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2021 DIGILAW 273 (AP)

V. Arjuna Murthy v. V. Kodanda Ramayaa

2021-04-23

M.VENKATA RAMANA

body2021
JUDGMENT : The plaintiffs in O.S.No.108 of 1989 on the file of the Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Machilipatnam, Krishna District are the appellants. The defendants therein are the respondents. 2. The suit was laid for partition of the plaint schedule properties into four (04) equal shares and to allot one such share to the original plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the original defendants 1 and 2. 3. The 1st appellant was the father of the 2nd appellant, respondents 1 and 2 and Sri Srimannarayana Murthy. The wife of the 1st appellant died long ago. They have three daughters too, who were all married by the date of institution of the suit. 4. During pendency of the suit, the 1st appellant died. So also the 2nd respondent. The appellants 3 and 4 were brought on record as L.Rs.of the deceased 1st appellant in the course of trial and the respondent No.6 being the alleged legatee under the Will of the deceased 1st appellant. Similarly, the respondents 3 to 5 were brought on record as L.Rs.of the 2nd respondent during trial. The respondents 7 and 8 were brought on record being the legal representatives of the 6th respondent and appellants 3 and 4 are also L.Rs.of the 6th respondent, who was the wife of the deceased 2nd appellant. 5. The appeal against the 3rd respondent was dismissed for default by an order dated 18.10.2011. No attempt was made to get the appeal restored against her. 6. The deceased 1st appellant was running firewood business in Item No.2 of plaint ‘A’ schedule. His elder brother by name Sri Vemula Sreerama Murthy had no issues and had adopted Sri Srimannarayana Murthy, one of the sons of the 1st appellant. Under a registered partition deed dated 10.11.1941 (Ex.B1), Sri Vemula Sreerama Murthy, their another brother Sri Venkatachalam and the 1st appellant got divided their properties. 7. Out of his business, the 1st appellant had also acquired substantial extent of lands. There was a division among the 1st appellant and his sons viz., the 2nd appellant and the respondents 1 and 2 evidenced by a partition list dated 14.06.1979. (This partition list is not a part of the record in this case). Prior to the year 1979, all of them got divided their movable properties. There was a division among the 1st appellant and his sons viz., the 2nd appellant and the respondents 1 and 2 evidenced by a partition list dated 14.06.1979. (This partition list is not a part of the record in this case). Prior to the year 1979, all of them got divided their movable properties. However, at the time when the partition was entered into in the year 1979, an extent of Ac.2-00 of agricultural land in Kankipudi village apart from item Nos. 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule were left joint. This Ac.2-00 of land was sold away by the 1st appellant during his lifetime. 8. The specific case of the appellants is that plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties constituted those of Hindu joint family comprised of the appellants 1 and 2 as well as the respondents 1 and 2. They further contended that they used to have a common mess till the year 1985 and when disputes arose among women members of the family leading to having separate mess by appellants 1 and 2 on one hand, respondents 2 as well as respondent No.3 separately, while all of them were living in item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule. They further contended that the 1st appellant had purchased item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule house in the name of the 1st respondent on account of an advice by an astrologer though it was also treated as a joint family property acquired from the funds provided by the 1st appellant himself. The sale deeds in respect thereof according to them were retained by the 1st appellant, who had bargained with the vendors, paying sale consideration by means of two different bank drafts obtained from Andhra Bank, Machilipatnam. They further contended that the 1st appellant alone was paying property tax to this house, attending to its maintenance and that taking advantage of the sale deeds being in his name, the 1st respondent demolished small varandah on the rear side of his house during 2nd week of August, 1988. Legal notices were exchanged between the appellants 1 and 2 on one hand and the 1st respondent on the other dated 23.08.1988 and 10.10.1988 respectively. 9. Legal notices were exchanged between the appellants 1 and 2 on one hand and the 1st respondent on the other dated 23.08.1988 and 10.10.1988 respectively. 9. The appellants further contended that in mediation during June, 1986, the 1st respondent admitted item No.1 of plaint ‘A’ schedule being joint family property and agreed for its division into four (04) equal shares signing an agreement. Therefore, in the above circumstances, finding that it was no longer convenient for them to remain joint, the appellants claimed that they were constrained to institute the suit for partition. 10. The case of the 1st respondent is one of denial of purchase of item No.1 of plaint ‘A’ schedule properties by his father benami in his name. He asserted that it was purchased from and out of his own funds. He claimed that ever since the partition of the year 1979 all the properties were divided completely except the one that were left joint. He claimed that the saw machine viz., item No.2 of plaint ‘B’ schedule exclusively belonged to him. The 1st respondent also denied that there was a common mess for all of them till the year 1985 contending that they were all living separately in the same house in different portions. He further contended that the title deeds relating to item No.1 of plaint ‘A’ schedule were given by him to his father, when a notice was received from the officer of the Sub-Registrar, to get his advice, which however the 1st appellant did not return. 11. While admitting that differences arose among women members of the family in the year 1985, the 1st respondent claimed that the appellants 1 and 2 agreed to pay rent for the portions in occupation to him in item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule and that when they defaulted in paying the rents regularly he also instituted a eviction petition in RCC No.31 of 1989 on the file of the Court of the learned Principal District Munsif-cum-Rent Controller, Machilipatnam. He denied of the mediation with reference to the plaint schedule properties, while stating that he did not have any objection for division of items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties and also Ac.2-00 of land. He denied of the mediation with reference to the plaint schedule properties, while stating that he did not have any objection for division of items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties and also Ac.2-00 of land. The claim of other appellants upon the death of the 1st appellant to the share of the 1st appellant in the plaint schedule properties by means of a registered Will dated 02.02.1980 is denied stating that it was brought out and obtained by undue influence of the 2nd appellant from his father whereby neither the appellants 3 and 4 nor the respondent no.6 could claim any share in the property of his father. 12. The 2nd respondent remained expartein the suit. 13. The 6th respondent filed a separate written statement asserting that by virtue of the Will, she has a share out of 1/4th share allotable to the 1st appellant in the plaint schedule properties. 14. On the pleadings, the learned trial Judge settled the following issues and additional issues for trial: 1. Whether item No.1 of plaint ‘A’ schedule property is separate property of 1st defendant? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate possession of their shares as mentioned in the plaint? 3. What are all the properties available for partition? 4. To what relief? Additional issues framed on 15.03.1996 1. Whether Will executed by late Narayana Murthy is genuine, true and valid? 2. Whether plaintiffs 3 and 4 are entitled for any share in properties of late Narayana Murthy? Additional issues framed on 20.02.1997 1. Whether the 1st plaintiff bequeathed 1/4th share in items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property under a Will dated 02.02.1988? 2. Whether the 6th defendant is entitled for 1/4th share in items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘B’ schedule property? 15. At the trial, the deceased 1st and 2nd appellants examined themselves as P.W.1 and P.W.2 respectively. P.W.3 is one of the attestors to Ex.X1 Will (Ex.A24 is its registration extract) and whereas P.W.4 examined on their behalf was then working in Sub Registrar’s Office at Machilipatnam. They relied on Ex.A1 to Ex.A26 and Ex.X1 to Ex.X4. The 1st respondent examined himself as D.W.1. D.W.2, an alleged mediator in the mediation, was examined on behalf of the 1st respondent and he relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B7 in support of his contention. 16. They relied on Ex.A1 to Ex.A26 and Ex.X1 to Ex.X4. The 1st respondent examined himself as D.W.1. D.W.2, an alleged mediator in the mediation, was examined on behalf of the 1st respondent and he relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B7 in support of his contention. 16. On the material and evidence, the learned trial Judge held that it was not open for the appellants to claim item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties on account of the operation of Section 4(1) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 though on facts held that there is material to support the version of the 1st appellant that he purchased this property in the name of the 1st respondent. The learned trial Judge also held that items 1 and 2 of the plaint ‘B’ schedule exclusively belonged to the 1st respondent and that these parties are entitled for 1/4th share each in items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule. Accordingly, a preliminary decree was passed in respect of items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule, while dismissing the remaining claim of the appellants. 17. It is against this decree and judgment, the present appeal is preferred by the appellants and as against the findings recorded adversely against him the 1st respondent presented cross-objections. 18. Sri K. Narasimham, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, addressed arguments. 19. Now, the following points arise for determination: 1. Whether items No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule was purchased by the deceased 1st appellant in the name of the 1st respondent benami and if the claim so set up by the appellants in respect of this property is hit by the provisions of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988? 2. Whether Ex.A24 Will is true, valid and binding on the respondents? 3. Whether the plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties are amenable for partition among the appellants 1 and 2 and respondents 1 and 2? 4. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court are proper and if require interference? 5. To what relief? POINT No.1: 20. Item 1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule is a terraced house and site bearing Door No.7-261, Godugupet, Machilipatnam. It belonged to Nidugondi family and was acquired by this family as per Ex.A21 sale deed dated 17.08.1932. 4. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court are proper and if require interference? 5. To what relief? POINT No.1: 20. Item 1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule is a terraced house and site bearing Door No.7-261, Godugupet, Machilipatnam. It belonged to Nidugondi family and was acquired by this family as per Ex.A21 sale deed dated 17.08.1932. It consisted of four portions, as is explicit from Ex.A13 letter dated 23.03.1985 of one of the members of the above family viz., Sri M.G.Krishna Rao to the deceased 1st appellant. The appellants 1 and 2, the 1st respondent and Sri Srimannarayana Murthy, another son of the 1st appellant, were in occupation of different portions of this house. 21. It is in the evidence of the 1st respondent as D.W.1 that the 2nd appellant was occupying a portion in this house of two rooms towards East and whereas he was occupying three rooms towards North. His deposition is also that Sri Srimannarayana was occupying a portion of two rooms towards South in this house. He also deposed that they were all paying a rent of Rs.60/-per month. It remained undisputed that the deceased 1st appellant by the date of his death (03.07.1993) was staying with the 2nd appellant. It is in the evidence of the 1st appellant himself as P.W.1 that he continued to stay with the 2nd appellant and his family in that house. 22. This house stood purchased as seen from Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds dated 28.03.1985 in the name of the 1st respondent. Sri N.K.Raghavendra Rao executed Ex.A1 selling away a portion of this house for valuable consideration of Rs.45,114/-. Sri N.S.Madhava Rao through his GPA Sri N.Gopala Krishna Rao sold another portion of this house as seen from Ex.A2 sale deed for valuable consideration of Rs.30,927/-. 23. It is the contention of the appellants that these sales under Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds are benamitransactions in the name of the 1st respondent and that this house was purchased by the deceased 1st appellant from and out of the joint family funds, which he could pool up. The 1st respondent is disputing it on the ground that he had purchased this house from and out of his own funds. 24. The 1st respondent is disputing it on the ground that he had purchased this house from and out of his own funds. 24. It is an undisputed fact that the deceased 1st appellant was running firewood shop at Machilipatnam since about the year 1947 and the material on record makes out that even after his demise, when being run by his sons, it enjoyed good patronage. Though the material on record is that the deceased 1st appellant and his two brothers got divided their properties under Ex.B1 registered partition deed dated 10.11.1941, the property acquired by him thereunder was meager, which apparently included a part of the house at Rajupet at Machilipatnam. The parties are in agreement in saying that it was by the efforts of the 1st appellant, in this firewood business, almost about Ac.82-00 of land was acquired by the 1st appellant. Everyone of his sons could get Ac.20-00 of land, in the partition of 1979. So also the 1st appellant. According to the 1st respondent as D.W.1 that he was allotted Ac.12-00 of dry land and Ac.8-00 of wet land in that partition. The 1st appellant retained about Ac.12-00 of land in that partition. His daughters were given Ac.2-00 each, by him. Thus, the family properties available by then viz., 14.06.1979 were subjected to division among all the members of this joint family. 25. Apart from items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule, an extent of Ac.2-00 of agricultural land was retained for the purpose of their common enjoyment. In items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule, the firewood business continued. If the version in Ex.X1 Will, which of course, is seriously disputed by the 1st respondent, is considered, a part of this business relating to rafters and beams was being carried on by the 2nd respondent, who is the eldest son of the deceased 1st appellant and other part of this business was being attended to by the 1st respondent. However, evidence on record is that the 2nd appellant was attending to this firewood business. It stood in the name of his wife viz., 6th respondent. The 1st appellant receded himself from this business from October, 1986 as per the contents of Ex.X1 and the fact that he did not attend to this business since about the year 1986 is not as such disputed among these parties. 26. It stood in the name of his wife viz., 6th respondent. The 1st appellant receded himself from this business from October, 1986 as per the contents of Ex.X1 and the fact that he did not attend to this business since about the year 1986 is not as such disputed among these parties. 26. The agricultural land of Ac.2-00 was also sold away by the deceased 1st appellant during his lifetime. The 1st respondent agreed for partition of items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule. 27. Thus, by the year 1979, there was disruption in the status of this joint family. To call it a coparcenary, particularly in terms of Ex.B1 partition deed and stand of the parties in this case, it is rather difficult to hold that there was sufficient nucleus for the 1st appellant upon Ex.B1 partition, to throw the same into common hotchpot and to improve the estate and assets of this family. 28. The learned trial Judge took into consideration these factors and rightly observed that the erstwhile joint family did not continue by the date of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds when item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule house was purchased. The learned trial Judge elaborately discussed the fact situation and legal position in this context. The reasons so assigned are proper and the entire issue was considered in correct perspective. 29. These factors are considered in as much as the predominant question now is as to application of Section 4(1) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. 30. Section 4(1) of this Act reads as under: 4. Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami.—(1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. 31. A careful reading and consideration of the same indicates that, a suit or claim or action basing on a plea of benami in respect of its subject matter shall not lie against the person who claims being the real owner of this property. 32. The 1st respondent is the owner, who purchased this property in terms of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 title deeds. 32. The 1st respondent is the owner, who purchased this property in terms of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 title deeds. It should be noted that execution of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds by the erstwhile owners is not disputed and the fact that they stand in the name of the 1st respondent. The prohibition envisaged in terms of Section 4(1) of the Act is absolute and imperative in its effect. 33. Only exception in relation thereto is in terms of Section 4(3) of this Act then in force. Section 4(3) of this Act reads as under: 4(3) – Nothing in this section shall apply – (a) where the person in whose name the property is held in a coparcener in a hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or (b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity. 34. For the present purpose, in terms of Section 4(3) property held by a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family for and on behalf of the coparceners stands exempted from operation of Section 4 of this Act. (Section 4(3) of this Act is omitted by Act 43 of 2016 w.e.f. 01.11.2016). 35. In view of the discussion and reasons assigned above, by the date of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds and by the date of the institution of the suit in the trial Court (17.07.1989) there was neither coparcenery nor a Hindu undivided family of these parties. 36. Therefore, even if the exception to application of Section 4(1) of the Act was then available in terms of Section 4(3) of the same Act, in the given facts and circumstances of this case, it is not applicable. 37. The learned trial Judge considered this question very elaborately while discussing issue No.1 framing different points for consideration and predominantly considering the effect of these provisions of this Act, whether retrospective or retroactive. 37. The learned trial Judge considered this question very elaborately while discussing issue No.1 framing different points for consideration and predominantly considering the effect of these provisions of this Act, whether retrospective or retroactive. As seen from the judgment under appeal, the learned trial Judge took into consideration the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari and another vs. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247 , Nand Kishore Mehra vs. Sushila Mehra, AIR 1995 SC 2145 , Rajagopal Reddy vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan, AIR 1996 SC 238 and Smt. Rebti Devi vs. Ram Dutt and another, AIR 1998 SC 310 and held that in view of Section 4(1) of this Act, the suit is barred and that Section 4(3) of this Act did not save this situation. 38. The prepositions of law considered by the learned trial Judge are not disputed on behalf of the parties in the course of hearing in this appeal. When Section 4(1) of this Act clearly applies to this case, the suit filed by the appellants, as rightly held by the learned trial Judge stood barred. Thus, the appellants did not have a right to promote a case of benami, of the transactions covered by Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds. 39. However, the learned trial Judge took into consideration the evidence on record particularly of the deceased appellants 1 and 2 as P.W.1 and P.W.2 respectively and held that it was the deceased 1st appellant who contributed funds to acquire this house. 40. The 1st appellant deposed at the trial that he had pooled up necessary funds to purchase this house upon borrowing from one Smt. Seeram Anjamma of Rs.20,000/-, selling away gold for Rs.23,000/-, upon sale of Ac.2-00 of land for Rs.14,600/-, the profits from then existing business of Rs.10,000/-and the proceeds realised of Rs.20,000/-from the casuarina plantation. 41. In support of this version, no documentary proof was adduced at the trial. It cannot be stated that there was no possibility of adducing such proof at the trial. The sale of gold could be evidenced by necessary record as well as sale of Ac.2-00 of land and profits from casuarina plantation. It is also in the evidence of P.W.1 that he was maintaining accounts relating to the firewood business as long as he was managing it till the year 1986. Thus, books of accounts could have been produced at the trial. It is also in the evidence of P.W.1 that he was maintaining accounts relating to the firewood business as long as he was managing it till the year 1986. Thus, books of accounts could have been produced at the trial. When it is the version of the parties that the 1st appellant could acquire substantial profits out of this business and who was also maintaining accounts in respect thereof, it cannot be accepted that these books of accounts could have been destroyed in such casual and easy manner as sought to be projected by P.W.2. 42. However, support is sought to be drawn in this context on behalf of the appellants that Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds were produced at the trial from the custody of the 1st appellant and that it is a strong indicator that this house was purchased by him alone. Ex.A3 to Ex.A10 are the property tax receipts relating to this house, which stood in the name of the original owners viz., the vendors under Ex.A1 and Ex.A2. During the lifetime of the appellants 1 and 2, no effort was made to get the house in the municipal records mutated in the name of the 1st appellant. On the other hand, the evidence of the 1st respondent as D.W.1 reflected that he did make such attempt to get this house mutated in his name. 43. Ex.A13 and Ex.A22 letters of the executants of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 to the 1st appellant are also relied on in this context contending that they offer sufficient proof that the 1st appellant himself bargained for purchase of this house. With reference to payment of sale consideration, Ex.A14 to Ex.A17 are also relied on for the appellants contending that the demand drafts were purchased towards sale consideration in the name of these vendors by the 1st appellant. Ex.A18 and Ex.A19 receipts in respect of payment of registration charges and Ex.A20 and Ex.A21 the powers of attorney enabling to execute sale deeds on behalf of the vendor under Ex.A2 are also relied on in the same context. Thus, the appellants contend that the documentary evidence so produced offer sufficient material to substantiate their claim that the funds for acquisition of this house were provided by the deceased 1st appellant alone and that the 1st respondent did not in any manner contribute. 44. Thus, the appellants contend that the documentary evidence so produced offer sufficient material to substantiate their claim that the funds for acquisition of this house were provided by the deceased 1st appellant alone and that the 1st respondent did not in any manner contribute. 44. The deceased 1st appellant is none other than the father of the 2nd appellant and the respondents 1 and 2. The 2nd appellant as P.W.2 deposed that the title deeds were with his father in respect of these properties, though the sale deeds were obtained in the names of other members of the family. This statement was made by the 2nd appellant at the trial in the context of purchase of not only item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule but also a site behind this house. Admittedly the 2nd appellant had purchased this site from the same vendors. He further deposed that the documents in relation to purchase of these two properties were obtained on the one and the same day. 45. P.W.2 was cross-examined with reference to Ex.A13 and Ex.A22 letters. In fact, Ex.A22 letter is not at all concerned to this transaction and its contents make out a completely different transaction in respect of taking away an almyrah from this house on behalf of these vendors. 46. Therefore, from the testimony of P.W.2 itself there is an explanation available for retaining these sale deeds by the 1st appellant. 47. However, there is a different version in the written statement of the 1st respondent that, when there was a notice issued by Registration Department after registration of these sale deeds, when he sought an advice from his father, these sale deeds were retained by him. Nonetheless, these circumstances are indicative of the fact that these brothers were given to keeping these records with their father and in his custody. Further to note in this context is that they were all living and staying in the same premises during that time. Therefore, there is nothing unusual either for the 1st respondent or the 2nd appellant to hand over these title deeds or documents to their father. 48. Even otherwise, participation of the 1st appellant in bargaining to acquire this house or the site, which the 2nd appellant purchased from the very same vendors, cannot be an unusual factor. 49. Therefore, there is nothing unusual either for the 1st respondent or the 2nd appellant to hand over these title deeds or documents to their father. 48. Even otherwise, participation of the 1st appellant in bargaining to acquire this house or the site, which the 2nd appellant purchased from the very same vendors, cannot be an unusual factor. 49. When the burden is on the appellants to establish the nature of these sale transactions of such tainted nature to call the 1st respondent an ostensible owner, who held them benami for the joint family, it is for them to place cogent and convincing material of acceptable nature. The material on record indicates that the appellants failed to discharge this burden in terms of Section 104 of the Evidence Act. In these circumstances, any deficiency in the evidence of the 1st respondent is not a factor by itself, to assist them. 50. The learned trial Judge held that the 1st respondent failed to produce satisfactory evidence to show that he himself has contributed funds to purchase this house. When Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 themselves are the title deeds by which the 1st respondent had acquired this house as per their recitals, they bear a presumption in his favour. This presumption is not discharged by the evidence adduced by the appellants. Failure of the 1st respondent to examine any of the attestors or scribe to these sale deeds as pointed out by the learned trial Judge, is not sufficient to accept the version of the appellants. In fact, it was for the appellants to have had examined them to support their contention that the funds had flown from the 1st appellant to acquire this property, to prove and demonstrate that he had taken active role in those circumstances including at the time of registration of the documents. 51. One of the contentions of the appellants is that Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds were obtained in the name of the 1st respondent on account of an astrologer’s advice. This reason is obviously false. If contents of Ex.X1 Will and testimony of the 2nd appellant as P.W.2 are considered for argument sake, it is clear that it was with a view and intention to get over and avoid any difficulty or liability in terms of Income Tax Act, these sale deeds were obtained in the name of the 1st respondent. If contents of Ex.X1 Will and testimony of the 2nd appellant as P.W.2 are considered for argument sake, it is clear that it was with a view and intention to get over and avoid any difficulty or liability in terms of Income Tax Act, these sale deeds were obtained in the name of the 1st respondent. Thus, one of the strong circumstances sought to rely on by the appellants and to explain the purpose behind in obtaining Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 in the name of the 1st appellant, falls to ground on their own showing. 52. One of the contentions advanced in this appeal for the appellants is that there is sufficient proof of continuation of the joint Hindu family of these parties and retention of certain property for the benefit of this joint family is a strong indicator. There is nothing on record to indicate that this erstwhile joint Hindu family continued and leaving aside certain properties was for common benefit and enjoyment. Apparently, items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule were retained where the firewood business was continuing even when the 1st appellant was attending to it, after the partition in the year 1979. Beneficial enjoyment of certain items of the property of the erstwhile joint Hindu family after partition and division in status, mind and kind, cannot clothe the entire set up to call an unity in right, possession and enjoyment, as joint tenants. 53. Therefore, on twin grounds that the suit as such could not have been maintained in respect of item 1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule viz., on the ground of benamiset up by the appellants and on another ground that the evidence adduced by them at the trial is not sufficient to support their stand in respect of this house qua the 1st respondent, all the contentions of the appellants should be rejected. 54. Findings of the learned trial Judge in this context with reference to application of Section 4(1) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 should be upheld and that item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule thus be held that it is the property of the 1st appellant, who has right, title and interest to it by virtue of Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 sale deeds. Thus, this point is answered. POINT No.2 55. The 1st appellant died during pendency of the suit. Thus, this point is answered. POINT No.2 55. The 1st appellant died during pendency of the suit. It is the contention of the appellants that he left behind a Will dated 02.02.1988 bequeathing all his properties, in favour of the appellants 2 to 4 and respondent No.6. It was presented for registration on 29.07.1988 and was kept in a sealed cover. P.W.4-then Junior Assistant in the office of the Sub Registrar, Machilipatnam, deposed in this context through whom Ex.X1 to Ex.X4 were exhibited at the trial. 56. To prove this Will, the appellants relied on the evidence of P.W.2 and that of P.W.3, who is an Ayurvedic Medical Practitioner at Machilipatnam. He claims himself a classmate of the 1st respondent. This Will was scribed by Sri Yedida Sesha Sai and attested by P.W.3-Sri K.Vijayakumar, Sri G.S.R.Prasad, Sri T. Ranga Rao and Sri V.S.Ramakrishna. The evidence of P.W.3 is also that, it was to the dictation of the 1st appellant, this Will was scribed by Sri Sesha Sai and this transaction took place at about 3.00 p.m. or 4.00 p.m. 57. This witness was subjected to extensive cross-examination on behalf of the 1st respondent. 58. As rightly contended for the 1st respondent, it is the burden of the appellants to dispel any circumstances surrounding execution of this Will, which give raise to suspicion. The 1st respondent cannot be asked to do something negative to make out that there are circumstances which impel to hold that this Will did not reflect a genuine transaction. 59. In the additional written statement, the 1st respondent disputed execution of this Will not only on the ground that it was brought out by the 2nd appellant by manipulation and even otherwise it was an outcome of undue influence exerted by the 2nd appellant upon the 1st appellant. However, at the trial, as seen from the tenor of cross-examination of P.W.2 and P.W.3, the defence of the 2nd respondent was that this Will is a fabrication by the 2nd appellant. 60. The 2nd appellant as P.W.2 deposed that he was present during the transaction when this Will was prepared at the instance of his father. The contents of this Will are that the 2nd appellant and his family members are the ultimate beneficiaries under this bequest. Thus, highly interested nature in this bequest is seen, of P.W.2. 61. 60. The 2nd appellant as P.W.2 deposed that he was present during the transaction when this Will was prepared at the instance of his father. The contents of this Will are that the 2nd appellant and his family members are the ultimate beneficiaries under this bequest. Thus, highly interested nature in this bequest is seen, of P.W.2. 61. Added to it, in cross-examination, the 2nd appellant clearly stated as P.W.2 that the dispute is between himself and the 1st respondent. It was so stated by him in the context of referring to a mediation evidenced by Ex.A25-agreement. This agreement was relied on in the course of trial for the appellants contending that the 1st respondent admitted that item no.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule is a joint family property. 62. Cross-examination of P.W.2 makes out that he has not satisfied with this transaction. It is in his testimony that their father did not like this mediation and did not participate therein. He himself described Ex.A25 an incomplete document. The site purchased by him, in terms of its contents was agreed to be divided into four (04) shares which obviously was not to the liking of the 2nd appellant. He further stated that no final settlement was reached in the presence of the mediators. His version is also that he objected to this mediation on the ground that item No.1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule was purchased by his father and presence of his father was necessary at that time, which was not heeded to by the mediators. 63. When these circumstances are considered they point out highly interested nature of the 2nd appellant in the outcome of the entire effort in this suit, at every stage and level. 64. On the other hand, the evidence let in by the 1st respondent through D.W.2, who is his co-brother, indicated that during this alleged mediatory effort, signatures of the 1st respondent were obtained on blank stamp papers or whitepapers. D.W.2, one of the mediators who took part in this mediatory effort, described it being a sham and make believe affair, which did not in real terms intended to bring about a patch-up in between these disputing parties. 65. Therefore, Ex.A25 agreement cannot have any bearing in this matter and the appellants in these circumstances cannot rely on it. D.W.2, one of the mediators who took part in this mediatory effort, described it being a sham and make believe affair, which did not in real terms intended to bring about a patch-up in between these disputing parties. 65. Therefore, Ex.A25 agreement cannot have any bearing in this matter and the appellants in these circumstances cannot rely on it. On the other hand, it is clear reflection of the nature of the 2nd appellant to get at the properties and it was he who had fomented and driven his father to this litigation. 66. Ex.A11 legal notice was issued before the institution of this suit to the 1st respondent. It is dated 23.08.1988. It was issued as per its contents upon the instructions of the 1st appellant also. If Ex.A24 Will was executed on 02.02.1988 and was registered on 21.07.1988, Ex.A11 legal notice should have referred to it. It cannot be stated that the situation then did not require exposure of this Will. Yet, if at all the 1st appellant had an intention to give away the properties to the 2nd appellant and his family, since it is stated that this Will is his last will and testament, finding its reference in Ex.A11 and also in the plaint would have been appropriate. The 1st appellant as P.W.1 could have revealed his intentions to bequeath his share of the properties to P.W.2 and his family members at the trial, under the original of Ex.X1 Will, if it was in existence by then. It would have been the best evidence possible for the appellants in this respect. It is a serious and fatal omission to affect the credibility of this transaction. 67. As seen from the testimony of P.W.3, apparently, he is an interested witness in the 2nd appellant. In terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act read with Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, it is obligatory on the part of the appellant to examine the attestors of this Will. Failure to examine other attestors is another circumstance to consider and no reason is assigned by the appellants for this serious omission. They should have examined the scribe also in this process. 68. Thus, the evidence adduced by the appellants to prove original of Ex.X1 Will suffered from such serious deficiency fatally affecting their claim. 69. Failure to examine other attestors is another circumstance to consider and no reason is assigned by the appellants for this serious omission. They should have examined the scribe also in this process. 68. Thus, the evidence adduced by the appellants to prove original of Ex.X1 Will suffered from such serious deficiency fatally affecting their claim. 69. While considering issue No.2 and additional issues 1 and 2 framed on 15.03.1996 and issues 1 and 2 framed on 20.02.1997 the learned trial Judge accepted this Will. The entire process of acceptance of Ex.X1 by the learned trial Judge is bereft of any reasons. The requirements of law as discussed above in the context of application of Section 68 of the Evidence Act and Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, more importantly to dispel such serious suspicious circumstances surrounding execution of Ex.X1, were not at all considered or discussed. The learned trial Judge jumped to the conclusion that it was executed by the deceased 1st appellant in a sound and disposing state of mind basing on the evidence of P.W.3 alone. Therefore, the findings so recorded on these issues in Para-81 of the Judgment of the trial Court require interference holding that the appellants failed to establish and prove the original of Ex.X1-Will. Therefore, the testamentary disposition of the property claimed by the appellants, as if by the deceased 1st appellant cannot stand. Consequently, it has to be held that there is no proof offered by the appellants that the original of Ex.X1 Will is true or valid nor it binds the respondents 1 to 4. Therefore, the cross-objections of the 1st respondent stand accepted. POINT No.3: 70. The plaint ‘B’ schedule properties consisted of a tractor trailor and a Saw machine. Both of them are no more available, since the evidence on record is that the 1st respondent sold them away. 71. The appellants contended that item no.1 of the plaint ‘B’ schedule tractor trailor was purchased by the funds provided by the 2nd appellant and the 1st respondent. The loan was raised, according to them in Vadlamannadu Land Mortgage Bank, Pedana for this purpose, where, as seen from Ex.A23, the 2nd appellant had borrowed Rs.66,000/-on 17.10.1981 agreeing to repay in instalments and that this loan was closed on 26.09.1989 as per its entries. 72. The loan was raised, according to them in Vadlamannadu Land Mortgage Bank, Pedana for this purpose, where, as seen from Ex.A23, the 2nd appellant had borrowed Rs.66,000/-on 17.10.1981 agreeing to repay in instalments and that this loan was closed on 26.09.1989 as per its entries. 72. The 1st respondent also contended that he has purchased this tractor trailor in the year 1981, for Rs.75,000/-, sold it away for Rs.40,000/-and that, it belonged to him absolutely. For this purpose, according to the 1st respondent, he had raised a loan on 17.10.1981 upon mortgaging property on 14.10.1981 and this entire loan was redeemed by him on 21.04.1988. Ex.B6 dated 23.06.1989 is the discharge certificate issued by Krishna District Central Cooperative Bank, Machilipatnam in this respect relied on by the 1st respondent. 73. Admittedly, this tractor trailor was being used by the 1st appellant. The learned trial judge considering the material on record while discussing issue no.3 accepted the contention of the 1st respondent and rightly. There is no proof adduced by the appellants that this tractor trailor remained property for common use of all these parties. Nor evidence offered by them proved that this tractor was acquired jointly by the 2nd appellant and the 1st respondent. 74. With reference to item no.2 of plaint ‘B’ schedule Saw Machine, one factor to indicate that it exclusively belonged to the 1st respondent is that the licence to run it stood in his name. According to him as D.W.1, it was purchased in the year 1976 or 1977 at Kodali. Whatever income from this machine, even according to P.W.2, was shown in the name of the 1st respondent. Thus, it is clear that it was the first 1st respondent who was attending to this machine and was receiving income therefrom. During pendency of this suit, the 1st respondent also faced prosecution on account of it, from Factory Inspector in STC No.19 of 1997 on the file of the Court of one of the Magistrates at Machilipatnam. He was convicted and was directed to pay a fine of Rs.900/-as is seen from Ex.B7 receipt dated 26.07.1997. 75. There is no reference to these two items in Ex.A11 legal notice issued by the 1st and 2nd appellants to the 1st respondent claiming that they are the properties of the then joint family. 76. He was convicted and was directed to pay a fine of Rs.900/-as is seen from Ex.B7 receipt dated 26.07.1997. 75. There is no reference to these two items in Ex.A11 legal notice issued by the 1st and 2nd appellants to the 1st respondent claiming that they are the properties of the then joint family. 76. It is an undisputed fact that prior to the partition of 1979 all other movable properties of the family were divided among all the members of this erstwhile joint family. Either acquisition or retention of these two items was never an issue among these parties and of their enjoyment later. The material on record also established that these two items were always enjoyed by the 1st respondent himself. 77. Considering the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge and on re-appraisal of the evidence on record, these findings have to be confirmed. Thus, these two items in plaint ‘B’ schedule and item 1 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule are not available or amenable for partition among the appellants and the respondents. Thus, this point is answered. POINT No.4 78. In view of the findings on points 1 to 3, the findings of the learned trial Judge in the judgment under appeal have to be confirmed except in respect of those issues raised in cross-objections. Accordingly, the cross-objections shall be allowed. As a consequence, the ultimate relief granted by the learned trial Judge in substance, did not get altered since preliminary decree passed is confined only with reference to items 2 and 3 of plaint ‘A’ schedule. However, the findings relating to devolvement or distribution of 1/4th share allotable to the deceased 1st appellant, gets altered. In the sense in terms of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act prior to amendment in the year 2005, 1/4th share of the 1st appellant in items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule shall be divided among the 1st appellant, the 2nd appellant, 1st respondent and 2nd respondent notionally. Since the 2nd appellant and 2nd respondent are no more, their respective legal heirs are entitled to the share allotable to them in respective proportions. Since the 2nd appellant and 2nd respondent are no more, their respective legal heirs are entitled to the share allotable to them in respective proportions. Therefore, items 1 and 2 of plaint ‘A’ schedule be divided into three (03) equal shares and the 1st respondent is entitled for one such share, legal heirs of the 2nd appellant viz., the appellants 3 and 4 and respondents 7 and 8 are entitled for one such share and whereas the legal heirs of the 2nd respondent are entitled for one such share. Accordingly, there shall be modification of the preliminary decree granted by the trial Court. 79. In the result, this appeal is dismissed and cross objections are allowed. Consequently, the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court is modified as follows: (1) items 2 and 3 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule shall be divided into three (03) equal shares. One such share shall be allotted to the 1st respondent and whereas one such share shall be allotted to the legal heirs of the 2nd appellant viz., the appellants 3,4 and respondents 7 and 8 together. Similarly, legal heirs of the 2nd respondent including respondents 4 and 5 are entitled for one such share. (2) The decree and judgment of the trial Court in respect of item 1 of plaint ‘A’ schedule and items 1 and 2 of plaint ‘B’ schedule stand confirmed. (3) The parties including all the legal heirs whether on record or not of the deceased 2nd appellant and 2nd respondent are at liberty to file separate applications for passing of final decree in terms of this preliminary decree. (4) In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.