JUDGMENT : Jaspreet Singh,J. Heard Shri S. B. Pandey, learned A. S. G. assisted by Shri Deepanshu Dass for the petitioners and Km. Vishwa Mohini for the respondent. 2. By means of instant petition, the petitioners assail the order dated 19.02.2020 passed by the Presiding Officer Central Government, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Lucknow in L.C.A. No.02 of 2017 whereby the application filed by the private respondent has been allowed and the petitioners have been directed to pay a sum of Rs.5,95,453 within five weeks, failing which, the workman/private respondent shall be entitled to simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the order till the the date of actual payment. 3. While assailing the impugned order, two grounds have been raised by the learned ASG; (1) it is submitted that the order passed by the Central Government of Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as CGIT) is wholly without jurisdiction; inasmuch as this Court in the case of Vishambhar Dayal alias Vishmbhar Lal Vs. Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Kendhriya Bhawan & others in Writ Petition No.984 (M/S) of 2014 decided on 19.01.2017 had directed the Assistant Labour Commissioner to decide the dispute as provided under Section 33 (C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter was remanded to the Assistant Labour Commissioner for the aforesaid purpose after permitting the parties to lead evidence/ documents in respect of their version. Since the order passed by this Court dated 19.01.2017 directed the parties to appear before the Assistant Labour Commissioner but the private respondent made an application before the CGIT, hence the said order passed by the CGIT was without jurisdiction. (ii) It has further been urged that the CGIT did not grant any adequate opportunity to the petitioners to put up their case and even otherwise in terms of Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, once it was required to be ascertained how much amount is to be paid to the private respondent then it was incumbent upon the CGIT to have considered the case on its own merits and could not merely reply on the version of the private respondent because the petitioners did not file any evidence in rebuttal hence without testing the veracity of the claim of the private respondent it was not open for the CGIT to accept the version of the private respondent. On both the counts the Tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction with material irregularity and has also exceeded the jurisdiction vested in law, consequently the impugned order is a nullity and deserves to be set aside. 4. Learned counsel for the private respondent submits that the private respondent is the workman and has filed short counter-affidavit. Itt has been submitted that initially the private respondent was working as Group-D (Daily Wager) with the petitioners with effect from 14.07.1988 and his services were terminated from 01.06.1989. The private respondent had agitated the matter before the CGIT-cum-Labour Court at Kanpur through Industrial Dispute No.262 of 1990 wherein the termination of the petitioners was held to be illegal and an award was passed in his favour reinstating him with back wages vide award dated 02.06.1995. The petitioners assailed the said award before the High Court in Writ Petition NO.1055 (S/S) of 1996 which finally came to be dismissed by means of judgment dated 18.05.2012. 5. The petitioners further escalated the matter before the Apex Court and vide judgment dated 04.02.2013 the SLP preferred by the petitioners was also dismissed and thus the award dated 02.06.1995 became final. 6. As per the private respondent since he was reinstated with all back wages he claimed a sum of Rs.8,60,351/= but the petitioners paid a sum of Rs.37,406/= only. Thereafter again on 04.06.2013 the petitioners pait a further sum of Rs.2,27,492/=. The private respondent after adjusting the amount so paid to him still claimed a sum of Rs.5,95,453/=. 7. Since in the award dated 02.06.1995 the total amount had not been computed, accordingly the private respondent had made an application before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Lucknow regarding the aforesaid demand. The Assistant Labour Commissioner did not pass any order and by means of order dated 25.07.2013 closed the proceedings. This was assailed by the private respondent by preferring Writ Petition No.984 (M/S) of 2014 before this Court which was allowed by means of a judgment dated 19.01.2017 and the matter was remanded to the Assistant Labour Commissioner to decide afresh after permitting the parties to lead evidence and documents in support of their version. 8. After the remand the private respondent approached the CGIT who took notice of the application of the private respondent and issued notice to the petitioners. 8. After the remand the private respondent approached the CGIT who took notice of the application of the private respondent and issued notice to the petitioners. Despite service the petitioners though appeared before the CGIT, however, failed to raise any defence and finally the order came to be passed which has now been assailed by the petitioners. 9. It is further submitted that the petitioners had not raised any issue regarding jurisdiction before the CGIT and had succumbed to the jurisdiction and now they are prevented from raising any dispute before this Court. The petition is devoid of merits and an endeavour is being made to harass the private respondent and the fruits of the award passed in his favour dated 02.06.1995 is being deprived keeping the private respondent embroiled in compulsive litigation. 10. The Court has considered the rival submissions and has also perused the record. Since the pleadings have been exchanged and the point involved is a short once, hence with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the matter is being decided finally at the admission stage itself. 11. The facts in issue are not in dispute; inasmuch as that the private respondent had been working with the petitioners whose services were terminated on 01.06.1989. The private respondent had preferred an Industrial Dispute Case No.262 of 1990 wherein his termination was held to be illegal and the private respondent was awarded reinstatement with back wages vide award dated 02.06.1995. 12. It is also not disputed that the said award dated 02.06.1995 though assailed by the petitioners before this Court as well as the Apex Court unsuccessfully, hence the award dated 02.06.1995 attained finality. 13. It is also not disputed that since the quantum of back wages had not been computed in the award dated 02.06.1995, consequently the private respondent had moved an application under Section 33 (C)(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act before the Assistant Labour Commissioner. The Assistant Labour Commissioner had closed the proceedings which was assailed by the private respondent before this Court and by means of order dated 19.01.2017 the matter was remanded to the Assistant Labour Commissioner. 14. The Assistant Labour Commissioner had closed the proceedings which was assailed by the private respondent before this Court and by means of order dated 19.01.2017 the matter was remanded to the Assistant Labour Commissioner. 14. It is also not disputed that after the remand the private respondent instead of approaching the Assistant Labour Commissioner made the said application under Section 33(C) (2) of the Industrial Dispute Act before the CGIT who by means of the impugned order has allowed the application of the private respondent directing the petitioners to pay a sum of Rs.5,95,453/= alngwith interest as provided therein. 15. The issue raised by the learned A.S.G. is that once the High Court by means of order dated 19.01.2017 had remanded the matter to the Assistant Labour Commissioner then in the such circumstances whether the CGIT could exercise the jurisdiction and pass the impugned order. 16. According to the learned A.S.G., the order is wholly without jurisdiction. Since the order of the High Court had conferred the jurisdiction on the Assistant Labour Commissioner and thus the Assistant Labour Commissioner alone could have exercised the powers. Moreover, even assuming the CGIT did not have jurisdiction even then the private respondent ought to have either got order passed by the High Court corrected and then would have made an application before the CGIT but in absence thereof the order passed by the CGIT is bad. 17. The other submission of the learned A.S.G. is that the CGIT while considering the case under Section 33(C)(2 of the Industrial Disputes Act was required to make a determination of the amount which was liable to be paid to the private respondent. 18. It is further urged that from the perusal of the impugned order, it does not indicate whether any determination has been made and merely accepting the version of private respondent the Tribunal has erred and passing the impugned order. 19. The learned A.S.G. has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Prokash Chandra Mukherjee and others Vs. Saradindu Kumar Mukherjee of Choudhury para Roa, Barasat and others reported in 1971 (3) SCC page 607 and Supdt. of Taxes Dhubri and others Vs. M/s. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust reported in 1976 (1) SCC page 766 to buttress his submission that a wrong order passed by the court should not cause prejudice to any party. 20. Saradindu Kumar Mukherjee of Choudhury para Roa, Barasat and others reported in 1971 (3) SCC page 607 and Supdt. of Taxes Dhubri and others Vs. M/s. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust reported in 1976 (1) SCC page 766 to buttress his submission that a wrong order passed by the court should not cause prejudice to any party. 20. This Court considering the submission and from the record finds that the first submission raised by the learned A.S.G. on the point of the jurisdiction is not sustainable. The learned A.S.G. could not dispute the fact that the award dated 02.06.1995 was passed by the CGIT-cum-Labour Court. 21. The learned A.S.G. also could not dispute that the award did not contain the amount which was payable to private respondent. In such a case if the private respondent had to make an application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such an application would ordinarily lie before the CGIT. 22. In so far as the decision relied upon by the learned A.S.G. is concerned, the same has got no applicability in the present facts and circumstances; inasmuch as it is not a case whether the Court has passed an erroneous order prejudicing the rights of any party. 23. In the aforesaid backdrop what needs to be considered is whether by the order dated 19.01.2017 the High Court could have conferred the jurisdiction on a forum which otherwise did not so possess. 24. This issue may not detain this Court for long; inasmuch as the issue regarding jurisdiction is now fairly settled by the Apex Court that the High Curt cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court or an authority which does not possess jurisdiction. As the parties by acquiescence or consent cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court or authority which in law does not so possess. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd and others reported in 2006 (1) SCC page 364 and the relevant portion of the aforesaid decision reads as under:- "30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. DLF Universal Ltd and others reported in 2006 (1) SCC page 364 and the relevant portion of the aforesaid decision reads as under:- "30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity. 31. In Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Reissue, Vol. 10, para 317, it is stated: 317. Consent and waiver.—Where, by reason of any limitation imposed by a statute, charter or commission, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular claim or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court, nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. Where the court has jurisdiction over the particular subject-matter of the claim or the particular parties and the only objection is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the court ought to exercise jurisdiction, the parties may agree to give jurisdiction in their particular case; or a defendant by entering an appearance without protest, or by taking steps in the proceedings, may waive his right to object to the court taking cognizance of the proceedings. No appearance or answer, however, can give jurisdiction to a limited court, nor can a private individual impose on a judge the jurisdiction or duty to adjudicate on a matter. A statute limiting the jurisdiction of a court may contain provisions enabling the parties to extend the jurisdiction by consent.” 25. No appearance or answer, however, can give jurisdiction to a limited court, nor can a private individual impose on a judge the jurisdiction or duty to adjudicate on a matter. A statute limiting the jurisdiction of a court may contain provisions enabling the parties to extend the jurisdiction by consent.” 25. The Apex Court in the case of Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others Vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana and others reported in 2013 (10) SCC page 136 has considered the issue of jurisdiction and the relevant paras 9 and 11 of the aforesaid decision reads as under:- "9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a court/tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetrate and perpetuate defeating of the legislative animation. The court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen [ AIR 1951 SC 230 ] , Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan [ (1978) 1 SCC 58 : AIR 1978 SC 22 ] , Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios [ (1981) 1 SCC 523 ] and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] .) 11. The law does not permit any court/tribunal/authority/forum to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such an authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject-matter. For the reason that it is not an objection as to the place of suing; “it is an objection going to the nullity of the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction”. Thus, for assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the court or tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory facts or facts in issue. Thus, for assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the court or tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory facts or facts in issue. (Vide Setrucherla Ramabhadraraju v. Maharaja of Jeypore [(1918-19) 46 IA 151 : (1919) 10 LW 362 : AIR 1919 PC 150 ] , State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot [ (1996) 5 SCC 477 : AIR 1996 SC 2664 ] , Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. [ (2005) 7 SCC 791 : AIR 2005 SC 4446 ] and Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons [ (2007) 8 SCC 559 : AIR 2008 SC 187 ] .)" 26. Thus this issue is not open for the petitioners to raise since admittedly the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Section 33(C)(2) of Industrial Disputes Act vested with the CGIT. 27. Another aspect which needs to be noticed is that though the petitioners had appeared before the CGIT and repeatedly sought a adjournments on more than six dates but never raised any objection regarding the jurisdiction nor it made any effort to get the order of the High Court dated 09.01.2017 corrected. Now once the order has been passed against the petitioners, the aforesaid issue of jurisdiction is being raised which in light of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court in the case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi (supra) and Jagmittar Sain (supra) is not open for the petitioners and for the said reason the aforesaid contention of the learned A.S.G. does not have merit and is accordingly turned down. 28. The other limb of the submission that the CGIT while entertaining the application under Section 33(C)(2) ought to have determined the amount considering the material before it whereas the petitioners had disputed the aforesaid sum. It is also sought to be submitted that the Presiding Officer of the CGIT had taken umbrage and did not even accept the reply filed by the petitioners and proceeded in an ex parte fashion relying upon the averments made by the private respondent only. It is also sought to be submitted that the Presiding Officer of the CGIT had taken umbrage and did not even accept the reply filed by the petitioners and proceeded in an ex parte fashion relying upon the averments made by the private respondent only. In these circumstances, the petitioners have been deprived of an opportunity of placing the true and correct facts so that the appropriate amount could be determined to be paid to the private respondent and that the private respondent may not be unjustly enriched merely on account of default of the petitioners. 29. Considering this aspect of the matter, let it be noted that the petitioners in pragraph 24 of the writ petition has stated that the Presiding Officer of the CGIT became prejudiced and did not record the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners appearing before it and the petitioners had filed its counter reply under a postal receipt with CGIT, a copy of the counter reply alongwith postal receipt has been filed as annexure no.7 with the writ petition. 30. Apparently from the perusal of the covering letter which has been brought on record as annexure no.7 dated 30.08.2018 though is addressed to the Presiding Officer of the CGIT and it also refers to the LCA Case No.2 of 2017 (Vishamber Lal Vs. Post Officer) (Union of India) and further states that please finds enclosed herewith, the counter reply submitted for necessary action. However, the postal receipt appended with the said covering letter is not addressed to the Presiding Officer of the CGIT rather it is addressed to Shri R. K. Singh, resident of Gomti Nagar. 31. A pin pointed query was put whether the petitioners had submitted or sent the said counter-affidavit through post to the Presiding Officer of the CGIT. The petitioners could not give any satisfactory reply and apparently from the perusal of paragraph nos.19 and 20 of the writ petition it appears that a misstatement has been made to give an impression as if the Presiding Officer of the CGIT has not taken note of the counter reply sent by the petitioners under postal receipt and addressed to the CGIT. This is apparently a sharp practice, hence for the said reason this Court does not find any merit in the submission that the Presiding Officer did not give adequate apparently to contest or that he was prejudiced. This is apparently a sharp practice, hence for the said reason this Court does not find any merit in the submission that the Presiding Officer did not give adequate apparently to contest or that he was prejudiced. 32. Be that as it may, the issue as to whether the CGIT has considered the views before passing the impugned is also not borne out from the record for the simple reason that since the petitioners had not participated in the proceedings though they had appeared on more than five dates but repeatedly sought adjournment, therefore, the Presiding Officer had only the version submitted by the private respondent to consider and noticing the same, the impugned order has been passed. 33. However, it is equally true that there is no discussion on the issue regarding the quantum as determined by the CGIT. It ought to have considered the said issue in a fashion which indicated the application of judicial mind to the said aspect as even without the petitioner, the CGIT ought to have considered the veracity of the claim of the private respondent. 34. In the aforesaid backdrop without entering into the merits and in order to do the substantial justice without prejudicing the case of either of the parties, this Court finds that ends of justice can be served if the impugned order is set aside and the petitioner is directed to appear before the CGIT and furnish its reply regarding the quantum in reply to the working sheet (its computation) given by the private respondent within a period of two weeks from today. In case if such objections are filed within the time aforesaid then the private respondent shall have ten days thereafter to file its response thereto and thereafter CGIT shall consider and decide the same most expeditiously preferably within a period of three weeks thereafter. However, it shall be noted that no adjournment shall be granted to either of the parties except in exceptional circumstances. However, it shall be noted that no adjournment shall be granted to either of the parties except in exceptional circumstances. Since the private respondents who has been contesting the proceedings since long i.e. since 1995 and is being relegated again before the CGIT and solely at the behest of the petitioners, accordingly the private respondent shall be entitled to a cost of Rs.50,000.00 which shall be paid by the petitioners to the respondent within two weeks from today and only after payment is made to the private respondent will the petitioners be entitled to get his objections decided on merits before the CGIT. 35. With the aforesaid, the impugned order dated 19.02.2020 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the CGIT to decide the issue afresh strictly in accordance with the direction given in this order within the time span mentioned in this judgment. 36. With the aforesaid directions, the petition is allowed.