ORDER : 1. The petitioners in all these writ petitions who are appointed as District Government Pleaders/Additional Government Pleaders (hereinafter referred to as ‘Pleaders’ short) have called in question their orders of removal and appointment of private respondents in their place. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petitions, as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:- The petitioners are all practicing Advocates in Hassan District. The State Government directed the 3rd respondent/Deputy Commissioner, Hassan to appoint Pleaders to various Courts in Hassan District. In furtherance of the said directive, the 3rd respondent invited applications for appointment as Pleaders as per Rule 26 of the Karnataka Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’ for short). The petitioners finding themselves eligible and qualified for consideration for appointment to the said posts submitted their applications. On receipt of those applications the 3rd respondent/Deputy Commissioner forwarded the same to the District Judge, Hassan District as required under sub-rule (2) of Rule 26 of the Rules. Thereafter the District Judge forwarded the applications along with remarks regarding suitability of each of the applicant to be considered for appointment. On further consideration of the remarks made the Law Ministry/Department of Law and Justice of the State Government issued orders of appointments appointing the petitioners to the posts of Pleaders for a period of three years from the date of appointment. 3. The petitioners claim to have discharged their duties with utmost devotion and integrity which led their tenure to be extended for a second term of three years with effect from the date on which the first term would come to an end. Therefore, the petitioners in all these cases had their term extended for a further period of three years from the year 2018 and would come to an end on various dates in the year 2021. The initial term and the extended term of the petitioners are as follows:- S. No. Petitioner Date of appointment as District Government Pleader/Additional Government Pleader First Term of three years Second Term of three years 1. L.N. Narasimha Murthy 07-01-2015 24-01-2018 2. Devarajegowda 12-02-2015 16-01-2018 3. G.N. Suresh 19-01-2015 08-03-2018 4. Doreswamy 04-03-2014 09-05-2017 In terms of the afore-extracted chart, the term of the petitioners as stated herein above, was to end on completion of three years term from the month of January 2018. L.N. Narasimha Murthy 07-01-2015 24-01-2018 2. Devarajegowda 12-02-2015 16-01-2018 3. G.N. Suresh 19-01-2015 08-03-2018 4. Doreswamy 04-03-2014 09-05-2017 In terms of the afore-extracted chart, the term of the petitioners as stated herein above, was to end on completion of three years term from the month of January 2018. In the month of May 2018 there was a change in Government in the State of Karnataka which led to a Notification being issued on 17-10-2018 removing the petitioners from the posts of Pleaders and appointing the private respondents in these cases as Pleaders in place of the petitioners. This was called in question in Writ Petition No. 47687-47690 of 2018 which was initially filed challenging the action of removal of the Pleaders/petitioners therein. The petitioners in that writ petition claimed that respondents 1 to 3/Government therein filed its statement of objections to the interim prayer for stay of the Notification removing the petitioners from the posts of Pleaders. In the statement of objections the Government contended that consultation with the District Judge as required under Rule 26(2) and Rule 26(3) of the Rules was mandatory. In those petitions it was further contended that the State Government had lost trust, faith and confidence and grant of any interim order would frustrate and harm the interest of the respondent/State Government. On the statement of objections filed by the respondents/Government the petitioners contend that this order, though passed under sub-rule (6) of Rule 26 of the Rules, it is an order which casts a stigma and is passed under sub-rule (5) of Rule 26 of the Rules which requires an enquiry to be conducted if the order were to be really stigmatic. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners Sri. B.N. Manmohan would vehemently argue and contend that the tenure of the petitioners was extended beyond the period of three years for a second term of three years. Change in Government cannot be made a change in circumstance to obliterate the contract between the Government and the petitioners. The statement of objections filed by the respondents/State Government in the connected writ petition wherein the challenge was to the very same action of the Government contending that the Government had lost confidence would clearly indicate that the order was stigmatic. The statement of objections filed by the respondents/State Government in the connected writ petition wherein the challenge was to the very same action of the Government contending that the Government had lost confidence would clearly indicate that the order was stigmatic. He would further submit that note sheet that is produced in the writ petition would clearly indicate that the executive had in fact warned the Government not to change as they were left with three years term when there was change in Government and the appointment of respondents 4 to 8 in terms of the note sheet was clearly out of political interference and would seek that the writ petition be allowed. The learned counsel would place reliance upon judgments of this Court in the case of S.H. Mohan Kumar vs. State of Karnataka, ILR 2005 Kar. 5517 to contend that if the order is attached with stigma the same could not have been passed without following due process of law as mandated under sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 of the Rules. 6. Per-contra, the learned Additional Government Advocate would submit that the appointment of the petitioners was purely contractual for a period of three years or until further orders. Even the term of extension that was given to the petitioners was for a period of three years or until further orders which would mean that it is at the pleasure of the Government. Since it was a pleasure appointment, the petitioners have no right to continue or that they have to be continued till the tenure was over. The choice of Advocate to defend the Government is with the Government like any other litigant who has a choice to choose his Advocate. The learned Additional Government Advocate would place reliance upon the judgment of this Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 6478 of 2012, disposed of 5-10-2012, ILR 2017 Kar. 59, AIR 1994 SC 1654 and (2011) 5 SCC 341 . 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the respective counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the material on record. 59, AIR 1994 SC 1654 and (2011) 5 SCC 341 . 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the respective counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the material on record. In furtherance whereof the point that arises for my consideration is whether the Government was well within its power to terminate the services of the petitioners by invoking pleasure doctrine and whether the order of removal of the petitioners casts a stigma which would be in violation of sub-rule (5) Rule 5 of the Rules. 8. The appointment of Law Officers/Pleaders in the State of Karnataka is governed by the Karnataka Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977. Rule 26 of the said rules reads as follows:- “26. Appointment of District Government Pleader, etc. - (1) The number of posts of District Government Pleaders, Additional District Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the State and their particulars shall be as specified in Schedule VI. (2) The Deputy Commissioner shall, whenever required by the Government, invite applications from eligible practising advocates of the place, for the post of District Government Pleaders, Additional District Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders specifying the date before which such application should be made and forward the applications so received to the District Judge along with his remarks about their suitability for appointment to the concerned post. On receipt of the same, the District Judge shall forward them to the Government in the Department of Law and Parliamentary Affairs appending his remarks regarding his suitability of each of them for the concerned post. The Government shall thereafter' make the appointments having regard to the remarks of District Judge and the Deputy Commissioner. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule-2, but subject to other provisions of these rules, the Government may in cases of urgency appoint in consultation with the concerned District Judge, any advocate as District Government Pleader or Additional District Government Pleader for a period not exceeding one year.” Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 26 provides that the Government may in cases of urgency appoint in consultation with the District Judge any Advocate as Pleader for a period not exceeding one year. The Rule that empowers removal of a Pleader is dealt with under Rule 5 of the Rules which reads as follows:- “5. The Rule that empowers removal of a Pleader is dealt with under Rule 5 of the Rules which reads as follows:- “5. Appointment of Law Officers - (1) No person shall be eligible for appointment: (i) as a Government Advocate or as the State Prosecutor or a Special Counsel unless he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than fifteen years: (i-a) as a High Court Government Pleader unless he has been in practice as an Advocate for not less than twelve years. (ii) as a District Government Pleader or as an Additional District Government Pleader unless he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years. (iii) as an Assistant Government Pleader unless he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years. (2) All law officers shall be appointed by the Government and shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. (3) Subject to the other provisions contained is these rules, unless otherwise ordered in the order of appointment, a person appointed as a law officer shall hold office at a time, for a term not exceeding three years, but shall be eligible for re-appointment after the expiry of such term: Provided that notwithstanding the expiry of the term a law officer shall, unless otherwise ordered, continue in office until fresh appointment is made or for a period of 3 twelve months, whichever is earlier. (4) No person shall ordinarily be eligible for appointment or to continue as a law officer in anyone capacity continuously for a period exceeding six years. (5) A law officer shall be liable to be removed from office at any time if he is guilty of any act or conduct which, in the opinion of the Government is contrary to these rules or is incompatible with his duties as such law officer. Decision of the Government in such cases, shall be final. (6) Save as otherwise provided in sub-rule (5) and subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), the State Government may terminate the appointment of a law officer without assigning any reason by giving one month's notice in writing or by giving one month's retainer in lieu of such notice. (7) A law officer may resign his office by giving one month's notice in writing to the Government. (7) A law officer may resign his office by giving one month's notice in writing to the Government. “The Law Officer intending to resign the office shall be fully responsible for the conduct of the Government Litigation during the period of notice and up to the date of his handing over charge of the office. The law officer shall make good the loss if any, caused to Government due to failure on his part and shall also be liable for legal action for such failure.” The petitioners herein who are all practicing Advocates in different Courts of Hassan District and pursuant to a Notification issued by the State Government calling for applications for appointment were appointed as Pleaders. The appointment order of one of the petitioners reads as follows:- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx A perusal at the order of appointment for a term of three years initially made on 07-01-2015 clearly indicates that the appointment was for a period of three years or until further orders whichever would be earlier. It is on the strength of this Notification and the kind, the petitioner and the like assumed office of Pleader in various courts of Hassan District.” 9. After completion of the term of three years, an order of extension was also given to the petitioners, one of which reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx This extension was also for a period of three years or until further orders whichever would be earlier. A perusal at the orders, on the strength of which the petitioners were initially appointed and later continued, would unmistakably indicate that it is with the pleasure of the Government, which was for a period of three years or terminable at any time as the Government reserved its right as provided in the Rule and the Notification for appointment. 10. After extension of the term of the petitioners for another period of three years, the circumstance was that there was a change in the Government. The moment Government changed a note was put up by the Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs for change of Pleaders in Hassan District. 10. After extension of the term of the petitioners for another period of three years, the circumstance was that there was a change in the Government. The moment Government changed a note was put up by the Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs for change of Pleaders in Hassan District. The note sheet maintained by the Government in so far as it pertains to the impugned appointments reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx On the minute put up by the Law Minister at Page 76, the names of the private respondents in all these cases figure to be appointed as Pleaders. It is after this the petitioners were removed and the private respondents were appointed by the impugned Notification. It is this that will have to be decided on the anvil of doctrine of pleasure qua arbitrariness which would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. Two factors would emerge from the afore-extracted orders of appointment and the note sheets maintained on the file of the Government concerning appointment of pleaders. 12. The first factor is that the appointment of petitioners as pleaders was for a term varying from 09.05.2017 to 24.01.2018. This was extended by another order for another term of three years which was from the said dates of expiry. A change in Government in the interregnum has generated a thought of change in the pleaders. A perusal at the afore extracted note sheet would unequivocally display that the removal and the appointment of the private respondents is driven by political motivation. Therefore, would fringe on the borders of arbitrariness being in violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 13. As the Doctrine of Pleasure that is invoked to remove the pleaders is not absolute. Non-arbitrariness is that golden thread that runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution through which every bead of state action should pass. On this principle, if the case at hand is noticed, it would lead to an unmistakable conclusion that the removal of pleaders on invocation of Doctrine of Pleasure was not free from arbitrariness. Non-arbitrariness is that golden thread that runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution through which every bead of state action should pass. On this principle, if the case at hand is noticed, it would lead to an unmistakable conclusion that the removal of pleaders on invocation of Doctrine of Pleasure was not free from arbitrariness. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331 while elucidating and elaborating the Doctrine of Pleasure comparing it to the Doctrine of Pleasure under the queen has held as follows: “(ii) Scope of doctrine of pleasure 16. The pleasure doctrine has its origin in English law, with reference to the tenure of public servants under the Crown. In Dunn vs. R. (1896) 1 QB 116 : (1895-99) All ER Rep 907 (CA), the Court of Appeal referred to the old common law rule that a public servant under the British Crown had no tenure but held his position at the absolute discretion of the Crown. It was observed: (QB pp. 119-120) “......I take it that persons employed as the petitioner was in the service of the Crown, except in cases where there is some statutory provision for a higher tenure of office, are ordinarily engaged on the understanding that they hold their employment at the pleasure of the Crown. So I think that there must be imported into the contract for the employment of the petitioner, the term which is applicable to civil servants in general, namely, that the Crown may put an end to the employment at its pleasure.....It seems to me that it is the public interest which has led to the term which I have mentioned being imported into contracts for employment in the service of the Crown. The cases cited show that, such employment being for the good of the public, it is essential for the public good that it should be capable of being determined at the pleasure of the Crown, except in certain exceptional cases where it has been deemed to be more for the public good that some restriction should be imposed on the power of the Crown to dismiss its servants.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. In Shenton vs. Smith, 1895 AC 229 (PC), the Privy Council explained that the pleasure doctrine was a necessity because, the difficulty of dismissing those servants whose continuance in office was detrimental to the State would, if it were necessary to prove some offence to the satisfaction of a jury (or court) be such, as to seriously impede the working of the public service. 18. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672, explained the origin of the doctrine thus: (SCC p. 425, Para 8) “8......In England, except where otherwise provided by statute, all public officers and servants of the Crown hold their appointments at the pleasure of the Crown or durante bene placito (‘during good pleasure’ or ‘during the pleasure of the appointor’) as opposed to an office held dum bene se gesserit (‘during good conduct’) also called quadiu se bene gesserit (‘as long as he shall behave himself well’). When a person holds office during the pleasure of the Crown, his appointment can be terminated at any time without assigning cause. The exercise of pleasure by the Crown can, however, be restricted by legislation enacted by Parliament because in the United Kingdom Parliament is sovereign....” (Emphasis supplied) 19. In State of Bihar vs. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245 : 1954 SCR 786 , another Constitution Bench explained the doctrine of pleasure thus: (AIR p. 250, Para 13) “13. The rule that a civil servant holds office at the pleasure of the Crown has its origin in the Latin phrase durante bene placito (during pleasure) meaning that the tenure of office of a civil servant, except where it is otherwise provided by statute, can be terminated at any time without cause assigned. The true scope and effect of this expression is that even if a special contract has been made with the civil servant the Crown is not bound thereby. In other words, civil servants are liable to dismissal without notice and there is no right of action for wrongful dismissal, that is, that they cannot claim damages for premature termination of their services.” 20. H.M. Seervai, in his treatise Constitutional Law of India (4th Edn. Vol. 3, pp. In other words, civil servants are liable to dismissal without notice and there is no right of action for wrongful dismissal, that is, that they cannot claim damages for premature termination of their services.” 20. H.M. Seervai, in his treatise Constitutional Law of India (4th Edn. Vol. 3, pp. 2989-2990) explains this English Crown's power to dismiss at pleasure in the following terms: “27.4.......In a contract for service under the Crown, civil as well as military, there is, except in certain cases where it is otherwise provided by law, imported into the contract a condition that the Crown has the power to dismiss at pleasure.....Where the general rule prevails, the Crown is not bound to show good cause for dismissal and if a servant has a grievance that he has been dismissed unjustly, his remedy is not by a law suit but by an appeal of an official or political kind....If any authority representing the Crown were to exclude the power of the Crown to dismiss at pleasure by express stipulation, that would be a violation of public policy and the stipulation cannot derogate from the power of the Crown to dismiss at pleasure, and this would apply to a stipulation that the service was to be terminated by a notice of a specified period of time. Where, however, the law authorises the making of a fixed term contract, or subjects the pleasure of the Crown to certain restrictions, the pleasure is pro tanto curtailed and effect must be given to such law.” 21. Black's Law Dictionary defines “pleasure appointment” as the assignment of someone to employment that can be taken away at any time, with no requirement for notice or hearing. 22. There is a distinction between the doctrine of pleasure as it existed in a feudal set-up and the doctrine of pleasure in a democracy governed by the rule of law. In a nineteenth century feudal set-up unfettered power and discretion of the Crown was not an alien concept. However, in a democracy governed by rule of law, where arbitrariness in any form is eschewed, no Government or authority has the right to do what it pleases. The doctrine of pleasure does not mean a licence to act arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically. However, in a democracy governed by rule of law, where arbitrariness in any form is eschewed, no Government or authority has the right to do what it pleases. The doctrine of pleasure does not mean a licence to act arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically. It is presumed that discretionary powers conferred in absolute and unfettered terms on any public authority will necessarily and obviously be exercised reasonably and for the public good. 23. The following classic statement from Administrative Law (H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, 9th Edn. pp. 354-355) is relevant in this context: “The common theme of all the authorities so far mentioned is that the notion of absolute or unfettered discretion is rejected. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely-that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way which Parliament when conferring it is presumed to have intended. Although the Crown's lawyers have argued in numerous cases that unrestricted permissive language confers unfettered discretion, the truth is that, in a system based on the rule of law, unfettered governmental discretion is a contradiction in terms. The real question is whether the discretion is wide or narrow, and where the legal line is to be-drawn. For this purpose everything depends upon the true intent and meaning of the empowering Act. The powers of public authorities are therefore essentially different from those of private persons. A man making his will may, subject to any rights of his dependants, dispose of his property just as he may wish. He may act out of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law this does not affect his exercise of his power. In the same way a private person has an absolute power to allow whom he likes to use his land, to release a debtor, or, where the law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This is unfettered discretion. But a public authority may do none of these things unless it acts reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest...... The whole conception of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it may use them for the public good. There is nothing paradoxical in the imposition of such legal limits. The whole conception of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a public authority, which possesses powers solely in order that it may use them for the public good. There is nothing paradoxical in the imposition of such legal limits. It would indeed be paradoxical if they were not imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. It is of some relevance to note that the “doctrine of pleasure” in its absolute unrestricted application does not exist in India. The said doctrine is severely curtailed in the case of government employment, as will be evident from clause (2) of Article 310 and clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. Even in regard to cases falling within the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311, the application of the doctrine is not unrestricted, but moderately restricted in the sense that the circumstances mentioned therein should exist for its operation. The Canadian Supreme Court in Wells vs. Newfoundland, (1999) 3 SCR 199 : (1999) 177 DL 4th 73 (Can SC) has concluded that “at pleasure” doctrine is no longer justifiable in the context of modern employment relationship. 33. The doctrine of pleasure as originally envisaged in England was a prerogative power which was unfettered. It meant that the holder of an office under pleasure could be removed at any time, without notice, without assigning cause and without there being a need for any cause. But where the rule of law prevails, there is nothing like unfettered discretion or unaccountable action. The degree of need for reason may vary. The degree of scrutiny during judicial review may vary. But the need for reason exists. As a result when the Constitution of India provides that some offices will be held during the pleasure of the President, without any express limitations or restrictions, it should however necessarily be read as being subject to the “fundamentals of constitutionalism.” Therefore in a constitutional set-up, when an office is held during the pleasure of any authority, and if no limitations or restrictions are placed on the “at pleasure” doctrine, it means that the holder of the office can be removed by the authority at whose pleasure he holds office, at any time, without notice and without assigning any cause. 34. The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. 34. The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other words “at pleasure” doctrine enables the removal of a person holding office at the pleasure of an authority, summarily, without any obligation to give any notice or hearing to the person removed, and without any obligation to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons.” In the light of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench (supra), the action of the State in unceremoniously removing the pleaders on political dictates is contrary to law. 14. Arbitrariness in State action is not an area which is untravelled. The Apex Court right from the judgment in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 till this day, has expounded the widening horizons of arbitrariness in State action. Shrilekha Vidyarthi insofar as they are germane to the lis are quoted and they read as follows: “13. The learned Additional Advocate General contended that clause (3) of Para 7.06 says that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side and not appointment to a post under the government; and the government has the power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause. He contended that this power to terminate the appointment at any time without assigning any cause and the clear statement that the appointment is only professional engagement terminable at will on either side is sufficient to indicate that the relationship is the same as that of a private client and his counsel. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred to. The expression ‘professional engagement’ is used therein to distinguish it from ‘appointment to a post under the government’ in the strict sense. In our opinion, this provision has to be read not in isolation, but in the context in which it appears and along with the connected provisions, already referred to. The expression ‘professional engagement’ is used therein to distinguish it from ‘appointment to a post under the government’ in the strict sense. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a person who is not a government servant holding a post under the government does not hold any public office and the engagement is purely private with no public element attaching to it. This part of clause (3) of Para 7.06 means only this and no more. The other part of clause (3) which enables the government to terminate the appointment ‘at any time without assigning any cause’ can also not be considered in the manner suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General. The expression ‘at any time’ merely means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and ‘without assigning any cause’ means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, ‘without assigning any cause’ is not to be equated with without existence of any cause. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not to be assigned or communicated to the appointee. It was held in Liberty Oil Mills vs. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 465 , that the expression ‘without assigning any reason’ implies that the decision has to be communicated, but reasons for the decision have not to be stated; but the reasons must exist, otherwise, the decision would be arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbitrary and, therefore, against public policy. Clause (3) of Para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to mean that the appointment of a District Government Counsel is not to be equated with appointment to a post under the government in the strict sense, which does not necessarily mean that it results in denuding the office of its public character; and that the appointment may be terminated even during currency of the term by only communicating the decision of termination without communicating the reasons which led to the termination. It does not mean that the appointment is at the sweet will of the government which can be terminated at any time, even without the existence of any cogent reason during the subsistence of the term. The construction, suggested on behalf of the State of U.P. of this provision, if accepted, would amount to conceding arbitrary power of termination to the government, which by itself is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby save it from any attack to its validity. 15. A brief reference to some decisions of this Court, in which the character of engagement of a Government Counsel was considered, may be made. In Mahadeo vs. Shantibhai, (1969) 2 SCR 422 , it was held that a lawyer engaged by the Railway Administration during the continuance of the engagement was holding an office of profit. The engagement of the Railway counsel was similar to that of the Government Counsel in the present case. It was pointed out that by ‘office’ is meant the right and duty to exercise an employment or a position of authority and trust to which certain duties are attached; and such an engagement satisfied that test. Even though the decision was rendered in the context of disqualification under the Election Law by holding an ‘office of profit’ yet it is useful for appreciating the nature of such an engagement or appointment of a counsel by the government. In Mundrika Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (1979) 4 SCC 701 : (1980) 1 SCR 759 , the nature of appointment of Government Pleaders came up for consideration and it was said that the office of a Government Pleader, as defined in Section 2(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is a public office. Krishna Iyer, J. in that decision, also pointed out that the (SCC p. 707, Para 16) “Governments under our Constitution shall not play with Law Offices on political or other impertinent considerations as it may affect the legality of the action and subvert the rule of law itself.” In that decision, an earlier Madras decision was quoted with approval, wherein, it was clearly held that the duties of the Government Pleader are of a public nature and that the office of a Government Pleader is a public office. The relevant extract is as under: (SCC pp. 706-707, Para 15) “.....A Government Pleader is more than an advocate for a litigant. The relevant extract is as under: (SCC pp. 706-707, Para 15) “.....A Government Pleader is more than an advocate for a litigant. He holds a public office. We recall with approval the observations a Division Bench of the Madras High Court made in Ramachandran vs. Alagiriswami, AIR 1961 Mad. 450 : ILR 1961 Mad. 553 and regard the view there, expressed about a Government Pleader's office, as broadly correct even in the Bihar set up..... The duties of the Government Pleader, Madras are duties of a public nature. Besides, as already explained the public are genuinely concerned with the manner in which Government Pleader discharges his duties because, if he handles his cases badly, they have ultimately to foot the bill..... *** *** *** I consider that the most useful test to be applied to determine the question is that laid down by Erle, J. in (1851) 17 QB 149. The three criteria are, source of the office, the tenure and the duties. I have applied that test and I am of opinion that the conclusion that the office is a public office is irresistible.” Similarly, in Mukul Dalal vs. Union of India, (1988) 3 SCC 144 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 566, it was held that: (SCC pp. 149 and 152, Para 6 and 9) “The office of the Public Prosecutor is a public one” and “the primacy given to the Public Prosecutor under the Scheme of the Code (Cr.P.C.) has a social purpose.” In the aforesaid paragraphs the Apex Court has clearly held for an action of the kind that was called in question before the Apex Court, reasons must exist. The same is applicable to the case at hand as well, as their existed no reasons for the impugned action of the State. The Apex Court further at paragraphs 18 and 20 holds as follows: 18. The scope of judicial review permissible in the present case, does not require any elaborate consideration since even the minimum permitted scope of judicial review on the ground of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or irrationality, once Article 14 is attracted, is sufficient to invalidate the impugned circular as indicated later. We need not, therefore, deal at length with the scope of judicial review permissible in such cases since several nuances of that ticklish question do not arise for consideration in the present case. 20. We need not, therefore, deal at length with the scope of judicial review permissible in such cases since several nuances of that ticklish question do not arise for consideration in the present case. 20. Even apart from the premise that the ‘office’ or ‘post’ of DGCs has a public element which alone is sufficient to attract the power of judicial review for testing validity of the impugned circular on the anvil of Article 14, we are also clearly of the view that this power is available even without that element on the premise that after the initial appointment, the matter is purely contractual. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said that the State can thereafter cast off its personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without anything more? We have no hesitation in saying that the personality of the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts, which cannot co-exist. The Apex Court in the aforesaid paragraphs has clearly held that when the State enters into a contract, it does not take away the action of the State to be in consonance with the rigors of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The orders impugned tested on the anvil of the said principles, would fall foul of the same. More so, in the light of the statement of objections filed by the State refuting the grant of interim order and sustaining the same in the objections filed to the main petition as well, which reads as follows: “29. The orders impugned tested on the anvil of the said principles, would fall foul of the same. More so, in the light of the statement of objections filed by the State refuting the grant of interim order and sustaining the same in the objections filed to the main petition as well, which reads as follows: “29. The question of petitioners handing over charge does not arise when the services of an Advocate is terminated which is within the sole prerogative of the client, the Advocate has no right whatsoever to retain the files or the records. Other averments made in this Para which are repetition are hereby denied. Granting of an interim order would cause grave and irreparable injury to the State Government. The relationship of client and advocate is one of trust, faith and confidence. In the instant case, the State Government has lost trust, faith and confidence in the Petitioners. In fact, grant of interim order and continuous of the Petitioners can harm the interest of the State Government who out of sheer anger and frustration may harm the cases of the State Government which they were earlier handling and which they would continue to hand in case if the interim order is granted. 30. The respondent herein also relied on the decision of W.P. No. 64718/2012 (dated 5.10.2012) Smt. Dakshayani vs. State of Karnataka and Others (Para 32) - removal of District Government Pleaders challenged before this Hon’ble Court in a Writ Petition was dismissed holding that such Advocates have no right of continuance contrary to the wishes of the Government (client). Further, consultation with the District Judge is not mandatory and non consultation will not in any way make the removal of the Government Pleader illegally. The decision report in ILR 2017 Kar. 59 (DB) : 2017 (1) KCCR 383 (DB) Party to litigation has absolute right to engage a counsel of his choice.” The reliance placed on the judgment of a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Dakshayini vs. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 64718/2012 is inapplicable to the facts of the case at hand as it was rendered at a point in time which was before the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India. Therefore, in the light of the judgment of the Constitution Bench, the judgment of the Co-Ordinate Bench in the case of Dakshayini (supra) would be rendered inapplicable to the facts of the case. 15. The fact now remains that the extended term of all the petitioners in these writ petitions are also over. Therefore, the relief that has to be granted to the petitioners will have to be moulded. In identical circumstances, the Apex Court has while noticing the fact that the term of the office of the incumbents being over would be entitled to compensation. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I decline to grant any compensation for the reason that the pleaders who were appointed were practicing Advocates. They would have practiced and earned during the last three years and it is not placed on record that the petitioners were at any point in time became unemployed because of the state action. Therefore, while holding the state action to be arbitrary, politically motivated, I decline to grant relief of the petitioners to be put back as pleaders. Wherefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER: (i) Writ Petitions are allowed in part. (ii) The impugned orders though are held to be unsustainable, in the peculiar facts of the case they are not quashed, as the petitioners today are not entitled to continue as pleaders as their term is now over. (iii) The petitioners would be entitled to a cost of Rs. 100/- each from the hands of the State for the arbitrary action of removing them.