JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. 1. Baliapur P.S. Case No. 55 of 2006 was lodged on 31.07.2006 under section 304-B read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In his written report dated 31.07.2006, Jaleshwar Manjhi made specific allegation of harassment and torture of his daughter at the hands of her husband. A First Information Report was lodged against Jitendra Hembram @ Jitendra Manjhi, Fulmani Devi @ Fulmani Hembram and Basudeo Hembram @ Basu Manjhi. In course of investigation not many people came forward to state about the occurrence and during the trial only three persons, namely, Sakro Manjhian who is the mother, Baneshwar Manjhi who is the uncle and Jaleshwar Manjhi who is the father of Putul Manjhian were examined. Dr. Swapan Kumar Saraf who conducted the postmortem examination on 31.07.2006 did not find any antemortem external injury on the dead-body of Putul Manjhian. However, frothy blood was seen oozing from the lungs which was found congested and about 10 cc brownish fluid with odor of medicine was found in her stomach. The doctor did not render a conclusive opinion on the cause of death and viscera of Putul Manjhian was sent for chemical examination. A charge-sheet was filed against the above-named accused and they faced the trial on the charge of committing dowry death of Putul Manjhian in furtherance of criminal conspiracy. 2. In Sessions Trial No. 540 of 2006 with Sessions Trial No. 112 of 2007, Basudeo Hembram, Jitendra Hembram and Fulmani Devi were convicted and sentenced to RI for life under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, RI for five years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and RI for six months with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 3. In paragraph No. 14 of the judgment under challenge, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-I Dhanbad has held that the following incriminating circumstances were sufficient to hold the accused guilty: “14. I have given my anxious consideration on the evidence of the witnesses in the light of erudite and well-reasoned argument of the learned counsel of the accused and the, learned A.P.P. The following poignant circumstances have been traced out in order to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses. I have given my anxious consideration on the evidence of the witnesses in the light of erudite and well-reasoned argument of the learned counsel of the accused and the, learned A.P.P. The following poignant circumstances have been traced out in order to appreciate the evidence of the witnesses. They are as follows:- (i) Firstly, the deceased Putul Manjhi was married with accused Jitendra Hembram four years back to the occurrence and after marriage he was harassing the deceased for dowry. (ii) Secondly, all the accused persons were demanding money from Putul Manjhiain and for non-fulfillment of demand they were keeping her without food. (iii) Thirdly, the accused persons were also demanding money from informant Jaleshwar Manjhi and he oftenly used to meet their demand in order that the accused persons may keep his daughter properly. (iv) Fourthly, on one Thursday i.e. two days prior to the occurrence accused Jitendra Hembram went to the house of the informant and demanded Rs. 5,000/- when informant promised to meet his demand as and when he gets salary to which the accused went annoyed and did not take food in the night and returned in the morning along with his daughter. (v) Fifthly, on Sunday i.e. after two days the informant received massage on mobile phone that his daughter Putul Manjhiain has died. (vi) Sixthly, the informant along with his wife, brother and some villagers immediately rushed to village Mallikdih and found the dead-body of Putul Manjhi kept in verandah of her house. (vii) Seventhly, on 31.7.2006 informant lodged a written report in the Baliapur P.S. immediately after seeing the dead-body of his daughter. (viii) Eighthly, a U.D. case was registered by the I.O. on 30.7.2006 on the basis of fardbeyan of accused Fulmani Devi, wherein, she stated the cause of death of the deceased snake bite. (ix) Ninthly, doctor who conducted post mortem examination on the dead-body did not find any ante-mortem external wounds and also did not find any mark of snake bite and the viscera was sent to FSL, Ranchi for chemical analysis. (x) Tenthly, that on chemical examination of the viscera it was found that poison has been detected in the viscera of the deceased. (x) Tenthly, that on chemical examination of the viscera it was found that poison has been detected in the viscera of the deceased. (xi) Lastly, on the evidence of the material witnesses it has been brought to light that the accused persons subjected cruelty and harassment to the deceased for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry and lastly for not paying Rs. 5,000/- as demand of dowry they, administered poison to the deceased which resulted in her death as such the death of the deceased is a dowry death.” 4. As regards cruelty and harassment of Putul Manjhian in connection to demand of dowry, the learned trial Judge has observed that the accused were “oftenly” making demand of money from the informant and Jitendra Hembram had demanded Rs. 5,000/- from his father-in-law which was not fulfilled. According to the learned trial Judge, the aforesaid evidence proved that Putul Manjhian was subjected to torture for non-fulfillment of dowry. The learned trial Judge has further held that the demand of dowry continued at least two days prior to her death and FSL report established presence of “NUVAN” an organo phosphorous pesticide used in agriculture for killing of insects, in the viscera which contained parts of lung, liver, kidney and stomach of Putul Manjhian. In the final analysis, the learned trial Judge has held that the evidences brought during the trial were sufficient to constitute four basic ingredients of section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. However, the offence under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code was not found proved. 5. Mrs. Vani Kumari, the learned Amicus would contend that minor matrimonial hassles would not constitute harassment and demand of money for personal use would not fall under the definition of dowry. The learned Amicus has referred to the decision in Appasaheb and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 to fortify her contention that the appellants cannot be convicted for the offence of dowry death. 6. Per contra, Mr. Azeemuddin, the learned APP would submit that at every stage the accused gave false information and tried to mislead the investigation. 6. Per contra, Mr. Azeemuddin, the learned APP would submit that at every stage the accused gave false information and tried to mislead the investigation. The first information given by the accused that Putul Manjhian had died due to snakebite was not found true and FSL report clearly shows that she died an unnatural death and therefore the appellants were rightly convicted under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 7. In wake of the raising incidents of bride burning to curb the menace of dowry death by Amendment Act 43 of 1986 the offence under section 304-B was inserted in the Indian Penal Code. A corresponding amendment was made in the Indian Evidence Act to incorporate section 113-B. 8. Hira Lal and Others vs. State (Govt. of NCT) of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 80 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that conjoint reading of the provisions under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and section 113-B of the Evidence Act indicates a common point of reference that “soon before her death a woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with, any demand of dowry.” The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “8......As per the definition of “dowry death” in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been “soon before her death” subjected to cruelty or harassment “for or in connection with the demand of dowry.” Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the woman. This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304-B IPC. (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” 9. (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with any demand for dowry. (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.” 9. Three witnesses were examined by the prosecution to establish that soon before her death Putul Manjhian was subjected to harassment and torture at the hands of her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. PW-1 Sakro Manjhiain, PW-4 Baneshwar Manjhi and PW-5 Jaleshwar Manjhi were closely and intimately related to Putul Manjhian. They are not the eyewitnesses. On the information received by Baneshwar Manjhi from Basudeo Hembram, the informant along with his wife, brother and 2-4 other persons had gone to the matrimonial house of Putul Manjhian and found her dead-body. The learned trial Judge has observed that relationship is not a ground to discard evidence of a witness and we cannot disagree with the learned trial Judge on this proposition, but at the same time we would like to add that testimony of a related witness is examined with a little more care and caution to find out whether his evidence was prompted by past enmity or any other extraneous factor [Refer: Raju vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 ]. 10. We have carefully examined the evidences tendered by PW-1, PW-4 and PW-5 and find that they are largely truthful witnesses who on account of death of a dear daughter have added general allegation of demand of dowry and harassment of Putul Manjhian at the hands of the appellants. PW-1 has deposed in the Court that about four years back her daughter was married with Jitendra Hembram (in the year 2008 her evidence was recorded in the Court). She has stated that her son-in-law came to her house and asked for Rs. 5,000/-. Her husband was not at home and after he came from duty her husband told Jitendra Hembram that he would give him Rs. 5,000/- when salary was paid to him. However, Jitendra Hembram become angry, did not take food and went back home. On Sunday, she received an information that her daughter had fallen sick and after sometime her brother-in-law was informed that Putul Manjhian had died. Thereafter she had gone to village Mallikdih and she found the dead-body of her daughter in her matrimonial house, with a mark on her neck. On Sunday, she received an information that her daughter had fallen sick and after sometime her brother-in-law was informed that Putul Manjhian had died. Thereafter she had gone to village Mallikdih and she found the dead-body of her daughter in her matrimonial house, with a mark on her neck. She has further stated that her son-in-law initially treated her daughter well but after some time her father-in-law and mother-in-law started harassing her. In the cross-examination she denied that at the instance of the co-villagers she has falsely implicated the accused. She has, however, admitted that before the police she had said only that her daughter was not treated well in her matrimonial house. She could not remember the date when Jitendra Hembram demanded money from her and has said in the Court that she heard that her daughter had suffered snakebite and she saw dead snake there. PW-4 has stated that on 27.07.2006 Jitendra Hembram came to the house of his brother and next morning his brother and sister-in-law told him that Jitendra Hembram had asked Rs. 5,000/- and left annoyed because he could not pay. He has further stated that he received phone call from Basudeo Hembram that Putul Manjhian had died. Along with his brother, sister-in-law and 2-4 village people he had gone to village Mallikdih and saw the dead-body of Putul Manjhian on a cot. In his cross-examination he has admitted that he did not inform the police that he had received information about the death of his niece. PW-5 has stated in his examination-in-chief about demand of dowry, harassment and torture of his daughter at the hands of the accused. He has stated that his daughter used to tell him about demand of dowry. He has further stated that sometimes the accused would also demand money from him. He has further stated that his son-in-law visited his house on Thursday and asked for Rs. 5,000/-. When his wife told him that she would give money after getting salary, Jitendra Hembram became angry and did not even take food in the night. In his cross-examination he has admitted that his statement recorded by the police was not read over to him, but he did inform the police that he had seen marks on the neck and ear of his daughter. In his cross-examination he has admitted that his statement recorded by the police was not read over to him, but he did inform the police that he had seen marks on the neck and ear of his daughter. He has admitted that his son-in-law was engaged in agriculture and for that purpose sometimes he would ask help from him. 11. From the evidence of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-5 we find that there is no conclusive evidence on demand of dowry by the appellants and it was Jitendra Hembram who demanded Rs. 5,000/- on 27.07.2006 - the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that Putul Manjhian would tell them about demand by the appellants is largely in the realm of hearsay. 12. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act defines “dowry” to mean any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly - (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person at or before or at any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. 13. In Appasaheb the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that a demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses would not be demand of dowry. Moreover, the allegations by PW-1, PW-4 and PW-5 are made against Jitendra Hembram and not against the appellants except saying that they would also not keep Putul Manjhian well (thik thak) in the matrimonial home. There is no evidence that the appellants made demand of dowry from Putul Manjhian or her relatives and due to non-fulfillment of their demand inflicted various acts of harassment and torture upon her and soon before her death one such demand was made from Putul Manjhian. 14. There must be a live nexus between unnatural death of a woman and demand of dowry and/or torture and harassment in connection to demand of dowry at the hands of her husband or his family members or his relatives. 14. There must be a live nexus between unnatural death of a woman and demand of dowry and/or torture and harassment in connection to demand of dowry at the hands of her husband or his family members or his relatives. The expression “soon before the death” is not defined in the statutes and as held in Kamesh Panjiyar alias Kamlesh Panjiyar vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388 the expression “soon before” is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The demand of Rs. 5,000/- by Jitendra Hembram was not a demand of dowry and there is no evidence that in connection of demand of Rs. 5,000/- by Jitendra Hembram on 27.07.2006 Putul Manjhian was harassed and tortured by the appellants. 15. We further find that there is no evidence to conclusively hold the cause of death of Putul Manjhian. PW-3 Dr. Swapan Kumar Saraf has not rendered any opinion on cause of death. The chemical examination of viscera disclosed that poisonous substance was found in the body of Putul Manjhian, but that is not sufficient to hold that she died due to poison. After FSL report was received, PW-3 was not re-examined and in the context of FSL report his opinion was not obtained nor was the defence offered an opportunity to test FSL report. UD Case No. 15 of 2006 was registered on the basis of fardbeyan of Fulmani Devi that Putul Manjhian died due to snakebite, but no sign of snakebite was observed by PW-3. PW-1, Sakro Manjhian is a village woman who has stated in her cross-examination that she heard about death of Putul Manjhian by snakebite and, therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against Fulmani Devi on the ground that she set up a false defence. It is duty of the prosecution to establish circumstances against an accused to prove that it was the accused who has committed the crime. The prosecution is further required to show that no other hypothesis consistent with innocence of the accused can be inferred from the proved circumstances. In State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “13. The prosecution is further required to show that no other hypothesis consistent with innocence of the accused can be inferred from the proved circumstances. In State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran and Another, (2007) 3 SCC 755 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “13. The prosecution case is based on the circumstantial evidence and it is a well-settled proposition of law that when the case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established. (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused. (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 16. Putul Manjhian has died in her matrimonial home within seven years of marriage. Even assuming, that her death was under unnatural circumstances, the appellants in absence of clear evidence that soon before her death Putul Manjhian was subjected to torture and harassment at their hands in connection to demand of dowry cannot be convicted for dowry death. 17. The learned trial Judge misdirected himself and raised a presumption against the appellants for which there was no material on record. The appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Judge is highly unsatisfactory, the learned trial Judge has held the appellants guilty on the basis of surmises and conjectures. 18. Having minutely examined the materials on record, we find that one of the essential ingredients for constituting the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code was not established by the prosecution and, accordingly, conviction of the appellants for the said offence was not sustainable. 19. Jitendra Hembram served the sentence during the pendency of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 309 of 2011 which was not pressed by him on merits and, accordingly, the criminal appeal preferred by him was dismissed as not pressed. 20. 19. Jitendra Hembram served the sentence during the pendency of Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 309 of 2011 which was not pressed by him on merits and, accordingly, the criminal appeal preferred by him was dismissed as not pressed. 20. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction dated 21.12.2010 under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and the order of sentence of RI for life for the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, RI for five years with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and RI for six months with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, all dated 05.01.2011, against the appellants passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-I, Dhanbad in Session Trial No. 540 of 2006 with Sessions Trial No. 112 of 2007 are set-aside. 21. Mr. Azeemuddin, the learned APP states that the appellants, namely Fulmani Devi @ Fulmani Hembram and Basudeo Hembram @ Basu Manjhi are on bail. 22. Accordingly, the appellants, namely Fulmani Devi @ Fulmani Hembram and Basudeo Hembram @ Basu Manjhi who are on bail shall be discharged of liability of the bail bonds furnished by them. 23. In the result, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 57 of 2011 is allowed. 24. We record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mrs. Vani Kumari, the learned Amicus, who shall be paid fee and reimbursed for the expenses incurred by her. 25. Let lower Court records be transmitted to the Court concerned, forthwith. 26. Let a copy of the Judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned through FAX.