JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. - The petitioner, who is working as Junior Clerk in the office of Block Education Officer, Banki-II (Dumpada), Cuttack, has filed this writ petition seeking to quash the order dated 05.08.2015 under Annexure-3 passed by opposite party no.3 - Block Education Officer, Banki-II (Dampada), Cuttack in canceling the Revised Assured Career Progression benefit extended to him, vide order no. 128 dated 23.10.2013 under Annexure-2, and to issue direction to the opposite parties to extend such benefit to him. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in brief, is that the petitioner was duly selected in recruitment test and accordingly sponsored to the office of the Circle Inspector of Schools, Cuttack-III Circle, Jajpur and vide office order dated 23.03.1991 he was appointed as a Junior Clerk in the office of the Principal DIET, Dolipur, Cuttack, pursuant to which he joined on 02.04.1991. While he was continuing in service, he passed Paper-I of Group-A and Paper-I of Group- B of the Annual Departmental Examination of Accounts conducted by the Board of Revenue, Odisha, which was held on 26.12.1995 and 27.12.1995 respectively. 2.1 With the commencement of Orissa Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 1998, which inter alia provided that in case a person is allowed to continue in a single post or grade, in which he was originally appointed, then he will be entitled to get a Time Bound Advancement Scale of Pay. In compliance to the same, the petitioner was allowed to get his pay fixed under the Time Bound Advancement Scales of Pay in the year 2006 on completion of 15 years service. 2.2. The Orissa Revised Scales of Pay Rules, 2008 was introduced by the State Government, vide Finance Department Notification dated 24th December, 2008, and the same was given effect to from 1st January, 2006. According to the provisions of the said Rules, the pay of the petitioner was also got revised and he was also extended with the benefit admissible to him. 2.3 Consequent upon implementation of the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) by the Government of India, various service associations of the State Government employees came up with memoranda to consider implementation of the MACPS in respect to employees of the State Government. 2.3 Consequent upon implementation of the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) by the Government of India, various service associations of the State Government employees came up with memoranda to consider implementation of the MACPS in respect to employees of the State Government. Taking into account the uncertain promotional avenues and career stagnation of the State Government employees, the Government after careful consideration decided to implement a career advancement scheme to be known as Revised Assured Career Progression Scheme (RACPS) and the same was given effect to from 01.01.2013, which had come up by way of resolution dated 06.02.2013. 2.4. Under RACP scheme, it has been provided that there shall be three financial up-gradations, counted from the direct entry grade on completion of 10, 20 and 30 years of service in a single cadre, in absence of promotion. An employee if completed 10 years of service in the entry grade will be considered for 1st up-gradation under RACPS. An employee completing 20 years of service and has got only one up-gradation either by promotion or by RACPS will be considered for the 2nd up-gradation. Similarly, an employee completing 30 years of service and has got two up-gradations either by RACPS or promotion or both will be considered for 3rd up-gradation under RACPS. 2.5. As per the provisions of the above scheme, which has been issued vide resolution dated 06.02.2013, a screening committee was constituted and on the basis of the recommendation of the committee, vide its resolution dated 23.10.2013, the opposite party no.3 fixed the pay of the employees of the Block Education Officer, Cuttack under RACP scheme. The petitioner had got/earned no promotions during his service career spanning from 1991 till 2013. So his pay was fixed at Rs.10,090/- with grade pay of Rs.4200/- as his 1st RACP, then at Rs, 10,460/- with grade pay of Rs.4200/- as his 2nd RACP and consequent thereof, he was allowed to draw the arrears. The petitioner while receiving the benefit of RACP scheme available to him, on the basis of the recommendation made by the screening committee, the opposite party no.3 passed an order on 05.08.2015 in withdrawing/canceling the benefit relying upon the clarification of Finance Department letter dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014. The petitioner while receiving the benefit of RACP scheme available to him, on the basis of the recommendation made by the screening committee, the opposite party no.3 passed an order on 05.08.2015 in withdrawing/canceling the benefit relying upon the clarification of Finance Department letter dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No. 4298 (C) of 2015 and on abolition of the said tribunal, the original application has been transferred to this Court and registered as above. 3. Mr. D.K. Panda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. G. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the order dated 05.08.2015 in Annexure-3 withdrawing the benefit under RACP Scheme, which was made available to the petitioner vide office order dated 28.10.2013 under Annexure-2, has been passed without assigning any reasons and, thereby, the same cannot sustain in the eye of law. While canceling the benefit admissible to the petitioner, the opposite party no.3 had taken into account the clarifications issued vide the Finance Department letter dated 20.01.2014 as well as School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014, which are executive instructions and the same cannot have retrospective application. He further contended that in absence of any reasons, with regard to withdrawal or cancellation of the benefit extended to the petitioner, which directly or indirectly affects the conditions of service of the employees, the order so passed in Annexure-3 cannot sustain in the eye of law. More so, the cancellation has been made without applying the principle of natural justice. It is further contended that the petitioner has neither played any role in the matter of fixation of pay under the RACPS nor can he made responsible for furnishing any incorrect information, which had led the concerned authority to commit the mistake by making the higher payment to the petitioner. In other words, the payment of higher dues to the petitioner was not on account of any misrepresentation by him nor on account of any fraud committed by him. If any mistake has been committed by the employer in extending the monetary benefit to the petitioner, for that the petitioner should not have been made to suffer. In other words, the payment of higher dues to the petitioner was not on account of any misrepresentation by him nor on account of any fraud committed by him. If any mistake has been committed by the employer in extending the monetary benefit to the petitioner, for that the petitioner should not have been made to suffer. It is further contended that the benefit so extended to the petitioner should not have been cancelled or withdrawn, as he was a 'Group-C' employee, and thus any recovery, if directed, cannot sustain in the eye of law. To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc., AIR 2015 SC 696 . 4. Per contra, Mr. B. Prusty, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department, by admitting the fact that the petitioner was continuing as Junior Clerk by joining the post on 02.04.1991, vehemently contended that his service condition is regulated by the Odisha Ministerial Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Clerks and Assistants in the District Offices and Offices of the Heads of Departments) Rules, 1963 (in short the 'Rules, 1963'). As per the Rule-9(a) of the Rules, 1963, which provides that promotion to the post of Senior Clerk shall be made from amongst the Junior Clerks, who have passed the Preliminary Accounts Examination as laid down in Rule-24. A Junior Clerk to be eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of Senior Clerk is to pass preliminary Accounts Examination and to the post of Head Clerk he/she has to pass Group B paper III and Paper IV conducted by the Board of Revenue, Odisha. As the petitioner had not passed the Group-A Paper-II and Group-B Paper-IV of Accounts Examination, he was not eligible for promotion. It is further contended that Paragraph-13 of the RACP scheme unequivocally stipulates that grant of benefit under the RACP scheme shall be subject to rules/guidelines governing normal promotion. As the petitioner had not passed all the four papers of departmental examination, was ineligible for promotion to the promotional post of Senior Clerk and Head Clerk, thus was also not eligible for the benefit under RACP scheme, as there was no stagnation in promotion. But he was allowed the benefit of RACP scheme inadvertently, vide order dated 28.10.2013 at Annexure-2. But he was allowed the benefit of RACP scheme inadvertently, vide order dated 28.10.2013 at Annexure-2. Consequently, the order under Annexure-3 has been passed withdrawing such benefits, so far as it relates to the petitioner, relying upon the clarification issued by the Government of Odisha, Finance Department letter dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014 explaining the interpretation made to paragraph-13 of the RACP Scheme. Thereby, the authority has not committed any illegality or irregularity so as to warrant interference by this Court. 5. This Court heard Mr. D.K. Panda, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. G. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner; and Mr. B. Prusty, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department through virtual mode; and perused the record. Pleadings having been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. For just and proper adjudication of the case in hand, it is apt to mention here that in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Odisha was pleased to make the rules regulating the method of recruitment and conditions of service of the persons appointed to the posts of clerks and assistants of the District Offices and Offices of the Heads of Departments, namely 'The Odisha Ministerial Service (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Clerks and Assistants in the District Offices and Offices of the Heads of Departments) Rules, 1963'. Rules 2(d), 9(a)(b) and 24, being relevant for the purpose of this case, are extracted below: ' 2. Definitions - xx xx xx (d) 'Departmental Examination' means the Preliminary and Final Accounts Examination held by the Board of Revenue under Rule 163-A of the Bihar and Orissa Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1928; xx xx xx 9. Rules 2(d), 9(a)(b) and 24, being relevant for the purpose of this case, are extracted below: ' 2. Definitions - xx xx xx (d) 'Departmental Examination' means the Preliminary and Final Accounts Examination held by the Board of Revenue under Rule 163-A of the Bihar and Orissa Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1928; xx xx xx 9. Promotion to higher posts in the cadre of district offices - Promotion to the higher posts in the cadre of ministerial service of the district offices shall be subject to the passing of the departmental examinations and such other tests, if any, as may be ordered by the Head of the District Office in that behalf and shall be based on merit and suitability in all respects with due regard to seniority and be made in the following manner, namely: (a) Promotion to the posts of Senior Clerk shall be made from amongst the junior clerks who have passed the Preliminary Accounts Examination as laid down in Rule 24 ; (b) promotion to the posts of Head Clerks shall be made from amongst the senior clerks who have passed the Final Accounts Examination as laid down in Rule 24 on the basis of selection made by the selection board constituted in accordance with Rule 10; xx xx xx 24. Departmental Examination - (1) The Junior Clerks of the District Offices and the Junior Assistants of the Offices of the Heads of Departments shall be required to pass the Preliminary Accounts Examination which is held by the Board of Revenue under Rule 163-A of the Bihar and Orissa Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1928. (2) The Senior Clerks of the District Offices and the Senior Assistants of the Offices of the Heads of Departments shall be required to pass the Final Accounts Examination which is held by the Board of Revenue under Rule 163-A of the Bihar and Orissa Board's Miscellaneous Rules, 1928. (3) No one shall be exempted from passing the departmental examinations.' 7. Admittedly, the petitioner was selected in the recruitment test and was sponsored to the office of the Circle Inspector of Schools, Cuttack-III Circle, Jajpur and vide letter dated 23rd March, 1991 he was appointed as a Junior Clerk, pursuant to which he joined on 02.04.1991. (3) No one shall be exempted from passing the departmental examinations.' 7. Admittedly, the petitioner was selected in the recruitment test and was sponsored to the office of the Circle Inspector of Schools, Cuttack-III Circle, Jajpur and vide letter dated 23rd March, 1991 he was appointed as a Junior Clerk, pursuant to which he joined on 02.04.1991. He availed the benefit of Orissa Revised Pay Scale Rules, 1998 and also Orissa Revised Pay Scale Rules, 2008, without any promotional benefits from 1991 till 2013 for more than 22 years. 8. Taking into consideration the Modified Assured Career Promotion Scheme, introduced by the Government of India for Central Civilian employees, the Government of Odisha revised the Assured Career Progression Scheme for the State Government employees. The relevant clauses-1, 6, 9 and 13 of such Scheme, which have been annexed to the Resolution dated 06.02.2013 under Annexure-1, read as follows: '1. There shall be three financial upgradations under the R.A.C.P.S., counted from the direct entry grade on completion of 10, 20 and 30 years of service in a single cadre in absence of promotion. An employee if completed 10 years of service in the entry grade will be considered for 1st upgradation under R.A.C.P.S. An employee completing 20 years of service and has got only one upgradation either by promotion or by R.A.C.P.S. will be considered for the 2nd upgradation. Similarly an employee completing 30 years of service and has got two upgradation either by R.A.C.P.S. or promotion or both will be considered for 3rd upgradation under R.A.C.P.S. xx xx xx 6. On grant of financial upgradation under the Scheme, there shall be no change in the designation, classification or status. However, financial and certain other benefits which are linked to the pay drawn by an employee such as H.B.A., allotment of Government accommodation may be permitted. xx xx xx 9. There shall be no further financial upgradation under R.A.C.P.S., if an employee has already availed three financial upgradations by way of R.A.C.P.S./Promotion. xx xx xx 13. If a financial upgradation under the R.A.C.P.S. is not allowed after 10 years in a Grade Pay and is deferred for the reason an employee being unfit or due to departmental proceedings, his case will be reviewed in subsequent years. In the matter of disciplinary/penal proceedings, grant of benefit under the R.A.C.P.S. shall be subject to rules/guidelines governing normal promotion. If a financial upgradation under the R.A.C.P.S. is not allowed after 10 years in a Grade Pay and is deferred for the reason an employee being unfit or due to departmental proceedings, his case will be reviewed in subsequent years. In the matter of disciplinary/penal proceedings, grant of benefit under the R.A.C.P.S. shall be subject to rules/guidelines governing normal promotion. Such cases shall, therefore, be regulated under the provisions of the O.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules, 1962 and instructions issued thereunder.' In pursuance of the resolution dated 06.02.2013 under Annexure-1 and recommendation of the screening committee vide resolution no.3 dated 23.10.2013, the benefits of 1st RACP and 2nd RACP RACP Scheme were extended to the petitioner, vide office order dated 28.10.2013 under Annexure-2, where the name of the petitioner finds place at serial no. 7, which is extracted hereunder: Sl . No. Name of the Incumbe nt and post held Scale of pay Date of 1st appoint ment against the post. Date of increment/option if any taken to avail RACP with dates Pay+ G Pay will be fixed after grant of 1st RACP with date Pay+ G Pay will be fixed after grant of 2nd RACP with date Pay+ G Pay will be fixed after grant of 3rd RACP with date Pay+ G Pay will be fixed as per option exercised with date Date of Increm ent in the Existing Pay Date of Increment in RACP Remarks xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx 7. Sanjay Pradhan, Jr. Clerk, O/o B.E.O., Cuttack 9300-34800 GP 4200 02.04.1 991 JC. 01.04.2 013 10090 GP 2400/- 01.04.20 13 10460/- GP 4200/- 01.04.13 10460/ - GP 4200/- 01.04.1 3 01.04. 2014 01.04.2 014 Pursuant to such office order dated 28.10.2013, the benefits have already been extended under RACP Scheme to the petitioner. Consequentially, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioner to enjoy the RACP Scheme of 2013. 9. By referring to counter affidavit and relying upon a clarification issued by the Government in Finance Department letter dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014 and interpreting the paragraph-13 of the RACP Scheme, referred to above, Mr. Consequentially, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioner to enjoy the RACP Scheme of 2013. 9. By referring to counter affidavit and relying upon a clarification issued by the Government in Finance Department letter dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014 and interpreting the paragraph-13 of the RACP Scheme, referred to above, Mr. B. Prusty, learned Standing Counsel for School and Mass Education Department contended that in the matter of disciplinary/penal proceeding, grant of benefit under RACPS shall be subject to rules/guidelines governing normal promotions and such cases shall therefore be regulated under the provisions of the OCS (CCA) Rules, 1962 and instructions issued thereunder. But in the letter issued by the Government of Odisha in Finance Department, vide Annexure-A/3 dated 20.01.2014, which was in the nature of clarification, under Clause-2 it is stated as follows: 'Sub: Clarification on Revised Assured Progression Scheme (RACPS) for the State Government employees. Sl. No. Points of Doubt Clarification (1) (2) (3) Xx Xx Xx 2. Whether an employee who has not passed Departmental Examination, shall be considered for availing benefit under RACP Scheme it being a criterion for promotion? If passing of Departmental Examination is a criterion for promotion in the cadre, it shall be considered while extending RACP Scheme. If one has not passed the Departmental Examination, he/shall not be eligible for benefit under RACP Scheme.' Whether an employee who has not passed Departmental Examination, shall be considered for availing benefit under RACP Scheme it being a criterion for promotion? If passing of Departmental Examination is a criterion for promotion in the cadre, it shall be considered while extending RACP Scheme. If one has not passed the Departmental Examination, he/shall not be eligible for benefit under RACP Scheme.' 10. Admittedly, the Government of Odisha, Finance Department clarification dated 20.01.2014 and the letter of the School & Mass Education Department dated 01.05.2014, were issued after the benefits had been extended to the petitioner on 28.10.2013 in Annexure-2 on the basis of the resolution dated 06.02.2013 passed by the Government of Odisha in Finance Department in Annexure-1. Admittedly, the Government of Odisha, Finance Department clarification dated 20.01.2014 and the letter of the School & Mass Education Department dated 01.05.2014, were issued after the benefits had been extended to the petitioner on 28.10.2013 in Annexure-2 on the basis of the resolution dated 06.02.2013 passed by the Government of Odisha in Finance Department in Annexure-1. There is no dispute that such letters issued by the Finance Department of the Government of Odisha as well as the School & Mass Education Department of the Government of Odisha dated 20.01.2014 and 01.05.2014 are all executive instructions in the nature of a clarification to the Revised Assured Career Progression Scheme (RACPS) issued by the Government in Annexure-1 dated 06.02.2013 and the same, being executive instructions, cannot apply retrospectively and have any prospective effect. Therefore, the question of application of such clarifications to the present case for withdrawing the benefits, giving retrospective effect which were granted to the petitioner vide office order dated 28.10.2013 in Annexure-2, does not arise. 11. The contention raised, that the petitioner had not passed the preliminary accounts examination as laid down in Rule-24 of the Rules, 1963, is belied by the contention raised in the rejoinder affidavit that the petitioner joined as Junior Clerk on 02.04.1991 and next promotional post from Junior Clerk is Senior Clerk. As per Rule-9(a) of the Rules, 1963, promotion to the post of Senior Clerk shall be made from amongst the Junior Clerks, who have rendered at least four years of service and passed the preliminary accounts examination as laid down in Rule-24. The Preliminary Accounts Examination Group-A consisted of two papers, i.e., Paper-I and Paper-II. The petitioner had passed Group-A Paper-I examination held on 26.12.1995, as per notification issued on 16.08.1996 by the Board of Revenue, Odisha, and Group-A Paper-II examination held on 26.12.1996, as per notification issued on 30.09.1997 by the Board of Revenue, Odisha, which have been annexed as Annexures-4 and 5 respectively to the rejoinder affidavit. Thereby, the petitioner had qualified to get promotion to the post of Senior Clerk by passing the preliminary accounts examination conducted by the Board of Revenue, Odisha. If clause-13 of the resolution dated 06.02.2013 at Annexure-1 is closely scrutinized, it would be seen that the said clause relates to the employees who faced departmental proceeding. Thereby, the petitioner had qualified to get promotion to the post of Senior Clerk by passing the preliminary accounts examination conducted by the Board of Revenue, Odisha. If clause-13 of the resolution dated 06.02.2013 at Annexure-1 is closely scrutinized, it would be seen that the said clause relates to the employees who faced departmental proceeding. The language used in clause-13 makes it clear that financial up-gradation under the RACPS is not allowed after 10 years in a Grade Pay and is deferred for the reason an employee being unfit or due to departmental proceedings, his case will be reviewed in subsequent years. It has also been stated that in the matter of disciplinary/penal proceedings, grant of benefit under the RACPS shall be subject to rules/guidelines governing normal promotion. This portion of clause-13 has been misinterpreted and accordingly the benefit extended to the petitioner has been withdrawn vide letter dated 05.08.2015 in Annexure-3, relying upon the clarification issued by the Finance Department of the Government of Odisha vide Annexure-A/3 dated 20.01.2014. Under Clause- 2 of the said clarification dated 20.01.2014, which has been quoted above, it has been clarified that if passing of departmental examination is a criterion for promotion in the cadre, it shall be considered while extending RACP Scheme. If one has not passed the departmental examination, he/she shall not be eligible for benefit under RACP Scheme. As such, such notification is not applicable, as it is an executive instruction, which can apply prospectively and not retrospectively. Consequentially, the office order dated 05.08.2015 at Annexure-3, which has been passed withdrawing or cancelling the benefit extended to the some of the employees in Annexure-2, so far as it relates to the petitioner, cannot sustain in the eye of law. 12. The right to get the benefit of RACPS flows from the resolution of the Finance Department of the Government of Odisha dated 06.02.2013 in Annexure-1 under the RACP Scheme. Thereby, a 'vested right' or 'accrued right' has already been created in favour of the petitioner by extending the benefit on 28.10.2013 in Annexure-2 in consonance with the resolution dated 06.02.2013 in Annexure-1. 13. In Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, AIR 1997 SC 3828 the amendment brought into Rule - 2544 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. II (Fifth Reprint), which was given retrospective effect, was under consideration of the Constitution Bench of the apex Court. 13. In Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, AIR 1997 SC 3828 the amendment brought into Rule - 2544 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. II (Fifth Reprint), which was given retrospective effect, was under consideration of the Constitution Bench of the apex Court. The said Rule was amended by Notification No. G.S.R. 1143 (E) with effect from 1st January, 1973 and by Notification No. G.S.R. 1144 (E), the amendment was made with effect from 1st April, 1979. The Supreme Court in paragraph - 24 of the said judgment held as follows:- '24. In many of these decisions the expressions "vested rights" or "accrued rights" have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc. of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in Roshan Lal Tandon (: AIR 1967 SC 1889 ) (supra); B.S. Yadav (: AIR 1981 SC 561 ) (supra) and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni (: AIR 1984 SC 161 ) (supra).' The aforesaid Constitution Bench decision, therefore, has emphasized with regard to the right of an employee, which has accrued in his favour on the date he retired, and such right cannot be taken away by amending the rules retrospectively prior to his retirement. 14. Similarly, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 , the amendment brought to Madhya Pradesh Employees State Insurance Service (Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1981, by notification dated 20.05.2003, giving it retrospective effect from 14.10.1982, was under consideration of the Supreme Court. 14. Similarly, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 , the amendment brought to Madhya Pradesh Employees State Insurance Service (Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1981, by notification dated 20.05.2003, giving it retrospective effect from 14.10.1982, was under consideration of the Supreme Court. By the said amendment, the earlier provision in the Rule prescribing payment of None Practising Allowance @ 25% of pay was amended to the effect that "NPA at such rates as may be fixed by the State Government from time to time by the orders issued in this behalf" in place of words 'NPA @ 25% of the pay" wherever they occurred in the Rules. 15. On considering the said question, the Supreme Court, in paragraph - 15 of the said judgment in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) held as follows:- '15. It is no doubt true that Rules made under Article 309 can be made so as to operate with retrospective effect. But it is well settled that rights and benefits which have already been earned or acquired under the existing Rules cannot be taken away by amending the Rules with retrospective effect. (See N.C. Singhal v. Armed Forces Medical Services; K.C. Arora v. State of Haryana and T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana). Therefore, it has to be held that while the amendment, even if it is to be considered as otherwise valid, cannot affect the rights and benefits which had accrued to the employees under the unamended rules. The right to NPA @ 25% of the pay having accrued to the respondents under the unamended Rules, it follows that respondent employees will be entitled to the non-practising allowance @ 25% of their pay up to 20-5-2003.' 16. In a large number of cases, the apex Court has categorically laid down that the right of an employee, which accrued in his favour on the date of appointment, cannot be taken away by the amending provisions of the Rules concerning the service with retrospective effect. An employee, while entering into service, is subjected to the condition of service as on the date, when he joins. An employee, while entering into service, is subjected to the condition of service as on the date, when he joins. Any right given to such employee under the provision of any Act or Rules governing the employment, if taken away by amending such Rules with retrospective effect, the same would be violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and it would amount to an arbitrary and unreasonable action. 17. Applying the said principles to the present context, since the benefit of RACP has already been accrued in favour of the petitioner, pursuant to letter dated 28.10.2013 vide Annexure-2, the 'accrued' and 'vested' right should not have been taken away by issuing letter dated 05.08.2015 under Annexure-3, by applying the Government of Odisha, Finance Department clarification dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014 retrospectively. That itself violates Articles- 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, which amounts to arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power by the authority. 18. On perusal of Annexure-3 dated 05.08.2015 it is seen that while canceling/withdrawing the benefit admissible to the petitioner, there was non-compliance of principles of natural justice. Because the right already 'accrued' and 'vested' with the petitioner cannot be taken away without following due procedure of law and, more particularly, the principle of natural justice, and nothing has been placed on record by way of filing counter affidavit by the opposite parties that they have given opportunity of hearing to the petitioner while withdrawing the benefit from him. Thereby, the entire action taken in Annexure-3 cannot sustain in the eye of law, as the same is violative of principle of natural justice. 19. The soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action' In HK (An Infant) in re, 1967 1 All ER 226 (DC), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secy of State for Environment, 1976 2 All ER 865 (HL), Lord Russel of Killowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' In R. v. Secy. Of State for Home Affairs, ex p. Hosenball, Geoffrey Lane, LJ, 1977 3 All ER 452 (DC & CA), preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness' in defining natural justice. Of State for Home Affairs, ex p. Hosenball, Geoffrey Lane, LJ, 1977 3 All ER 452 (DC & CA), preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness' in defining natural justice. Natural justice, another name of which is common sense justice, is the name of those principles which constitute the minimum requirement of justice and without adherence to which justice would be a travesty. Natural justice accordingly stands for that 'fundamental quality of fairness which being adopted, justice not only be done but also appears to be done'. 20. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 , the meaning of natural justice came up for consideration and the apex Court held as follows:- 'The phase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of cast-iron formula. Historically, 'natural justice' has been used in a way, 'which implies the existence of moral principles of self evident and unarguable truth', 'natural justice' by Paul Jackson, 2nd Ed, page-1, In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to 'equity and good conscience'. Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between 'natural justice' and 'natural law'. 'Natural justice' was considered as 'that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice'. 21. In Bhagwan v. Ramchand, AIR 1965 SC 1767 , the apex Court held that the rule of law demands that the power to determine questions affecting rights of citizens would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice. 22. In Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, AIR 1990 SC 307 , the appellant was appointed to the post of Tax Inspector. His appointment was cancelled by the authorities on the representation made by a departmental candidate who contended that a Tax Inspector's post should have been exclusively filled by promotion. The authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the extant Government orders provided for filling up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion and therefore the appellant's appointment was illegal. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation of the Government order made by the High Court. The authority as well as the High Court proceeded on the assumption that the extant Government orders provided for filling up the post of Tax Inspector exclusively by promotion and therefore the appellant's appointment was illegal. The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation of the Government order made by the High Court. But, the Court proceeded to observe that since the order of appointment had conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording an opportunity of hearing to him. The Court observed as follows: 'It is an elementary principle of natural justice that no person should be condemned without hearing. The order of appointment conferred a vested right in the appellant to hold the post of Tax Inspector, that right could not be taken away without affording opportunity of hearing to him. Any order passed in violation of principles of natural justice is rendered void. There is no dispute that the Commissioner's Order had been passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant therefore the order was illegal and void.' In view of law laid down by the apex Court it cannot, however, be doubted that cancellation of appointment has adverse civil consequences and therefore before making the order of cancellation the employee concerned must be given an opportunity of making a representation and the elementary of principles of natural justice has to be complied with. 23. In Rajendra v. State of Maharastra, (2008) 11 SCC 90 , the apex Court held that even if the appointment is by mistake, the abrupt withdrawal of the same after the employee has worked for 17months amounts to violation of natural justice. Similar view has also been taken in Purna Chandra Hota and others v. Sambalpur University and others, 2019 (1) OLR 5 . 24. In view of such position, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, while passing the order dated 05.08.2015 in Annexure-3, which violates the principles of natural justice, and more so the order so passed is without any reasons. 25. In Siemens Engg. Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 the apex Court held that the rule requiring reasons to be recorded by quasi-judicial authorities in support of the orders passed by them is a basic principle of natural justice. 25. In Siemens Engg. Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 the apex Court held that the rule requiring reasons to be recorded by quasi-judicial authorities in support of the orders passed by them is a basic principle of natural justice. Hon'ble Justice Bhagwati (as he then was), speaking for the Court, observed as follows: 'If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.' The same view has been reiterated in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . 26. In CIT v. Walchand & Co. (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1435 the apex Court observed: 'The practice of recording a decision without reasons in support cannot but be deprecated.' 27. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 the apex Court observed: 'Except in cases where the requirement of recording reasons has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions must record reasons in support of their decisions. The considerations for recording reasons are :1) such decisions are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 as well as supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227; 2) it guarantees consideration by the adjudicating authority; 3) it introduces clarity in the decisions; and 4) it minimizes chances of arbitrariness and ensures fairness in the decision-making process.' 28. Reasons being a necessary concomitant to passing an order, the appellate authority can thus discharge its duty in a meaningful manner either by furnishing the same expressly or by necessary reference to those given by the original authority. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 it has been held: 'Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion and decision reached. Recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record. It is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice.' The decisions, referred to above, have been followed in Sanjay Kumar Rout v. State of Orissa, AIR 2018 ORISSA 162, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, where Dr. Justice B.R. Sarangi is a member and in Kalipada Acharya v. Union of India and Ors. 2019 (I) ILR -CUT-103. 29. Applying the above judgments to the present context, this Court is of the firm view that the order dated 05.08.2015 passed under Annexure-3 is without assigning any reasons and thus the same also cannot sustain in the eye of law. 30. On perusal of Annexure-3 dated 05.08.2015, it appears that while canceling the benefit, which was granted to the petitioner vide office order dated 28.10.2013 under Annexure-2, a direction was given that the excess amount drawn has to be calculated and recovered from the salary of concerned employees, where the name of the petitioner finds place at serial no.10. 31. In Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521 , wherein the apex Court observed as under: '11. 31. In Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521 , wherein the apex Court observed as under: '11. Although we have held that the petitioners were entitled only to the pay scale of Rs 330-480 in terms of the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission w.e.f. 1-1-1973 and only after the period of 10 years, they became entitled to the pay scale of Rs 330- 560 but as they have received the scale of Rs 330- 560 since 1973 due to no fault of theirs and that scale is being reduced in the year 1984 with effect from 1-1- 1973, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them. Accordingly, we direct that no steps should be taken to recover or to adjust any excess amount paid to the petitioners due to the fault of the respondents, the petitioners being in no way responsible for the same.' 32. In Sahib Ram v. Union of India [Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 18 : 1995 AIR SCW 1780, wherein it was concluded as under: '4. Mr. Prem Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the previous scale of Rs. 220-550 to which the appellant was entitled became Rs. 700-1600 since the appellant had been granted that scale of pay in relaxation of the educational qualification. The High Court was, therefore, not right in dismissing the writ petition. We do not find any force in this contention. It is seen that the Government in consultation with the University Grants Commission had revised the pay scale of a Librarian working in the colleges to Rs 700-1600 but they insisted upon the minimum educational qualification of first or second class MA, MSc, MCom plus a first or second class BLib Science or a Diploma in Library Science. The relaxation given was only as regards obtaining first or second class in the prescribed educational qualification but not relaxation in the educational qualification itself. 5. Admittedly the appellant does not possess the required educational qualifications. Under the circumstances the appellant would not be entitled to the relaxation. The Principal erred in granting him the relaxation. Since the date of relaxation the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. 5. Admittedly the appellant does not possess the required educational qualifications. Under the circumstances the appellant would not be entitled to the relaxation. The Principal erred in granting him the relaxation. Since the date of relaxation the appellant had been paid his salary on the revised scale. However, it is not on account of any misrepresentation made by the appellant that the benefit of the higher pay scale was given to him but by wrong construction made by the Principal for which the appellant cannot be held to be at fault. Under the circumstances the amount paid till date may not be recovered from the appellant. The principle of equal pay for equal work would not apply to the scales prescribed by the University Grants Commission. The appeal is allowed partly without any order as to costs.' 33. In B.J. Akkara v. Govt. of India [B.J.Akkara v. Govt. of India, (2006) 11 SCC 709 : (2006 AIR SCW 5252, the apex Court observed as under: '28. Such relief, restraining back recovery of excess payment, is granted by courts not because of any right in the employees, but in equity, in exercise of judicial discretion to relieve the employees from the hardship that will be caused if recovery is implemented. A government servant, particularly one in the lower rungs of service would spend whatever emoluments he receives for the upkeep of his family. If he receives an excess payment for a long period, he would spend it, genuinely believing that he is entitled to it. As any subsequent action to recover the excess payment will cause undue hardship to him, relief is granted in that behalf. But where the employee had knowledge that the payment received was in excess of what was due or wrongly paid, or where the error is detected or corrected within a short time of wrong payment, courts will not grant relief against recovery. The matter being in the realm of judicial discretion, courts may on the facts and circumstances of any particular case refuse to grant such relief against recovery.' 34. In Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar [Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 475 : (2009 AIR SCW 1871, wherein the apex Court recorded the following observation in para 58: '58. In Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar [Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 475 : (2009 AIR SCW 1871, wherein the apex Court recorded the following observation in para 58: '58. The relief against recovery is granted by courts not because of any right in the employees, but in equity, exercising judicial discretion to relieve the employees from the hardship that will be caused if recovery is ordered. But, if in a given case, it is proved that the employee had knowledge that the payment received was in excess of what was due or wrongly paid, or in cases where the error is detected or corrected within a short time of wrong payment, the matter being in the realm of judicial discretion, courts may, on the facts and circumstances of any particular case, order for recovery of the amount paid in excess. See Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana [Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 18 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 248], Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India [Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 683 : (1994) 27 ATC 121], Union of India v. M. Bhaskar [ (1996) 4 SCC 416 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 967], V. Gangaram v. Director [ (1997) 6 SCC 139 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1652], B.J. Akkara v. Govt. of India [B.J. Akkara v. Govt. of India, (2006) 11 SCC 709 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 529], Purshottam Lal Das v. State of Bihar [ (2006) 11 SCC 492 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 508], Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh [ (2006) 8 SCC 647 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 16] and Bihar SEB v. Bijay Bhadur [ (2000) 10 SCC 99 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 394].' 35. First and foremost, it is pertinent to note, that the apex Court in its judgment in Syed Abdul Qadir's case (supra) recognized, that the issue of recovery revolved on the action being iniquitous. Dealing with the subject of the action being iniquitous, it was sought to be concluded, that when the excess unauthorised payment is detected within a short period of time, it would be open for the employer to recover the same. Conversely, if the payment had been made for a long duration of time, it would be iniquitous to make any recovery. Conversely, if the payment had been made for a long duration of time, it would be iniquitous to make any recovery. Interference because an action is iniquitous, must really be perceived as, interference because the action is arbitrary. All arbitrary actions are truly, actions in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The logic of the action in the instant situation, is iniquitous, or arbitrary, or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, because it would be almost impossible for an employee to bear the financial burden, of a refund of payment received wrongfully for a long span of time. It is apparent, that a government employee is primarily dependent on his wages, and if a deduction is to be made from his/her wages, it should not be a deduction which would make it difficult for the employee to provide for the needs of his family. Besides food, clothing and shelter, an employee has to cater, not only to the education needs of those dependent upon him, but also their medical requirements, and a variety of sundry expenses. Based on the above consideration, we are of the view, that if the mistake of making a wrongful payment is detected within five years, it would be open to the employer to recover the same. However, if the payment is made for a period in excess of five years, even though it would be open to the employer to correct the mistake, it would be extremely iniquitous and arbitrary to seek a refund of the payments mistakenly made to the employee. 36. The cumulative effect of judgments clearly indicates that in all situations of hardship, which would govern the employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement, then there shall be no recovery by the authority. 37. The above mentioned judgments have been considered by the apex Court in Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc. (supra). In paragraph-12, the apex Court summarized the few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible. Paragraph-12 of the said judgment reads as follows: '12. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. (supra). In paragraph-12, the apex Court summarized the few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible. Paragraph-12 of the said judgment reads as follows: '12. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law: (i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service). (ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.' 38. Considering the factual matrix of the case at hand and propositions of law, as discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the entire action has been taken by the authority in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and without assigning any reasons and, as such, recovery is impermissible because of the mistaken action taken by the said authority, particularly when the Government of Odishas, Finance Department clarification letter dated 20.01.2014 and School and Mass Education Department letter dated 01.05.2014 cannot have any retrospective effect. Consequentially, the benefits extended to the petitioner, pursuant to letter dated 28.10.2013 under Annexure-2, shall continue. Accordingly, the order dated 05.08.2015 under Annexure-3, so far it relates to the petitioner, is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. 39. The writ petition is thus allowed. No order to costs. Consequentially, the benefits extended to the petitioner, pursuant to letter dated 28.10.2013 under Annexure-2, shall continue. Accordingly, the order dated 05.08.2015 under Annexure-3, so far it relates to the petitioner, is liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. 39. The writ petition is thus allowed. No order to costs. As the restrictions due to resurgence of COVID-19 situation are continuing, learned counsel for the parties may utilize a printout of the judgment available in the High Court's website, at par with certified copy, subject to attestation by the concerned advocate, in the manner prescribed vide Court's Notice No.4587, dated 25th March, 2020 as modified by Court's Notice No. 4798 dated 15th April, 2021.