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2021 DIGILAW 281 (KER)

WE BUILD (P) LTD. v. STATE BANK OF INDIA

2021-03-15

S.MANIKUMAR, SHAJI P.CHALY

body2021
JUDGMENT : S. MANIKUMAR, J. Instant appeal is filed being aggrieved by the judgment dated 15.10.2020 in W.P.(C) No. 12035 of 2020. 2. Facts leading to the writ appeal are that appellant is a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1968, by engineers and other professionals. In the year 2009, appellant approached the erstwhile State Bank of Travancore, Poojapura Branch, for expanding business. The Directors of appellant company mortgaged 5 items of property, out of which, 2 items are residential building. Those 5 items of property are treated as secured assets. Loan arrangement was a cash credit overdraft limit. The sanctioned limit of the loan was Rs.987 lakhs, including bank guarantee. The operating level of aggregate CCOD level was tentatively fixed as Rs.657 lakhs. 3. Thereafter, when the State Bank of Travancore was acquired by the State Bank of India, it was intimated by the respondent Bank that adhoc OD limit of Rs.4 lakhs sanctioned by Exhibit P2 would remain closed and Exhibit P5 notice was issued intimating that the loan account has already been declared as NPA and to clear the entire outstanding dues. The appellant company issued a reply, explaining the fact that at no point of time, the account was in default and hence, there is no chance to declare the account as Non Performing Asset. Later, after one year, Exhibit P9 notice was issued with the same contentions as in Exhibit P8. The appellant has submitted a reply to the same. Thereafter, Exhibit P10 communication was issued by the Bank stating that the first respondent is withdrawing Exhibits P5 and P8 notices stating that inadvertent mistakes were crept in the notices. But, after a few days, Exhibit P11 notice was issued stating the same contention as that of Exhibits P5 and P8. 4. Aggrieved by the same, appellant approached the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam, by filing S.A. No. 144 of 2019, challenging the proceedings of the Bank against the company. The respondent Bank also filed O.A. No. 168 of 2019 seeking realisation of Rs.963.28 lakhs. However, the learned DRT-2, Ernakulam, as per order dated 21.03.2020, dismissed S.A. No.144/2019, on the ground of limited jurisdiction and held that the respondent Bank is duty bound to recover the dues as on 29.06.2019. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed W.P.(C) No. 12035 of 2020. 5. However, the learned DRT-2, Ernakulam, as per order dated 21.03.2020, dismissed S.A. No.144/2019, on the ground of limited jurisdiction and held that the respondent Bank is duty bound to recover the dues as on 29.06.2019. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed W.P.(C) No. 12035 of 2020. 5. Writ court, by order dated 18.06.2020, found that the writ petition would not be maintainable and taking note of the present COVID-19 pandemic situation and the circumstances, that the DRAT, Chennai, was not holding regular sittings, adjourned the matter and restrained the Bank from taking possession of the property or sale of the property, till 31.08.2020. Thereafter, writ court, by another order dated 30.09.2020, while adjourning the case, directed the appellant company to prefer an appeal before the DRAT, in the meanwhile. 6. Taking note of the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant company that an appeal is yet to be filed before DRAT, writ court dismissed the writ petition on 15.10.2020, finding that the writ petition is not maintainable before this Court and directing that the stay already granted would continue to be in force till 31.10.2020. 7. Mr. K.P.Dandapani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the learned Tribunal failed to legally appreciate the evidence adduced and the documents available and, therefore, Exhibit P21 order passed by the DRT-2, Ernakulam, is unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside. He also contended that the learned single Judge, while holding that the writ petition is not maintainable, erroneously upheld the stand taken by the DRT that the DRT is vested with 'limited jurisdiction' with respect to Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and the substantive question with respect to Sections 13(2) and 13(3A) are outside the scope of judicial review. He further contended that the learned single Judge ought to have considered the fact that the respondent Bank had failed to comply with Section 14(1)(vii) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 8. He further contended that the learned single Judge ought to have considered the fact that the respondent Bank had failed to comply with Section 14(1)(vii) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 8. Posed with a question, as to why the appellant could file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when SARFAESI Act, 2002 provides a statutory appeal under Section 18 of the Act, reply of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant was that the appellant could not make the deposit, as contemplated under Section 18 of the Act and hence, filed the writ petition challenging the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal-2, Ernakulam. Towards the end of the arguments, learned Senior Counsel submitted that, within two weeks, steps would be taken to take pre-deposit. 9. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and perused the material on record. 10. Admittedly, DRT-2, Ernakulam, has passed an order on 21.03.2020 in S.A. No.144/2019, dismissing the same. 11. W.P.(C) No. 12035 of 2020 has been filed by the appellant for the following reliefs: i. Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, directing the respondents to reconsider Exts.P7 and P19 and to consider Ext.P19 representation, within time frame stipulated by this Court and appropriate positive orders. ii. Issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, directing the respondents to release the properties taken as secured assets forthwith. iii. Issue a writ of Mandamus or any appropriate writ, order, or direction and direct the bank to limit the collateral securities as defined in the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and release the secured asset in excess of the bank debt as on 30-04-2017 less the bank debts subsequently discharged by petitioner and applying interest correction. iv. Declare that the 1st respondent having faulted to comply with the requirement under Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act is precluded from proceeding further pursuant to Exhibits P5 and P11. v. Declare that the classification of petitioner's account as Non Performing Asset by the respondent Bank is illegal. vi. iv. Declare that the 1st respondent having faulted to comply with the requirement under Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act is precluded from proceeding further pursuant to Exhibits P5 and P11. v. Declare that the classification of petitioner's account as Non Performing Asset by the respondent Bank is illegal. vi. Declare that once objections against the notices issued under Section 13(2) are raised, respondents are legally bound to consider the same and only if objections are found unacceptable and the reasons for non-acceptance of the objections is communicated to the debtor, within the time prescribed by SARFAESI Act, further proceedings under Section 13 are permissible. vii. Call for the records pertains to Ext.P21 and set aside the same. viii. Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, directing the 5th respondent to direct Central Vigilance Commission or any other appropriate authority to conduct an investigation with regard to the corrupt practice and illegalities committed by the officers of respondents 1 to 4. ix. Issue a writ under the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction and call for the records pertaining to Ext.P22 and quash the same. 12. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 is an Act to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and to provide for a Central database of security interests created on property rights, and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. 13. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 speaks about appeal to the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal and it reads thus:- “18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.—(1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.— Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder.” 14. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) and clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 38 read with sub-sections (4), (10) and (12) of Section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), the Central Government have made the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. Rule 12 of the said Rules, which speaks about application to the Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal reads thus: “12. Application to the Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal.-(1) Any application to the Debt Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17 shall be, as nearly as possible, in the form given to Appendix VII to the rules. (2) Any application to the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (6) of section 17 of the Act shall be, as nearly as possible, in the form given in Appendix VIII to the said rules. Any appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under section 18 of the Act shall be, as nearly as possible, in the form given in Appendix IX to the said rules.” 15. Rule 13 of the Rules, speaks about fees for applications and appeals under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act and it reads thus: “13. Fees for applications and appeals under sections 17 and 18 of the Act.-(1) Every application under sub-section (1) of Section 17 or an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 18 shall be accompanied by a fee provided in the sub-rule (2) and such fee may be remitted through a crossed demand draft drawn on a bank or Indian Postal Order in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal or the Court as the case may be, payable at the place where the Tribunal or the Court is situated. (2) The amount of fee payable shall be as follows: No. Nature of Application Amount of Fee payable 1. Application to a Debt Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17 against any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 (a) Where the applicant is a borrower and the amount of debt due is less than Rs. 10 lakhs Rs. 500 for every Rs. 1 lakh or part thereof (b) Where the applicant is a borrower and the amount of debt due is Rs. 10 lakhs and above Rs. 5,000+Rs. 250 for every Rs. 1 lakh or part thereof in excess of Rs. 10 lakhs subject to a maximum of Rs. 1,00,000 (c) Where the applicant is an aggrieved party other than the borrower and where the amount of debt due is less than Rs. 10 lakhs Rs. 125 for every Rupees One lakh or part thereof (d) Where the applicant is an aggrieved party other than the borrower and where the amount of debt due is Rs. 10 lakhs and above Rs. 1250 + Rs. 125 for every Rs. 1 lakh or part thereof in excess of Rs. 10 lakhs subject to a maximum of Rs. 50,000 (e) Any other application by any Rs. 200 2. Appeal to the Appellate Authority against any order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal under section 17 Same fees as provided at clauses (a) to (e) of serial number 1 of this rule.” 16. Now, let us consider a few decisions on the mandatory requirement of pre-deposit, for entertaining an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. (i) In Babu Ganesh Singh Deepnarayan v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. ( AIR 2009 Guj 98 ), a Hon'ble Division Bench of Gujarat High Court had occasion to consider a case involving a challenge on the vires of the second proviso under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, on the mandatory pre-deposit. While upholding the provision, at paragraphs-5 and 6, it was observed thus: “5. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute. Legislature can impose conditions under which it is to be exercised. Without a statutory provision creating such a right, a person aggrieved is not entitled to prefer an appeal. Legislature while granting right of appeal can impose conditions which it thinks reasonable. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute. Legislature can impose conditions under which it is to be exercised. Without a statutory provision creating such a right, a person aggrieved is not entitled to prefer an appeal. Legislature while granting right of appeal can impose conditions which it thinks reasonable. Such conditions merely regulate the exercise of right of appeal so that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party, and there is no difficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in case the appeal is ultimately dismissed. Imposition of such a condition is essential, so that frivolous appeals would not be filed. Ultimately if the appeal is dismissed, the aggrieved party can always seek refund of the amount deposited and therefore, he is not in any way aggrieved. Further the Third Proviso to Section 18(1) of the Securitization Act also enables the Appellate Tribunal, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than 25% of the debt referred to in the Second Proviso. We are not prepared to accept the contention that conditions imposed in the second and third proviso to Section 18(1) of the Securitization Act are onerous in nature so as to make the right of appeal illusory. Delhi High Court in R.V. Saxena's case (supra) also upheld the validity of Second Proviso to Section 18(1) of the Securitization Act with which we fully concur. 6. We have also not come across any provision in the Statute, enabling the secured creditor to adjust or appropriate the amount deposited by the borrower to prefer an appeal Under Section 18(1) of the Act. On dismissal of the appeal the amount deposited as a pre-condition for filing the appeal will be refunded to the Appellant and therefore, he is no way prejudiced. We therefore, find no merit in the contention raised by the Petitioner that the second proviso to Section 18(1) of the Act is discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Petitions lack merit and the same are dismissed.” (ii) In Narayana Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank and Ors. [ (2011) 4 SCC 548 ], the question posted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, as to whether the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is mandatory. Petitions lack merit and the same are dismissed.” (ii) In Narayana Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank and Ors. [ (2011) 4 SCC 548 ], the question posted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was, as to whether the requirement of pre-deposit under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is mandatory. Going through the provisions of the Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 8 & 9, held as under: “8. Section 18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. However, the right conferred under Section 18(1) is subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. However, under the third proviso to the Sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than twenty-five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso. Thus, there is an absolute bar to entertainment of an appeal under Section 18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. It is well-settled that when a Statute confers a right of appeal, while granting the right, the Legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right, so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions, rendering the right almost illusory. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre-deposit under Subsection (1) of Section 18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre-deposit under Subsection (1) of Section 18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the Statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to Section 18(1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said Section, the Appellate Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the Appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement. 9. The argument of learned Counsel for the Appellant that as the amount of debt due had not been determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal without insisting on pre-deposit, is equally fallacious. Under the second proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act the amount of fifty per cent, which is required to be deposited by the borrower, is computed either with reference to the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. Obviously, where the amount of debt is yet to be determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the borrower, while preferring appeal, would be liable to deposit fifty per cent of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. Therefore, the condition of pre-deposit being mandatory, a complete waiver of deposit by the Appellant with the Appellate Tribunal, was beyond the provisions of the Act, as is evident from the second and third proviso to the said Section. At best, the Appellate Tribunal could have, after recording the reasons, reduced the amount of deposit of fifty per cent to an amount not less than twenty five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining Appellant's appeal without insisting on pre-deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed.” (iii) In MRB Roadconst. Pvt. Ltd. v. Rupee Co-Op. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining Appellant's appeal without insisting on pre-deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed.” (iii) In MRB Roadconst. Pvt. Ltd. v. Rupee Co-Op. Bank Ltd. [2016 SCC Online Bom 85], a Hon'ble Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held as under: “On a plain reading of the 2nd proviso to section 18(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act read with the definition under the word “debt” as defined in section 2(g) of the RDDB Act, it is clear that before an appeal can be entertained by the DRAT, the borrower has to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the DRT whichever is less. If there is no determination of the debt by the DRT under the provisions of the RDDB Act, then the borrower would have to deposit 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. The provision on a plain reading does not in any way exclude taking into consideration the future interest that is accrued on the debt owed by the borrower to the secured creditor. In fact, the definition of the word “debt” means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution. Therefore, if the claim made by secured creditor in section 13(2) notice includes future interest, same would certainly be included in the “amount of the debt due” from borrower to the secured creditor as contemplated under the 2nd proviso to section 18(1) of the Securitisation Act. There is therefore no justification to hold that it is only the figure that is mentioned in section 13(2) notice that is to be taken into consideration and not the future interest accrued on the said sum, whilst determining the deposit amount under the 2nd proviso to section 18 of the Securitisation Act. The amount of deposit has to be determined on basis of amount of debt due by borrower to secured creditor on date when appeal is filed in DRAT. The amount of deposit has to be determined on basis of amount of debt due by borrower to secured creditor on date when appeal is filed in DRAT. This would not only include the amount mentioned in section 13(2) notice but also interest accrued thereon till the date of filing of the appeal under section 18 of the Securitisation Act. AIR 2010 Delhi 28, AIR 2011 SC 1913 , Dist., AIR 2012 Madras 57 and (2012) 4 Mh.L.J. 472, Ref.” (iv) In IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Aditya Logistics (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. [ 2017 (5) MhLj 69 ], a Hon'ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court, at paragraphs 11 to 13 and 17, held thus: “11. Under sub-section (1) of section 18, right is available to a person aggrieved by an order made by learned D.R.T. under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the order. The second proviso to Sub-section (1) mandates that no Appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal, 50 percent of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditor or determined by the D.R.T. which ever is less. Third proviso bestows discretion upon the Appellate Tribunal to reduce an amount of deposit which shall not be less than 25 percent of the debt referred to second proviso for the reasons recorded in writing. 12. It could thus, be clearly seen that the legislative intent is clear. The statute mandates that normally no Appeal shall be entertained by the learned Appellate Tribunal unless a borrower has deposited 50 percent of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Recovery Tribunal, which ever is less. No doubt, that the third proviso bestows the discretion with the Tribunal to reduce the said amount to 25 percent, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing. It could thus, be clearly seen that the statute provides that for entertaining an Appeal, deposit of 50 percent of amount, as claimed by the creditor or as determined by D.R.T. whichever is less as provided in second proviso is mandatory, which can be reduced to 25 percent by the learned Tribunal for the reasons to be recorded in writing. 13. 13. In other words, in no case the Appeal could be entertained by the learned Tribunal unless 25 percent of amount is deposited and that too, when the Appellant makes out a special case and the learned Tribunal records the reason for reducing the amount from 50 percent to 25 percent. xxx xxxxx xxxxxxxx 17. In that view of the matter, while entertaining an Appeal under section 18, the learned Tribunal by no stretch of imagination could have given a go by to the mandatory provisions under section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.” (v) In Union Bank of India v. Rajat Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. [ (2020) 3 SCC 770 ], considering the statutory provision and the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh's case (cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: “This Court in the case of Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. UCO Bank and Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 548 , held that keeping in view the language of the Section even if the amount or debt due had not been determined by the DRT, the appeal could not be entertained by the DRAT without insisting on pre-deposit. The DRAT, at best could, after recording the reasons, have reduced the amount to 25% but could not have totally waived the deposit. This Court also held that the right of appeal conferred Under Section 18(1) is subject to the conditions laid down in the second proviso therein which postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited 50% of the amount of debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DRT, whichever is less. The third proviso enables the DRAT, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to reduce the amount of deposit to not less than 25%. The following observations of this Court are relevant: “7. ...Thus, there is an absolute bar to the entertainment of an appeal Under Section 18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity.” 8. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity.” 8. In view of the law laid down by this Court, we are clearly of the view that the observation made by the High Court was totally incorrect. 9. We are not in agreement with the submission of Mr. Chaudhri that the High Court has exercised its discretionary powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution. The order of the High Court does not show any exercise of such discretionary powers but according to the High Court on an interpretation of the Section, pre-deposit was not required. We are also not impressed with the argument of Mr. Chaudhri that his client is not a borrower. A guarantor or a mortgagor, who has mortgaged its property to secure the repayment of the loan, stands on the same footing as a borrower and if he wants to file an appeal, he must comply with the terms of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. 10. Furthermore, we may add that the High Court has no powers akin to powers vested in this Court Under Article 142 of the Constitution. The High Court cannot give directions which are contrary to law. 11. In view of the above discussion, we set aside both the orders dated 25.11.2019 and 16.12.2019 of the High Court in so far as they hold that pre-deposit is not required and allow the appeals. We reiterate that we have not gone into the merits of the contentions raised by the parties which shall be decided by the DRAT when it entertains the appeal and is called upon to do so. We extend the time given to the auction purchasers, Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to deposit the balance of the sale amount till 20.03.2020. We also direct that in case Respondent No. 1 files an appeal within 30 days of the pronouncement of this order it shall not be rejected on the ground of limitation.” 17. Repeatedly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that writ petitions as against proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 should not be entertained. On that aspect, reference can be made to a few decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Repeatedly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that writ petitions as against proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 should not be entertained. On that aspect, reference can be made to a few decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. (i) In Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , at paragraphs 15 to 18, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others [ AIR 2010 SC 3413 ], has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, [1969 AIR 556, 1969 SCR (1) 518], Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ], and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [ AIR 2003 SC 2120 ] and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.”(emphasis supplied) (ii) In Civil Appeal Nos.10243-10250 of 2018 [ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Umakanta Mohapatra and Others], by order dated 5.10.2018, the Honourable Apex Court reaffirmed the legal position that High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, relating to matters coming under the purview of SARFAESI Act, 2002, where a statutory remedy is available by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act. 18. In K.C.Mathew's case (cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that writ petition challenging proceedings initiated against SARFAESI Act, 2002 is not maintainable, in view of the alternate remedy provided under the statute. In the light of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment in W.P(C). No.12035 of 2020 dated 15.10.2020. Appeal fails and accordingly, it is dismissed.