JUDGMENT : (Prayer in WP.No.3323 of 2020: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to direct the respondents to compute and pay to the petitioners for acquisition of their lands measuring 4000 sq.mts., in Survey No.44/1B, Annathanapatti Village covered under Award of the 6th respondent dated 27.06.2008 in R.O.C.No,1299/2008 (A2) as modified by the arbitral award of the 5th respondent dated 08.11.2012 in NH.No.47 Aa.Va.No.554/B2, the benefits under Section 23(1A), 23(2), and the proviso to Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. WP.Nos.697, 701, 716, 721, 722, 724, 725, 733, 744, 746, 747, 748, 980, 983, 985 of 2021 : Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents herein to pay solatium amount at 30% as per Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and an additional amount at 12% as per Section 23(1-A) of the said Act, 1894 from the date of notification under Section 3A(1) of National Highways Act, 1956, to the date of award for the compensation amount as enhanced by the first respondent i.e., 369.42 per sq.mtr., 180.06 per sq.mtr., together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum for one year from the date of possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of realization as per Section 28 of the said Act, 1894 for the said enhanced compensation, solatium and additional market value in respect of the petitioner’s land situated at Pappinaickenpatti Village, Namakkal Taluk and District, comprised in Survey Nos.3/6, 10/1, 33/3B, 33/3C, 34/1G2, 1/3A2B3, 3/1B1, 34/3B2B2, 4/1E, 80/8, 8/1B3, 128/1, 130/3E1, 3/5, 4/1A, 4/1C, 3/7A, 80/6B, 80/7, 80/6A, 80/5, 130/2A, 130/1B, acquired for the purpose of widening four lane of National Highways No.7 in line with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 12.08.2020, 18.08.2020 respectively and to pass orders. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 12.08.2020, 18.08.2020 respectively and to pass orders. WP.Nos.2774, 2779, 2782, 2787, 2798, 2802, 2804, 2806, 2808, 2809, 2818, 2821, 2824, 2826, 2827, 3031, 3052, 3054, 3055, 3058,3060, 3062, 3063, 3065, 3067, 3264, 3265, 3267, 3270, 3272, 3273, 3275, 3277, 3278, 3279, 3599, 3600, 3610, 3612, 3614, 3618, 3621, 3626, 3630, 3632, 3635, 3638, 3640, 3643, 3646, 3649, 3651, 3654 of 2021 : Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents herein to pay solatium amount at 30% as per Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and an additional amount at 12% as per Section 23(1-A) of the said Act, 1894 from the date of notification under Section 3A(1) of National Highways Act, 1956, to the date of award for the compensation amount as enhanced by the first respondent i.e., 122.25 per sq.mtr., for Phase-I and 323.07 per sq.mtr., for Phase-II respectively together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum for one year from the date of possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of realization as per Section 28 of the said Act, 1894 for the said enhanced compensation, solatium and additional market value in respect of the petitioner’s land situated at Sellappampatti Village, Namakkal Taluk and District, comprised in Survey Nos.137/4B1, 137/2C1, 139/2AD, 105/3A, 21/5, 21/8F, 78/1C, 21/8A, 137/4B3, 105/3A, 58/2D, 75/2B1, 104/3A, 75/2B2, 75/1B, 109/4, 78/1D, 107/1C, 107/1D1, 107/2A, 107/2C1, 107/2B1, 108/2, 78/1B, 137/4C, 137/6B, 65/5, 104/2A, 109/4, 139/2A2, 139/2B, 139/2C3, 107/1F3, 107/2D, 107/2E, 65/5, 104/3A, 65/5, 137/5A, 137/2D1, 105/3E, 71/8B, 104/2G, 87/3, 87/2, 68/2B, 104/3B, 71/8A, 105/3A, 21/1A, 21/8B, 105/3A, 109/2, 109/1B, 109/1K, 109/3A, 109/3C, 139/2AE, 139/2P, 139/2AC2, 139/2A1, 139/2C3, 69/2A2, 69/2B2, 103/2B, 75/1B, 65/5, 142/3A, 142/3C, 73/6, 73/5C, 75/2A, 75/3, 69/1, 71/5, 59/6B, 71/1, 65/4B, 71/2, 71/3, 71/4, 73/7A acquired for the purpose of widening four lane of National Highways No.7 in line with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 10.08.2020 and to pass orders.) 1. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 10.08.2020 and to pass orders.) 1. The short point involved in this batch of 69 petitions concerns the entitlement of the petitioners to solatium and interest on the compensation paid to them for the acquisition of their lands under the provisions of National Highways Act (henceforth would be referred to as the Act). A Note on Legislative History: 2. A travel through the lane of legislative history may help capturing the setting in which the petitioners rest their cause for the present action. On 24-01-1997, the President of India promulgated the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1997 by which Sections 3-A to 3-J were inserted into the National Highways Act, 1956. These provisions provide for a mechanism for speedy acquisition of land for the construction of national highways and also for a speedier resolution of disputes relating to determination of compensation through a mechanism of statutory arbitration as contemplated in Section 3-G of the Act. Sec.3-G (7) of the Act sets out the relevant criteria which the arbitrator must take into account in determining the compensation under the Act. Section 3G(7) roughly corresponds to Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 3-J, which, as would be seen has become the epicentre of the present lis, specifically declared that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would apply to an acquisition under the National Highways Act, 1956. As Sec. 3G(7) imported only the elements of Section 23(1) of the L.A Act for determination of compensation, Sec. 3-J had the effect of excluding the benefit of the additional compensation under Section 23 (2) statutorily computed at 30% of the market value (commonly known as ‘solatium’, and hence would be referred to as such in this order) and interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. The ordinance was replaced by the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 (Act 16 of 1997). This position continued till 01.01.2015 when the Right to Fair Compensation & Transparency in Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 made solatium and interest payable for acquisitions under the National Highways Act as well (vide Sec. 105). The ordinance was replaced by the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 (Act 16 of 1997). This position continued till 01.01.2015 when the Right to Fair Compensation & Transparency in Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 made solatium and interest payable for acquisitions under the National Highways Act as well (vide Sec. 105). To complete the narration, recently in Project Director, NHAI Vs Hakkim [2021 Scc Online 473], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has travelled far enough to hold that the entire amendment introduced in 1997 to the National Highways Act is discriminatory, but stopped short of declaring it as unconstitutional as its vires was not challenged before it. The legislative history concludes here. Sec.3-J and Constitutionality -The Journey: 3.1 The constitutional validity of Section 3-J was first called into question before the Karnataka High Court in Lalita v Union of India [ILR 2002 Karnataka 259]. Following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Vajaravelu Mudaliar v Special Deputy Collector, Madras [ AIR 1965 SC 1017 ] and Nagpur Improvement Trust v Vithal Rao [ AIR 1973 SC 689 ], the Karnataka High Court, by an order dated 11.10.2002, struck down Section 3-J as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, in 2005 a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Banshilal Samariya v Union of India [2006 Supp R.L.W 559] dissented from the view of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of Sec.3-J, partly on account of the fact that the decision of the learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court had been stayed by a Division Bench of the same Court in W.A 6115-17 of 2002. A few years later, a similar challenge arose before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs Union of India [2008 SCCOnline P&H 498], and a Division Bench of the said Court struck down Sec.3-J of the Act as violative of Article 14. Its reasoning was along the lines of Karnataka High Court in Lalita case. 3.2 Following the judgment in Golden Iron and Steel case [2008 SCC Online P&H 498], a learned Single Judge of this Court struck down Section 3-J of the Act in Chakrapani v Union of India [ (2011) 7 MLJ 858 ]. Its reasoning was along the lines of Karnataka High Court in Lalita case. 3.2 Following the judgment in Golden Iron and Steel case [2008 SCC Online P&H 498], a learned Single Judge of this Court struck down Section 3-J of the Act in Chakrapani v Union of India [ (2011) 7 MLJ 858 ]. Both the Golden Iron and Steel case and Chakrapani case have held that in an acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act, land owners would be entitled to solatium and interest as under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The judgment of the Single Judge in Chakrapani case was, however, stayed by a Division Bench in W.A.Nos. 2359 to 2388 of 2011. 3.3 In the meantime, the NHAI challenged the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs Union of India in Civil Appeal 10695 of 2011. The order of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Chakrapani case too was directly assailed by the NHAI before the Supreme Court. By an order dated 03.01.2014, the Supreme Court granted leave, and tagged the matter [Civil Appeal 129-159 of 2014, pertaining to Chakrapani batch of cases] along with the other batch of cases from the Punjab & Haryana High Court. 3.4 On 21.07.2016, the Hon’ble Supreme Court disposed of Chakrapani batch of cases after recording a statement of the Solicitor General of India that the solatium would be paid to the land owners in that batch of cases. However, the other batch of cases from the Punjab & Haryana High Court was kept pending. 3.5 In the meantime, two appeals, one from the Delhi High Court and another from Punjab and Haryana High Court, came before the Supreme Court. In the case arising from the Delhi High Court, a learned Single Judge of the Court had closed the writ petition recording the submission of the NHAI that the outcome of the decision in Golden Iron & Steel batch of cases would enure to the benefit of the petitioners before the Delhi High Court as well. Challenging the same, the landowner went on an appeal. The Supreme Court vide an order dated 11.08.2016 did not choose to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court, but noted that the Golden Iron and Steel batch of cases was pending consideration before it. Challenging the same, the landowner went on an appeal. The Supreme Court vide an order dated 11.08.2016 did not choose to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court, but noted that the Golden Iron and Steel batch of cases was pending consideration before it. However, by an order in Sunita Mehra & another Vs Union of India & Others [(2019) 17 SCC 672], the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with another batch of cases from Punjab & Haryana High Court. The Supreme Court directed as under: Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in Golden Iron & Steel Forging v. Union of India [Golden Iron & Steel Forging v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 498] i.e. 28-3-2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As for future proceedings, the position would be covered by the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 1-1-2014), which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of notification/order issued under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 3.6 The Golden Iron and Steel batch of cases finally came up for disposal on 26.10.2016. However, it appears that the NHAI entered into a compromise with the landowners and the appeals were ultimately withdrawn vide Order dated 03.08.2017. In view of the above, the correctness of the decision in Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs Union of India [2008 SCC Online P&H 498] was never tested before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 3.7 Meanwhile, relying on the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chakrapani case, this Court vide its order dated 06.03.2018 in WP 1654 of 2018 batch of cases directed the Union of India to pass appropriate orders for payment of solatium and interest The NHAI assailed this order in a batch of intra court appeals in Union of India Vs M. Pachamuthu [W.A 62 of 2019 batch of cases] before a Division Bench of this Court. The Court vide its Order dated 26.03.2019, rejected the contention of the NHAI that the benefit of the orders in Chakrapani case would be available only to the petitioners before the Supreme Court. The Court vide its Order dated 26.03.2019, rejected the contention of the NHAI that the benefit of the orders in Chakrapani case would be available only to the petitioners before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench was categorical when it held that the claim for solatium is maintainable. 3.8 Sensing perhaps the potential implications of its strategy in seeking the Court to confine the benefit of the aforesaid order of the Division Bench dated 26.03.2019, the NHAI approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court to clarify its the order dated 21.07.2016 that it had passed earlier in Chakrapani batch of cases. See paragraph 3.4 above. This attempt however, backfired on the NHAI when the Hon’ble Supreme Court through its Order dated 26.07.2019, not only dismissed the clarification petition filed by the NHAI, but also granted liberty to the landowners to “derive advantage from any other order of the High Court. 3.9 Now arrives the Tarsem Singh v Union of India [ (2019) 9 SCC 304 ] in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court struck down Section 3-J of the National Highways Act as unconstitutional. This decision penetrated through the comfort that NHAI has been hitherto was enjoying under the legislative shade. It now cannot deny the landowners of their right to be treated equally with those who lose their land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of Karnataka, Punjab & Haryana and Madras High Courts, and overruled the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court. In particular, the Supreme Court has taken notice of the concession made by the Solicitor General in Chakrapani batch of cases and also the order passed in Sunita Mehra case [(2019) 17 SCC 672], and observed: 52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed.”(emphasis supplied) The Pleadings: 4.1 The 69 cases in this batch arise from two Districts -68 from Namakkal, and 1 from Salem. The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition constituted under the National Highways Act (herein after would be referred to as CALA) passed awards in all but two cases in 2008, and in the other two in 2007. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of the compensation amount as determined by the CALA, the petitioners-land owners moved the statutory arbitrators, the respective District Collectors of the two Districts. These challenges were disposed of vide their separate proceedings dated 19-07-2013,03-02-2017, 04-02-2017, 26-06-2019 (Namakkal) and on 08-11-2012 (Salem). Aggrieved by the inadequacy of the compensation amount as determined by the CALA, the petitioners-land owners moved the statutory arbitrators, the respective District Collectors of the two Districts. These challenges were disposed of vide their separate proceedings dated 19-07-2013,03-02-2017, 04-02-2017, 26-06-2019 (Namakkal) and on 08-11-2012 (Salem). The details are as below: District Writ Petition No. Date of CALA Award Date of Arbitration Award Remarks Namakkal 697/2021, 701/2021, 716/2021, 721/2021, 722/2021, 724/2021, 725/2021, 03.06.2008 19.07.2013 Arbitration Award after Chakrapani case (2011) 7 MLJ 858 733/2021, 744/2021, 746/2021, 747/2021, 748/2021 30.12.2007 980/2021, 983/2021, 985/2021 30.12.2007, 03.06.2008 2774/2021, 2779/2021, 2782/2021, 3599/21 09.01.2008 03.02.2017 Arbitration Award after disposal of Chakrapani case by Supreme Court on 21.07.2016 3031/2021 13.05.2008 3610/2021 09.01.200813.05.2008 2787/2021, 2798/2021, 2802/2021, 2804/2021, 2806/2021, 2808/2021, 2809/2021, 2818/2021, 2821/2021, 2824/2021, 2826/2021, 2827/2021, 3600/2021, 3612/2021, 3614/2021, 3618/2021, 09.01.2008 04.02.2017 Arbitration Award after disposal of Chakrapani case by Supreme Court on 21.07.2016 3052/2021, 3054/2021, 3055/2021, 3058/2021, 3060/2021, 3062/2021, 3063/2021, 3065/2021, 3067/2021, 3264/2021, 3265/2021, 3267/2021, 3270/2021, 3272/2021, 3273/2021, 3275/2021, 3277/2021, 3278/2021, 3279/2021, 3632/2021, 3635/2021 13.05.2008 3621/2021, 3626/2021, 3630/2021, 3638/2021, 3640/2021, 3643/2021 09.01.2008, 13.05.2008 3646/2021, 09.01.2008 26.06.2019 3649/2021,3651/2021 13.05.2008 3654/2021 09.01.2008 & 13.05.2008 Arbitration Award after Chakrapani case (on 21.7.2016), & Sunita Mehra case (on 11.08.2016) & Pachamuchu case (HC) (on 26.3.2018) and before Tarsem Singh case Salem 3323/2020 27.06.2008 08.11.2012 Arbitration Award after Chakrapani case (2011) 7 MLJ 858 4.2 Almost immediately after the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case the petitioner in W.P.Nos.3323 of 2020 (the lone petitioner from Salem District) has given her representation dated 30.10.2019 seeking solatium and interest. The other petitioners followed (from Namakkal District) with their request through their separate representations in August, 2020 to the CALA and the Project Director, NHAI on the market value determined by the Arbitrators. Since, there was no response from the respondents, the petitioners are before this Court. 5. The NHAI alone contested this batch of cases. It has filed its counters in 53 cases out of 69 cases, and adopted the same in other cases. Broadly, its defences are: * When the petitioners herein were aggrieved by non-grant of solatium and interest in the award of CALA, they ought to have raised it as a ground before the statutory arbitrators constituted under Sec. 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act. Since the petitioners have not claimed it, they are deemed to have waived and abandoned their claim. Since the petitioners have not claimed it, they are deemed to have waived and abandoned their claim. * After the awards were passed by the arbitrators, if the petitioners were aggrieved by the non awarding of solatium and interest, they should have challenged them under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (henceforth A & C Act). * Sec. 34 of the A & C Act provides the effective and alternative statutory remedy, and it is impermissible for the petitioners to raise the issue on solatium and interest under Article 226 of the Constitution. * Alternatively, if at all they have to approach this Court, they ought to have done it when the learned Single Judge has struck down Section 3-J of the Act in Chakrapani v Union of India [ (2011) 7 MLJ 858 ]. Since it was not done, the present proceedings is hit both by limitation and laches. * Now after fence-sitting for several years, the petitioners cannot take advantage of the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case. This apart, if old cases such as this are re-opened for grant of solatium and interest, that may leave a huge monetary implications on the NHAI. 6. To appreciate the points raised, and the arguments advanced, this Court thought it fit to appoint Shri.Sharath Chandran, Advocate, as an amicus curiae. He, with his immense commitment, and remarkable capability for legal research, was of considerable assistance. This Court records its appreciation for him. The Arguments: A. Of the Petitioners: 7. Leaning heavily on Tarsem Singh case, the counsel for the petitioners contended that petitioners’right to claim solatium and interest can neither be disputed, nor denied purely on the technical pleas of the NHAI. They added that the time when the petitioner became entitled to claim solatium and interest is not when the awards were passed either by the CALA or the statutory arbitrator, but only when Tarsem Singh case was decided. Till Tarsem Singh case, there was no certainty if solatium and interest were payable in cases of acquisition of lands under the National Highways Act. And after the judgment in Tarsem Singh case the petitioners wasted no time to remind the authorities of their obligation to pay solatium and interest. They adopted the submissions of the learned amicus curiae. (b) Of the NHAI: 8. And after the judgment in Tarsem Singh case the petitioners wasted no time to remind the authorities of their obligation to pay solatium and interest. They adopted the submissions of the learned amicus curiae. (b) Of the NHAI: 8. NHAI contends that all the writ petitioners have approached the authorities for payment of solatium and interest only after the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh case. The petitions are neither maintainable, nor their claim sustainable. The reasons are: * CALA may not be directed to consider the representations of petitioners to pay solatium and interest, as they have become functus officio, the moment they passed the Awards. Reliance was placed on the Order of the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India & Others Vs M.Pachamuthu and another [W.A.No.62/2019 batch dated 26.03.2019]. * When the petitioners approached the statutory arbitrator under Sec. 3G(5) of the Act, they merely assailed the adequacy of the compensation as determined by the CALA but not the solatium and interest. These awards were not challenged, and hence they have attained finality. The statutory arbitrator had disposed of the proceedings only in 2017. But by then the judgment of this Court in Chakrapani case [ (2011)7 MLJ 858 ] had been pronounced. If at all the petitioners were interested in claiming solatium and interest, they ought to have raised it before the arbitrator, and ought not to have remained fence sitters, waiting for the disposal of Tarsem Singh case. Law does not enable a fence-sitters to agitate a stale claim beyond the period of limitation. Reliance was to State Of U.P.& Ors vs Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others [ (2015)1 SCC 347 ], Union of India & Another vs M.M. Sarkar [ (2010)2 SCC 59 )], Hasmukhraj vs Commissioner [SCA/14055/2011 (Gujarat)]. * The petitioners have, consciously waived their right to claim solatium and interest as they had acquiesced in the arbitral proceedings. If at all the petitioners had felt aggrieved they ought to have challenged the awards of the statutory arbitrator under Sec.34 of the A & C Act, and that too within the period of limitation provided for the same, and hence they are not permitted to adopt the writ-route to the remedy they seek. If at all the petitioners had felt aggrieved they ought to have challenged the awards of the statutory arbitrator under Sec.34 of the A & C Act, and that too within the period of limitation provided for the same, and hence they are not permitted to adopt the writ-route to the remedy they seek. * Not only did the petitioners opt not to challenge the order of the Arbitrator under Sec.34 of the A & C Act, they also had received the differential compensation amount consequent to the enhancement of compensation as determined by the arbitrator. If the petitioners are aggrieved by the award of the statutory arbitrator, then their remedy is under Sec.34 of the A & C Act. When a more efficacious alternate remedy is statutorily provided, Courts have always refrained from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was to Punjab National Bank vs. D.C.Krishna [ 2001 (6) SCC 569 ], Sheela Devi vs. Jaspal Singh [ AIR 1999 SC 2859 ], Union of India vs. T.R.Verma [ AIR 1957 SC 882 ]. * Where a person, himself a fence-sitter, seeks an advantage similar to the one obtained by another, he ought to approach the Court at the earliest point of time, or atleast within a reasonable time after the Order was pronounced in Chakrapani’s case on 04-03-2011. A fence-sitter in hibernation is ineligible for equal treatment with those who approached the Court. It is impermissible in law to allow the persons whose litigations have been concluded and attained finality to aim to benefit out of a subsequent declaration of law in another case. Reliance was placed on the ratio in Mafatlal Industries Ltd and others vs. Union of India and others [(1997 (5) SCC page 536, para 108 (iv)]. * The petitioners have opted not to claim solatium and interest in their Arbitration Petition filed under Sec.3G(5) of the Act. In terms of Sec.3G(6), provisions of A & C Act, were made applicable to any arbitration under Sec.3G(5). That which the petitioners had an opportunity to claim, but have chosen to abandon or waive, cannot be revived pursuant to the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case [ (2019)9 SCC 304 ]. * Inasmuch as the awards of the statutory arbitrators have been allowed to become final, the present claim is hit by the doctrine of res judicata. That which the petitioners had an opportunity to claim, but have chosen to abandon or waive, cannot be revived pursuant to the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case [ (2019)9 SCC 304 ]. * Inasmuch as the awards of the statutory arbitrators have been allowed to become final, the present claim is hit by the doctrine of res judicata. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Constitution Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal [( 2020 (8) SCC 129 ], and Daryao and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1961 SC 1457 ]. * A writ petition is not an automated route to revive a stale claim. Reliance was placed on the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision in Trilokchand Motichand and others Vs H.B. Munshi & another [ AIR 1970 SC 898 ]. In The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and Others Vs M/s Commercial Steel Limited [judgment dated 03.09.2021] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances such as (i) where there is a breach of fundamental rights; or, (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; or, (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or, (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation. None of these criteria are present in the present batch of cases. * And, today, moving the Court under Sec.34 of the Act is terribly barred by limitation. See: Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, [ (2019) 2 SCC 455 ]. Invoking Art.226 of the Constitution at this stage is plainly impermissible. Reliance was placed on Assistant Commissioner (Ct) Ltu, Kakinada & ors vs M/S Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Healthcare Limited [ 2020 (4) MLJ 652 ], State Bank of Travancore vs. Mathew K.C., [ (2018) 3 SCC 85 ], Thansingh Vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and others [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ]. Assistant Commisioner (CT) Ltu, Kakinada & Others Vs M/s Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., [ 2020(4) MLJ 652 ] and Gurpreet Singh Vs Union of India [(2006) 8 SCC 257]. * The present claim is hit by delay and laches, which disentitle the petitioners to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhailal Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] and State Of Maharashtra vs Digambar [ AIR 1995 SC 1991 ]. * The present claim is hit by delay and laches, which disentitle the petitioners to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhailal Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] and State Of Maharashtra vs Digambar [ AIR 1995 SC 1991 ]. This apart where a claim is barred by limitation (claim should have been within three years from the order in Chakrapani case), writ petition cannot be maintained. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary in character. Where a set of petitioners, themselves fence-sitters, and guilty of laches, and have waived or abandoned their right of claim, approach the Court invoking its writ jurisdiction beyond the period of limitation, discretion may not be exercised in their favour. Reliance was to the ratio in City & Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and others [ (2009) 1 SCC 168 ]. Submissions of the Amicus curiae: 9. To appreciate the submissions of the learned Amicus curiae, flip/scroll backwards to paragraphs 3.1 to 3.9 of this Order. His submissions are: * Post Chakrapani case, the Supreme Court passed an order in Sunita Mehra case [(2019) 17 SCC 672], and had directed payment of solatium and interest only for cases pending on the date of the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Golden Iron & steel case. Despite this, the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh case, has held that the Government itself was of the view that solatium and interest should be granted for acquisitions between 1997 and 2015. In other words, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not consider it fit to confine the relief to those cases pending on 28.03.2018, the date on which Punjab High Court passed its order in Golden Iron & Steel Forging v. Union of India [2008 SCC OnLine Punjab &Haryana 498]. * The consequences flowing from Tarsem Singh were examined and relied on by a Division Bench of this Court in Gandhimathi v The District Collector [W.A.(MD) 1680 of 2018]. The NHAI‘s efforts to assail this Order before the Supreme Court were in vain when the Court rejected it in limine vide its Order dated 25.02.2021. Therefore, the statutory obligation to pay solatium and interest has moved far beyond the orbit of Court hall debates. The NHAI‘s efforts to assail this Order before the Supreme Court were in vain when the Court rejected it in limine vide its Order dated 25.02.2021. Therefore, the statutory obligation to pay solatium and interest has moved far beyond the orbit of Court hall debates. * The plea of the NHAI that claim of solatium and interest cannot be considered since the awards of the statutory arbitrators have attained finality has already been rejected by the Division Bench of this Court in Pachamuthu and Gandhimathi cases. The precedential value of these judgments cannot be wished away. * So far as laches and delay goes, the decision of the Single Judge in Chakrapani case, came to be stayed by a Division Bench of this Court in a batch of appeals in W.A.2359 to 2388 of 2011 filed at the instance of the NHAI. Thereafter, the matter went to the Hon’ble Supreme Court and was eventually disposed of as per its Order dated 21.07.2016, based on the statement of the Solicitor General. (Ref: Paragraph 3.4 above). Its immediate effect was that the Order of the learned Single Judge of this Court merged with the Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide the ratio in Khoday Distilleries v Sri Mahadeshwara [ (2019) 4 SCC 376 ]. * Secondly, the final Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not disturb the initial declaration of this Court that Sec.3-J of the Act was unconstitutional. A judgment of the High Court holding that a provision of a Central enactment as unconstitutional would operate pan India. Reliance was placed on the dictum in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd v Union of India, [ (2004) 6 SCC 254 )]. The tenor of NHAI’s contention appears to indicate thatthe benefit of the judgments in Chakrapani case, or Pachamuthu’s case would be available only to the petitioners in those cases. * If a referential base-time is to be reckoned for deciding when the acquirer of private lands under the National Highways Act became obligated to pay compensation, it cannot but be 19.09.2019, the date on which judgment was pronounced by the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh case. It is settled law that a declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, operates retrospectively unless it is expressly made prospective. It is settled law that a declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, operates retrospectively unless it is expressly made prospective. Reliance was placed on the ratio in Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v Laxmi Devi [ (2009) 7 SCC 205 ] and Goan Real Estate v Union of India [ (2010) 5 SCC 388 ). And, there is no such indication in Tarsem Singh case that the Supreme Court has intended to make its dictum to operate only prospectively. Additionally, it may also be pointed out that the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution is that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts and authorities in the country. If viewed thus, the NHAI cannot whittle down the scope of the judgment by resorting to selective cherry picking by claiming that it applies to some and not to others. The ratio in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd., [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ] was relied on. * The question of laches in respect of the claims made post the striking down of a provision of law was examined by the Supreme Court in D.Cawasji v State of Mysore [ (1975) 1 SCC 636 ]. The Supreme Court applied Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, and held that relief arising from the consequences of a mistake of law (i.e., a payment made under an unconstitutional provision) cannot be discovered before a judgment adjudging the validity of the law and the starting point of limitation for the purposes of a writ petition under Article 226 for consequential relief in such circumstances would run from the date on which any provision was declared unconstitutional. This judgment was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahabir Kishore v State of Madhya Pradesh [ (1989) 4 SCC 1 ] wherein the plea that the starting point of limitation commenced only from the date on which the judgment was published in the law reports was accepted. A similar plea of laches was raised and rejected by the Supreme Court in U.P Pollution Control Board v Kanoria Industrial Limited [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ] where the writ petitions were entertained and allowed for refund of water cess collected under a provision which was declared unconstitutional. A similar plea of laches was raised and rejected by the Supreme Court in U.P Pollution Control Board v Kanoria Industrial Limited [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ] where the writ petitions were entertained and allowed for refund of water cess collected under a provision which was declared unconstitutional. It is therefore clear that the period of limitation under Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, for seeking relief would arise only from 19.09.2019, the date of the Order in Tarsem Singh case. The present batch of cases appear to closely ally themselves with the ratio of U.P Pollution Control Board v Kanoria Industrial Limited [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ]. * Recourse to Sec.34 of the A & C Act cannot be resorted to seek something which fall outside the scope of the authority of the CALA or the statutory arbitrator. When Section 3-J stood in the statute book, a claim for solatium and interest was not a claim “under the Act”, for the CALA and the statutory arbitrator were statutorily injuncted from applying Section 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 to those landowners who lost their lands under the National Highways Act. The procedural machinery under the Act can be utilised only to decide disputes that arise under the substantive provisions of the Act which are not ultra vires. Rejection of solatium and interest based on an unconstitutional provision is not a decision “under the Act”, hence the procedural mechanism provided under the National Highways Act is inapplicable. It implies that the petitions invoking Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S Venkataraman v State of Madras [ AIR 1966 SC 1089 ], Bharat Kala Mandir v Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon [ AIR 1966 SC 249 ], and Mafatlal Industries Limited v Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ]. The Discussion: 10. As the din of the arguments settle down to permeate into the deeper layers of contemplation, it becomes evident that the controversy seeks a solution not in evaluating the legitimacy of the claim of the petitioners, but in assessing the tenability of the NHAI’s defences. If the decision in the Chakrapani case does not aid the petitioners, the ratio of Tarsem Singh surely does. 11. The arrangement of defences by the NHAI is impressive, but they forsake novelty. If the decision in the Chakrapani case does not aid the petitioners, the ratio of Tarsem Singh surely does. 11. The arrangement of defences by the NHAI is impressive, but they forsake novelty. They are picked straight from the repertoire of standard(ised) defences: the pleas of waiver and the abandonment and those of limitation and laches with the fence sitter theory and rule of res judicata thrown in for good measure. These are rounded off with availability of alternate remedies and the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. None of these take on the entitlement, or the lack of it, of the petitioners to claim solatium and interest, but aim at avoiding a potential liability to pay. They do raise an issue on jurisdiction, but do they also camouflage any technical (or is it tactical?) escapism to manoevere through the consequences flowing from the decision of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh? The endeavour of the Court will focus on this. 12. After the decision in Tarsem Singh it will be outlandish to contend that the landowners would not be entitled to solatium and interest, since the denial statutorily authorised by Sec.3-J is lifted. The effect of striking down Sec. 3-J is that it is deemed to have never existed or, to borrow the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 1955 SC 781 ] it is “still born .......”. Another facet of the impact-capability of a judicial decision is that, unless expressly declared otherwise, they always operate retrospectively. See: Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v Laxmi Devi [ (2009) 7 SCC 205 ]. There is no indication in Tarsem Singh that the declaration of law would have only prospective effect. Therefore, the default rule in the Laxmi Devi case will apply. 13. The defences of the NHAI must be contextualised in the backdrop of the Right to Property under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Though this right originally shared a space in the club of freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f), it underwent a perceived relegation to a Constitutional right under Article 300A vide the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. 13. The defences of the NHAI must be contextualised in the backdrop of the Right to Property under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Though this right originally shared a space in the club of freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f), it underwent a perceived relegation to a Constitutional right under Article 300A vide the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. The Parliamentary intent was clear, yet it ended up becoming an optical illusion, since the right to property managed to crawl its way to occupy a vital space in the constantly expanding human rights jurisprudence, with the Court integrating it within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Vidya Devi v State of H.P. [ (2020) 2 SCC 569 ] the Supreme Court held: “12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution....” A school of Constitutional thought perceives that right to property is now on a firmer ground than before. Prof. P.K. Tripathi, in a seminal article titled “Right to Property After Forty Fourth Amendment -Better Protected Than Ever Before”[AIR 1980 Journal Section p.49], points out that by deleting Right to Property under Article 19(1)(f) and rehabilitating it in Article 300-A, the Parliament had unwittingly unshackled it from the rigours of Article 31-A which shielded certain laws from the dragnet of Articles 14,19 and 21 and the obligation to pay just compensation. He writes: “The net result, therefore, is that the right of the individual to receive compensation when his property is acquired or requisitioned by the State continues to be available in the form of an implied condition of the power of the State to legislate on “acquisition or requisitioning of property” while all the exceptions and limitations set up against and around it in Arts 31, 31A and 31B have disappeared.” In Lalaram v. Jaipur Development Authority [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ], the Supreme Court holds: “124. The right to property though no longer a fundamental right is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The right to property though no longer a fundamental right is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty, justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions. 127. While recognising the power of the State to acquire the land of its citizens, it has been proclaimed in Dev Sharan, (2011) 4 SCC 769 , that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right and was never a natural right, it has to be accepted that without the right to property, other rights become illusory. 129. In summa, the right to property having been elevated to the status of human rights, it is inherent in every individual, and thus has to be venerably acknowledged and can, by no means, be belittled or trivialised by adopting an unconcerned and nonchalant disposition by anyone, far less the State, after compulsorily acquiring his land by invoking an expropriatory legislative mechanism. The judicial mandate of human rights dimension, thus, makes it incumbent on the State to solemnly respond to its constitutional obligation to guarantee that a land loser is adequately compensated. The proposition does not admit of any compromise or laxity.” In K.A.Ravindran Vs The District Collector, Vellore District & Ors. [ 2021(4) CTC 527], I had an occasion to hold: “…. In Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited v State of U.P [ 2011 9 SCC 354 ] the Supreme Court termed the right to property as a human right under Article 21 and alluded to it as the seed bed for securing other human freedoms such as liberty. The Supreme Court observed: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” JUDGMENT : (Prayer in WP.No.3323 of 2020: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to direct the respondents to compute and pay to the petitioners for acquisition of their lands measuring 4000 sq.mts., in Survey No.44/1B, Annathanapatti Village covered under Award of the 6th respondent dated 27.06.2008 in R.O.C.No,1299/2008 (A2) as modified by the arbitral award of the 5th respondent dated 08.11.2012 in NH.No.47 Aa.Va.No.554/B2, the benefits under Section 23(1A), 23(2), and the proviso to Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. WP.Nos.697, 701, 716, 721, 722, 724, 725, 733, 744, 746, 747, 748, 980, 983, 985 of 2021 : Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents herein to pay solatium amount at 30% as per Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and an additional amount at 12% as per Section 23(1-A) of the said Act, 1894 from the date of notification under Section 3A(1) of National Highways Act, 1956, to the date of award for the compensation amount as enhanced by the first respondent i.e., 369.42 per sq.mtr., 180.06 per sq.mtr., together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum for one year from the date of possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of realization as per Section 28 of the said Act, 1894 for the said enhanced compensation, solatium and additional market value in respect of the petitioner’s land situated at Pappinaickenpatti Village, Namakkal Taluk and District, comprised in Survey Nos.3/6, 10/1, 33/3B, 33/3C, 34/1G2, 1/3A2B3, 3/1B1, 34/3B2B2, 4/1E, 80/8, 8/1B3, 128/1, 130/3E1, 3/5, 4/1A, 4/1C, 3/7A, 80/6B, 80/7, 80/6A, 80/5, 130/2A, 130/1B, acquired for the purpose of widening four lane of National Highways No.7 in line with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 12.08.2020, 18.08.2020 respectively and to pass orders. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 12.08.2020, 18.08.2020 respectively and to pass orders. WP.Nos.2774, 2779, 2782, 2787, 2798, 2802, 2804, 2806, 2808, 2809, 2818, 2821, 2824, 2826, 2827, 3031, 3052, 3054, 3055, 3058,3060, 3062, 3063, 3065, 3067, 3264, 3265, 3267, 3270, 3272, 3273, 3275, 3277, 3278, 3279, 3599, 3600, 3610, 3612, 3614, 3618, 3621, 3626, 3630, 3632, 3635, 3638, 3640, 3643, 3646, 3649, 3651, 3654 of 2021 : Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Mandamus to direct the respondents herein to pay solatium amount at 30% as per Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and an additional amount at 12% as per Section 23(1-A) of the said Act, 1894 from the date of notification under Section 3A(1) of National Highways Act, 1956, to the date of award for the compensation amount as enhanced by the first respondent i.e., 122.25 per sq.mtr., for Phase-I and 323.07 per sq.mtr., for Phase-II respectively together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum for one year from the date of possession and thereafter at 15% per annum till the date of realization as per Section 28 of the said Act, 1894 for the said enhanced compensation, solatium and additional market value in respect of the petitioner’s land situated at Sellappampatti Village, Namakkal Taluk and District, comprised in Survey Nos.137/4B1, 137/2C1, 139/2AD, 105/3A, 21/5, 21/8F, 78/1C, 21/8A, 137/4B3, 105/3A, 58/2D, 75/2B1, 104/3A, 75/2B2, 75/1B, 109/4, 78/1D, 107/1C, 107/1D1, 107/2A, 107/2C1, 107/2B1, 108/2, 78/1B, 137/4C, 137/6B, 65/5, 104/2A, 109/4, 139/2A2, 139/2B, 139/2C3, 107/1F3, 107/2D, 107/2E, 65/5, 104/3A, 65/5, 137/5A, 137/2D1, 105/3E, 71/8B, 104/2G, 87/3, 87/2, 68/2B, 104/3B, 71/8A, 105/3A, 21/1A, 21/8B, 105/3A, 109/2, 109/1B, 109/1K, 109/3A, 109/3C, 139/2AE, 139/2P, 139/2AC2, 139/2A1, 139/2C3, 69/2A2, 69/2B2, 103/2B, 75/1B, 65/5, 142/3A, 142/3C, 73/6, 73/5C, 75/2A, 75/3, 69/1, 71/5, 59/6B, 71/1, 65/4B, 71/2, 71/3, 71/4, 73/7A acquired for the purpose of widening four lane of National Highways No.7 in line with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 10.08.2020 and to pass orders.) 1. Tarsem Singh by considering the petitioner’s representation dated 10.08.2020 and to pass orders.) 1. The short point involved in this batch of 69 petitions concerns the entitlement of the petitioners to solatium and interest on the compensation paid to them for the acquisition of their lands under the provisions of National Highways Act (henceforth would be referred to as the Act). A Note on Legislative History: 2. A travel through the lane of legislative history may help capturing the setting in which the petitioners rest their cause for the present action. On 24-01-1997, the President of India promulgated the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1997 by which Sections 3-A to 3-J were inserted into the National Highways Act, 1956. These provisions provide for a mechanism for speedy acquisition of land for the construction of national highways and also for a speedier resolution of disputes relating to determination of compensation through a mechanism of statutory arbitration as contemplated in Section 3-G of the Act. Sec.3-G (7) of the Act sets out the relevant criteria which the arbitrator must take into account in determining the compensation under the Act. Section 3G(7) roughly corresponds to Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 3-J, which, as would be seen has become the epicentre of the present lis, specifically declared that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would apply to an acquisition under the National Highways Act, 1956. As Sec. 3G(7) imported only the elements of Section 23(1) of the L.A Act for determination of compensation, Sec. 3-J had the effect of excluding the benefit of the additional compensation under Section 23 (2) statutorily computed at 30% of the market value (commonly known as ‘solatium’, and hence would be referred to as such in this order) and interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act. The ordinance was replaced by the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 (Act 16 of 1997). This position continued till 01.01.2015 when the Right to Fair Compensation & Transparency in Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 made solatium and interest payable for acquisitions under the National Highways Act as well (vide Sec. 105). The ordinance was replaced by the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 (Act 16 of 1997). This position continued till 01.01.2015 when the Right to Fair Compensation & Transparency in Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 made solatium and interest payable for acquisitions under the National Highways Act as well (vide Sec. 105). To complete the narration, recently in Project Director, NHAI Vs Hakkim [2021 Scc Online 473], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has travelled far enough to hold that the entire amendment introduced in 1997 to the National Highways Act is discriminatory, but stopped short of declaring it as unconstitutional as its vires was not challenged before it. The legislative history concludes here. Sec.3-J and Constitutionality -The Journey: 3.1 The constitutional validity of Section 3-J was first called into question before the Karnataka High Court in Lalita v Union of India [ILR 2002 Karnataka 259]. Following the judgments of the Supreme Court in Vajaravelu Mudaliar v Special Deputy Collector, Madras [ AIR 1965 SC 1017 ] and Nagpur Improvement Trust v Vithal Rao [ AIR 1973 SC 689 ], the Karnataka High Court, by an order dated 11.10.2002, struck down Section 3-J as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, in 2005 a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Banshilal Samariya v Union of India [2006 Supp R.L.W 559] dissented from the view of the Karnataka High Court and upheld the validity of Sec.3-J, partly on account of the fact that the decision of the learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court had been stayed by a Division Bench of the same Court in W.A 6115-17 of 2002. A few years later, a similar challenge arose before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs Union of India [2008 SCCOnline P&H 498], and a Division Bench of the said Court struck down Sec.3-J of the Act as violative of Article 14. Its reasoning was along the lines of Karnataka High Court in Lalita case. 3.2 Following the judgment in Golden Iron and Steel case [2008 SCC Online P&H 498], a learned Single Judge of this Court struck down Section 3-J of the Act in Chakrapani v Union of India [ (2011) 7 MLJ 858 ]. Its reasoning was along the lines of Karnataka High Court in Lalita case. 3.2 Following the judgment in Golden Iron and Steel case [2008 SCC Online P&H 498], a learned Single Judge of this Court struck down Section 3-J of the Act in Chakrapani v Union of India [ (2011) 7 MLJ 858 ]. Both the Golden Iron and Steel case and Chakrapani case have held that in an acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act, land owners would be entitled to solatium and interest as under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The judgment of the Single Judge in Chakrapani case was, however, stayed by a Division Bench in W.A.Nos. 2359 to 2388 of 2011. 3.3 In the meantime, the NHAI challenged the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs Union of India in Civil Appeal 10695 of 2011. The order of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in Chakrapani case too was directly assailed by the NHAI before the Supreme Court. By an order dated 03.01.2014, the Supreme Court granted leave, and tagged the matter [Civil Appeal 129-159 of 2014, pertaining to Chakrapani batch of cases] along with the other batch of cases from the Punjab & Haryana High Court. 3.4 On 21.07.2016, the Hon’ble Supreme Court disposed of Chakrapani batch of cases after recording a statement of the Solicitor General of India that the solatium would be paid to the land owners in that batch of cases. However, the other batch of cases from the Punjab & Haryana High Court was kept pending. 3.5 In the meantime, two appeals, one from the Delhi High Court and another from Punjab and Haryana High Court, came before the Supreme Court. In the case arising from the Delhi High Court, a learned Single Judge of the Court had closed the writ petition recording the submission of the NHAI that the outcome of the decision in Golden Iron & Steel batch of cases would enure to the benefit of the petitioners before the Delhi High Court as well. Challenging the same, the landowner went on an appeal. The Supreme Court vide an order dated 11.08.2016 did not choose to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court, but noted that the Golden Iron and Steel batch of cases was pending consideration before it. Challenging the same, the landowner went on an appeal. The Supreme Court vide an order dated 11.08.2016 did not choose to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court, but noted that the Golden Iron and Steel batch of cases was pending consideration before it. However, by an order in Sunita Mehra & another Vs Union of India & Others [(2019) 17 SCC 672], the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with another batch of cases from Punjab & Haryana High Court. The Supreme Court directed as under: Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in Golden Iron & Steel Forging v. Union of India [Golden Iron & Steel Forging v. Union of India, 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 498] i.e. 28-3-2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As for future proceedings, the position would be covered by the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 1-1-2014), which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of notification/order issued under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 3.6 The Golden Iron and Steel batch of cases finally came up for disposal on 26.10.2016. However, it appears that the NHAI entered into a compromise with the landowners and the appeals were ultimately withdrawn vide Order dated 03.08.2017. In view of the above, the correctness of the decision in Golden Iron and Steel Forging vs Union of India [2008 SCC Online P&H 498] was never tested before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 3.7 Meanwhile, relying on the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chakrapani case, this Court vide its order dated 06.03.2018 in WP 1654 of 2018 batch of cases directed the Union of India to pass appropriate orders for payment of solatium and interest The NHAI assailed this order in a batch of intra court appeals in Union of India Vs M. Pachamuthu [W.A 62 of 2019 batch of cases] before a Division Bench of this Court. The Court vide its Order dated 26.03.2019, rejected the contention of the NHAI that the benefit of the orders in Chakrapani case would be available only to the petitioners before the Supreme Court. The Court vide its Order dated 26.03.2019, rejected the contention of the NHAI that the benefit of the orders in Chakrapani case would be available only to the petitioners before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench was categorical when it held that the claim for solatium is maintainable. 3.8 Sensing perhaps the potential implications of its strategy in seeking the Court to confine the benefit of the aforesaid order of the Division Bench dated 26.03.2019, the NHAI approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court to clarify its the order dated 21.07.2016 that it had passed earlier in Chakrapani batch of cases. See paragraph 3.4 above. This attempt however, backfired on the NHAI when the Hon’ble Supreme Court through its Order dated 26.07.2019, not only dismissed the clarification petition filed by the NHAI, but also granted liberty to the landowners to “derive advantage from any other order of the High Court. 3.9 Now arrives the Tarsem Singh v Union of India [ (2019) 9 SCC 304 ] in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court struck down Section 3-J of the National Highways Act as unconstitutional. This decision penetrated through the comfort that NHAI has been hitherto was enjoying under the legislative shade. It now cannot deny the landowners of their right to be treated equally with those who lose their land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of Karnataka, Punjab & Haryana and Madras High Courts, and overruled the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court. In particular, the Supreme Court has taken notice of the concession made by the Solicitor General in Chakrapani batch of cases and also the order passed in Sunita Mehra case [(2019) 17 SCC 672], and observed: 52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed.”(emphasis supplied) The Pleadings: 4.1 The 69 cases in this batch arise from two Districts -68 from Namakkal, and 1 from Salem. The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition constituted under the National Highways Act (herein after would be referred to as CALA) passed awards in all but two cases in 2008, and in the other two in 2007. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of the compensation amount as determined by the CALA, the petitioners-land owners moved the statutory arbitrators, the respective District Collectors of the two Districts. These challenges were disposed of vide their separate proceedings dated 19-07-2013,03-02-2017, 04-02-2017, 26-06-2019 (Namakkal) and on 08-11-2012 (Salem). Aggrieved by the inadequacy of the compensation amount as determined by the CALA, the petitioners-land owners moved the statutory arbitrators, the respective District Collectors of the two Districts. These challenges were disposed of vide their separate proceedings dated 19-07-2013,03-02-2017, 04-02-2017, 26-06-2019 (Namakkal) and on 08-11-2012 (Salem). The details are as below: District Writ Petition No. Date of CALA Award Date of Arbitration Award Remarks Namakkal 697/2021, 701/2021, 716/2021, 721/2021, 722/2021, 724/2021, 725/2021, 03.06.2008 19.07.2013 Arbitration Award after Chakrapani case (2011) 7 MLJ 858 733/2021, 744/2021, 746/2021, 747/2021, 748/2021 30.12.2007 980/2021, 983/2021, 985/2021 30.12.2007, 03.06.2008 2774/2021, 2779/2021, 2782/2021, 3599/21 09.01.2008 03.02.2017 Arbitration Award after disposal of Chakrapani case by Supreme Court on 21.07.2016 3031/2021 13.05.2008 3610/2021 09.01.200813.05.2008 2787/2021, 2798/2021, 2802/2021, 2804/2021, 2806/2021, 2808/2021, 2809/2021, 2818/2021, 2821/2021, 2824/2021, 2826/2021, 2827/2021, 3600/2021, 3612/2021, 3614/2021, 3618/2021, 09.01.2008 04.02.2017 Arbitration Award after disposal of Chakrapani case by Supreme Court on 21.07.2016 3052/2021, 3054/2021, 3055/2021, 3058/2021, 3060/2021, 3062/2021, 3063/2021, 3065/2021, 3067/2021, 3264/2021, 3265/2021, 3267/2021, 3270/2021, 3272/2021, 3273/2021, 3275/2021, 3277/2021, 3278/2021, 3279/2021, 3632/2021, 3635/2021 13.05.2008 3621/2021, 3626/2021, 3630/2021, 3638/2021, 3640/2021, 3643/2021 09.01.2008, 13.05.2008 3646/2021, 09.01.2008 26.06.2019 3649/2021,3651/2021 13.05.2008 3654/2021 09.01.2008 & 13.05.2008 Arbitration Award after Chakrapani case (on 21.7.2016), & Sunita Mehra case (on 11.08.2016) & Pachamuchu case (HC) (on 26.3.2018) and before Tarsem Singh case Salem 3323/2020 27.06.2008 08.11.2012 Arbitration Award after Chakrapani case (2011) 7 MLJ 858 4.2 Almost immediately after the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case the petitioner in W.P.Nos.3323 of 2020 (the lone petitioner from Salem District) has given her representation dated 30.10.2019 seeking solatium and interest. The other petitioners followed (from Namakkal District) with their request through their separate representations in August, 2020 to the CALA and the Project Director, NHAI on the market value determined by the Arbitrators. Since, there was no response from the respondents, the petitioners are before this Court. 5. The NHAI alone contested this batch of cases. It has filed its counters in 53 cases out of 69 cases, and adopted the same in other cases. Broadly, its defences are: * When the petitioners herein were aggrieved by non-grant of solatium and interest in the award of CALA, they ought to have raised it as a ground before the statutory arbitrators constituted under Sec. 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act. Since the petitioners have not claimed it, they are deemed to have waived and abandoned their claim. Since the petitioners have not claimed it, they are deemed to have waived and abandoned their claim. * After the awards were passed by the arbitrators, if the petitioners were aggrieved by the non awarding of solatium and interest, they should have challenged them under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (henceforth A & C Act). * Sec. 34 of the A & C Act provides the effective and alternative statutory remedy, and it is impermissible for the petitioners to raise the issue on solatium and interest under Article 226 of the Constitution. * Alternatively, if at all they have to approach this Court, they ought to have done it when the learned Single Judge has struck down Section 3-J of the Act in Chakrapani v Union of India [ (2011) 7 MLJ 858 ]. Since it was not done, the present proceedings is hit both by limitation and laches. * Now after fence-sitting for several years, the petitioners cannot take advantage of the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case. This apart, if old cases such as this are re-opened for grant of solatium and interest, that may leave a huge monetary implications on the NHAI. 6. To appreciate the points raised, and the arguments advanced, this Court thought it fit to appoint Shri.Sharath Chandran, Advocate, as an amicus curiae. He, with his immense commitment, and remarkable capability for legal research, was of considerable assistance. This Court records its appreciation for him. The Arguments: A. Of the Petitioners: 7. Leaning heavily on Tarsem Singh case, the counsel for the petitioners contended that petitioners’right to claim solatium and interest can neither be disputed, nor denied purely on the technical pleas of the NHAI. They added that the time when the petitioner became entitled to claim solatium and interest is not when the awards were passed either by the CALA or the statutory arbitrator, but only when Tarsem Singh case was decided. Till Tarsem Singh case, there was no certainty if solatium and interest were payable in cases of acquisition of lands under the National Highways Act. And after the judgment in Tarsem Singh case the petitioners wasted no time to remind the authorities of their obligation to pay solatium and interest. They adopted the submissions of the learned amicus curiae. (b) Of the NHAI: 8. And after the judgment in Tarsem Singh case the petitioners wasted no time to remind the authorities of their obligation to pay solatium and interest. They adopted the submissions of the learned amicus curiae. (b) Of the NHAI: 8. NHAI contends that all the writ petitioners have approached the authorities for payment of solatium and interest only after the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh case. The petitions are neither maintainable, nor their claim sustainable. The reasons are: * CALA may not be directed to consider the representations of petitioners to pay solatium and interest, as they have become functus officio, the moment they passed the Awards. Reliance was placed on the Order of the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India & Others Vs M.Pachamuthu and another [W.A.No.62/2019 batch dated 26.03.2019]. * When the petitioners approached the statutory arbitrator under Sec. 3G(5) of the Act, they merely assailed the adequacy of the compensation as determined by the CALA but not the solatium and interest. These awards were not challenged, and hence they have attained finality. The statutory arbitrator had disposed of the proceedings only in 2017. But by then the judgment of this Court in Chakrapani case [ (2011)7 MLJ 858 ] had been pronounced. If at all the petitioners were interested in claiming solatium and interest, they ought to have raised it before the arbitrator, and ought not to have remained fence sitters, waiting for the disposal of Tarsem Singh case. Law does not enable a fence-sitters to agitate a stale claim beyond the period of limitation. Reliance was to State Of U.P.& Ors vs Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others [ (2015)1 SCC 347 ], Union of India & Another vs M.M. Sarkar [ (2010)2 SCC 59 )], Hasmukhraj vs Commissioner [SCA/14055/2011 (Gujarat)]. * The petitioners have, consciously waived their right to claim solatium and interest as they had acquiesced in the arbitral proceedings. If at all the petitioners had felt aggrieved they ought to have challenged the awards of the statutory arbitrator under Sec.34 of the A & C Act, and that too within the period of limitation provided for the same, and hence they are not permitted to adopt the writ-route to the remedy they seek. If at all the petitioners had felt aggrieved they ought to have challenged the awards of the statutory arbitrator under Sec.34 of the A & C Act, and that too within the period of limitation provided for the same, and hence they are not permitted to adopt the writ-route to the remedy they seek. * Not only did the petitioners opt not to challenge the order of the Arbitrator under Sec.34 of the A & C Act, they also had received the differential compensation amount consequent to the enhancement of compensation as determined by the arbitrator. If the petitioners are aggrieved by the award of the statutory arbitrator, then their remedy is under Sec.34 of the A & C Act. When a more efficacious alternate remedy is statutorily provided, Courts have always refrained from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was to Punjab National Bank vs. D.C.Krishna [ 2001 (6) SCC 569 ], Sheela Devi vs. Jaspal Singh [ AIR 1999 SC 2859 ], Union of India vs. T.R.Verma [ AIR 1957 SC 882 ]. * Where a person, himself a fence-sitter, seeks an advantage similar to the one obtained by another, he ought to approach the Court at the earliest point of time, or atleast within a reasonable time after the Order was pronounced in Chakrapani’s case on 04-03-2011. A fence-sitter in hibernation is ineligible for equal treatment with those who approached the Court. It is impermissible in law to allow the persons whose litigations have been concluded and attained finality to aim to benefit out of a subsequent declaration of law in another case. Reliance was placed on the ratio in Mafatlal Industries Ltd and others vs. Union of India and others [(1997 (5) SCC page 536, para 108 (iv)]. * The petitioners have opted not to claim solatium and interest in their Arbitration Petition filed under Sec.3G(5) of the Act. In terms of Sec.3G(6), provisions of A & C Act, were made applicable to any arbitration under Sec.3G(5). That which the petitioners had an opportunity to claim, but have chosen to abandon or waive, cannot be revived pursuant to the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case [ (2019)9 SCC 304 ]. * Inasmuch as the awards of the statutory arbitrators have been allowed to become final, the present claim is hit by the doctrine of res judicata. That which the petitioners had an opportunity to claim, but have chosen to abandon or waive, cannot be revived pursuant to the judgment in the Tarsem Singh case [ (2019)9 SCC 304 ]. * Inasmuch as the awards of the statutory arbitrators have been allowed to become final, the present claim is hit by the doctrine of res judicata. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Constitution Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal [( 2020 (8) SCC 129 ], and Daryao and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1961 SC 1457 ]. * A writ petition is not an automated route to revive a stale claim. Reliance was placed on the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision in Trilokchand Motichand and others Vs H.B. Munshi & another [ AIR 1970 SC 898 ]. In The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax and Others Vs M/s Commercial Steel Limited [judgment dated 03.09.2021] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances such as (i) where there is a breach of fundamental rights; or, (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; or, (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or, (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation. None of these criteria are present in the present batch of cases. * And, today, moving the Court under Sec.34 of the Act is terribly barred by limitation. See: Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, [ (2019) 2 SCC 455 ]. Invoking Art.226 of the Constitution at this stage is plainly impermissible. Reliance was placed on Assistant Commissioner (Ct) Ltu, Kakinada & ors vs M/S Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Healthcare Limited [ 2020 (4) MLJ 652 ], State Bank of Travancore vs. Mathew K.C., [ (2018) 3 SCC 85 ], Thansingh Vs. Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri and others [ AIR 1964 SC 1419 ]. Assistant Commisioner (CT) Ltu, Kakinada & Others Vs M/s Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., [ 2020(4) MLJ 652 ] and Gurpreet Singh Vs Union of India [(2006) 8 SCC 257]. * The present claim is hit by delay and laches, which disentitle the petitioners to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhailal Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] and State Of Maharashtra vs Digambar [ AIR 1995 SC 1991 ]. * The present claim is hit by delay and laches, which disentitle the petitioners to invoke Article 226 of the Constitution. State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhailal Bhailal Bhai [ AIR 1964 SC 1006 ] and State Of Maharashtra vs Digambar [ AIR 1995 SC 1991 ]. This apart where a claim is barred by limitation (claim should have been within three years from the order in Chakrapani case), writ petition cannot be maintained. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary in character. Where a set of petitioners, themselves fence-sitters, and guilty of laches, and have waived or abandoned their right of claim, approach the Court invoking its writ jurisdiction beyond the period of limitation, discretion may not be exercised in their favour. Reliance was to the ratio in City & Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and others [ (2009) 1 SCC 168 ]. Submissions of the Amicus curiae: 9. To appreciate the submissions of the learned Amicus curiae, flip/scroll backwards to paragraphs 3.1 to 3.9 of this Order. His submissions are: * Post Chakrapani case, the Supreme Court passed an order in Sunita Mehra case [(2019) 17 SCC 672], and had directed payment of solatium and interest only for cases pending on the date of the judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Golden Iron & steel case. Despite this, the Supreme Court, in Tarsem Singh case, has held that the Government itself was of the view that solatium and interest should be granted for acquisitions between 1997 and 2015. In other words, the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not consider it fit to confine the relief to those cases pending on 28.03.2018, the date on which Punjab High Court passed its order in Golden Iron & Steel Forging v. Union of India [2008 SCC OnLine Punjab &Haryana 498]. * The consequences flowing from Tarsem Singh were examined and relied on by a Division Bench of this Court in Gandhimathi v The District Collector [W.A.(MD) 1680 of 2018]. The NHAI‘s efforts to assail this Order before the Supreme Court were in vain when the Court rejected it in limine vide its Order dated 25.02.2021. Therefore, the statutory obligation to pay solatium and interest has moved far beyond the orbit of Court hall debates. The NHAI‘s efforts to assail this Order before the Supreme Court were in vain when the Court rejected it in limine vide its Order dated 25.02.2021. Therefore, the statutory obligation to pay solatium and interest has moved far beyond the orbit of Court hall debates. * The plea of the NHAI that claim of solatium and interest cannot be considered since the awards of the statutory arbitrators have attained finality has already been rejected by the Division Bench of this Court in Pachamuthu and Gandhimathi cases. The precedential value of these judgments cannot be wished away. * So far as laches and delay goes, the decision of the Single Judge in Chakrapani case, came to be stayed by a Division Bench of this Court in a batch of appeals in W.A.2359 to 2388 of 2011 filed at the instance of the NHAI. Thereafter, the matter went to the Hon’ble Supreme Court and was eventually disposed of as per its Order dated 21.07.2016, based on the statement of the Solicitor General. (Ref: Paragraph 3.4 above). Its immediate effect was that the Order of the learned Single Judge of this Court merged with the Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide the ratio in Khoday Distilleries v Sri Mahadeshwara [ (2019) 4 SCC 376 ]. * Secondly, the final Order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court did not disturb the initial declaration of this Court that Sec.3-J of the Act was unconstitutional. A judgment of the High Court holding that a provision of a Central enactment as unconstitutional would operate pan India. Reliance was placed on the dictum in Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd v Union of India, [ (2004) 6 SCC 254 )]. The tenor of NHAI’s contention appears to indicate thatthe benefit of the judgments in Chakrapani case, or Pachamuthu’s case would be available only to the petitioners in those cases. * If a referential base-time is to be reckoned for deciding when the acquirer of private lands under the National Highways Act became obligated to pay compensation, it cannot but be 19.09.2019, the date on which judgment was pronounced by the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh case. It is settled law that a declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, operates retrospectively unless it is expressly made prospective. It is settled law that a declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, operates retrospectively unless it is expressly made prospective. Reliance was placed on the ratio in Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v Laxmi Devi [ (2009) 7 SCC 205 ] and Goan Real Estate v Union of India [ (2010) 5 SCC 388 ). And, there is no such indication in Tarsem Singh case that the Supreme Court has intended to make its dictum to operate only prospectively. Additionally, it may also be pointed out that the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution is that the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts and authorities in the country. If viewed thus, the NHAI cannot whittle down the scope of the judgment by resorting to selective cherry picking by claiming that it applies to some and not to others. The ratio in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Kanoria Industrial Ltd., [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ] was relied on. * The question of laches in respect of the claims made post the striking down of a provision of law was examined by the Supreme Court in D.Cawasji v State of Mysore [ (1975) 1 SCC 636 ]. The Supreme Court applied Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, and held that relief arising from the consequences of a mistake of law (i.e., a payment made under an unconstitutional provision) cannot be discovered before a judgment adjudging the validity of the law and the starting point of limitation for the purposes of a writ petition under Article 226 for consequential relief in such circumstances would run from the date on which any provision was declared unconstitutional. This judgment was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahabir Kishore v State of Madhya Pradesh [ (1989) 4 SCC 1 ] wherein the plea that the starting point of limitation commenced only from the date on which the judgment was published in the law reports was accepted. A similar plea of laches was raised and rejected by the Supreme Court in U.P Pollution Control Board v Kanoria Industrial Limited [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ] where the writ petitions were entertained and allowed for refund of water cess collected under a provision which was declared unconstitutional. A similar plea of laches was raised and rejected by the Supreme Court in U.P Pollution Control Board v Kanoria Industrial Limited [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ] where the writ petitions were entertained and allowed for refund of water cess collected under a provision which was declared unconstitutional. It is therefore clear that the period of limitation under Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, for seeking relief would arise only from 19.09.2019, the date of the Order in Tarsem Singh case. The present batch of cases appear to closely ally themselves with the ratio of U.P Pollution Control Board v Kanoria Industrial Limited [ (2001) 2 SCC 549 ]. * Recourse to Sec.34 of the A & C Act cannot be resorted to seek something which fall outside the scope of the authority of the CALA or the statutory arbitrator. When Section 3-J stood in the statute book, a claim for solatium and interest was not a claim “under the Act”, for the CALA and the statutory arbitrator were statutorily injuncted from applying Section 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 to those landowners who lost their lands under the National Highways Act. The procedural machinery under the Act can be utilised only to decide disputes that arise under the substantive provisions of the Act which are not ultra vires. Rejection of solatium and interest based on an unconstitutional provision is not a decision “under the Act”, hence the procedural mechanism provided under the National Highways Act is inapplicable. It implies that the petitions invoking Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in K.S Venkataraman v State of Madras [ AIR 1966 SC 1089 ], Bharat Kala Mandir v Municipal Committee, Dhamangaon [ AIR 1966 SC 249 ], and Mafatlal Industries Limited v Union of India [ (1997) 5 SCC 536 ]. The Discussion: 10. As the din of the arguments settle down to permeate into the deeper layers of contemplation, it becomes evident that the controversy seeks a solution not in evaluating the legitimacy of the claim of the petitioners, but in assessing the tenability of the NHAI’s defences. If the decision in the Chakrapani case does not aid the petitioners, the ratio of Tarsem Singh surely does. 11. The arrangement of defences by the NHAI is impressive, but they forsake novelty. If the decision in the Chakrapani case does not aid the petitioners, the ratio of Tarsem Singh surely does. 11. The arrangement of defences by the NHAI is impressive, but they forsake novelty. They are picked straight from the repertoire of standard(ised) defences: the pleas of waiver and the abandonment and those of limitation and laches with the fence sitter theory and rule of res judicata thrown in for good measure. These are rounded off with availability of alternate remedies and the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. None of these take on the entitlement, or the lack of it, of the petitioners to claim solatium and interest, but aim at avoiding a potential liability to pay. They do raise an issue on jurisdiction, but do they also camouflage any technical (or is it tactical?) escapism to manoevere through the consequences flowing from the decision of the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh? The endeavour of the Court will focus on this. 12. After the decision in Tarsem Singh it will be outlandish to contend that the landowners would not be entitled to solatium and interest, since the denial statutorily authorised by Sec.3-J is lifted. The effect of striking down Sec. 3-J is that it is deemed to have never existed or, to borrow the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 1955 SC 781 ] it is “still born .......”. Another facet of the impact-capability of a judicial decision is that, unless expressly declared otherwise, they always operate retrospectively. See: Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan v Laxmi Devi [ (2009) 7 SCC 205 ]. There is no indication in Tarsem Singh that the declaration of law would have only prospective effect. Therefore, the default rule in the Laxmi Devi case will apply. 13. The defences of the NHAI must be contextualised in the backdrop of the Right to Property under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Though this right originally shared a space in the club of freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f), it underwent a perceived relegation to a Constitutional right under Article 300A vide the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. 13. The defences of the NHAI must be contextualised in the backdrop of the Right to Property under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Though this right originally shared a space in the club of freedoms guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f), it underwent a perceived relegation to a Constitutional right under Article 300A vide the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. The Parliamentary intent was clear, yet it ended up becoming an optical illusion, since the right to property managed to crawl its way to occupy a vital space in the constantly expanding human rights jurisprudence, with the Court integrating it within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Vidya Devi v State of H.P. [ (2020) 2 SCC 569 ] the Supreme Court held: “12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution....” A school of Constitutional thought perceives that right to property is now on a firmer ground than before. Prof. P.K. Tripathi, in a seminal article titled “Right to Property After Forty Fourth Amendment -Better Protected Than Ever Before”[AIR 1980 Journal Section p.49], points out that by deleting Right to Property under Article 19(1)(f) and rehabilitating it in Article 300-A, the Parliament had unwittingly unshackled it from the rigours of Article 31-A which shielded certain laws from the dragnet of Articles 14,19 and 21 and the obligation to pay just compensation. He writes: “The net result, therefore, is that the right of the individual to receive compensation when his property is acquired or requisitioned by the State continues to be available in the form of an implied condition of the power of the State to legislate on “acquisition or requisitioning of property” while all the exceptions and limitations set up against and around it in Arts 31, 31A and 31B have disappeared.” In Lalaram v. Jaipur Development Authority [ (2016) 11 SCC 31 ], the Supreme Court holds: “124. The right to property though no longer a fundamental right is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The right to property though no longer a fundamental right is otherwise a zealous possession of which one cannot be divested save by the authority of law as is enjoined by Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Any callous inaction or apathy of the State and its instrumentalities, in securing just compensation would amount to dereliction of a constitutional duty, justifying issuance of writ of mandamus for appropriate remedial directions. 127. While recognising the power of the State to acquire the land of its citizens, it has been proclaimed in Dev Sharan, (2011) 4 SCC 769 , that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right and was never a natural right, it has to be accepted that without the right to property, other rights become illusory. 129. In summa, the right to property having been elevated to the status of human rights, it is inherent in every individual, and thus has to be venerably acknowledged and can, by no means, be belittled or trivialised by adopting an unconcerned and nonchalant disposition by anyone, far less the State, after compulsorily acquiring his land by invoking an expropriatory legislative mechanism. The judicial mandate of human rights dimension, thus, makes it incumbent on the State to solemnly respond to its constitutional obligation to guarantee that a land loser is adequately compensated. The proposition does not admit of any compromise or laxity.” In K.A.Ravindran Vs The District Collector, Vellore District & Ors. [ 2021(4) CTC 527], I had an occasion to hold: “…. In Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited v State of U.P [ 2011 9 SCC 354 ] the Supreme Court termed the right to property as a human right under Article 21 and alluded to it as the seed bed for securing other human freedoms such as liberty. The Supreme Court observed: “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed-bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.”