ORDER : B.P. Colabawalla, J. 1. The above Interim Application has been preferred by the applicants/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 seeking the following reliefs:- "(a) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to appoint the Court Receiver of this Hon'ble Court as a Receiver to take possession of the property being Plot No. 250/1 and 250/2, Road No. 2, GIDC Sachin, Surat, 394 230, under Order 39 Rule 2-4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (b) this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to attach all the properties of the plaintiffs, including plot No. 250/1 and 250/2, Road No. 2, GIDC Sachin, Surat, 394 230, under Order 39 Rule 2-4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (c) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the present Suit under Order 39 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (d) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to order the plaintiffs to be detained in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months." 2. According to defendant Nos. 1 to 4, the reliefs sought in this application ought to be granted in view of the fact that the plaintiffs have violated the status quo order passed by this Court on 4 September, 2014 (for short "the 2014 order") in Notice of Motion No. 303/2011. For the sake of convenience the 2014 order reads thus:- "Heard the learned counsel for both parties. After the matter was heard at some length, it is now agreed between the learned counsel for parties that both the parties, namely, Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 on the one hand and Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on the other, shall maintain status quo in respect of their respective plots, namely plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1 situated at Road No. 2, Sachin GIDC, Sachin. Surat, pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit. It is clarified that this agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in Summary Suit No. 193 of 2010. The Notice of Motion is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) 3. Dr. Chandrachud, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 to 4, submitted that plaintiff Nos. The Notice of Motion is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) 3. Dr. Chandrachud, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 to 4, submitted that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are in possession of plot No. 250/1 and 250/2, Road No. 2, Sachin GIDC, Sachin, Surat, 394230 along with the factory standing thereon. He submitted that in relation to the said plots and the factory standing thereon, there were no third-party rights created in relation thereto as on the date of the passing of the 2014 order. Subsequently, it has come to the knowledge of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 have inducted a third party, namely Padmavati Textile Mills (a proprietary concern of the respondent above named), as a lessee/licensee in the said property by entering into an agreement dated 23 November, 2019. This is in direct violation of the 2014 order, which directs plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 on the one hand and defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on the other, to maintain status quo in respect of their respective plots, namely, plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1. He submitted that it is, in these circumstances, that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 have preferred the present application inter alia seeking appointment of a Court Receiver to take possession of the aforesaid two plots and attach all the properties of plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4, pending the hearing and final disposal of the above suit. 4. Dr. Chandrachud submitted that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 have violated the 2014 order principally on two grounds: (a) that the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 entered into with Padmavati Textile Mills is a Lease Agreement and not a Business Conducting Agreement as sought to be contended by the plaintiffs. This would clearly be in violation of the status quo order passed by this Court on 4 September, 2014; and (b) even assuming that the aforesaid agreement dated 23 November, 2019 could be construed as a Business Conducting Agreement, it is still in violation of the order dated 4 September, 2014 which directs the parties to maintain status quo as set out above. 5. 5. On his first contention, namely, that the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 is a Lease Agreement and not a Business Conducting Agreement, Dr. Chandrachud pointed out that the said agreement was executed between a partnership firm called Tejoday Dyeing and Printing Works (for short "TDPW") on the one hand and Padmavati Textile Mills on the other. He submitted that admittedly plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are partners of the said TDPW. The fact that the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 is a Lease Agreement is clear from the language and terminology used in the agreement. He submitted that firstly the title of the agreement states that it is a Lease Agreement and the agreement has been referred to as such in the terms and conditions as well. Dr. Chandrachud pointed out that the parties to the agreement have been referred to as "Lessor" and "Lessee", and the periodic lease amount towards the use of the property has been referred to as "Monthly Lease Amounts". He further submitted that clause 12 of the agreement clearly mentions that the Lessee (respondent above named) has to pay Monthly Lease Amount for three months in case the property is not let out to another. He further submitted that reading the agreement as a whole, one can hardly dispute that this is a Lease Agreement and not a Business Conducting Agreement. While the title and designation of a document alone may not be conclusive as to its nature, Dr. Chandrachud submitted that this would have strong persuasive value. Reading the said agreement holistically, there is no doubt that it is a Lease Agreement, was the submission. If that be so, then there is a clear breach of the 2014 order, and therefore, this would be a fit case to grant the reliefs as prayed for in the Interim Application, was the argument canvassed by Dr. Chandrachud. 6. As far as Dr. Chandrachud's second contention is concerned, namely, that even assuming that the aforesaid agreement is a Business Conducting Agreement it is still in violation of the 2014 order, he submitted that the said order directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of their respective plots, namely, plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1. He submitted that the scope of the term "status quo" is very broad and encapsulates any change in the circumstances or change in the rights and interest in the property or any building standing thereon, after the date of the order. In the instant case, the induction of a third party by the plaintiffs pursuant to the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 would certainly alter the status quo, even if one were to assume that the said agreement was to be treated as a Business Conducting Agreement. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 can be termed as a Business Conducting Agreement, the same would still be in violation of the 2014 order which directed the parties to maintain the status quo. 7. To substantiate his argument that the term "status quo" has a very broad meaning and encapsulates any change in the circumstances or change in the rights and interest in the property, Dr. Chandrachud relied upon the following decisions:- 1) Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1987) Supp SCC 284; 2) Narmada Mai Khadan Kamgar Karigar Sahkari Samiti and Ors. v. Laxminarayan and Ors.,: 1998 (1) JLJ 357 ; 3) Ghulam Ahmad Dar and Ors. v. Mushtaq Ahmad Shah and Ors.,: AIR 2006 J and K 91. 8. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions, Dr. Chandrachud submitted that in the instant case the position as on 4 September, 2014 (the 2014 order) was altered by the plaintiffs by entering into the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 and inducting the respondent above named into the factory premises standing on plot Nos. 250/1 and 250/2. Hence there was a clear violation of the status quo order, was the submission of Dr. Chandrachud. 9. Dr. Chandrachud submitted that the contentions raised by the plaintiffs that TDPW being a partnership firm and not being a party to the above suit, would not be bound by the 2014 order, is wholly misconceived. He submitted that the aforesaid argument is fallacious for two reasons. Firstly, he submitted that TDPW being a partnership firm, would have no existence independent of its partners who were bound by the 2014 order. He submitted that the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to subvert the operation of the 2014 order by acting through their partnership firm. Secondly, Dr. Chandrachud submitted that the plaintiffs (including plaintiff Nos. Firstly, he submitted that TDPW being a partnership firm, would have no existence independent of its partners who were bound by the 2014 order. He submitted that the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to subvert the operation of the 2014 order by acting through their partnership firm. Secondly, Dr. Chandrachud submitted that the plaintiffs (including plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 who are partners of TDPW) themselves made plot No. 250/1 and 250/2 and the factory standing thereon, the subject matter of the present suit by seeking specific performance of an alleged oral agreement concerning the said premises. He, therefore, submitted that merely because TDPW is not a party to the suit, and therefore, there is no violation of the status quo order, is wholly misconceived. 10. Dr. Chandrachud then submitted that even the argument of the plaintiffs that the factory premises was not in issue in the suit, and therefore, the status quo order does not cover the factory premises but only plot No. 250/1 and plot No. 250/2, is wholly misconceived. He submitted that this argument also is totally frivolous for the following reasons. He submitted that firstly, reading the averments in the plaint, it is clear that the factory premises as well as the said two plots were the subject matter of the alleged oral settlement of which the plaintiffs seek specific performance. Secondly, if the argument of the plaintiffs is taken to its logical conclusion, then there was no reason for this Court to pass the status quo order in respect of plot No. 250/1 and plot No. 250/2 for the simple reason that the defendants, in their Written Statement, have averred at paragraph "G" that with respect to the disputes as to the land, plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 intended to exchange their plots, but plaintiff No. 1 backed out and the transaction fell through. Thus, as the agreement had fallen through there was technically no reason for this Court to pass a status quo order concerning plot Nos. 250/1 and 250/2. However, this Court, in its order, decided to direct the parties to maintain status quo with respect to plot Nos. 250/1 and 250/2, which according to Dr. Chandrachud, not only covers the land but also the factory standing thereon. 250/1 and 250/2. However, this Court, in its order, decided to direct the parties to maintain status quo with respect to plot Nos. 250/1 and 250/2, which according to Dr. Chandrachud, not only covers the land but also the factory standing thereon. He, therefore, submitted that looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it was clear that the 2014 order was willfully and deliberately violated by the plaintiffs and hence the reliefs sought for in the above Interim Application for appointment of the Receiver; attachment; dismissal of the suit under Order XXXIX Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and detaining the plaintiffs in a civil prison for a term not exceeding three months, ought to be granted in their entirety. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Kapadia the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, submitted that there is absolutely no violation of the 2014 order. He submitted that it is incorrect on the part of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 to contend that the 2014 order has been violated for the following reasons:- (i) the order directing the parties to maintain status quo must be read in the context of the facts and issues before the court that passed the status quo order. The said order of status quo only prevented the parties from transferring and/or creating any interest in their respective plots of land and does not in any manner cover the factory premises which were on the said plots, namely, plot Nos. 250/1 and 250/2; (ii) admittedly, TDPW (of which plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are partners) has been granted a lease of 99 years in respect of plot No. 250/1 by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 by defendant No. 1, since the year 2004. Incidentally, plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of plaintiff No. 1 and nephews of defendant Nos. 1 and 7. TDPW is admittedly in continuous and uninterrupted enjoyment of the said plots since 2004 and has constructed a factory on the said plots with plant and machinery therein. Incidentally, plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are the sons of plaintiff No. 1 and nephews of defendant Nos. 1 and 7. TDPW is admittedly in continuous and uninterrupted enjoyment of the said plots since 2004 and has constructed a factory on the said plots with plant and machinery therein. The respondent to the Interim Application, namely, the proprietor of Padmavati Textile Mills, under the agreement dated 23 November, 2019, has only been permitted by TDPW (and who is not a party to the present suit or the status quo order) to use the factory with plant and machinery therein on a conducting basis and the same does not result in any breach of the status quo order; (iii) TDPW is not a party to the above suit, or Notice of Motion No. 303 of 2011 or the 2014 order. In these circumstances, even assuming that TDPW created any rights in relation to the factory premises, the same cannot be said to be in breach of the status quo order, which in any event only related to the aforesaid two plots (250/1 and 250/2) and not the factory premises standing thereon. 12. In support of his submissions, Mr. Kapadia relied upon the following decisions:- 1) Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors.,: AIR 1988 SC 127 ; 2) N. Ramaiah v. Nagaraj S. and Ors.: AIR 2001 Kant 395; 3) Suraj Roy V. Leela Nath and Ors.: (2004) 3 Gauhati Law Reports 312; 4) Madan Mohan Sahoo v. Bijay Kumar Sahoo. 5) Image Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. N. Subhash. 13. Lastly, Mr. Kapadia submitted that before I pass any order as sought for in the above Interim Application, it is necessary for the Court to arrive at a finding about the default and/or non-compliance of the order of the Court and further that such a default was either deliberate or intentional or willful. The party complaining of the violation cannot, as a matter of right, demand for the reliefs sought in the instant case, for every violation at the hands of the opposite party. It is for the Court to take an appropriate decision in its discretion and depending upon the facts of each case. He submitted that this is now well settled as held by this Court in the case of Samsul Hudda and Ors. It is for the Court to take an appropriate decision in its discretion and depending upon the facts of each case. He submitted that this is now well settled as held by this Court in the case of Samsul Hudda and Ors. v. Khayber Properties and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.,: AIR 2004 Bom 126 . In the facts of the present case, he submitted that even assuming for the sake of argument that there was any violation of the status quo order, the same can never be termed as deliberate, willful or intentional. On this ground also, therefore, Mr. Kapadia submitted that the above Interim Application is without any merit and ought to be dismissed with costs. 14. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the papers and proceedings in the Interim Application as well as the above suit. The principal contention that I have to consider is whether the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 entered into between TDPW and Padmavati Textile Mills falls foul of the status quo order passed by this Court on 4 September, 2014. The secondary question to be decided is, if the 2014 order is violated, then whether the said violation was willful, intentional and/or deliberate. 15. To understand and ascertain whether the status quo order (the 2014 order) is violated or not, one must read and understand it in the context of the facts of the case and the issues before the Court that passed the status quo order. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to some of the pleadings in the plaint. In the plaint, it is the case of the plaintiffs that they and the defendants were jointly carrying on the business of manufacturing and/or selling and/or marketing as commission agents, art silk cloth, through several different partnership and/or proprietary concerns in Surat and Mumbai. The description of the proprietary and partnership firms set up in Surat and Mumbai are set out in Exhibit "A" and "B" to the plaint. It is the case of the plaintiffs that in March 2008 there was an oral family arrangement entered into by the members of Mashruwala family (plaintiff Nos. 1 to 6 and defendant Nos. 1 to 11). It is the case of the plaintiffs that in March 2008 there was an oral family arrangement entered into by the members of Mashruwala family (plaintiff Nos. 1 to 6 and defendant Nos. 1 to 11). In this family arrangement, it is the case of the plaintiffs, that plaintiff No. 1 and his faction were to inter alia get plot No. 250/2 which was in the name of defendant No. 1/H.U.F. (that is his faction). For this purpose, defendant No. 1 and/or his faction were to transfer the ownership of plot No. 250/2 to the faction of plaintiff No. 1. 16. Much prior to the aforesaid family arrangement, a lease deed dated 20 January, 2004 was executed between (i) plaintiff No. 1 in favour of TDPW in respect of plot No. 250/1 and (ii) defendant No. 1 and TDPW in respect of plot No. 250/2, to use their respective plots for 99 years. It is pursuant to this lease that a factory has been constructed on the said two plots by c TDPW. 17. When one reads the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 (executed between TDPW and Padmavati Textile Mills) and which is styled as a Lease Agreement, it is clear that the agreement is entered into between TDPW on the one hand and the proprietor of Padmavati Textile Mills on the other. The agreement is for a period of 60 months for industrial purpose from 15.12.2019 to 14.12.2024. The property forming the subject matter of the said agreement is described in the schedule thereto. Though the agreement is in Gujarati, the official translation of the said agreement has been tendered before me and which translation has been done by the Office of the Chief Translator and Interpreter, High Court, Bombay. The official English translation of the schedule to the said agreement reads as under:- "-:SCHEDULE:- -: Description of the property mentioned in this Lease Agreement: The property consisting of structures of buildings-plants only together with the fully constructed factory building, boiler house, ETP plant, all the machinery, instruments situated inside the factory building, pipe lines, water softening plant, underground water tank, generator, electric house and office building and all the machinery plants, etc. presently operating or lying not operated on the land bearing Plot No. 250/1 and Plot No. 250/2 admeasuring approximately 14500 square meters situated at Road No. 2 in Sachin G.I.D.C. at Sachin area of Taluka Choryasi of Surat District, but except the land of the partnership firm Tejoday Dyeing and Printing Works, without assigning the lease rights of all the properties to the party of second part." (Emphasis supplied) 18. From the aforesaid agreement, it is quite clear that even if the aforesaid agreement is termed as a Lease Agreement, there is no lease created in favour of Padmavati Textile Mills of plot No. 250/1 and plot No. 250/2. The lease, if at all, is in relation to the factory building, boiler house, ETP plant, all the machinery, instruments situated inside the factory building, pipe lines, water softening plant, underground water tank, generator, electric house and office building etc. As far as the lease of 2004 is concerned (being created by plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 in relation to the said plots in favour of TDPW), the same is not in dispute. Prima facie, there was no dispute between the parties in relation to the lease created by plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 in favour of TDPW, which was in respect of plot No. 250/1 and 250/2. It is also not in dispute that TDPW is in possession of the said plots and has constructed a factory thereon and is in lawful possession thereof ever since. In other words, the fact with regard to the possession of the said plots and the possession and use of the factory thereon by TDPW was not in issue between the parties at all. Prima facie, the dispute between the parties was in relation to the ownership/title of the said plots which was in possession and occupation of TDPW, namely, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to ownership of plot No. 250/2 as alleged by them in the oral family settlement, or otherwise. In other words, it appears that the dispute between the parties was with reference to the ownership of the plots, namely, plot No. 250/1 and 250/2. This being my prima facie opinion, then clearly the agreement entered into by TDPW with Padmavati Textile Mills does not fall foul of the status quo order. This is also clear because the status quo order itself records that "plaintiff Nos. This being my prima facie opinion, then clearly the agreement entered into by TDPW with Padmavati Textile Mills does not fall foul of the status quo order. This is also clear because the status quo order itself records that "plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 on the one hand and defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on the other, shall maintain the status quo in respect of their respective plots, namely, plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1.........". If one were to read the status quo order in this context, and since admittedly no right, title or interest is created in the aforesaid plots under the agreement dated 23 November, 2019, I do not think that Dr. Chandrachud is correct in his submission that the said agreement falls foul of the status quo order. This is apart from the fact that TDPW is not a party to the present suit at all. It is true that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are partners of TDPW. However, to my mind, that would make little difference. To bind the partnership firm by the status quo order, it would have to be a party to the suit and against whom the status quo order would have to be passed. It is not even the case of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 that the status quo order was passed against TDPW. This being the case, I do not find that there is any breach by the plaintiffs of the status quo order passed by this Court on 4th September, 2014. 19. Even otherwise, looking at the facts of the present case, even if I were to assume Dr. Chandrachud's submissions to be correct, it can certainly not to be said that the alleged breach of the 2014 order is either willful, deliberate or intentional. The interpretation put by the plaintiffs on the status quo order is certainly a plausible interpretation, namely, that the status quo order relates only to the plots and not to the factory building standing thereon. Once it is a plausible interpretation, then there is no question of the violation being either intentional, deliberate or willful. This being the position, I find that the applicants/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are not entitled to the interim reliefs prayed for in the above Interim Application. 20. I must mention that Dr. Once it is a plausible interpretation, then there is no question of the violation being either intentional, deliberate or willful. This being the position, I find that the applicants/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are not entitled to the interim reliefs prayed for in the above Interim Application. 20. I must mention that Dr. Chandrachud relied upon several judgments as set out by me earlier, especially with reference to, what is the scope and ambit of the status quo order. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the status quo order has to be understood in the context in which it was passed. The expression "status quo" is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. To my mind, when the Court orders a "status quo" to be maintained, it means the position that was existing at the time of the passing of the order, should not be altered. However, having said this, the question whether a party is guilty of contempt and willfully disregarded the Court's status quo order must be seen in the context in which it was passed. Further the status quo order cannot be extended to mean and apply to what has not been specifically stated in the order. As mentioned earlier, the status quo order passed by this Court was in respect of plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1. By entering into the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 between TDPW and Padmavati Textile Mills, I do not think that the status quo with reference to the aforesaid two plots has been altered in any way. This is quite clear from the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 itself, which clearly, in the schedule, keeps out the land of the partnership firm, namely, the land of TDPW and which was leased to it (being plot No. 250/1 and plot No. 250/2). This being the factual position, I do not think that the decisions relied upon by Dr. Chandrachud can be of any assistance to him in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In any event, as mentioned earlier, the interpretation of the said order put by the defendants is certainly a plausible interpretation. This being the factual position, I do not think that the decisions relied upon by Dr. Chandrachud can be of any assistance to him in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In any event, as mentioned earlier, the interpretation of the said order put by the defendants is certainly a plausible interpretation. Once having held that it is a plausible interpretation, then there is no question of holding that the plaintiffs have willfully and deliberately violated the status quo order passed by this Court on 4 September, 2014. 21. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the above Interim Application. It is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 22. This order shall be digitally signed by the Private Secretary/Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned shall act on production by fax or e-mail of a digitally signed copy of this order.