement dated 09.10.2015 in terms of the MDG applicable to RO dealerships. As per Clause-8.2(vi) of MDG, unauthorised purchase and sale of products is a Critical Irregularity and consequent action that can be taken is termination of RO Dealership Agreement. Similarly, clause 8.3(iv) of MDG provides that stock variation beyond permissible limits is a major irregularity against which, suspension of sales and supplies can be ordered. b) While so, on 10.08.2017 Anti Adulteration Cell of IOCL (for short ‘AAC’) of respondent Corporation inspected the subject RO and found the following irregularities. (i) Positive stock variation of Xtrapremium MS beyond the permissible limit (+42702 litres). (ii) Positive stock variation of high speed diesel beyond permissible limits (+7723). (iii) The metering units seal (A1) of GVR dual pump (provided for XP MS) was found broken. Since the above positive stock variation is a major irregularity as per clause 8.3 of MDG, all supplies to petitioner’s RO were suspended from 10.08.2017 pending enquiry and investigation. A notice dated 05.09.2017 was issued by IOCL asking the petitioner to explain the major irregularity, for which, he submitted his reply dated 20.09.2017. c) When the supplies to RO were under suspension, the respondent Corporation received a complaint dated 06.06.2018 from a third party that since the last five (5) months, the petitioner had been selling HPCL fuel in the IOCL RO. Immediately, the officials of IOCL conducted an inspection on 14.06.2018 in the presence of K. Prabhakara Rao, one of the partners and found several irregularities including tampering and breaking of meter unit seals, dispensing of fuel through one DU in spite of expiry of calibration certificate by 02.06.2018 and operation of one DU without producing the calibration certificate. It was also found that the product was being sold regularly post 10.08.2017. K. Prabhakara Rao signed on the inspection report dated 14.06.2018. Thus, in the inspection, it was found that several breaches were committed during the period of suspension which resulted in unauthorised purchase and sale of fuel not supplied by the IOCL and therefore, the act of the petitioner’s RO was a critical irregularity. K. Prabhakara Rao signed on the inspection report dated 14.06.2018. Thus, in the inspection, it was found that several breaches were committed during the period of suspension which resulted in unauthorised purchase and sale of fuel not supplied by the IOCL and therefore, the act of the petitioner’s RO was a critical irregularity. Subsequently, a letter dated 10.07.2018 was issued to the petitioner to submit explanation for the irregularities found during the inspection dated 14.06.2018. The petitioner submitted explanation dated 18.07.2018 and a supplementary explanation dated 26.07.2018. d) While so, apprehending that action would be initiated against his illegal activities, the petitioner filed W.P.No.27451 of 2018 and this Court in its order dated 07.09.2018 directed the respondent Corporation to consider the explanations dated 20.09.2017, 18.07.2018 and 26.07.2018 to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. Pursuant to the said order, the respondent Corporation heard the petitioner on 03.10.2018. During the said hearing by the Executive Director, the petitioner himself agreed that he procured unauthorised products and sold it to his customers. It is false to say that the respondent tried to convince the petitioner to admit the allegations. On the other hand, the petitioner himself admitted the guilt of procuring products and selling unauthorizedly. After considering his replies, the RO dealership agreement of the petitioner was terminated vide impugned order dated 09.10.2018. The respondents, thus, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. It should be noted that earlier, learned single Judge of this Court heard the matter and passed an order dated 01.11.2019. Learned Judge on perusal of the record observed that the contentions raised by the petitioner vide his explanations dated 18.7.2018 and 26.7.2018 were considered and answered and the matter was disposed of by the respondent authorities. Learned Judge further observed that the additional document that was filed along with I.A.No.1/2019 would clearly show that the deponent of the affidavit was present and had admitted his guilt. The proceedings dated 3.10.2018, in the opinion of learned Judge, would show that the deponent had admitted his guilt and the contrary argument of the petitioner if were to be considered in detail, it would amount Court entering into disputed question of fact which is not permissible under law. The proceedings dated 3.10.2018, in the opinion of learned Judge, would show that the deponent had admitted his guilt and the contrary argument of the petitioner if were to be considered in detail, it would amount Court entering into disputed question of fact which is not permissible under law. Learned Judge thus came to conclusion that the petitioner admitted his wrong doings on 3.10.2018 and he did not find any reason to believe that no meeting at all took place on 3.10.2018 or that petitioner was misguided in signing the said document. In addition to above, learned Judge also observed that there is an appeal provision against the impugned order before the appellate authority consisting three members namely, 1) Retired High Court Judge, (2) a retired Government servant not below the rank of Joint Secretary, and 3) a retired Officer of PSU Oil Marketing Company and in view of the availability of efficacious and alternative remedy namely the appeal forum, the court was precluded from going into the merits and demerits of the impugned order as the issues raised by the petitioner were in the realm of fact finding and require detailed evidence and the same was not permissible in a writ proceeding. However, at the same time, learned Judge observed that a reading of the impugned order showed that contentions raised by the petitioner were also considered and hence, on merits also there was no reason to interfere as there were sufficient grounds to lead to the decision. 6. As stated supra, the petitioner preferred Writ Appeal No.107/2020 wherein a Division Bench of this Court observed that the impugned order was passed by respondent No.2 who has participated in the enquiry representing the Oil Company although in the previous round of litigation, a direction was issued to decide the representation by the Executive Director. In that view of the matter, the plea taken by the respondent Corporation that an efficacious and alternative remedy is available to the petitioner is not primarily sustainable. The Division Bench accordingly set aside the order of the learned single Judge and directed that the matter shall be heard and decided as per law. 7. In that view of the matter, the plea taken by the respondent Corporation that an efficacious and alternative remedy is available to the petitioner is not primarily sustainable. The Division Bench accordingly set aside the order of the learned single Judge and directed that the matter shall be heard and decided as per law. 7. In the above context, this Court again heard arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner Sri C.V.R. Rudra Prasad and learned standing counsel for the respondents Sri Sai Sanjay Suraneni, both of whom have reiterated their arguments in tune with their pleadings. 8. The point for consideration is, whether the impugned order of termination passed by the 2nd respondent is factually and legally sustainable? 9. POINT: As can be seen, the Corporation levelled two main allegations against the petitioner. Firstly that during the inspection by Anti-Adulteration Cell of IOCL on 10.08.2017, the authorities found variation of the stock beyond the permissible limit in the RO of the petitioner which was considered as a major irregularity. Therefore, all the supplies to the said RO was suspended from 10.08.2017 and a notice dated 5.9.2017 was issued calling for his explanation and the petitioner submitted his reply dated 20.09.2017. Secondly, when the above issue was pending on 6.6.2018 a complaint was received from a third party that since five months the petitioner was selling HPCL fuel in the IOCL RO unauthorisedly. Therefore, the authorities conducted inspection on 14.6.2018 in the presence of K. Prabhakar Rao one of the partners and during the course of inspection, the authorities found several irregularities including tampering and breaking of meter units seals, one DU dispensing fuel in spite of expiry of calibration certificate and another DU was functioning without having calibration certificate and some other irregularities like the products were being sold regularly post 10.8.2017. K. Prabhakar Rao signed on the inspection report dated 14.6.2018. The authorities considered the unauthorised sales in the retail outlet by procuring fuel from outside as a critical irregularity and issued notice dated 10.7.2018 calling for explanation and the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 18.7.2018 and supplementary explanation dated 26.7.2018. Therefore, the aforesaid allegations and corresponding explanations submitted by the petitioner were the subject matter of enquiry on 3.10.2018. Inter alia, the enquiry was conducted also in view of the order dated 7.9.2018 passed by the combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P.No.27451/2018. Therefore, the aforesaid allegations and corresponding explanations submitted by the petitioner were the subject matter of enquiry on 3.10.2018. Inter alia, the enquiry was conducted also in view of the order dated 7.9.2018 passed by the combined High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.P.No.27451/2018. It should be noted that the aforesaid writ petition was filed by the petitioner on the ground that the respondents were not restoring the supply of fuel to his RO since 10.8.2017. The order in the said writ petition is germane for our consideration and hence extracted below: “In view of the same, the Approving Authority/Competent Authority is directed to consider the explanation of the petitioner and take action as per the Marketing Discipline Guidelines within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As far as irregularities found in the inspection conducted on 14.06.2018 are concerned, since the petitioner submitted reply dated 18.7.2018 and also supplementary reply dated 26.7.2018 to the notice dated 10.7.2018 issued by the respondent authorities, respondent authorities are directed to consider the same and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It is needless to say that the competent authority should also take into consideration the explanation of the petitioner dated 20.9.2017 in pursuance to the notice dated 5.9.2017. Till passing of the orders on the explanation of the petitioner by the competent authority, the interim order granted by this Court on 3.8.2018 shall operate.” Thus, the above order reads that the Approving Authority/Competent Authority shall consider the explanations submitted by the petitioner and pass appropriate orders. Be that it may, Clause 8.8 of Marketing Discipline Guidelines (MDG) 2012 specifies the authority who is competent to approve the different action to be taken against the different kinds of irregularities. It reads thus: “i) The action of termination and all other critical irregularities will be approved by Regional head/State head /Zonal head of the concerned all company (General Manager and above). However, in respect of SC/ST category dealerships termination will be approved by the Director (Marketing) HQ. ii) In respect of major irregularities, the approving authority would be an authorised officer not below the rank of Dy.General Manager at State/Region/Zonal level. (iii) In respect of minor irregularities the approving authority would be the head of Territory/Regional/Divisional Office. However, in respect of SC/ST category dealerships termination will be approved by the Director (Marketing) HQ. ii) In respect of major irregularities, the approving authority would be an authorised officer not below the rank of Dy.General Manager at State/Region/Zonal level. (iii) In respect of minor irregularities the approving authority would be the head of Territory/Regional/Divisional Office. Thus, the above clause pellucidly tells that the action of termination against critical irregularities has to be approved by Regional Head/State Head/Zonal Head of the Oil Company (General Manager and above) and in respect of SC/ST category dealerships, the termination has to be approved by the Director (Marketing) HQ. In the instant case, perusal of the impugned termination order dated 9.10.2018 shows that it was passed by the 2nd respondent who is the Chief Divisional Retail Sales Manager of IOCL. In my considered view, for two main reasons, the said termination order is legally unsustainable. Firstly, for the reason that the action of termination for critical irregularities has to be approved by Regional Head/State Head/Zonal Head of the concerned Oil Company (General Manager and above), as stipulated in Clause 8.8 of MDG. However, the impugned termination order is totally silent as to any such approval for action of termination was made by the Regional Head/State Head/Zonal Head of the Oil Company (General Manager and above). The order simply reads that it was passed by the 2nd respondent in the capacity of Chief Divisional Retail Sales Manager for IOCL. No doubt, it is argued on behalf of the respondents that approval was obtained from concerned authority. However, more than the assertion of the respondents, manifestation of such approval shall be borne by the record, in view of the fact that the action taken was grave one of termination. In my considered view, the stamp of approval by a higher authority as stipulated in Clause 8.8 is not an empty formality. On the other hand, the Approving Authority has to consider the nature of irregularity alleged, material relied upon by the Corporation to sustain the allegation, and also the mitigating circumstances if any, and then decide by applying his wisdom and authority as to whether the termination is an appropriate measure or not. Thus, the remarks of the approving authority also signify that due procedure was followed by the enquiry authority. Since such approval is conspicuously absent, the termination order is unsustainable. Thus, the remarks of the approving authority also signify that due procedure was followed by the enquiry authority. Since such approval is conspicuously absent, the termination order is unsustainable. The second reason is that in para 16 of the writ affidavit, it was the specific contention of the petitioner that during the enquiry held on 3.10.2018 before the Executive Director, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh State Office (TAPSO), the 2nd respondent along with the sales team was present and he represented the case of Corporation before the said authority. As such, the 2nd respondent is not competent to pass the impugned order. The respondent, in para No.20 of its counter, though in a general manner denied the averments in para 16 of the writ petition, however did not specifically deny the averment that on 3.10.2018, the 2nd respondent represented the case of Oil Company before the Executive Director. TAPSO. What is sought to be explained in para 20 is that the 2nd respondent, as if took the approval of the Executive Director, TAPSO, to terminate the dealership of the petitioner. It is already observed that such an approval is not manifested in the termination order. Hence, it can only be held that the order was passed by the 2nd respondent without any approval. More so, when he represented the case of IOCL before the Executive Director like a presenting officer in a Departmental enquiry, the final order of termination bearing his signature can be regarded as illegal and procedurally irregular. So, for these reasons, the impugned termination order is unsustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. 10. In the result, the impugned termination order dated 9.10.2018 passed by the 2nd respondent is set aside with a direction to the respondents to conduct a fresh enquiry through Competent authority by considering the explanations submitted by the petitioner and by affording personal hearing to the petitioner and to pass appropriate order in accordance with Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2012 in terms of the order in W.P.No.27451/2018, expeditiously but not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Till such exercise is completed, the respondent authorities shall not take any coercive steps against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned termination order dated 9.10.2018. This writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned above. There shall be no order as to costs. Till such exercise is completed, the respondent authorities shall not take any coercive steps against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned termination order dated 9.10.2018. This writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned above. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.