JUDGMENT : A. J. DESAI, J. 1. By way of the present appeal preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the appellants – two lady convicts (who happen to be sister-in-law of deceased) have challenged the judgment and order of conviction dated 26.9.2016 rendered by learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Surat in Sessions Case No.44 of 2008 by which the appellants have been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 120 (B) of Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment for a period of one year. The appellants also came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 365 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years with fine of Rs.2,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The appellants also came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 506 (2) of the Indian Penal Code and ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs.2,000/- each and in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment for a period of one month. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The appeal came to be admitted by order dated 18.1.2017. The Records and Proceedings had reached to this Court along with the paper-book prepared by the learned Trial Court. Since the appellant Nos.1 and 2 came to be arrested in the month of November 2007 and January 2008 respectively and have undergone more than eleven years of imprisonment, the appeal has been taken up for final hearing when an application for suspension of sentence came to be filed. 3. The short facts arise from the record are as under :- 3.1 That one Kamabhai Amratbhai Parmar, Unarmed Head Constable, Buckle No.605 serving in Kamrej Police Station declared before Senior Police-Sub Inspector of Kamrej Police Station that on 12.10.2007, when he was in petrolling in Navratri festival, at about 22.00 hours in Kathor town, he received a phone call on his mobile that a dead body in a burnt condition is lying on a road from Kathor – Abrama in the sim of village Kathor. He immediately reached at the place where he found a dead body of unknown lady in a burnt condition who was prima facie of 20 to 25 years. 3.2 Such information (Exh.62) was recorded in writing by the Senior Police Sub-Inspector. Mr. P.D. Vaghela, Senior Sub- Inspector of Kamrej Police Station at District Surat lodged an FIR on 14.10.2007 which was registered as C.R. No.I-192 of 2007 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code wherein it was declared that having received the cause of death from Medical Officer after performing Post-Mortem, as per the P.M. Note, the deceased was first strangulated and then put ablaze. The said aspect was declared in the FIR. 3.3 One Vinesh Jashwantlal Kapadia (P.W.4 – Exh.73) had made a janvajog entry (Exh.74) with Mahidharpur Police Station of Surat city about missing of his sister, namely, Amiben wife of deceased Praful Shah. Having come to know about finding a dead body of a lady aged about 20 to 25 years, he was called to identify the dead body and accordingly, he identified the dead body as of his deceased sister Amiben, wife of deceased Praful Shah. 3.4 After some investigation and information received by the Investigating Agency, the present appellants along with third accused, namely, Sanjay Chandubhai Ahir came to be arrested on different dates. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed against all the accused persons before the Court of concerned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Surat. 3.5 On the basis of material recovered during the course of investigation, it was noticed by the learned Magistrate that the incident in question, for which, the offence is registered, is triable by the Court of Sessions in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. and therefore, the case was committed to Sessions Court, Surat and the same was registered as Sessions Case No.44 of 2008. 3.6 A charge against all the three accused came to be framed by the learned Sessions Judge on 24.9.2008 at Exh.7. The charges levelled against the accused were denied by them. Thereafter, an application dated 21.11.2008 under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code (Exh.15) was filed by one of the accused, namely, Sanjay Ahir requesting to grant him pardon since he has declared full and true disclosure of all the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence. The charges levelled against the accused were denied by them. Thereafter, an application dated 21.11.2008 under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code (Exh.15) was filed by one of the accused, namely, Sanjay Ahir requesting to grant him pardon since he has declared full and true disclosure of all the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence. The said application came to be allowed by the learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 24.12.2008. Accordingly, he was examined by the prosecution as an accomplice to the crime. The prosecution in all examined 24 witnesses and produced several documentary evidence in support of the case. The accused did not examine any witness in their defence. 3.7 The learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Surat after considering the deposition of all the witnesses and documentary evidence, found the appellants – accused guilty of having committed the offence and accordingly convicted them and recorded sentence as stated herein above. The appellants – lady accused happen to be sister-in-law of deceased lady Amiben and real sisters of late husband Praful Shah of deceased Amiben. 3.8 Hence the present appeal. 4. Mr. Shakeel A. Qureshi and Mr. Pratik Barot, learned advocates appearing for the respective appellants in the present appeal have submitted that the learned Trial Court has committed grave error in convicting the appellants by accepting the case solely on the deposition of the accomplice which was required to be dealt with very cautiously and particularly when the prosecution has miserably failed to corroborate the case put forward by the prosecution itself and deposed by the accomplice Sanjay Ahir who has been examined as P.W.1 – Exh.43. It was further argued that the case put forward by the prosecution is that there were some property disputes between the family members of deceased Amiben’s late husband and deceased Amiben herself. The deceased was initially abducted in a vehicle driven by Sanjay and had travelled from Surat upto Ankleshwar and at Tapi Hotel, when Sanjay went for dinner, both the appellants - lady accused had committed the crime of murder of Amiben. It was further submitted that it is an admitted fact that Sanjay had not seen the actual occurrence of crime and, therefore, in absence of any other eyewitness, the case would rest only on circumstantial evidence which the prosecution has miserably failed in establishing against both the accused persons. It was further submitted that it is an admitted fact that Sanjay had not seen the actual occurrence of crime and, therefore, in absence of any other eyewitness, the case would rest only on circumstantial evidence which the prosecution has miserably failed in establishing against both the accused persons. 4.1 It was further argued that on completion of the investigation and even after framing of charge, which was denied by all the accused including Sanjay, there was no evidence collected by the Investigating Agency and, therefore, after considerable long time, an application under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code was submitted by Sanjay Ahir for declaring him as approver. It was further submitted that the case put forward by the prosecution is that Sanjay Chandubhai Ahir was a driver and working with one Ajay Panjwani and was driving the vehicle, namely, Quallis Car bearing Registration No.GJ-5CA-3839. On 10.10.2007, the said Ajay Panjwani who is employer of Sanjay Ahir informed him that he had to reach near Hindu Milan Temple of Gopipura area of Surat where some party would come and at that time, one of the appellant, namely, Binaben Shah came. The said appellant Binaben asked to take the Car near her residence where another appellant, namely, Falguniben was waiting for them. Both of them travelled near Tadvadi signal where some man having good height and body sat in the Car along with two ladies. However, after some time, they told Sanjay that they have cancelled the trip of Ankleshwar and had handed over Rs.500/- to Sanjay. It was further submitted that there is no investigation by the Investigating Agency with regard to the man who had allegedly travelled along with the appellants on 10.10.2007. It is also the case of Sanjay Ahir that on 11.10.2007, his employer Ajay Panjwani called him to take the appellants – Binaben and Falguniben to Ankleshwar. However, when he reached at the place, both of them gave Rs.500/- and informed him that the trip is cancelled. Thereafter, one by one dropped from the Car. It was further argued that the case put forward by the prosecution by taking help of Sanjay Ahir is that on 12.10.2007, again he was called for third time by Binaben and was asked by Ajay Panjwani to go in a Quallis Car where both the accused – Binaben and Falguniben were waiting. It was further argued that the case put forward by the prosecution by taking help of Sanjay Ahir is that on 12.10.2007, again he was called for third time by Binaben and was asked by Ajay Panjwani to go in a Quallis Car where both the accused – Binaben and Falguniben were waiting. Both of them boarded the Car and asked Sanjay to go towards Hirabaug Circle. Then he travelled towards Hirabaug Circle where Binaben got down from the Car and went in a Rickshaw to some unknown place. Falguniben continued to travel in the said vehicle. At that time, one lady was going on Scooty. Sanjay Ahir was informed by Falguniben that the lady who is travelling on the Scooty is her sister-in-law and asked him to follow her. Thereafter, they travelled at a particular place, namely, Roowala tekra where he found Binaben. Both of them again travelled in the vehicle and at a particular place, the lady who was travelling on Scooty was waiting with her luggage. Both the appellants asked the lady to board the Car and accordingly, all the three ladies were travelling in the vehicle. 4.2 It is further deposed by Mr. Sanjay Ahir that Binaben asked him to travel towards Ankleshwar and accordingly, he drove the vehicle and stopped at Reliance Petrol Pump, Ankleshwar. Binaben asked him to visit Reliance Petrol Pump office and collect some papers. Accordingly, he collected all the papers and handed over all the papers to Binaben. Thereafter, she asked him to return to Surat. In context of this deposition of Sanjay Ahir, it was argued that neither the prosecution has examined any person from Reliance Petrol Pump situated at Ankleshwar nor any documents have been collected from Reliance Petrol Pump which were collected by Sanjay Ahir at the instance of Binaben though she was subjected to remand. Therefore, one of the important link is missing in so-called chain of circumstances which may lead to the conclusion that only the appellants are real culprits. 4.3 By taking us through the further deposition of Sanjay Ahir, it was argued that as per his say while returning from Ankleshwar to Surat, they stopped at Tapi hotel where Binaben paid Rs.100/- to Sanjay and asked him to have dinner. Accordingly, he alone went for dinner and came back in the Car. 4.3 By taking us through the further deposition of Sanjay Ahir, it was argued that as per his say while returning from Ankleshwar to Surat, they stopped at Tapi hotel where Binaben paid Rs.100/- to Sanjay and asked him to have dinner. Accordingly, he alone went for dinner and came back in the Car. However, there is no material produced on record about the so-called visit of Sanjay Ahir at Tapi Hotel and no witness is examined from Tapi Hotel. As per the say of Sanjay Ahir, when he along with all the women were travelling towards Surat, he had smell of some medicine and asked Binaben about the same, but he was asked to drive the vehicle without questioning. Thereafter, from the side mirror of his Car, he saw deceased Amiben sleeping on her head and, therefore, he slowed down the vehicle and asked Binaben that such things would not be permitted in the Car. At that time, Binaben again asked him to drive the vehicle and at that time, when he tried to get down from the Car, she caught his collar and showed an injection and threatened him that he would be injected if he did not follow her instructions and, therefore, he continued to drive the vehicle. He travelled along with all the three ladies towards Surat and during that period, Binaben threw a bottle out of the Car. In context with this say of accomplice Sanjay, it was argued that neither any bottle nor any medicine is discovered or recovered since it was alleged by the prosecution and accordingly, charge was framed that the deceased was injected with poison and was made unconscious and subsequently, she was strangulated. It was further argued that even as per P.M. Note and Viscera Report, no medicine is found from the body of deceased Amiben. Therefore, the charge framed as per the investigation is not proved by the prosecution. By taking us through the deposition of the said accomplice Sanjay Ahir, the case put forward by him is that the appellants have asked him to take the Car towards village Abrama through Kathor and at village Nava Varachha, the appellant No.1 Binaben found a Dhaba where she got down and purchased a dabba and filled up the said dabba with petrol from Bharat Petrol Pump which was adjacent to the said Dhaba. Thereafter, it is further alleged that near sim of village Abrama, Sanjay Ahir was asked to stop the vehicle and thereafter, appellants got down from the Car and threw deceased Amiben out of the vehicle and thereafter, poured petrol on her and asked for matchbox from Sanjay. Having found no matchbox from Sanjay, Binaben took out lighter from her own purse and put Amiben ablaze. In connection with this deposition, it was argued that dabba which was discovered at the instance of Sanjay Ahir was sent for chemical analysis with regard to liquid found in the dabba. Kerosene is found which is contrary to say of this witness that petrol was purchased from Bharat Petrol Pump. Even nobody is examined from Bharat Petrol Pump from where it is alleged that the petrol was purchased. Mr. Sanjay Ahir further deposed before the Court that Falguniben – appellant No.2 got down on ring road near over bridge whereas Binaben got down near Gopipura. The luggage of Amiben was also taken by Binaben and subsequently, she went to her home. With regard to this particular say of this witness, it was argued that no luggage of Amiben was discovered from Binaben. It was further argued that as per the say of Sanjay Ahir, on the next day, Binaben had called him and inquired about anything left in the Car pursuant to which he informed her that one ladies purse is found from the back seat and, therefore, she asked Sanjay to destroy the same. However, the same was not destroyed by Sanjay. In connection with this deposition, it was argued that the incident as alleged has taken place on 13.10.2007 whereas said Sanjay Ahir came to be arrested on 13.11.2007 i.e. after a period of almost one month and the said purse was discovered at his instance on 16.11.2007 which belonged to Amiben, which is very doubtful, considering his overall conduct. 4.4 By taking us through the cross-examination of said accomplice Sanjay Ahir, it was argued that this witness has admitted that there is no material to establish that he was in service of said Ajay Panjwani. He has admitted that he is keeping a mobile through which he remained in contact with his employer, namely, Ajay Panjwani. 4.4 By taking us through the cross-examination of said accomplice Sanjay Ahir, it was argued that this witness has admitted that there is no material to establish that he was in service of said Ajay Panjwani. He has admitted that he is keeping a mobile through which he remained in contact with his employer, namely, Ajay Panjwani. However, the prosecution has miserably failed in establishing the connection between the said Sanjay and his so-called employer Ajay Panjwani since the Investigating Agency has deliberately not discovered any mobile from any of the witnesses nor any CDR is produced on record. The so-called talk between Ajay Panjwani and Sanjay Ahir in connection with sending the vehicle to Binaben’s residence is not established since there is no record whatsoever produced on record about any telephone talk between Binaben and Sanjay, Binaben and Ajay Panjwani or Sanjay and Ajay Panjwani in absence of any mobile instrument or mobile number provided by any of these two witnesses. Even as per the deposition of Ajay Panjwani – P.W. 19 – Exh.168, he stated that he was asked to send a vehicle which is not a ‘Taxi’ for travel, at the instance of some of his friends whose names have been named in his deposition. However, the prosecution has neither examined those witnesses nor any material is produced which would support the say of Ajay Panjwani about sending the vehicle on three occasions. It was further argued that as per admission in the crossexamination of Sanjay Ahir, he has stated that drivers do remain in contact with the employer if some untoward incident takes place while they are on duty. However, in the present case, Sanjay has neither disclosed anything to his employer – Ajay Panjwani for a period of more than one month nor even after his arrest, which has been accepted by Ajay Panjwani in his deposition before the Court. It was further argued that the manner and method in which all the three ladies have travelled i.e. Binaben getting down from the Car and then along with Falguniben, followed a Scooty which was allegedly driven by deceased Amiben cannot be believed since no Scooty belonged to Amiben or her brother or any other relative is discovered as well as no documents in connection with the said vehicle is produced on record. It was further argued that by admitting before the Court in his cross-examination, accomplice witness Sanjay Ahir had stated that even after he found some bad smell in the Car, he continued to drive the vehicle only on threats given by appellants lady accused, that too showing some injection, is not a believable or acceptable story put forward by this witness. He has admitted in his cross-examination that he has not seen actual occurrence of crime since he went for dinner in Tapi Hotel. However, his subsequent conduct i.e. travelling to Dhaba and purchasing metal dabba and then to Petrol Pump and purchasing petrol under the threat by lady accused and particularly as per his say, some bottle was thrown out of the window of the Car, he continued to drive the vehicle is not gullible story put forward by the said witness. It was further argued that he has admitted in his cross-examination that in application Exh.15 which was filed by him under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code, he has not stated that the injection which was shown by one of the appellant was filled with poison. 4.5 It was further argued that overall conduct of the accomplice witness Sanjay of not supplying mobile details, travelling with three women in a vehicle in night hours and after alleged incident of murder, dropped them at their respective residences and went back to home and remained silent for more than one month till he was arrested and not disclosing the entire incident to anybody, raises serious doubt about falsehood of the story put forward by him before the trial Court. He, therefore, would submit that if this witness is found not trust-worthy and he is not a reliable witness, like other witnesses, his evidence is required to be discarded. Even if the first stage about reliability and trustworthy is accepted, approver evidence require sufficient corroboration and in the present case, there is no corroboration from any other witness or any documentary evidence. In support of this submission, learned advocates for the appellants have relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinal Das and others v. State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479 . In support of this submission, learned advocates for the appellants have relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinal Das and others v. State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479 . By taking us through the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case, it was argued that when Court is examining the evidentiary value of approver / accomplice, his testimony must be corroborated with material particulars. 4.6 By taking us through the provisions of Sections 113 and 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was argued that an accomplice is a competent witness against accused persons. But as per illustration (b) to Section 114, the testimony of an accomplice becomes unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars, which has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinal Das and others (Supra). It was further argued that when Sanjay has not seen the actual occurrence of alleged strangulation, the prosecution is supposed to prove the case by establishing entire chain by truthful various types of evidence to bring the charge home, which has not been done in this case. 4.7 As far as other evidence relied by the prosecution and tried to establish the case by only one of the circumstance chain so- called purchase of dabbas by examining one witness, namely, Chandresh Parbatbhai, P.W.14 – Exh.132 who owned Patiyala Dhaba at Kamrej-Surat Road from which dabba was purchased by Binaben. Binaben was arrested on 8.11.2007 whereas Test Identification Parade has been held on 17.11.2007 wherein the said witness has identified Binaben. There is no explanation about holding Test Identification Parade at belated stage at the instance of the Investigating Officer. The said witness Chandresh had admitted in his cross-examination that dabba was purchased at 10 p.m. by a lady. However, he has neither seen the Car nor any person sitting in the Car which creates doubt about his version. He has admitted that he is partner of Dhaba, however, there is no material to show that he is running said Dhaba under any legal authority. However, he has neither seen the Car nor any person sitting in the Car which creates doubt about his version. He has admitted that he is partner of Dhaba, however, there is no material to show that he is running said Dhaba under any legal authority. As far as identifying the appellant No.1 in the Court premises is concerned, this witness has admitted that he had visited Court twice to depose before the Court and on both the occasions, the appellants were in custody of police, it was argued that even if it is believed that he has identified one of the appellants, it is not sufficient to convict a person in absence of any other cogent and corroborative evidence. 4.8 Learned advocates appearing for the appellants have also taken us through the deposition of Kamabhai Amratbhai – P.W.22 (Exh.176) who had received the phone call about the dead body of a woman lying in the burnt condition in the sim of village Abrama and would submit that though he has reached at the place and there were opportunities to record statements of persons nearby in the area, he has not collected any evidence. 4.9 By taking us through the deposition of Ashok Ramjibhai Chaudhary, P.W.18 – Exh.166, the Executive Magistrate who has arranged the Test Identification Parade, it is argued that there are many procedural lapses on his part before arranging the Test Identification Parade. He has admitted that he has not asked his peon to arrange dummy woman describing the age similar of the accused and had asked his peon to arrange for the same and accordingly, some women were called in Test Identification Parade and, therefore, it became easy for a witness to identify a woman of a particular age when he came forward for such parade after a period of eight to nine days from the date of arrest of Binaben. 4.10 Learned advocates appearing for the appellants have also taken us through the depositions of relatives of deceased Amiben, namely, Vinesh Jashwantlal P.W.4 – Exh.73 who is brother of deceased Amiben, Kiranben Vijaykumar Kothari P.W.17 – Exh.156 who is sister of deceased Amiben, Jayantilal Chunilal Shah P.W.20 – Exh.169 who is Uncle of the appellants and submitted that the prosecution has tried to establish motive behind commission of the serious crime of murder. However, close scrutiny of their depositions would lead to the conclusion that though there have been some disputes between the parties, the same was amicably settled and, therefore, there is no truth in alleged motive. 4.11 It was further argued that as per the deposition of Vinesh Jashwantlal P.W.4 – Exh.73 who is brother of deceased Amiben, who is serving in Municipal Corporation and on the date of incident, when he was on his job, he received a phone call from his sister Amiben by which she informed him that she is going to Vadodara in Bhilad Express. She further informed him that when she was waiting at Roowala Tekra for rickshaw, her sister-in-law, namely, Falguniben stopped her Rickshaw and asked Amiben to sit in the Car and stated that she will drop her to station. Amiben had called him on the mobile of his peon, namely, Kalpesh Daliya. As per the say of the said Vinesh Jashwantlal, he was not keeping any mobile. As far as this aspect is concerned, the prosecution has neither examined the said Kalpesh Daliya nor any mobile information is collected. As per his further say, when Amiben did not reach Vadodara, he called Falguniben from his cousin’s mobile to inquire about Amiben. However, neither any details are produced on record with regard to his cousin nor any mobile information is produced on record. It is unbelievable that a person working on the post of Senior Clerk would not keep a mobile and his peon has his own mobile, that too is doubtful. It was further argued that if Janvajog entry Exh.76 is perused, it was declared by him that though his sister Amiben has travelled with Falguniben, deceased herself had informed him that she had dropped near Surat Station and Falguniben had left the place. Therefore, the story put forward by the prosecution about travelling in the Quallis Car along with both the appellants is falsified from its inception. It was further argued that it has been admitted by him that he has not inquired about the mobile of his deceased sister Amiben and even has not requested the Mobile Company to disconnect the services. Even the Scooty allegedly driven by deceased Amiben, details thereof has not been supplied by him. It was further argued that it has been admitted by him that he has not inquired about the mobile of his deceased sister Amiben and even has not requested the Mobile Company to disconnect the services. Even the Scooty allegedly driven by deceased Amiben, details thereof has not been supplied by him. 4.12 It was emphatically argued that to hide the truth about the death of his sister, the said witness Vineshbhai had deliberately not supplied the details about his mobile number and had always come forward with the story that he used to call from either his peon or relatives mobiles to talk with his sister or any other person, which is an unbelievable story since the Police has not collected any mobile information of those persons through whose mobiles, the said witness used to call. 4.13 By taking us through the deposition of Jayantilal Chunilal Shah P.W.20 – Exh.169 who is Uncle of the appellants, it was submitted by him that the story about sore relation between the deceased Amiben and the present appellants are not believable since he himself had some issues with the father of the present appellants. 4.14 By taking us through the medical evidence in the form of deposition of Dr. Mahendrasinh Nandlal Bhati – P.W. 15 – Exh.136 and Post-Mortem Note Exh.137, it was argued that the initial story put forward by the prosecution and subsequently relying upon the say of Sanjay – accomplice about giving injection to the deceased is falsified since no poison is found from the body of the deceased. It was further argued that initially, the cause of death was prima facie found to be Asphyxial death due to throttling with 69% postmortem burns. However, final cause of death was awaited after chemical analysis of viscera report. However, as per the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory Exh.217, no poison is found from the syringe discovered from the place of incident. It was, therefore, submitted that the entire story put forward by the prosecution by taking support of Sanjay Ahir – accomplice about initially giving poison to the deceased and showing injection to him is not reliable and it ought not to have been accepted by the learned Trial Court. It was, therefore, submitted that the entire story put forward by the prosecution by taking support of Sanjay Ahir – accomplice about initially giving poison to the deceased and showing injection to him is not reliable and it ought not to have been accepted by the learned Trial Court. 4.15 It was further argued that the case put forward by the prosecution is that a dabba was purchased from a Dhaba in which the petrol was purchased from a Petrol Pump to burn the dead body. However, when the said dabba was recovered, having liquid therein was sent for Forensic Science Laboratory, kerosene is found from the said dabba and even on the clothes of the deceased, kerosene is found and, therefore, the entire story of purchasing Petrol and putting the dead body ablaze ought not to have been accepted by the learned Trial Court. 4.16 It was further argued that the Certificate issued under Section 65 B (4) (c) of the Evidence Act, 1872, signed and produced by one witness, namely, Manish Mangalbhai Patel P.W.-23 Exh.193 has not been issued in compliance with the provisions of Section 65 B of the Evidence Act. It was further argued that CDRs have been produced by the concerned Nodal Officer at the time of investigation in the year 2007 wherein Certificate has been issued in the year 2013 and he has admitted that he himself has not verified the details and, therefore, the learned Trial Court ought to have rejected the submission made by the prosecution that the Certificate is a valid certificate and issued after following the procedure under Section 65 B of the Evidence Act. In support of his submission, reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others, (2020) 7 SCC 1 . It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal be allowed and the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellants be set aside. 5. On the other hand, Ms. Krina Calla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent – State has supported the findings of the learned Trial Court and would submit that the learned Trial Court has committed no error in convicting both the appellants. 5. On the other hand, Ms. Krina Calla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent – State has supported the findings of the learned Trial Court and would submit that the learned Trial Court has committed no error in convicting both the appellants. It was argued that the prosecution has established the motive behind committing the crime by the appellants who are sister-in-law of deceased Amiben (sister of deceased husband of Amiben). She would further submit that when Amiben had not returned home on the day of incident, her brother, namely, Vinesh Kapadia had informed Mahidharpur Police Station which was recorded as Janvajog Entry - Exh.76 wherein he has categorically stated that he had received a phone call from his sister Amiben that she is going towards Vadodara but she had boarded a rickshaw along with one of the appellants, namely, Falguniben. Therefore, there was some doubts against Falguniben and subsequently, during the investigation, it was found that both the appellants had travelled in a Car hired by them along with Sanjay Ahir – accomplice. She would further submit that the delay in filing the application under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code for tender of pardon at the instance of Sanjay Ahir itself would not fatal the case of the prosecution since that person can file such an application before the pronouncement of the judgment. She would further submit that even before any witness was examined, an application Exh.15 was submitted by him on 21.11.2008 which was allowed and became final since there was no challenge to the said order by the appellants. 5.1 By taking us through the deposition of Sanjay Ahir – accomplice, she would submit that he has initially travelled with the present appellants on three different dates and three different times which has been established by the CDR record produced by the Nodal Officer, namely, Manish Patel P.W. 23. She would further submit that all the three ladies had travelled from Surat to Ankleshwar and while returning, Sanjay was asked to have a dinner at Tapi restaurant and during the said period where he took dinner, the deceased was throttled by the present appellants in the Car itself. She would further submit that all the three ladies had travelled from Surat to Ankleshwar and while returning, Sanjay was asked to have a dinner at Tapi restaurant and during the said period where he took dinner, the deceased was throttled by the present appellants in the Car itself. When Sanjay found bad smell in the Car and inquired by him, was threatened by the appellants by showing injection and was asked to follow the instructions given by them and accordingly, he had travelled towards Surat and near village Abrama, dead body was thrown out of the Car and both the appellants poured kerosene and put ablaze the dead body. She would further submit that the said Sanjay has been exhaustively cross-examined by the defense. However, nothing has come on record to support the submission made on behalf of the defense. He is clear in his deposition that he had gone for the dinner and during that period, the entire incident has taken place. She would further submit that when a person who is a driver and smell something poisonous in his Car when he returned to his Car and threatened by the appellants by showing syringe, a person would naturally follow the instructions under such threats and, therefore, the submission made by learned advocate appearing for the appellants about the conduct which is alleged to have been unnatural cannot be accepted. 5.2 By relying upon the provisions of Section 114 read with Section 133 of the Evidence Act, it was argued that accomplice is a competent witness against an accused and conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of the accomplice and if the Court accepts the testimony of such accomplice, the Court may presume the existence of those facts which it thinks likely to have happened in common course of natural events and human conduct. In support of her submissions, she has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 832 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that every detail of the story of the accomplice is not to be confirmed by independent evidence. In support of her submissions, she has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 832 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that every detail of the story of the accomplice is not to be confirmed by independent evidence. 5.3 She has further relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Hasim v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down certain principles while dealing with the evidence of accomplice and has held that the story put forward by such person should be probable and can be reasonably said to act upon it. Need not be a direct evidence that the accused committed the crime and circumstantial evidence of its connection with the crime will be enough as well as the accused accomplice was one of those accused who committed the offence. In the present case, the accomplice is trustworthy who had indirectly helped the appellants in committing the crime and did not disclose the correct story before the Investigating Officer and was initially charged for all the offences including abatement of the offence. 5.4 She has further relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Balveer @ Balli and another, (2013) 16 SCC 321 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that minor inconsistency so far as evidence of approvers are immaterial and, therefore, in such circumstances, the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants. 5.5 As far as motive is concerned, she would submit that there is enough material to establish that there were disputed amongst the appellants and the deceased since her husband who happened to be brother of the appellants had expired and litigations were pending. As far as FSL Report Exh.217 with regard to the liquid found in the dabba is concerned, by taking us through the said Report, she would submit that hydrocarbons were found which is also part of petrol. Therefore, there is corroboration of the case put forward by the prosecution about buying petrol and using the same for setting ablaze the dead body of deceased Amiben. Therefore, there is corroboration of the case put forward by the prosecution about buying petrol and using the same for setting ablaze the dead body of deceased Amiben. 5.6 As far as the Certificate issued under Section 65 B (4) (b) of the Evidence Act, 1872, at the instance of Manish Patel, she would submit that he has stated that the documents were supplied at the initial stage by his predecessor. However, the same were again picked up from the billing server and, therefore, the procedure under Section 65 B has been followed by the witness and rightly admitted by the learned Trial Court and relied upon by the learned Trial Court. Hence, no interference is called for by this Court and hence, the present appeal be dismissed. 6. We have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the impugned judgment and order, depositions of witnesses, documentary evidence produced on record. We have also gone through the Records and Proceedings received from the learned Trial Court. Initially, when the charge was framed against the appellants and another accused, namely, Sanjay Chandubhai Ahir, the case was rest on circumstantial evidence only. Even charge Exh.7 was framed against all the three original accused for the offences punishable under Section 302, 201, 365, 120-B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas additional charge was framed against appellants under Section 506 (1) and/or under Section 506 (2) of the Indian Penal Code on 24.9.2008. 7. Thereafter, Sanjay Chandubhai Ahir preferred application Exh.15 under Sections 306 and 307 of the Code seeking tender of pardon being an accomplice to other accused on 21.11.2008. By an order dated 24.12.2008, the said application was allowed on condition that the accomplice shall make full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge related to the offence. 8. Since the prosecution has heavily relied upon the deposition of Sanjay Ahir - accomplice, we have very closely scrutinized his deposition (P.W.1 – Exh.43) in detail and have tried to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and State. The said witness – Sanjay has stated that he was working as a driver with one Ajay Panjwani from the year 2007. The said witness – Sanjay has stated that he was working as a driver with one Ajay Panjwani from the year 2007. On 10.10.2007, his employer i.e. Ajay Panjwani asked him to wait at Gopipura Milan Temple of Surat where the party who has hired the vehicle would be waiting and accordingly, he went at the said place. At that place, Sanjay found Binaben standing there. As per her instructions, he went to Kazi compound where Falguniben was waiting and both the ladies boarded the Car. Thereafter, as per his say, near Tadvadi zone office, a man having good height body boarded the vehicle and all of them went near Athwagate over bridge where Binaben and Falguniben went to some office and after returning informed him that the trip is cancelled and paid Rs.500/- to him. It is pertinent to note that the Investigating Agency is totally silent about any person having good height body and no investigation has been carried out about the office. 9. Same thing happened on 11.10.2007. However, there is absence of any third party on the said date. On third day i.e. 12.10.2007, again employer i.e. Ajay Panjwani informed Sanjay that he has to take the appellants to Ankleshwar and accordingly, he went along with his Quallis Car. Now with regard to use of Quallis Car is concerned, the owner of the vehicle, Ajay Panjwani who has been examined as P.W.19 – Exh.168 has no permit to ply his vehicle as a commercial vehicle. Even as per the deposition of Ajay Panjwani, he had no direct talk with any of the appellants. He has sent the Car as per request of his friends, but there is no investigation on that line. Sanjay as well as Ajay said that they had talked on mobile phone with regard to the trips. However, the Investigating Agency has neither collected nor discovered any mobile phones from any of these two witnesses nor any CDRs have been produced on record. If we scrutinize the deposition of Sanjay, he has stated that as per the instructions of one of the appellants, namely, Falguniben, they followed a lady who was travelling on a Scooty and after sometime at the place, namely, Roowala Tekra, Binaben joined her and thereafter, they travelled further where the lady who was driving the Scooty was found with the luggage. In connection with this deposition, if we look at the Janvajog entry Exh.76 which was recorded at the instance of Vinesh Jashwantlal Kapadia - brother of the deceased, he had declared that Amiben had informed that she is travelling in a rickshaw with Falguniben and going towards Station, which is contradictory to each other. It is his further say that all the three women i.e. the present appellants and deceased had travelled towards Ankleshwar and stopped the vehicle at Ankleshwar Reliance Petrol Pump where Binaben asked Sanjay to collect the papers from the office of Reliance. Therefore, Sanjay went inside the office and collected the papers and handed over the papers to Binaben. This story is not supported by any evidence since the Investigating Agency has not cared to investigate the case on this line. Neither any witness from Reliance office at Ankleshwar nor any documents which allegedly collected from the said office of Reliance have come on record. 10. As per the story put forward by Sanjay, he was told to have his dinner and, therefore, he stopped the Car near Tapi hotel where he had his dinner. As per his say, only he got down from the Car and had dinner in the said restaurant. It is pertinent to note that the Investigating Agency has neither examined any witness nor produced any documents to prove this factum of visiting Tapi hotel near Ankleshwar. 11. It is the further say of Sanjay that when he returned after his dinner and started travelling towards Surat, he had bad smell of some chemical and, therefore, he asked Binaben about such smell and at that time, she compelled him to drive the vehicle and when he saw from the side glass of the Car, deceased Amiben was sleeping by keeping her head on one side and, therefore, slowed down the Car and Sanjay told the appellants that he would not permit such things in his Car and at that time, again one of the appellant asked him to drive the Car and at that time, when he tried to jump from the Car, she caught hold him by his collar and shown injection and threatened that she will inject him and, therefore, he continued to drive the Car. It is his case that after sometime, one bottle was thrown out of the window by Binaben and near Nava Varachha, the Car was stopped near Patiyala Dhaba from where Binaben purchased a dabba and thereafter went to Bharat Petrol Pump which is adjacent to said Dhaba and purchased petrol and filled the metal dabba with the same. It is further case of the prosecution through Sanjay that the said petrol was used to put ablaze the dead body which was thrown at Abrama village. However, the metal dabba was discovered during the investigation and having liquid therein, was sent for analysis to Forensic Science Laboratory and the FSL Report Exh.217 clearly reveals that the liquid was smelling of kerosene and ultimately, the final opinion recorded is that the liquid is having kerosene hydrocarbons and not petrol. Sanjay further stated that dead body was thrown in the sim of village Abrama and the petrol was poured on the body of the deceased and was set at ablaze. However, the clothes collected from the body, one ladies watch belt, soil collected from the place where the dead body was lying and burnt pieces of clothes, kerosene hydrocarbons were found whereas no petrol is found from any of these articles. It is also pertinent to note that the Investigating Agency has not collected any evidence in the nature of witness from Bharat Petrol Pump or any documentary evidence about purchase of petrol. Even otherwise, the story put forward by the prosecution that the petrol was purchased and body was burnt by the said petrol is ruled out in view of the FSL report Exh.217. It is pertinent to note that the Investigating Agency has tried to prove the case by examining Patiyala Dhaba owner, namely, Chandresh P.W.14 – Exh.132 who has identified Binaben who had allegedly purchased metal dabba from the said Dhaba. Binaben was the first amongst three accused, who came to be arrested on 8.11.2007, whereas Sanjay came to be arrested on 13.11.2007. Though Binaben was arrested on 8.11.2007, Test Identification Parade at the instance of Chandresh, owner of Patiyala Dhaba was arranged on 17.11.2007. In this connection, if we peruse the deposition of Chandresh, he has admitted that he is running the Dhaba in partnership, however, having no valid license to run such Dhaba. Though Binaben was arrested on 8.11.2007, Test Identification Parade at the instance of Chandresh, owner of Patiyala Dhaba was arranged on 17.11.2007. In this connection, if we peruse the deposition of Chandresh, he has admitted that he is running the Dhaba in partnership, however, having no valid license to run such Dhaba. He has admitted that he could not identify one of the appellant, namely, Falguniben since only Binaben had got down to buy a dabba from his Dhaba. It appears that only after arrest of Sanjay, T.I. Parade has been arranged. In this connection, if we peruse the deposition of Ashok Ramjibhai Chaudhary, P.W.18 – Exh.166, the Executive Magistrate, he has admitted that peon had arranged dummy persons for T.I. Parade and had not examined the age of the accused who was to be identified and those dummy persons. He has also admitted that there is no report from the concerned Police Station about T.I. Parade arranged on 17.11.2007. It appears to us that the entire Test Identification Parade has been casually carried out at his instance and, therefore, in our opinion, it would be risky to accept such T.I. Parade even as evidence in this case. 12. It is the say of Sanjay that luggage belonged to Amiben was taken away by Binaben, but there is no discovery or recovery of such luggage at the instance of any of the appellants. It is pertinent to note that this witness has for the first time produced the purse allegedly belonged to the deceased and kept the same with him for a period of more than one month and produced only on 16.11.2007. In his cross-examination, Sanjay has admitted that he had not informed his employer about his second day visit to the appellants which was cancelled. He also admitted that he had received the instructions on his mobile on 12.10.2007 about the socalled visit by the appellants. However, as stated herein above, there is no material produced on record. As far as the conduct of the appellants which is described that he was threatened by the appellants by showing injection and under such compulsion, he was driving the Car, such story is not gullible. It is an undisputed fact that there is no deadly weapon shown to him compelling him to drive the Car. As far as the conduct of the appellants which is described that he was threatened by the appellants by showing injection and under such compulsion, he was driving the Car, such story is not gullible. It is an undisputed fact that there is no deadly weapon shown to him compelling him to drive the Car. Hence, the story put forward by Sanjay becomes unnatural when he had chance to run away from the place when Binaben had got down at Patiyala Dhaba to purchase dabba. He did not even try to make hue and cry at Patiyala Dhaba as well as at Bharat Petrol Pump, where he allegedly stopped the Car to purchase petrol. He did not even make hue and cry when the dead body was thrown near Abrama village at around 8.30 to 9 p.m. or dead body was put ablaze. In this connection, if we peruse the deposition of Kamabhai Amratbhai Parmar, Unarmed Head Constable of Palsana Police Station, P.W.22 – Exh.176, it seems that Navratri festival was going on and he was in petrolling and at around 22.00 hours on 12.10.2007, he received an information that dead body in burnt condition was lying there. In his cross-examination, he has admitted that number of vehicles were passing on that day in the area when he had reached the place when the dead body allegedly thrown at the place, there is traffic and hence, Sanjay had ample opportunity to make hue and cry and/or could have immediately informed the Police. On the contrary, he further travelled with the appellants and both of them were dropped one by one at different places and thereafter, he went to his home and remained silent for more than one month till he was arrested on 13.11.2007. He has admitted that he did not disclose anything about the incident even to his employer Ajay Panjwani. In such circumstances, the story put forward by the accomplice and relied upon by the prosecution cannot be accepted. It is pertinent to note that Sanjay Ahir – accomplice as well as Vinesh Kapadia – brother of the deceased had deliberately hide details of their mobile numbers. In such circumstances, the story put forward by the accomplice and relied upon by the prosecution cannot be accepted. It is pertinent to note that Sanjay Ahir – accomplice as well as Vinesh Kapadia – brother of the deceased had deliberately hide details of their mobile numbers. As per the story put forward by Sanjay, he had travelled initially with the appellants for two days along with some unknown man with good height body and on third day, he had travelled with three women till the dead body was disposed but it becomes undisputed fact that he has not seen the actual occurrence of the alleged crime since he was taking his dinner at Tapi Hotel. Therefore, he cannot be treated as an eye-witness to the incident and, therefore, on the basis of the story put forward by the said witness which is not supported by other circumstances which are in the nature of corroborative piece of evidence, a person cannot be convicted. 13. It is true that the Investigating Agency has collected three mobiles i.e. two of the appellants and third of Amiben. The location of the mobile phones of the appellants on 12.10.2007 (Exh.200) was found at around 20.30 hours at Ankleshwar and at around 21.30 hours near village Kim. But the mobile location of Amiben Exh.204 is lastly recorded at 17.41 p.m. in Haripura area of Surat. However, there is no mobile location of deceased Amiben at Ankleshwar. Even otherwise, relying upon only this evidence, a person cannot be held guilty for the serious offence like murder when complete chain is not established. There is no doubt that the accomplice is a competent witness against an accused as provided under Section 133 and conviction can be based on his deposition. When an accomplice deposed before the Court describing the offence which has allegedly taken place in his presence, the Court may presume existence of those facts which have been described by him. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinal Das and others v. State of Tripura (Supra) has relied upon illustration (b) to Section 114 and has held that the story disclosed by the approver should be reasonable and can safely accepted as true and acceptable, even the second test should be sufficient corroboration of the story put forward by him. By relying upon several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrinal Das and others v. State of Tripura (Supra) has held under the heading “Evidentiary Value of approver/accomplice” in paragraphs 16 to 28 as under :- “Evidentiary value of Approver/Accomplice : 16. Before considering the impugned judgment on merits, inasmuch as the High Court heavily relied on the evidence of the "approver", let us find out the legal position about the evidentiary value of "approver" and its acceptability with or without corroboration. 17. Though a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver, yet the universal practice is not to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The evidence of an approver does not differ from the evidence of any other witness save in one particular aspect, namely, that the evidence of an accomplice is regarded ab initio as open to grave suspicion. If the suspicion which attaches to the evidence of an accomplice be not removed, that evidence should not be acted upon unless corroborated in some material particulars; but if the suspicion attaching to the accomplice's evidence be removed, then that evidence may be acted upon even though uncorroborated, and the guilt of the accused may be established upon the evidence alone. 18. In order to understand the correct meaning and application of this term, it is desirable to mention Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 along with Illustration (b) to Section 114 which read as under :- "133. Accomplice .- An accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." Illustration (b) to Section 114 "The Court may presume (b) that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars." 19. Dealing with the scope and ambit of the abovenoted two provisions, this Court, in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 599 - (1963) 3 SCR 830 has held that both the sections are part of one subject and have to be considered together. It has further been held :- (AIR p. 601, para 7) "7. Dealing with the scope and ambit of the abovenoted two provisions, this Court, in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 599 - (1963) 3 SCR 830 has held that both the sections are part of one subject and have to be considered together. It has further been held :- (AIR p. 601, para 7) "7. The combined effect of Sections 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114, may be stated as follows : according to the former, which is a Rule of law, an accomplice is competent to give evidence and according to the latter, which is a Rule of practice it is almost always unsafe to convict upon his testimony alone. Therefore, though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said to be illegal yet the courts will, as a matter of practice, not accept the evidence of such a witness without corroboration in material particulars." 20. The very same principle was reiterated in Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K. S. Dalipsinghji and Another etc., (1969) 3 SCC 429 and it was held :- (SCC p. 438, para 21) “21..... The combined effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) is that though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is legal, the Court will not accept such evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars. The corroboration must connect the accused with the crime. It may be direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary that the corroboration should confirm all the circumstances of the crime. It is sufficient if the corroboration is in material particulars. The corroboration must be from an independent source. One accomplice cannot corroborate another....." 21. While considering the validity of approver's testimony and tests of credibility, this Court, in Sarwan Singh S/o Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 637 has held as under :- (AIR pp. 640-42, paras 7 & 8) “7.....An accomplice is undoubtedly a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission of the offence introduces a serious stain in his evidence and Courts are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. There can be, however, no doubt that the very fact that he has participated in the commission of the offence introduces a serious stain in his evidence and Courts are naturally reluctant to act on such tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. It would not be right to expect that such independent corroboration should cover the whole of the prosecution story or even all the material particulars. If such a view is adopted it would render the evidence of the accomplice wholly superfluous. On the other hand, it would not be safe to act upon such evidence merely because it is corroborated in minor particulars or incidental details because, in such a case, corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that the main story disclosed by the approver can be reasonably and safely accepted as true. But it must never be forgotten that before the court reaches the stage of considering the question of corroboration and its adequacy or otherwise, the first initial and essential question to consider is whether even as an accomplice the approver is a reliable witness. If the answer to this question is against the approver then there is an end of the matter, and no question as to whether his evidence is corroborated or not falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation of an approver's evidence has to satisfy a double test. His evidence must show that he is a reliable witness and that is a test which is common to all witnesses. If this test is satisfied the second test which still remains to be applied is that the approver's evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. This test is special to the cases of weak or tainted evidence like that of the approver..... 8..... Every person who is a competent witness is not a reliable witness and the test of reliability has to be satisfied by an approver all the more before the question of corroboration of his evidence is considered by criminal courts". 22. Further, in Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (1975) 3 SCC 742 , this Court, while considering the approver's testimony within the meaning of Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has observed :- (SCC pp. 747- 48, para 12) “12. 22. Further, in Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (1975) 3 SCC 742 , this Court, while considering the approver's testimony within the meaning of Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has observed :- (SCC pp. 747- 48, para 12) “12. An Approver is a most unworthy friend, if at all, and he, having bargained for his immunity, must prove his worthiness for credibility in Court. This test is fulfilled, firstly, if the story he relates involves him in the crime and appears intrinsically to be a natural and probable catalogue of events that had taken place. Secondly, once that hurdle is crossed, the story given by an approver so far as the accused on trial is concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as to give rise to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a rare case, taking into consideration all the factors, circumstances and situation governing a particular case, conviction based on the uncorroborated evidence of an approver confidently held to be true and reliable by the Court may be permissible. Ordinarily, however, an approver's statement has to be corroborated in material particulars bridging closely the distance between the crime and the criminal. Certain clinching features of involvement disclosed by an approver appertaining directly to an accused, if reliable, by the touchstone of other independent credible evidence, would give the needed assurance for acceptance of his testimony on which a conviction may be based." 23. In Abdul Sattar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, 1985 (Supp) SCC 599 where the prosecution had sought to prove its case by relying upon the evidence of the approver, it was held that : (SCC p. 602, para 6) “6..... The approver is a competent witness but the position in law is fairly well settled that on the uncorroborated testimony of the approver, it would be risky to base the conviction, particularly, in respect of a serious charge like murder.” Once the evidence of the approver is found to be not reliable, the worth of his evidence is lost and such evidence, even by seeking corroboration, cannot be made the foundation of a conviction. The above said ratio has been reaffirmed and reiterated by this Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar (1995 Supp (1) SCC 80); Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra, : AIR 1999 SC 1969 : (1999 Cri LJ 2889) and Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, : (2000) 8 SCC 457 . 24. In Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary (supra), it was further held that : (SCC p. 479, para 37) “37. For corroborative evidence, the court must look at the broad spectrum of the approver's version and then find out whether there is other evidence to corroborate and lend assurance to that version. The nature and extent of such corroboration may depend upon the facts of different cases. Corroboration need not be in the form of ocular testimony of witnesses and may even be in the form of circumstantial evidence. Corroborative evidence must be independent and not vague or unreliable.” 25. Similar question again came up for consideration before this Court in K. Hashim v State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 1 SCC 237 : 2005 Cri LJ 143 and Sitaram Sao @ Mungeri v State of Jharkhand, (2007) 12 SCC 630 wherein this Court has held that : (K. Hasim case, SCC p.247, para 26) “26. Section 133 of the Evidence Act expressly provides that an accomplice is a competent witness and the conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. In other words, this section renders admissible such uncorroborated testimony. But this Section has to be read along with Section 114 Illustration (b). The latter section empowers the Court to presume the existence of certain facts and the illustration elucidates what the Court may presume and make clear by means of examples as to what facts the Court shall have regard in considering whether or not maxims illustrated apply to a given case. Illustration (b) in express terms says that accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. The Statute permits the conviction of an accused on the basis of uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but the rule of prudence embodied in illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act strikes a note of warning cautioning the Court that an accomplice does not generally deserve to be believed unless corroborated in material particulars. The Statute permits the conviction of an accused on the basis of uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice but the rule of prudence embodied in illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act strikes a note of warning cautioning the Court that an accomplice does not generally deserve to be believed unless corroborated in material particulars. In other words, the rule is that the necessity of corroboration is a matter of prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such corroboration must be clearly present in the mind of the Judge." 26. In Sheshanna Bhumanna Yadav vs. State of Maharashtra (1970) 2 SCC 122 , the test of reliability of approver's evidence and rule as to corroboration was discussed. The following discussion and conclusion are relevant which read as under :- (SCC pp. 125-26, paras 12 & 13) “12. The law with regard to appreciation of approver's evidence is based on the effect of Sections 133 and 114, Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act, namely, that an accomplice is competent to depose but as a rule of caution it will be unsafe to convict upon his testimony alone. The warning of the danger of convicting on uncorroborated evidence is therefore given when the evidence is that of an accomplice. The primary meaning of accomplice is any party to the crime charged and some one who aids and abets the commission of crime. The nature of corroboration is that it is confirmatory evidence and it may consist of the evidence of second witness or of circumstances like the conduct of the person against whom it is required. Corroboration must connect or tend to connect the accused with the crime. When it is said that the corroborative evidence must implicate the accused in material particulars it means that it is not enough that a piece of evidence tends to confirm the truth of a part of the testimony to be corroborated. That evidence must confirm that part of the testimony which suggests that the crime was committed by the accused. If a witness says that the accused and he stole the sheep and he put the skins in a certain place, the discovery of the skins in that place would not corroborate the evidence of the witness as against the accused. That evidence must confirm that part of the testimony which suggests that the crime was committed by the accused. If a witness says that the accused and he stole the sheep and he put the skins in a certain place, the discovery of the skins in that place would not corroborate the evidence of the witness as against the accused. But if the skins were found in the accused's house, this would corroborate because it would tend to confirm the statement that the accused had some hand in the theft. 13. This Court stated the law of corroboration of accomplice evidence in several decisions. One of the earlier decision is Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1957 SCR 953 and the recent decision is Lachhi Ram v. State of Punjab, (1967) 1 SCR 243 . In Sarwan Singh case this Court laid down that before the court would look into the corroborative evidence it was necessary to find out whether the approver or accomplice was a reliable witness. This Court in Lachhi Ram case said that the first test of reliability of approver and accomplice evidence was for the court to be satisfied that there was nothing inherently impossible in evidence. After that conclusion is reached as to reliability corroboration is required. The rule as to corroboration is based on the reasoning that there must be sufficient corroborative evidence in material particulars to connect the accused with the crime." 27. In Dagdu and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 68 , the scope of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and nature of rule of corroboration of accomplice evidence was explained by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the following manner : (SCC p.76, paras 24-25) “24. In Bhiiboni Sahu v. King the Privy Council after noticing Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act observed that whilst it is not illegal to act on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, it is a rule of prudence so universally followed as to amount almost to a rule of law that it is unsafe to act on the evidence of an accomplice unless it is corroborated in material respects so as to implicate the accused; and further that the evidence of one accomplice cannot be used to corroborate the evidence of another accomplice. The rule of prudence was based on the interpretation of the phrase "corroborated in material particulars" in Illustration (b). Delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, Sir John Beaumont observed that the danger of acting on accomplice evidence is not merely that the accomplice is on his own admission a man of bad character who took part in the offence and afterwards to save himself betrayed his former associates, and who has placed himself in a position in which he can hardly fail to have a strong bias in favour of the prosecution; the real danger is that he is telling a story which in its general outline is true, and it is easy for him to work into the story matter which is untrue. He may implicate ten people in an offence and the story may be true in all its details as to eight of them but untrue as to the other two whose names may have been introduced because they are enemies of the approver. The only real safeguard therefore against the risk of condemning the innocent with the guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in some measure implicates each accused. 25. This Court has in a series of cases expressed the same view as regards accomplice evidence. (See State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh; Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar; Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra; and Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana). In Haricharan, Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking for a five-Judge Bench observed that the testimony of an accomplice is evidence under Section 3 of the Evidence Act and has to be dealt with as such. The evidence is of a tainted character and as such is very weak; but, nevertheless, it is evidence and may be acted upon, subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a part of the law that it is corroborated in material particulars." 28. In Rampal Pithwa Rahidas and others vs. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 73, while considering the very same provisions, this Court has held that approver's evidence must be corroborated in material particulars by direct or circumstantial evidence. This Court further held that while considering credibility of the approver and weight to be attached to his statement, the statement made in bail application of approver can be looked into by the Court.” 14. This Court further held that while considering credibility of the approver and weight to be attached to his statement, the statement made in bail application of approver can be looked into by the Court.” 14. One more reason not to accept the story put forward by this witness is admission by the Investigating Officer Dashrath Nathubhai Patel – P.W.24 – Exh.208 that during his investigation, he had recorded statement of one Kamlesh that some papers were handed over by one Hiral to him. Said Hiral is resident of Bharuch and friend of Kamlesh. Hiral happens to be nephew (son of sister of appellants) of appellants and as per the statement of Kamlesh, some confession was made by Hiral. However, he has not investigated in this line. The statement of said Kamlesh Hiralal Parmar dated 13.11.2007 was also read over in the Court wherein Hiral declared about murder of Amiben. However, he has not carried out investigation in this line. It is an undisputed fact that as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Hasim v. State of Tamil Nadu (Supra) relied upon by learned Additional Public Prosecutor, conviction can be based on the deposition of accomplice subject to the story put forward by him is probable and reasonably safe and can be acted upon. As stated herein above, we found the story of the accomplice untrustworthy and hence, we discard his evidence in toto. 15. In absence of the evidence of accomplice, we have appreciated the submissions made by learned Additional Public Prosecutor about the other circumstances like call records, Test Identification Parade of one of the appellant, namely, Binaben, Post Mortem Note, F.S.L. Report, deposition of relatives with regard to motive and deposition of Police Officers. 16. As far as the motive alleged is concerned, it appears from the deposition of Vinesh Kapadia, brother of deceased Amiben that settlement was arrived at between the parties i.e. between Amiben and the mother of the appellants who was party in the civil proceedings. If there was some dispute as alleged between the deceased and the family members of her late husband, she might not have travelled even in rickshaw with Falguniben upto Station as stated by his brother in Janvajog entry Exh.76. 17. If there was some dispute as alleged between the deceased and the family members of her late husband, she might not have travelled even in rickshaw with Falguniben upto Station as stated by his brother in Janvajog entry Exh.76. 17. As far as Test Identification Parade is concerned, as discussed herein above, there are lapses on the part of the Investigating Officer who has arranged the T.I. Parade at a belated stage i.e. after 9 days from the arrest of Binaben, at the instance of Chandresh Parbatbhai, P.W.14 – Exh.132 – owner of Patiyala Dhaba. Even the Executive Magistrate Ashok Ramjibhai Chaudhary, P.W.18 – Exh.166 has also admitted that there are many lapses on his part before arranging such T.I. Parade. There is no written communication about arranging T.I. Parade. He even did not care to verify the age of the accused, age of the dummy members and simply asked his peon to arrange for some dummy women persons to identify. 18. As far as the cause of death is concerned, Post-Mortem Note Exh.137 suggests that the same is due to throttling with 69% postmortem burns. However, as per F.S.L. Report Exh.217, no poison is found from the body of the deceased. Even the prosecution has failed to discover the poisonous liquid allegedly used by the appellants in commission of crime for throttling the deceased. It is true that the tower location with regard to mobile phones of the appellants is in the area of Ankleshwar, but only relying upon such evidence, the accused cannot be held guilty in absence of any complete chain of circumstances which led to the conclusion by the learned Trial Court that the appellants were the only persons who have committed the offence. 19. As far as submission made on the point of validity of Certificate issued under Section 65 B of the Evidence Act is concerned, we have scrutinized the deposition of Manish Patel P.W.23 – Exh.193, the Noddle Officer of the Mobile Company. As per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others (Supra), we are of the opinion that the Certificate is valid since the witness had downloaded the CDRs of three mobiles from ‘Billing Server’. 20. In the result, the present appeal succeeds and is allowed. As per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others (Supra), we are of the opinion that the Certificate is valid since the witness had downloaded the CDRs of three mobiles from ‘Billing Server’. 20. In the result, the present appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of conviction dated 26.9.2016 rendered by learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Surat in Sessions Case No.44 of 2008 recording the conviction of the appellants is set aside and the appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The appellants – accused are in jail. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other case. Fine, if any paid, shall be refunded to them. Registry is directed to send back the Records and Proceedings to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.