JUDGMENT : John Michael Cunha, J. This appeal is filed by accused No.1 challenging the judgment of conviction dated 04.09.2015 and order of sentence dated 07.09.2015 passed by the III-Additional Sessions Judge, Vijayapur in S.C.No.155/2011. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'accused No.1') is convicted for the offences punishable under sections 498A, 302, 364, 304B, 316 of IPC read with section 34 of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and is sentenced to imprisonment for life and various other terms of imprisonment and fine. 2. The appellant along with two other accused namely, accused Nos.2 and 3 were sent up for trial on the allegation that the appellant (accused No.1) being the husband of the deceased Shivabai was ill-treating and harassing her demanding additional dowry. On 13.05.2011 at around 10.00 a.m. he took the deceased from the house of the complainant PW-1 on the pretext of taking her for harvesting onion crop along with accused Nos.2 and 3. On the same day around 6.00 p.m. PW-2 the mother of the deceased found the dead body of the deceased lying in the sugar cane field of the complainant with her neck strangulated with her saree. She informed the matter to the father of the deceased. He lodged a report (Ex.P-1) before Babaleshwar Police Station, based on which FIR was registered against the appellant and two other accused persons under sections 302, 304B read with section 34 of IPC. As the deceased was pregnant for seven months at the time of the alleged incident and the fetus having died in the womb and the deceased having met with an unnatural death within seven years from the date of her marriage, charge sheet was laid against all the three accused persons for the offences punishable under sections 498A, 302, 304B, 316, 364 read with section 34 of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. The accused having denied the charges, the prosecution examined 16 witnesses (PWs-1 to 16) to bring home the guilt of the accused and produced in evidence 12 documents marked as Exs.P-1 to P-12 and material objects as M.Os.1 to 3. During the examination of prosecution witnesses, the portion of their statements were marked as Exs.D1 to D8 on behalf of the accused. The accused denied the incriminating evidence produced by the prosecution and did not enter into specific defence. During the examination of prosecution witnesses, the portion of their statements were marked as Exs.D1 to D8 on behalf of the accused. The accused denied the incriminating evidence produced by the prosecution and did not enter into specific defence. 4. Considering the above material, the trial court came to the conclusion that the testimony of PW-14, PW-9 and PW-1 suffer from material contradictions; the contents of Ex.P-1 complaint did not depict that accused Nos.2 and 3 were residing and living with accused No.1 and the deceased and that they were also instrumental in ill-treating and harassing the deceased. The trial court was of the opinion that the evidence on record proved that it was accused No.1 alone who harassed and ill-treated and subjected the deceased to cruelty for not satisfying the demand for dowry and further held that the evidence of PW-6 was not sufficient to hold that accused Nos.2 and 3 were also seen in the company of the deceased immediately prior to her death and consequently found it proper to convict accused No.1 alone for the offences punishable under sections 498A, 302, 304B, 316, 364 of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, and acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 of all the above charges for want of evidence. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant/accused No1. has preferred this appeal, inter alia contending that the findings recorded by the trial court are contrary to the evidence on record; that the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in proper perspective; there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and the evidence let in by the prosecution did not establish conclusively any circumstance pointing out the guilt of the accused either for the alleged act of cruelty or for the alleged murder of the deceased. It is further contended that the medical evidence adduced by the prosecution is inconsistent to the ocular testimony of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. Even though it is the case of the prosecution that the deceased was done to death by strangulation, the material used for strangulation was neither seized nor any opinion was secured from the medical officer who conducted the postmortem examination to show that the deceased died due to smothering as noted in the postmortem report. Even though it is the case of the prosecution that the deceased was done to death by strangulation, the material used for strangulation was neither seized nor any opinion was secured from the medical officer who conducted the postmortem examination to show that the deceased died due to smothering as noted in the postmortem report. The opinion of the medical officer that the deceased died about 36 hours prior to the commencement of the postmortem examination is contrary to the case of the prosecution that the deceased was taken from the house of the complainant by accused No.1 at about 10.00 a.m. on 13.05.2011, thereby rendering the case of the prosecution susceptible to doubt. 6. It is further contended that the trial court having disbelieved the evidence of PW-6 and having acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3, ought not to have convicted the appellant/accuse No.1 on the same set of evidence. In the course of his argument, learned counsel for the appellant by referring to the relevant portion of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses highlighted the discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and by placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy & Anr. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2006) 10 SCC 172 sought for acquittal of the accused. 7. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor, argued in support of the impugned judgment contending that in the absence of any eyewitness to the incident the prosecution has conclusively established the following circumstances pointing out the guilt of the accused namely: i. The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused as established by the evidence of PWs-2, 5 and 6. ii. The motive for the commission of offence, substantiated by the evidence of PWs-1, 2 and 3, the immediate relatives of the deceased and PWs-4 and 7 the independent panchayatdars who have spoken about the ill-treatment meted out to the deceased by accused No.1 on account of her physical handicap and also for her failure to satisfy the demand made by the accused for additional dowry. iii. The factum of the homicidal death as established by the inquest mahazar Ex.P-1 and the contents of the postmortem report Ex.P-12 and the testimony of PW-16 the Medical Officer who conducted postmortem examination. iv. iii. The factum of the homicidal death as established by the inquest mahazar Ex.P-1 and the contents of the postmortem report Ex.P-12 and the testimony of PW-16 the Medical Officer who conducted postmortem examination. iv. The factum of the unnatural death having taken place within seven years from the date of marriage and the presumption under section 113(B) of the Indian Evidence Act. v. The abscondance of the accused ever since the date of commission of the offence. 8. In support of his submission, learned Addl. SPP has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pattu Rajan vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2019) 4 SCC 771 . 9. We have bestowed our anxious thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have carefully analysed the oral and documentary evidence available on record. There are no eyewitnesses to the incident. The prosecution has rested its case exclusively on circumstantial evidence. The first and foremost circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the factum of accused No.1 taking away the deceased from the house of PW-1 on the date of the incident. This circumstance has been projected as the last seen circumstance to connect the accused to the death of the deceased. 10. On going through the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find that there is acceptable evidence to show that on the date of the incident i.e. on 13.05.2011 at about 10.00 a.m. accused No.1 had come to the house of the complainant and took away the deceased with him. This fact has been spoken to by PW-2 the mother of the deceased and her testimony in this regard has not been discredited in the cross-examination. Her evidence finds suitable corroboration in the testimony of PW-1 as well as the contents of Ex.P-1 wherein it is clearly stated that on the date of incident, PW-1 and his first wife had gone to their in-law's house and in the evening when they returned home, they were informed by PW-2 Boramma that around 10.00 a.m. accused No.1 took away the deceased with him on the pretext of harvesting onion crop and at about 6.00 p.m. when she had gone to the field to collect fodder for the cows, she found the dead body of the deceased lying in the sugar cane field. But the question is whether this evidence could be taken as the sufficient proof of the last seen circumstance pressed into service by the prosecution? 11. It is now well settled that the circumstance of the deceased and the accused last seen together could be considered as a circumstance to connect the accused to the death of the deceased, provided the time gap between the deceased and the accused last seen and the discovery of the dead body was so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime is ruled out. 12. In the instant case, the case of the prosecution right from inception is that the deceased was last seen in the company of accused Nos.1, 2 and 3. Though in the complaint it is stated that accused No.1 alone took the deceased with him from the house of PWs-1 and 2, but in her evidence PW-2 has improved her version stating that while the deceased was being taken away by accused No.1, accused Nos.2 and 3 were also present with him. PW-6 the co-brother of the complainant, has stated that on his way to the house of the complainant, he found accused Nos.1 to 3 in the company of the deceased. Though the trial court has not believed the evidence of PW-6, yet the circumstances projected by the prosecution indicate that the deceased was last seen in the company of three accused persons. This evidence, negates the theory that the deceased was last seen in the company of accused No.1 alone. If the deceased was last seen in the company of three persons, in the absence of any further evidence to show that two other persons parted company at any point of time prior to the commission of the offence, it is not safe to hold this evidence only against accused No.1. Accused Nos.2 and 3 having been acquitted of all the charges including the charge of the murder, in our view, accused No.1 cannot be convicted on the very same set of evidence. That apart, the time gap between accused No.1 taking away the deceased with him at about 10.00 a.m. in the morning and tracing the dead body at around 6.00 p.m. in the open field is so large, the possibility of any other person committing the murder of the deceased cannot be ruled out. That apart, the time gap between accused No.1 taking away the deceased with him at about 10.00 a.m. in the morning and tracing the dead body at around 6.00 p.m. in the open field is so large, the possibility of any other person committing the murder of the deceased cannot be ruled out. Therefore, from this evidence, it is not safe to hold that accused No.1 alone was last seen with the deceased as sought to be made out by the prosecution. When the case is based on circumstantial evidence, each circumstance forming the chain of circumstances must be conclusively proved by the prosecution. The evidence discussed above, in our opinion, is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that accused No.1 alone was last seen in the company of the deceased. As a result, we hold that the prosecution has failed to prove this circumstance. 13. Even the medical opinion relied on by the prosecution, in our considered view, does not support the case of the prosecution. On careful examination of the entire evidence on record, we find that the circumstance brought out in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses indicate that the deceased was seen alive by PW-2 around 10.00 a.m. on 13.05.2011. The dead body of the deceased was found by her in the sugar cane field at around 6.00 p.m. According to PW-2 when she saw the dead body, the mouth of the deceased was gagged with saree and her neck was strangulated with her saree; but none of these facts are noted either in the spot mahazar or in the inquest mahazar. On the other hand, the material on record point out that the inquest over the dead body was conducted on 14.05.2011 between 8.30 a.m. and 9.30 a.m. in the mortuary at AMC, Vijaypur and thereafter the spot panchanama was drawn up between 1.00 p.m. and 2.00 p.m. on 14.05.2011. In this background, if the evidence of PW-16, the Medical Officer who conducted postmortem examination is perused, according to PW-16 he conducted the postmortem examination between 10.00 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. on 14.05.2011. On examination he found that the dead body was distended, disfigured, discoloured, decomposed, foul smell was present, post mortem blebs were present front of top of the chest, front of abdomen, front of upper limbs, front of lower limbs patchily. On examination he found that the dead body was distended, disfigured, discoloured, decomposed, foul smell was present, post mortem blebs were present front of top of the chest, front of abdomen, front of upper limbs, front of lower limbs patchily. Marbling present over both the shoulder giracle, from of chest, front of abdomen, front of upper part of both the thighs. According to PW-16 he found the following external injuries: 1) Contused abrasion over right region measuring 3 cm x 2 cm 2) Contused abrasion over right side outer aspect of mandible measuring 2 cm x 2 cm 3) Contused abrasion front of top of thyroid cartilage measuring 5 x 3 cm 4) Contused over lower lip all over. 5) Contused abrasion front of middle of lower part of lower lip measuring 4 x 2 cm 6) Contused abrasion over middle of chin measuring 4 x 3 cm 7) Contused over right side of front of chest measuring 3 x 2 cm. 14. On dissection of the dead body, he found pharynx and oesophagus contused at places, stomach contained 70 ml semi digested groundnuts, bladder was empty, uterus contained dead female foetus measuring 31 cm. According to PW-16 all the injuries were ante mortem and death was due to asphyxia as a result of smothering. 15. In the cross-examination of PW-16, it was elicited that 36 hours after the death, decomposition of the body would start and rigor mortis will start disappearing. PW-16 admitted in the cross-examination that he has not mentioned in Ex.P-12 the time since the death of the deceased Shivabai and he has not mentioned the area on which the contusion abrasion was present on the neck. The above answers, therefore, would go to show that death had taken place at least 36 hours prior to the commencement of postmortem examination at 10.00 a.m. on 14.05.2011. If this evidence is taken into account, in all probability, the deceased might have died any time earlier to 10.00 p.m. on 12.05.2011. This timing appears to be more probable as the evidence of PW-16 suggests that the dead body was in the state of decomposition and foul smell was emanating therefrom, which according to PW-16 would take at least 36 hours from the time of death. This timing appears to be more probable as the evidence of PW-16 suggests that the dead body was in the state of decomposition and foul smell was emanating therefrom, which according to PW-16 would take at least 36 hours from the time of death. All these circumstances, falsify the case of the prosecution that the deceased was taken from the house of PWs-1 and 2 at about 10.00 a.m. on 13.05.2011 by accused No.1 and thereafter she was found dead in sugar cane field of PW-1. In the light of these evidence, we are not inclined to accept the case of the prosecution that accused No.1 committed the murder of the deceased. 16. The evidence produced by the prosecution, in our view, is not sufficient to conclusively establish any of the circumstances projected by the prosecution. Eventhough the learned Addl. SPP has contended that the abscondance of the accused is also one of the circumstances pointing out the guilt of the accused, but the circumstances of the case indicate that after registration of FIR, no efforts were made by the Investigating Agency to trace the accused. PW-15 the PSI who registered the FIR has merely stated that on 18.05.2011 he arrested the accused in Jamkhandi bus stand and produced him before the Investigating Officer PW-14. PW-14 has nowhere stated that accused No.1 has been absconding and that he had made any efforts to trace him. On the other hand, his evidence goes to show that after effecting the arrest, he recorded the voluntary statement of accused No.1 but no recovery was effected at the instance of accused No.1. It is also not the case of the prosecution that based on the voluntary statement of accused No.1 he showed the place of murder or the place where the dead body was dumped. In the absence of any such evidence, even the factum of abscondance cannot be considered as a circumstance connecting the accused to the death of the deceased. As a result, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove any of the circumstances connecting the accused to the death of the deceased rendering him culpable for the alleged offences punishable under sections 302, 304B, 364, 316 of IPC. 17. As a result, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove any of the circumstances connecting the accused to the death of the deceased rendering him culpable for the alleged offences punishable under sections 302, 304B, 364, 316 of IPC. 17. Eventhough the father and mother of the deceased namely PWs-1 and 2 and her uncle PW-6 have generally stated that accused No.1 was subjecting the deceased to cruelty in the matrimonial home for not satisfying the demand for additional dowry, yet the evidence of the witnesses in this regard is too general and bald in nature. None of the witnesses have narrated any specific instance of cruelty by accused No.1 within the meaning of section 498A of IPC. These allegations appears to have been pressed into service only after the unnatural death of the deceased. In any case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution, in our considered opinion, is not convincing to record conviction of accused No.1 for the offences punishable under section 498A of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 18. On going through the impugned judgment, we find that the trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence adduced by the prosecution in proper perspective. The inferences drawn by the trial court are not based on legal evidence. The trial court has recorded its findings solely on assumptions and surmises without any regard for legal proof. It is noticed that the trial court, after considering the evidence of PW-6 in the backdrop of Ex.D-8 has observed that "if the Ex.D-8 is to be believed, then the oral evidence of PW-6 that he saw the accused Nos.1 to 3 proceeding on the way in state of fear on their face is improbable to be believed. The appreciation of oral evidence of PW.6, PW.14 and contents of Ex.D.7 and Ex.D.8 proves that the prosecution has not proved the fact that PW.6 Ramanna Godhali did saw the accused Nos.2 & 3 along with accused No.1 in the company of Shivbai on Nandyal road while he was proceeding towards the house of Malappa and also he saw the accused Nos.1 to 3 returning in hurry in state of fear on their face towards village while the PW.1 was returning from the house of PW.1 after taking tea, much-less, as deposed by the PW.6. Therefore, it is made clear that the prosecution during the course of evidence made an attempt to improve the prosecution version that PW.6 Ramanna Godhali is a witness who last seen the accused Nos.1 to 3 in the company of deceased Shivbai." 19. In the wake of above finding and having acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 of the alleged offences, the learned Sessions Judge could not have held accused No.1 guilty of the offences punishable under sections 498A, 302, 304B, 316, 364 of IPC read with section 34 of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. On re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the clear view that none of the circumstances projected by the prosecution have been proved cogently and conclusively forming a chain of circumstance leading to hypothesis of the guilt of accused No.1. The impugned judgment therefore has turned out to be perverse and unsustainable under law and circumstances of the case. 20. For the above reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction dated 04.09.2015 and order of sentence dated 07.09.2015 passed by the III-Additional Sessions Judge, Vijayapur in S.C.No.155/2011, insofar as accused No.1 is concerned. Consequently, accused No.1 (Pandu S/o Mallappa Kokatnur) is acquitted of the charges under sections 498A, 302, 304B, 316, 364 read with section 34 of IPC and sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. He is directed to be set at large forthwith, if not required in any other case. The fine amount, if any, deposited with the court, shall be returned to the appellant/accused No.1.