ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed the present Cr.M.P. challenging order of the Revisional Court dated 10.05.2021 passed by the Fifth Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur in Criminal Revision No. 66/2021 affirming the warrant of arrest dated 03.04.2021 issued in pursuance of order dated 19.03.2021 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur in Criminal Case No. 11840/2021. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the witnesses who were to be examined as prosecution witnesses as well as the petitioner could not appear before the trial Court on 19.03.2019 as on 19.03.2021, father of the accused was ill therefore, he himself could not attend the court and due to counsel’s engagement in another case, the counsel also could not appear before the trial Court, therefore, warrant of arrest has been issued against him. As such, he has moved an application through his counsel under Section 70(2) of Cr.P.C. for cancellation of arrest warrant on 31.03.2021, but the same has been rejected by the Judicial Magistrate First Class and ordered for issuance of warrant of arrest on 03.04.2021. The petitioner has preferred Revision Petition before the Revision Court i.e. Fifth Additional Sessions’ Judge Bilaspur. 3. Learned Revisional Court vide its order dated 10.05.2021 has dismissed the revision petition treating the order dated 03.04.2021, by which the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has issued warrant of arrest against the petitioner, as interlocutory order and held that revision is not maintainable. 4. Both these orders have been challenged by the petitioner before this Court by filing present Cr.M.P. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Sessions Judge has also not examined the fact that Judicial Magistrate has already rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 70(2) Cr.P.C. for cancellation of warrant and the right of liberty of the petitioner-accused was being adversely affected by the order of the trial Court, therefore, it cannot be termed as interlocutory order. The Revisional Court without examining the provisions and without considering the law on the subject has held that order dated 03.04.2021 is interlocutory order as it does not finally dispose off the matter in dispute. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments has examined the orders which are interlocutory in nature or in the nature of final order. The Revisional Court without examining the provisions and without considering the law on the subject has held that order dated 03.04.2021 is interlocutory order as it does not finally dispose off the matter in dispute. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments has examined the orders which are interlocutory in nature or in the nature of final order. The first Judgment on the subject is in case of Amarnath and Others vs. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the order, which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties, cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced below :- “6. Let us now proceed to interpret the provisions of s. 397 against the historical background of these facts. Subsection (2) of s. 397 of the 1973 Code may be extracted thus : "The powers of revision conferred by Subsection (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed ; in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding." The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious diffident. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide 'the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to, us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights, or the liabilities of the parties. It seems to, us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights, or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.” 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also examined the interlocutory orders in case of Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 . The relevant part of para 15 of the judgment is reproduced below :- “15.....An order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not a interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2)” 7. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mohit @ Sonu and Another vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2013) 7 SCC 789 after survey of the previous judgments held that the bar imposed by Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. will not be attracted in such kind of intermediate orders. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 25 as under :- “25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 25 as under :- “25. In the light of the ratio laid down by this Court referred to hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the trial court refusing to issue summons on the application filed by the complainant under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. cannot be held to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. Admittedly, in the instant case, before the trial court the complainant’s application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was rejected for the second time holding that there was no sufficient evidence against the appellants to proceed against them by issuing summons. The said order passed by the trial court decides the rights and liabilities of the appellants in respect of their involvement in the case. As held by this Court in Amar Nath’s case (supra), an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order as contemplated under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C.” 8. From perusal of above judgments, the feasible test whether particular order is interlocutory order or not, it has to be seen that an objection is raised by other party and if proceedings are culminated, then any order passed on such objection would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. In the present case, if the objections raised by the prosecution were upheld by the Court, the entire proceedings would have been terminated, hence as per the said standard the impugned order was revisable. It is pertinent to mention here that the application for cancellation of warrant under Section 70(2) has been rejected, as such, proceedings have been culminated, therefore, it cannot be said to be an interlocutory order and the revision was very much maintainable before the Revisional Court. 9. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has issued warrant of arrest against the petitioner and application filed by the petitioner under Section 70(2) of the CrP.C. has been rejected by the trial Court. Therefore, the particular proceedings have been culminated as such the order dated 03.04.2021 cannot be termed as interlocutory order. Therefore, the particular proceedings have been culminated as such the order dated 03.04.2021 cannot be termed as interlocutory order. Thus, the Revisional Court has committed material illegality, irregularity and has failed to examine the correct provisions of law, therefore, the order dated 10.05.2021 deserves to be quashed. 10. In normal course, this Court should have remanded the matter to the Revisional Court for deciding the case on merits. Since warrant of arrest has been issued against the petitioner and his right of liberty is being infringed, therefore, this Court exercising inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is examining the legality and propriety of the order dated 19.03.2021 as well as 03.04.2021 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class. 11. The contention of the petitioner is that the Judicial Magistrate First Class in most mechanical manner has issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner without issuing bailable warrant of arrest and without application of mind as reflected from order dated 19.03.2021, which is extracted below :- ^^19-03-2021--- lk{khx.k vuqifLFkrA vfHk;qDr dks ckj&ckj iqdkj yxkbZ xbZA vfHk;qDr vuqifLFkrA vr% vfHk;qDr ds tekur@eqpyds fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA** 12. On 31.03.2021 on behalf of accused the counsel has moved an application under Section 70(2) of the Cr.P.C. and public prosecutor has sought time to file reply to the said application. The learned Magistrate has fixed the case for argument on said application 03.04.2021. The Judicial Magistrate First Class vide its order dated 03.04.2021 rejected the said application. Operative part of the order is extracted below – ^^03-04-2021----- Ádj.k ds voyksdu nf'kZr gS fd fu;r frfFk fnukad & 19-03-2021 dks vfHk;qDr rFkk mldh vksj ls iSjoh gsrq mlds vf/koDrk ds vuqifLFkr gksus ds QyLo:i vfHk;qDr dhs vksj ls iwoZ esa ÁLrqr tekur eqpyds fujLr fd;s tkus rFkk vfHk;qDr ds fo:) fxjrkjh okjaV tkjh fd;s tkus dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS A ÁLrqr vkosnu esa vfHk;qDr rFkk mldh vksj ls vf/koDrk dks fu;r frfFk fnukad&19-03-2021 dks vuqifLFkr gksuk Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS A ÁLrqr vkosnu vfHk;qDr }kjk Lo;a U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA mijksDr of.kZr vk/kkjksa ij ÁLrqr vkosnu Lohdkj ;ksX; Árhr ugha gksus ls fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA vkns'k fnuakd&19-03-2021 ds ifjis{; esa vfHk;qDr ds fo:) fxjrkjh okjaV tkjh fd;k tkosA Ádj.k ikaWp o"kZ ls vf/kd le; ls yafcr gS vr% mDr fxjrkjh okjaV iqfyl vf/k{kd ds ek/;e ls rkfey djk;k tkos A** 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Raghevansh Dewachand Bahasin vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 9 SCC 791 has held that the issuance of non-bailable warrant of arrest directly involves curtailment of liberty of a person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 9 as under :- “9. It needs little emphasis that since the execution of a non-bailable warrant directly involves curtailment of liberty of a person, warrant of arrest cannot be issued mechanically, but only after recording satisfaction that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is warranted. The Courts have to be extra-cautious and careful while directing issue of non-bailable warrant, else a wrongful detention would amount to denial of constitutional mandate envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, there is no gainsaying that the welfare of an individual must yield to that of the community. Therefore, in order to maintain rule of law and to keep the society in functional harmony, it is necessary to strike a balance between an individual's rights, liberties and privileges on the one hand, and the State on the other. Indeed, it is a complex exercise. As Justice Cardozo puts it "on the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice." Be that as it may, it is for the court, which is clothed with the discretion to determine whether the presence of an accused can be secured by a bailable or non-bailable warrant, to strike the balance between the need of law enforcement on the one hand and the protection of the citizen from highhandedness at the hands of the law enforcement agencies on the other. The power and jurisdiction of the court to issue appropriate warrant against an accused on his failure to attend the court on the date of hearing of the matter cannot be disputed. Nevertheless, such power has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, having regard, inter-alia, to the nature and seriousness of the offence involved; the past conduct of the accused; his age and the possibility of his absconding.” 14. Nevertheless, such power has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily, having regard, inter-alia, to the nature and seriousness of the offence involved; the past conduct of the accused; his age and the possibility of his absconding.” 14. Now, if we examine the facts of the case, the absence of the petitioner has been explained in the application filed under Section 70(2) of the Cr.P.C. which has not been given any consideration by the Judicial Magistrate First Class. This is glaring illegality committed by the trial Court. The learned trial Court has also not even taken care to consider the guidelines issued by this Court for not insisting the presence of accused during the Covid period. The Judicial Magistrate First Class has also not considered the law that before issuance of warrant of arrest, bailable warrant should have been issued and thereafter, if bailable warrant is executed and accused failed to appear before the Court, then only warrant of arrest should have been issued. 15. Accordingly, the present Cr.M.P. is allowed and the order of the Revisional Court dated 10.05.2021 passed by the Fifth Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur in Criminal Revision No. 66/2021 and order dated 19.03.2021, so far as it relates to issuance of arrest warrant against the petitioner, as well as order dated 03.04.2021 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur in Criminal Case No. 11840/2021 are quashed. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that he is now ready to appear before the trial Court on any date fixed by this Court. 17. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner is now directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 31.08.2021 and again he will apply for bail which will be considered by the learned trial Court on the same date without insisting for arrest of the petitioner.