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2021 DIGILAW 272 (MAD)

C. Amutha v. Shankar

2021-01-22

ABDUL QUDDHOSE, N.KIRUBAKARAN

body2021
ORDER : N. Kirubakaran, J. 1. Can the State discriminate its own citizens? Can there be a different set of rules for different citizens? Can there be any justification for treating the petitioner's son differently, denying the benefits which have been granted to the convicts in Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case? 2. The State is supposed to act fairly without any discrimination. If there are different rules applicable to a group of persons, there should be a reasonable nexus with the object of granting benefits to the said persons. The State cannot, at its own whims and fancies have different yardsticks while granting premature release/commutation of life imprisonment and denying the benefit under G.O. Ms. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018. 3. The petitioner's son was convicted under Section 302 IPC for life imprisonment and one year Simple Imprisonment under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Indian Arms Act in S.C. No. 50/1998 by the Principal District Court, Dharmapuri on 25.08.1999. The said conviction was confirmed in Criminal Appeal No. 761/1999 by this Court. The petitioner's son has been detained in Central Prison, Salem as Prisoner No. 4787 for the past 16 years without any bad antecedents and in fact, he has been teaching yoga for the co-prisoners for the past 8 years. 4. The State passed an order under G.O. Ms. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018 by which the prisoners who are detained in prison for more than 10 years can be considered for premature release and the cut-off period for such convicts is completion of 10 years on or before 25.10.2018. As the petitioner's son had already completed 10 years viz., 16 years in prison, the petitioner made a representation to the respondent on 31.07.2018 for premature release. As the said representation was not considered, the petitioner filed H.C.P. No. 2099/2018 seeking a direction to the respondent to produce the petitioner's son namely, C. Senthil, S/o. Chinnasamy Gounder, life convict No. 4787 and directing the respondents to consider him under G.O. Ms. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018 for the premature release. 5. As the said representation was not considered, the petitioner filed H.C.P. No. 2099/2018 seeking a direction to the respondent to produce the petitioner's son namely, C. Senthil, S/o. Chinnasamy Gounder, life convict No. 4787 and directing the respondents to consider him under G.O. Ms. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018 for the premature release. 5. When the matter was argued before this Court, it was represented by the learned Public Prosecutor that the petitioner's son was not only convicted under the Sections of IPC but also under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Indian Arms Act which is a Central Act and therefore, the consent of the Central Government is also required as per Section 35 of Cr.P.C. Hence, he would submit that the petitioner's son is not entitled to premature release under G.O. Ms. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018. The learned Public Prosecutor would also submit that the Superintendent of Police, Salem Central Prison had already rejected the petitioner's representation vide order dated 25.09.2018. However, Mr. Mohammed Saifulla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner referred to the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court made in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination case viz., Union of India vs. Sriharan @ Murugan and others in W.P.(Crl). No. 48 of 2014 with Crl. M.P. No. 6280 to 6281 of 2017, dated 06.09.2018 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the petition has been filed under Article 161 of the Constitution before the Government of Tamil Nadu and the authority concerned would be at liberty to decide the said application as deemed fit. Taking note of the above order, this Court made it clear that there is no prohibition for the State Government to make recommendation for premature release as the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the State Government has got power to decide about the matters where the offences under the Central Act are involved. In the light of the above decision, this Court had set aside the order passed by the third respondent dated 25.09.2018 and directed the third respondent to reconsider the issue afresh and the same shall be forwarded to the committee/board within a period of six weeks and the board has to take a decision has per law. The said order was passed by this Court on 20.09.2019. Alleging that the aforesaid order dated 26.09.2018 has been violated, the present contempt petition has been filed. 6. The said order was passed by this Court on 20.09.2019. Alleging that the aforesaid order dated 26.09.2018 has been violated, the present contempt petition has been filed. 6. When the matter was moved, notice was taken on behalf of the Government. After filing of the contempt petition, Government passed G.O.(D). No. 249, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 04.03.2019 rejecting the petitioner's representation on the ground that the prison authority has not recommended the case of the petitioner's son. However, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order is not in consonance with the order passed by this Court. Thereafter, when the matter was called on 13.06.2019, the learned Advocate General on instructions from the Jail Superintendent submitted that reports have been sought from the District Collector and there was a delay in getting the report. It was also submitted that after getting the report, a date would be fixed for the meeting of the Advisory Committee members on 18.06.2019 and a decision would be taken on the said date and the said decision would be forwarded to the Government for consideration. Taking note of the said averments, this Court directed the Government to take a decision within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the report of the Advisory Committee which was scheduled to meet on 18.06.2019. 7. When the matter was again called on 05.07.2019, it was represented by the learned Advocate General that a positive decision has been taken by the Advisory Committee and it has been forwarded to the Government which required two weeks time to pass appropriate orders. 8. Again when the matter was called on 26.07.2019, it was represented that the Government passed G.O.(D). No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 stating that the request of the petitioner would not be sustainable as the petitioner's son murdered one Periyaraj in day light in a public place by using unlicensed gun to take revenge for killing of his father Chinnasamy, in a planned move, knowing fully well the consequences of the crime and therefore, he is not entitled to premature release. 9. When the order was produced before this Court, this Court pointed out the different stand taken by the Government in recommending the premature release of the other assassins of Rajiv Gandhi and the case of the petitioner's son. 9. When the order was produced before this Court, this Court pointed out the different stand taken by the Government in recommending the premature release of the other assassins of Rajiv Gandhi and the case of the petitioner's son. Thereafter, learned Advocate General as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner advanced their arguments. 10. Mr. Mohammed Saifulla, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Government cannot take different stands extending the benefit to one set of people and denying the same to the petitioner's son. He would rely upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of S. Dhanalakshmi v. State, reported in (2019) 1 MWN [Cri] 26 in which the benefit of premature release was denied on the ground that the prisoner's safety is at risk and this Court held that the possibility of harm to the family members of the deceased although the prisoner has been in prison for 16 years could be seen as unreasonable. 11. Another judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in (2000) 2 Supreme Court cases 595, Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, wherein the order of the Government rejecting the premature release on the ground of objections raised by the police for the chance of convict committing the crime again. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has been released on parole 35 times without escort, however he has not committed any adverse act. Moreover, he has got a good record in prison and he has been teaching yoga to the prisoners for the past 8 years. The learned counsel would further submit that the G.O. Ms. No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 is discriminative, arbitrary and based on different consideration which is in violation of the order passed by this Court. Therefore, he would submit that the order has to be set aside and the respondent should be punished for the contempt of Court. 13. The learned Advocate General would submit that taking into consideration all the material facts only, G.O. Ms. No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 has been passed. Therefore, he would submit that the order has to be set aside and the respondent should be punished for the contempt of Court. 13. The learned Advocate General would submit that taking into consideration all the material facts only, G.O. Ms. No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 has been passed. The petitioner has filed the contempt petition as though the respondent has not taken any decision as per the order dated 26.09.2018 passed in H.C.P. No. 2099/2019 and the order has been complied with by passing the orders on 04.03.2019 and again on reconsideration on 25.07.2019. Therefore, the learned Advocate General would submit that the order of this Court has been complied with and the contempt petition has to be closed. 14. The learned Advocate General would submit that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is only with regard to the sustainability of the order dated 25.07.2019 and the said argument cannot be advanced in a contempt petition. What has to be seen is that the order has been complied with or not. Once an order has been passed, the contempt petition has to be closed or dismissed and it is always open to the petitioner to file a fresh case challenging the order passed by the respondent on 25.07.2019 and the petitioner cannot make use of the contempt proceedings to challenge the consequential order passed by the respondent, even if it is discriminatory and illegal. It may be a good ground to challenge the said order in a fresh proceedings. 15. Pending disposal of the contempt petition, G.O.(D). No. 249, Home (Prison-IV) Department dated 04.03.2019 and G.O.(D). No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 have been passed by Mr. Niranjan Mardi, Home Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, Chennai rejecting the petitioner's claim and therefore, he is suo motu impleaded as second respondent to the proceedings. 16. The said orders have been produced before this Court and based on the above orders, the arguments were advanced by the learned Advocate General. Therefore, this Court is justified in suo motu impleading the 2nd respondent and notice is deemed to have been taken by the said respondent. 16. The said orders have been produced before this Court and based on the above orders, the arguments were advanced by the learned Advocate General. Therefore, this Court is justified in suo motu impleading the 2nd respondent and notice is deemed to have been taken by the said respondent. The 2nd respondent, even if issued with notice, cannot have a different version other than to support the orders which have already been passed on 04.03.2019 and 25.07.2019 and produced before this Court and the version of the 2nd respondent has been fully argued by the learned Advocate General before this Court. Moreover, suo motu impleading is necessary as the newly impleaded respondent should not take a technical point that he was not impleaded as party knowing fully well that the contempt petition has been filed before this Court and during pendency, orders have been passed and the reasons spelt out in the said orders have also been canvassed by the learned Advocate General very elaborately. 17. There is no doubt with regard to the facts of the case. This Court by an order dated 26.09.2018 had set aside the order dated 25.09.2018 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Salem Central Prison and directed to reconsider the issue within a period of three weeks, as there is no prohibition for the Superintendent of Police for making recommendation, in view of the offence committed by the prisoner under the Indian Arms Act and further directed the recommendation to be sent to the Committee/Board within a period of six weeks and the said Committee/Board shall take action as per law at the earliest. Paragraph 8 and 9 of the said order is usefully extracted as follows: "8. In view of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Rajiv Gandhi's Assassination case, the rejection of the petitioner's representation is not sustainable. Therefore, the communication of the 3rd respondent in Letter No. 4787/jF.1/2018, dated 25.09.2018 is set aside and the 3rd respondent is directed to reconsider the issue afresh, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order as there is no prohibition for the 3rd respondent for making recommendation in view of the offence involved in this case under the Arms Act. To put it in others words, the convict is eligible to get the benefit under G.O. Ms. To put it in others words, the convict is eligible to get the benefit under G.O. Ms. No. 64 as there is no prohibition for the convict to be considered for premature release. 9. Hence, the recommendation/proposal of the 3rd respondent shall be made and the same has to be sent to the Committee/Board within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the proposal or recommendation, the Committee/Board shall take a decision, as per law, at the earliest." 18. As the said order passed by this Court has not been complied with, the petitioner issued a contempt notice through the counsel on 27.11.2018 and a reply was received on 01.12.2018 stating that for making recommendation, the report of the District Collector is required and the said report is awaited. Thereafter, the contempt petition was filed and it was admitted on 08.01.2019. Only when the contempt petition was pending before this Court, G.O.(D). No. 249, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 04.03.2019 has been passed by the newly impleaded second respondent stating that the petitioner's son was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Indian Arms Act and therefore, he is ineligible for consideration for premature release. 19. First of all, the order of the first respondent dated 25.09.2018 was set aside by this Court by an order dated 26.09.2018 and the first respondent was directed to reconsider the issue afresh within a period of six weeks and send a recommendation to the Committee. The recommendation was made by the first respondent on 29.11.2018 to the ADGP (Prisons), in and by which the first respondent rejected the petitioner's plea for premature release as the petitioner's son was convicted under the Indian Arms Act. The said rejection based on the conviction under the Indian Arms Act itself is not sustainable as it is contrary to the judgment of this Court dated 26.09.2018. In paragraph 8 of the order, it was made clear that the convict is eligible to get benefit under G.O. Ms. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018, as there is no prohibition for the convict to be considered for premature release. Therefore, it would constitute an act of contempt by the newly impleaded second respondent. The order dated 04.03.2019 has been passed with scant respect to the order passed by this Court on 26.09.2018. 20. No. 64, Home (Prison-IV) Department, dated 01.02.2018, as there is no prohibition for the convict to be considered for premature release. Therefore, it would constitute an act of contempt by the newly impleaded second respondent. The order dated 04.03.2019 has been passed with scant respect to the order passed by this Court on 26.09.2018. 20. When the matter was argued stating that the order passed by the second respondent on 04.03.2019 is contrary to the order passed by this Court, by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, it was represented that the matter would be reconsidered. Finally, when the matter came up before this Court on 13.06.2019, this Court observed as follows: "Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned Advocate General, on instructions from the Jail Superintendent who is present before this Court would submit that reports have been sought from the District Collector However, he submitted that there was delay in getting the report from the District Collector, probably due to his work pressure. The learned Advocate General further submitted that after getting the report, the date has been fixed for the Advisory Members meeting on 18.06.2019 and that a decision will be taken on the said date and the same shall be forwarded to the Government for consideration. He further assured that the decision of the Government will be informed to this Court. 2. In view of submission made by the learned Advocate General, the Government is directed to take a decision within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the report of the Advisory Members meeting to be held on 18.06.2019. Call the matter on 05.07.2019." 21. Thereafter, the matter came up before this Court again on 05.07.2019 and the learned Advocate General submitted before this Court that a positive decision was taken by the Advisory Committee and it has been forwarded to the Government which required two weeks time to pass appropriate orders. Thereafter, the matter was directed to be posted for compliance on 26.07.2019. 22. When the matter was called on 26.07.2019, G.O.(D). No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 passed by the second respondent was produced before this Court. Thereafter, the matter was directed to be posted for compliance on 26.07.2019. 22. When the matter was called on 26.07.2019, G.O.(D). No. 819, dated 25.07.2019 passed by the second respondent was produced before this Court. The said Government Order rejected the claim of the petitioner stating that the petitioner's son Senthil committed daylight murder of one Periyaraj in a public place using unlicensed gun, in a pre-planned manner, knowing fully well, the consequences of the crime and in view of the heinous nature of the crime, the release of the prisoner may create law and order problem. 23. A close scrutiny of both the orders passed by the second respondent would reveal different yardsticks adopted by the respondents, eventhough this Court directed the respondents to consider and pass orders on the premature release of the petitioner's son, making it clear that there is no prohibition to consider the plea inspite of conviction under Indian Arms Act. Thus, the second respondent had passed a contemptuous order dated 04.03.2019 and therefore, he is guilty of contempt. 24. When the matter was argued before this Court by producing the order dated 04.03.2019, it was pointed out that when a recommendation was made by the Government for release of the convicts in Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case and the same is pending before His Excellency The Governor of Tamil Nadu, inspite of their conviction under Indian Arms Act and Explosives Act, the respondents cannot adopt a different yardstick as far as the petitioner's son is concerned on the ground that he was convicted under Indian Arms Act. Once a benefit has been given to the convicts in Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case by recommending their premature release, the same yardstick should be applied to the petitioner's son also and there should not be any prohibition for recommending his premature release. 25. In any event, the said order has been reconsidered and the Advisory Board in its meeting held on 18.06.2019 recommended for the premature release of the life convict prisoner no. 4787 under Rule 341(2) of Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983. The recommendation of the Advisory Board was considered by the Government and it was rejected giving reasons in paragraph 7 which is usefully extracted hereunder: "7. The Government have examined the recommendation of the Advisory Board together with the records enclosed with it. 4787 under Rule 341(2) of Tamil Nadu Prison Rules, 1983. The recommendation of the Advisory Board was considered by the Government and it was rejected giving reasons in paragraph 7 which is usefully extracted hereunder: "7. The Government have examined the recommendation of the Advisory Board together with the records enclosed with it. In this case, the life convict prisoner C. Senthil had killed one Thiru. Periaraj in a day light murder in a public place by using a unlicensed gun to take revenge for the killing of his father Chinnasamy by the deceased Thiru. Periaraj in a planned murder, knowing well the full consequences of the crime he had committed. Hence having regard to the heinous nature of the crime it is considered that the release of this prisoner may create further law and order problem in society." The reasons given in the order is contrary to the reasons given in the earlier order dated 04.03.2019. The new reason given is that the release of prisoner would create further law and order problem. The crime committed by the petitioner's son was about 16 years ago and the reason given by the respondents that the release of the petitioner's son would create law and order problem in the society at this distance of time cannot be accepted. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision reported in (2000) 2 Supreme Court cases 595, Laxman Naskar v. Union of India held that without considering the conduct records of the convicts in that case while in jail, the Government has passed the order and hence, it is liable to be quashed. Paragraph 6 of the order is usefully extracted as follows: "6. Though the police report did not cover all the above points, the prayer of "life convicts" for premature release was rejected mainly on the ground of objections by police. The police had only reported about the chances of the petitioners committing crime again. It becomes apparent from the record that the Government did not consider the prayer for premature release as per the rules. The Government did no pay sufficient attention to the conduct-record of the petitioners while in jail nor did it consider whether they had lost their potentiality in committing crime. It becomes apparent from the record that the Government did not consider the prayer for premature release as per the rules. The Government did no pay sufficient attention to the conduct-record of the petitioners while in jail nor did it consider whether they had lost their potentiality in committing crime. The relevant aspect, namely, that there is no fruitful purpose in confining them anymore was also not considered nor the socio-economic conditions of the convict's family were taken into account. Thus the orders of the Government suffer from infirmities and are liable to be quashed." In this case, the offence took place about 24 years ago, as evident from the judgment dated 28.07.2005 passed by this Court in Crl. A. No. 761/1999 preferred by the petitioner's son against the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court in S.C. No. 50/1998. The conduct of the petitioner, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the prisoner conducted himself very well and he has been teaching yoga to the fellow prisoners for more than 8 years which has also been observed by this Court in its order dated 25.04.2019. After the contempt petition was filed, the petitioner's son was prevented from conducting yoga classes which he has been conducting for the past 8 years for the benefit of the fellow prisoners in jail to overcome their stress. Therefore, this Court permitted the petitioner's son to conduct yoga classes for the fellow prisoners. The said order permitting the petitioner's son to continue taking yoga classes for the fellow prisoners was passed after hearing both the parties and it was not denied by the respondents. Therefore, the conduct of the petitioner's son is not only good but also very constructive and beneficial to the fellow prisoners, consequently benefiting the jail authorities also. This material fact weighs in the mind of this Court. 26. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the petitioner's son has been released on parole for 35 times without any escort and during his parole time, his conduct was good and there has been no law and order problem or any other issues. This conduct of the petitioner is also a material fact to be considered. 26. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the petitioner's son has been released on parole for 35 times without any escort and during his parole time, his conduct was good and there has been no law and order problem or any other issues. This conduct of the petitioner is also a material fact to be considered. However, without considering all these facts, the respondents had mechanically stated that the release of the petitioner's son would create law and order problem without giving any further explanation. As stated above, the murder took place about 24 years ago and thereafter, he has been released on parole for 35 times without escort and nothing adverse has happened and therefore, the reasoning given by the respondents that his release would create law and order problem is based on conjectures and surmises. 27. The respondent did not take note of the conduct of the petitioner's son as stated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India case wherein it has been stated that the Government should consider the conduct of the convicts while in jail. At the risk of repetition, paragraph 6 of the order is extracted as follows: "6. Though the police report did not cover all the above points, the prayer of "life convicts" for premature release was rejected mainly on the ground of objections by police. The police had only reported about the chances of the petitioners committing crime again. It becomes apparent from the record that the Government did not consider the prayer for premature release as per the rules. The Government did no pay sufficient attention to the conduct-record of the petitioners while in jail nor did it consider whether they had lost their potentiality in committing crime. The relevant aspect, namely, that there is no fruitful purpose in confining them anymore was also not considered nor the socio-economic conditions of the convict's family were taken into account. Thus the orders of the Government suffer from infirmities and are liable to be quashed." In the light of the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. 28. Thus the orders of the Government suffer from infirmities and are liable to be quashed." In the light of the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. 28. The reason given in the rejection order dated 04.03.2019 is that the petitioner's son has committed offences under ineligible Section viz., Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Indian Arms Act and therefore, the plea for premature release was rejected. Therefore, this Court directed the respondent to reconsider the plea of the petitioner's son in view of the decision made in Rajiv Gandhi assassination's case. To avoid the application of the order passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajiv Gandhi assassination's case, cleverly the respondent invented a new reason in the order dated 25.07.2019 that premature release of the petitioner's son would cause law and order problem. Every time the respondent cannot be inventing reasons for rejection. If really, premature release of the petitioner's son would cause law and order problem, that reason should have been found place in earlier order dated 04.03.2019. Hence, the reason now given is not sustainable. 29. Mr. Mohammed Saifulla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the stand taken by the Government that the day light murder committed by the petitioner's son is heinous and therefore, he is not entitled for premature release is liable to be rejected as the Government had already released the persons who were convicted for burning the bus in which innocent girls were trapped and killed. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision reported in (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 567, C. Muniappan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu while convicting the said persons had observed as follows: "98. Before parting with this case, we would like to take note of the fact that this crime occurred right in the middle of a busy city. Innocent girls trapped in a burning bus were shouting for help and only the male students from their University came to their rescue and succeeded in saving some of them. There were large number of people including the shopkeepers, media persons and on-duty police personnel, present at the place of the "Rasta Roko Andolan", which was very close to the place of their occurrence of the crime, and none of them considered it proper to help in their rescue. 99. There were large number of people including the shopkeepers, media persons and on-duty police personnel, present at the place of the "Rasta Roko Andolan", which was very close to the place of their occurrence of the crime, and none of them considered it proper to help in their rescue. 99. Even if the common man fails to respond to the all of his conscience, the police should not have remained inactive. The so-called administration did not bother to find out why the police did not intervene and assist in the rescue of the girl students. It is clear that the so-called protectors of the society stood there and witnessed such a heinous crime being committed and allowed the burning of the bus and roasting of the innocent children without being reprimanded for failing in their duty. If the common citizens and public officials present at the scene of the crime had done their duty, the death of three innocent young girls could have been prevented." Even the persons who have been indicted for committing heinous crimes by burning innocent girls in the bus in the middle of the busy city have been released by the respondents. Hence the argument of Mr. Mohameed Saifulla is well founded. In the said incident, after the verdict against their party chief, the cadres of a particular political party, to protest against the judgment, blocked the roads and destroyed the properties and in the course of such actions, they burnt a bus in the middle of the busy city in which three college girls were trapped and burnt to death. When those persons were given the benefit of premature release under the very same Government Order, there is no justification for the respondents to deny the said benefit to the petitioner's son, on the ground that his release would create law and order problem. 30. Though it is a contempt petition, this Court has got power and jurisdiction to quash the order passed by the Respondent, when it is not in consonance with the order passed by this Court. The learned Advocate General submitted that even if there is any illegality, lacuna or discrimination in passing the order, the same could be challenged only in a fresh proceedings and not in a contempt petition. The said argument has to be rejected for the following reasons: 1. The learned Advocate General submitted that even if there is any illegality, lacuna or discrimination in passing the order, the same could be challenged only in a fresh proceedings and not in a contempt petition. The said argument has to be rejected for the following reasons: 1. The order has not been passed within the time limit given by this Court which is contemptuous. 2. The order has been passed pending disposal of the contempt petition. 3. The order has been passed only pursuant to the directions given in the present contempt petition. 4. Passing of wrong order cannot be considered as compliance of the original order. 31. Therefore, this Court has got every power and jurisdiction to decide the validity of the order so passed. If the validity of the order passed is decided, it would avoid multiplicity of the proceedings. The petitioner who has been suffering for the past 16 years due to imprisonment of her son, cannot be compelled to file case after case spending her hard earned money. One cannot expect an aggrieved party to approach the Court often. In these circumstances, even in the contempt petition, the order passed by the second respondent is quashed invoking Article 225 and Section 11 of Contempt of Courts Act. This Court suo motu invokes Articles 225 and 226 of the Constitution to quash the rejection order passed by the second respondent. 32. Merely passing an order without giving relief to the aggrieved party is injustice done to the party. Therefore, this Court has to pass an order in such a way that the fruits of the order reach the parties. Otherwise, the people approaching the Court having faith in the judicial system would be frustrated. Each case gives a chance for the Court to make innovation, even going beyond the prayer, as the situation warrants. Irrespective of the party who approaches the Court, the Courts could decide the issue and grant relief to the right person or persons, even though they may be opposite party or may not even be a party to the proceedings. If the relief, as per the evidence available on record is to be given to a third party, definitely this Court should render justice by giving relief to such a stranger. 33. If the relief, as per the evidence available on record is to be given to a third party, definitely this Court should render justice by giving relief to such a stranger. 33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Reddappa reported in 1993 (4) SCC 269 has held that once the Court is satisfied of injustice or arbitrariness, then the restriction, self-imposed or statutory stands removed and no Rule or technicality or restraint of power can stand in the way of rendering justice. 34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baby v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others reported in 1998 (8) SCC 310 held that the power of the High Court under Constitution of India is always in addition to the power of the revision under Kerala Land Reforms Act. Similarly the power under Article 226/227 is in addition to Section 173 of the M.V. Act. That apart in Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 2006 (8) SCC 294 it was held that the power of this Court in administrative and judicial nature could be exercised suo motu also. In Union of India and Another v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. reported in 1996 (4) SCC 453 it was held that the power conferred under Article 226/227 is designated to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. 35. This Court is a constitutional Court and there cannot be any fetter or prohibition for this Court to set at naught the orders which have been passed illegally without application of mind and contrary to the facts, without taking into consideration, the conduct of the petitioner's son. 36. If this Court accepts the arguments of the learned Advocate General and closes the contempt petition stating that the order has been complied with, since the second respondent had passed the orders dated 25.07.2019 & 04.03.2019, again the petitioner will be driven to file another proceedings which will only add over to the arrears of cases for which the Courts are being blamed often by others. It should be the endeavor of the Government to ensure that multiplicity of proceedings is avoided and it cannot make the parties to approach the Court unnecessarily. The finality of the proceedings should be reached at the earliest and the multiplicity of the proceedings should be avoided. It should be the endeavor of the Government to ensure that multiplicity of proceedings is avoided and it cannot make the parties to approach the Court unnecessarily. The finality of the proceedings should be reached at the earliest and the multiplicity of the proceedings should be avoided. In an endeavor to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also to give relief to the petitioner, this Court directs the respondents to recommend the case of the petitioner's son as per the Advisory Board's recommendation to the appropriate authority for premature release within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 37. Even though the newly impleaded respondent has committed contempt by passing the order dated 25.07.2019, taking a lenient view, this Court is not passing any adverse order against the second respondent. Accordingly, this Contempt Petition is disposed of.