ORDER : Petitioners are arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 in C.C.No.53018/2016 arising out of Cr.No.240/2011 of Hennur P.S. for the offences punishable under Sections 418, 419, 420, 465, 468, 467, 474 and 120B read with Section 34 of the IPC, 1860. This petition is filed seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them in C.C.No.53018/2016 pending before the Court of the XI ACMM, Bangalore. 2. Factual matrix of the prosecution case is as under: The petitioners said to be arraigned as Accused Nos. 1, 10 and 11 are the employees of M/s. India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd., Malleswaram, Bangalore, (for short ‘IBHFL’). The aforesaid IBHFL is a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at F-16, Malhothra Building, Connaught Place, New Delhi having branches all over India and this case pertains to Bangalore Branch. The said IBHFL has been recognized by the Government of India as financial institution under Section 2(1)(m)(iv) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’, for short) by virtue of notification issued in No.F No.1/1/2006-BO-I dated 19.09.2007 of the Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. It further reveals from the charge-sheeted material that IBHFL has been lending finance and loan for housing purposes including mortgage loan for buying houses. Accordingly, Accused No.3/Narasimha and his wife Smt. Gayathri had applied for mortgage loan on 24.05.2010 by approaching M/s. IBHFL for the purpose of purchase of house property of Smt. Minnie Varghese bearing Nos.41, 42, 43 and 44, Khata No.248, Vaddarapalya village, Horamavu - Agara, K.R. Puram, Bangalore, to an extent of Rs.1-00 crore by way of deposit of title deeds. A copy of the application for loan and its enclosures and legal opinion are produced vide Annexures “F” and “G”. As per the procedure maintained while granting loan, all the documents connected with this proposed house property to be purchased were enclosed and the same were processed by different officers of IBHFL and the same was sent for securing legal opinion with M/s. D and M Law Associates. As per the procedure maintained while granting loan, all the documents connected with this proposed house property to be purchased were enclosed and the same were processed by different officers of IBHFL and the same was sent for securing legal opinion with M/s. D and M Law Associates. In pursuance of the act of the accused and on filing of a complaint by Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese, Cr.No.240/2011 was registered by the Hennur P.S. by recording an FIR and proceeded with the case for investigation and submitting charge-sheet against Accused No.1, Accused No.10 and Accused No.11 in C.C.No.53018/2016 who are the petitioners before this court. 3. Heard the learned Senior counsel Shri Hashmath Pasha for the petitioners and the learned HCGP for Respondent No.1. Respondent No.2 is represented by Shri Gireesha N who is on record. But however, Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese is arraigned as the complainant in C.C.No.53018/2016. Therefore, as per Section 301 of the Cr.P.C., the role of the counsel for Respondent No.2 is only to a limited extent who could not independently address the arguments but only to assist the learned HCGP for Respondent No.1 who is on record and represents the State. Therefore, the arguments on the part of Respondent No.1 by HCGP for the State has been heard, which shall also take care of the arguments of Respondent No.2, keeping in view Section 301 of the Cr.P.C. 4. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner Shri Hashmath Pasha has taken me through the entire chargesheet consisting of the statement of witnesses and so also the material documents secured by the I.O. during the course of investigation in order to lay the charge-sheet against the accused persons inclusive of Accused No.1, Accused No.10 and Accused No.11 who are the petitioners before this court and they are the employees of M/s. IBHFL Company which is established under the Companies Act, 1956. On the perusal of the entire charge-sheet materials at a cursory glance, it reveals that there is no specific allegation against these Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 relating to the role made by the said accused for impersonation or mis-representation of Respondent No.2 Minnie Varghese who is an instrument of the complaint in Cr.No.240/2011 registered by the Hennur P.S. The opinion has been formed by the Investigating Agency in order to lay the charge-sheet against these petitioners being arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. Even the Investigating Agency insofar as the role of Accused No.1, has not properly verified the documents before sanctioning the loan. But except the bare allegations made against these accused and in respect of Accused Nos.10 and 11, absolutely there is no specific allegation made against them in the charge-sheet laid by the I.O. Under such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Judicial Magistrate having power to proceed with the case further even on perusal of the charge-sheet materials. However, the Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance and issued process against the accused and even the concept of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. is without application of mind even though there is no specific allegation made against the accused in order to commit the offences. But cognizance has been taken looking into the materials secured by the I.O. during the course of investigation to lay the charge-sheet. But issuing process against the accused persons is an abuse of process of law. On this premise, the learned Senior counsel contends that it requires intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to avoid abuse of process of law and also miscarriage of justice against the petitioners being the gravamen of the charges leveled against them. 5. The primary ground urged by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners is that it is a settled position of law that taking cognizance and issuing process against the petitioners arraigned as accused, is a serious matter since they are required to face criminal charge before the court of law. But in fact in the circumstances of the case, it is made clear from the charge-sheet materials that these petitioners though arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11, they have not played any vital role as to the offences alleged against them but they are employees of M/s. IBHFL and have processed the loan application and thereafter it was accepted and loan was granted in favour of Accused No.3, namely Narasimha Reddy. But there is no act of any criminality being played by these accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 at any stage relating to sanction of loan. Accused No.3 and his wife with the assistance of Respondent No.2/Minnie Varghese in providing original title deeds of the house property, have developed financial obligation with M/s. IBHFL. But there is no act of any criminality being played by these accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 at any stage relating to sanction of loan. Accused No.3 and his wife with the assistance of Respondent No.2/Minnie Varghese in providing original title deeds of the house property, have developed financial obligation with M/s. IBHFL. This fact came to light only when they began making default in payment of monthly installment and also having failed to adhere with certain conditions. On verification of the house premises, instead of the real owner Minnie Varghese, another lady has misrepresented her saying that she was Minnie Varghese who is arraigned as Accused No.4 and had impersonated the original Respondent No.2 in order to secure the loan from the IBHFL Company and while executing the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar at 19.07.2010. But it is made clear that even at a cursory glance of the chargesheet materials, Accused Nos.2 to 5 have played a specific role in order to defraud M/s. IBHFL in misrepresenting the facts and fraudulently obtaining loan and thereafter became defaulters, resulting in huge financial loss to IBHFL. 6. The second limb of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Respondent No.2 who is an instrument of the complaint and based upon her complaint, the case in Cr.No.240/2011 registered by the Hennur P.S. But she has been impersonated by another lady. By way of misrepresentation, her house property has been sold in favour of accused no.3/Narasimha Reddy by executing a sale deed dated 19.07.2010. The lady who had impersonated the second respondent Smt. Minnie Varghese is the one who had played a pivotal role before the IBHFL for sanction of loan. In the facts and circumstances of the case, that M/s. IBHFL stands on the similar footing as that of the complainant/respondent No.2 namely Smt. Minnie Varghese. But these petitioners being employees of M/s. IBHFL they do not have any specific role in commission of the alleged offences in respect of the charge-sheet laid by the I.O. relating to the case in Cr.No.210/2011 registered by the Hennur P.S. The accused No.1, Accused No.10 and Accused No.11 they are the petitioners before this court in this petition. They are the officials of M/s. IBHFL who were discharging their duty as per the procedure prescribed for sanctioning the loan to the best of their ability. They are the officials of M/s. IBHFL who were discharging their duty as per the procedure prescribed for sanctioning the loan to the best of their ability. It is their responsibility to look into the material documents produced by the concerned person who intended to secure a loan. In spite of which Accused No.3, Accused No.4 and Accused No.5 cited in the charge-sheet laid by the I.O. against the accused had played the vital role of fraud on M/s. IBHFL Company by impersonating Respondent No.2 Smt. Minnie Varghese. The same is clear from the chargesheet materials secured by the I.O. during the course of investigation. The person who is alleged to have misled by another person will not become the offender. The bonafide role of employees of M/s. IBHFL has been complained by lodging an FIR against Narasimha Reddy and his wife and so also Respondent No.2 Smt. Minnie Varghese who is an instrument of the complaint in Cr.No.240/2011, who have been arraigned as accused in Koramangala P.S. After conducting investigation, the Investigating Agency have laid the charge-sheet against Accused No.3 and his wife and others and these petitioners arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 have been cited as CW-4, CW-5 and CW- 6 in C.C.No.13055/2013 arraigned in Cr.No.17/2011 registered by the Koramangala P.S. Accused No.1 Narasimha Reddy, Accused No.2/Smt. Gayathri, W/o. Narasimha Reddy, Accused No.3/Smt. Minni Varghese, Accused No.4/Sudhakar, Accused No.5/Padmanabha and Accused No.6/Latheesh, have been arraigned as accused in C.C.No.13055/2013 vide Annexure-“E”. But in the charge-sheeted column, Accused No.3 Minnie Varghese, W/o. Mohan Varghese and Accused No.4/Sudhakar and these Accused Nos.3 and 4 have been absconding and warrant has been issued against them. The same indicates in the specific column of the chargesheet laid by the Investigating Officer in Cr.No.17/2011 registered by the Koramangala P.S. 7. It is relevant to refer that CW-1/M.B. Chengappa is the complainant in Cr.No.17/2011 and being an employee of India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd. at Bangalore. CW-4/Azar Ali S/o. Abdul Ahab who is arraigned as Accused No.10 and Shri Harsha S/o. Krishnappa is arraigned as Accused No.11 and CW-6/Sri Pradeen Pradhan is arraigned as Accused No.1 in the present charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Agency of Hennur P.S. in Cr.No.240/2011. CW-4/Azar Ali S/o. Abdul Ahab who is arraigned as Accused No.10 and Shri Harsha S/o. Krishnappa is arraigned as Accused No.11 and CW-6/Sri Pradeen Pradhan is arraigned as Accused No.1 in the present charge-sheet laid by the Investigating Agency of Hennur P.S. in Cr.No.240/2011. However, Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese arraigned as Accused No.3 in C.C.No.13055/2013 arising in Cr.No.17/2011 registered by the Koramangala P.S. for offences punishable under Sections 406, 468, 471, 420, 120B read with Section 34 of the IPC. But the said Smt. Minnie Varghese has approached the Hennur P.S. to overcome the charge-sheet laid against her and also other accused in Cr.No.17/2011 registered by the Koramangala P.S. It is nothing but counterblast of a case against her in Cr.No.240/2011 registered by the Hennur P.S. in respect of which charge-sheet has been laid against Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 who are arraigned as petitioners before this court and who are employees of IBHFL. Even at a cursory glance of the charge-sheet laid by the I.O. against the accused, who are complainants and witnesses, they cannot be characterized as offenders on the same allegation and on the same facts. The bonafide role of employees of M/s. IBHFL has been complained of before the Koramangala P.S. by registering a case in Cr.No.17/2011. Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese is arraigned as Accused No.3 in the case in Cr.No.17/2011. In the charge-sheeted case of Koramangala P.S., the present petitioners have been cited as Witness Nos.4, 5 and 6 vide Annexure-“D” of the charge-sheet, which is produced for the purpose of perusal. In view of the same, they cannot be categorized as ‘offenders’ and the main witnesses in the chargesheeted case of Koramangala P.S. relates to the year 2011. 8. But accused No.3/G. Narasimha Reddy who availed equitable mortgage loan from M/s. IBHFL became a defaulter. The officials of M/s. IBHFL initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act of 2002 before the Court of the VIII ACMM, Bangalore and obtained an order dated 09.08.2011 to take physical possession of the property with the assistance of Respondent No.1 police. Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese had approached the DRT challenging the orders and measures passed by the Court of the VIII ACMM, Bangalore, in I.R. No.1810/2011 dated 29.07.2011. But the second respondent Minnie Varghese has not been successful to demonstrate her bona fides. Thereby the DRT upheld the measures initiated by the petitioner/company, that is M/s. IBHFL. Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese had approached the DRT challenging the orders and measures passed by the Court of the VIII ACMM, Bangalore, in I.R. No.1810/2011 dated 29.07.2011. But the second respondent Minnie Varghese has not been successful to demonstrate her bona fides. Thereby the DRT upheld the measures initiated by the petitioner/company, that is M/s. IBHFL. It is the specific observation that Respondent No.2/Smt. Minnie Varghese had not approached the Tribunal with clean hands. Therefore, the said fraud has been clearly traced by the Koramangala Police in Cr.No.17/2011 which has been culminated in filing of the charge-sheet in C.C.No.13055/2013 on the file of the IV ACMM, Bangalore, and later steps taken under the SARFAESI Act by M/s. IBHFL demonstrates that no offence has been committed by any of its officials, much less the present petitioners. But in order to overcome the charge-sheet laid against Smt. Minnie Varghese, she had approached the Hennur P.S. and made to register the case in Cr.No.240/2011. But the case in Cr.No.17/2011 has culminated with the filing of a charge-sheet in C.C.No.13055/2013 which is pending before the Court of the IV ACMM, Bangalore. The proceeding has been initiated by the IBHFL under the relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 relating to recovery of the loan amount which has been availed by accused Narasimha Reddy. Even pointed out the materials secured by the I.O. during the course of investigation in Cr.No.240/2011 registered by the Hennur P.S. as per the loan processing records of Accused No.3/Narasimha Reddy in M/s. IBHFL. The loan was ultimately sanctioned by one Sunil Gupta and not by the first petitioner. Therefore, the first petitioner/accused no.1 has no role to play regarding sanction of loan. He cannot be called upon to face any criminal charges leveled against him merely because of laying charge-sheet against the accused. Similarly, petitioners 2 and 3 arraigned as Accused Nos.10 and 11 have not played any vital role in the alleged transaction relating to sanction of loan. Therefore, it is made clear that the first respondent/police, that is Hennur P.S., without properly collecting the material and also collecting the material facts, have elaborately laid the charge-sheet against the accused on this ground alone, which requires for intervention as contemplated under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. Therefore, it is made clear that the first respondent/police, that is Hennur P.S., without properly collecting the material and also collecting the material facts, have elaborately laid the charge-sheet against the accused on this ground alone, which requires for intervention as contemplated under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. If not, the gravamen of the charges would be the sufferer and it would result in a miscarriage of justice. On all these premise, the learned Senior counsel Shri Hashmath Pasha for the petitioners seeks for intervention as contemplated under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings initiated in C.C.No.53018/2016 on the file of the XI ACMM, Bangalore, and to secure the ends of justice. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the following citations: (i) ANIL MAHAJAN vs. BHOR INDUSTRIES LTD. AND ANOTHER ( (2005) 10 SCC 228 ): “9. In Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan [ (2001) 3 SCC 513 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 565] this Court was considering a case where the complainant had alleged that the accused was not regular in making payment and committed default in payment of instalments and the bank had dishonoured certain cheques issued by him. Further allegation of the complainant was that on physical verification certain chairs were found missing from the premises of the accused and thus it was alleged that the accused committed cheating and caused misappropriation of the property belonging to the complainant. Noticing the decision in the case of Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] wherein it was held that the Magistrate while issuing process should satisfy himself as to whether the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused, and the circumstances under which the process issued by the Magistrate could be quashed, the contours of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC were laid down and it was held: (SCC p. 520, paras 10-11) “10. The facts in the present case have to be appreciated in the light of the various decisions of this Court. When somebody suffers injury to his person, property or reputation, he may have remedies both under civil and criminal law. The facts in the present case have to be appreciated in the light of the various decisions of this Court. When somebody suffers injury to his person, property or reputation, he may have remedies both under civil and criminal law. The injury alleged may form the basis of civil claim and may also constitute the ingredients of some crime punishable under criminal law. When there is dispute between the parties arising out of a transaction involving passing of valuable properties between them, the aggrieved person may have a right to sue for damages or compensation and at the same time, law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating. Here the main offence alleged by the appellant is that the respondents committed the offence under Section 420 IPC and the case of the appellant is that the respondents have cheated him and thereby dishonestly induced him to deliver property. To deceive is to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false and which the person practising the deceit knows or believes to be false. It must also be shown that there existed a fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of commission of the offence. There is no allegation that the respondents made any wilful misrepresentation. Even according to the appellant, the parties entered into a valid lease agreement and the grievance of the appellant is that the respondents failed to discharge their contractual obligations. In the complaint, there is no allegation that there was fraud or dishonest inducement on the part of the respondents and thereby the respondents parted with the property. It is trite law and common sense that an honest man entering into a contract is deemed to represent that he has the present intention of carrying it out but if, having accepted the pecuniary advantage involved in the transaction, he fails to pay his debt, he does not necessarily evade the debt by deception. 11. Moreover, the appellant has no case that the respondents obtained the article by any fraudulent inducement or by wilful misrepresentation. We are told that the respondents, though committed default in paying some instalments, have paid substantial amount towards the consideration.” (ii) PEPSI FOODS LTD. AND ANOTHER vs. SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, ( (1998) 5 SCC 749 ): “28. 11. Moreover, the appellant has no case that the respondents obtained the article by any fraudulent inducement or by wilful misrepresentation. We are told that the respondents, though committed default in paying some instalments, have paid substantial amount towards the consideration.” (ii) PEPSI FOODS LTD. AND ANOTHER vs. SPECIAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, ( (1998) 5 SCC 749 ): “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 29. No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial. It was submitted before us on behalf of the State that in case we find that the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction the matter should be remanded back to it to consider if the complaint and the evidence on record did not make out any case against the appellants. It was submitted before us on behalf of the State that in case we find that the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction the matter should be remanded back to it to consider if the complaint and the evidence on record did not make out any case against the appellants. If, however, we refer to the impugned judgment of the High Court it has come to the conclusion, though without referring to any material on record, that “in the present case it cannot be said at this stage that the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent man can ever reach a just conclusion that there exists no sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused”. We do not think that the High Court was correct in coming to such a conclusion and in coming to that it has also foreclosed the matter for the Magistrate as well, as the Magistrate will not give any different conclusion on an application filed under Section 245 of the Code. The High Court says that the appellants could very well appear before the court and move an application under Section 245(2) of the Code and that the Magistrate could discharge them if he found the charge to be groundless and at the same time it has itself returned the finding that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the appellants. If we now refer to the facts of the case before us it is clear to us that not only that allegation against the appellants do not make out any case for an offence under Section 7 of the Act and also that there is no basis for the complainant to make such allegations. The allegations in the complaint merely show that the appellants have given their brand name to “Residency Foods and Beverages Ltd.” for bottling the beverage “Lehar Pepsi”. The complaint does not show what is the role of the appellants in the manufacture of the beverage which is said to be adulterated. The only allegation is that the appellants are the manufacturers of bottle. There is no averment as to how the complainant could say so and also if the appellants manufactured the alleged bottle or its contents. His sole information is from A.K. Jain who is impleaded as Accused 3. The only allegation is that the appellants are the manufacturers of bottle. There is no averment as to how the complainant could say so and also if the appellants manufactured the alleged bottle or its contents. His sole information is from A.K. Jain who is impleaded as Accused 3. The preliminary evidence on which the first respondent relied in issuing summons to the appellants also does not show as to how it could be said that the appellants are manufacturers of either the bottle or the beverage or both. There is another aspect of the matter. The Central Government in the exercise of their powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 made the Fruit Products Order, 1955 (for short “the Fruit Order”). It is not disputed that the beverage in question is a “fruit product” within the meaning of clause (2)(b) of the Fruit Order and that for the manufacture thereof certain licence is required. The Fruit Order defines the manufacturer and also sets out as to what the manufacturer is required to do in regard to the packaging, marking and labelling of containers of fruit products. One of such requirements is that when a bottle is used in packing any fruit products, it shall be so sealed that it cannot be opened without destroying the licence number and the special identification mark of the manufacturer to be displayed on the top or neck of the bottle. The licence number of the manufacturer shall also be exhibited prominently on the side label on such bottle [clause (8)(1)(b)]. Admittedly, the name of the first appellant is not mentioned as a manufacturer on the top cap of the bottle. It is not necessary to refer in detail to other requirements of the Fruit Order and the consequences of infringement of the Order and to the penalty to which the manufacturer would be exposed under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. We may, however, note that in Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) v. Union of India [ AIR 1965 SC 1167 : (1965) 2 SCR 192 ] an argument was raised that the Fruit Order was invalid because its provision indicated that it was an Order which could have been appropriately issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. This Court negatived this plea and said that the Fruit Order was validly issued under the Essential Commodities Act. This Court negatived this plea and said that the Fruit Order was validly issued under the Essential Commodities Act. What we find in the present case is that there was nothing on record to show if the appellants held the licence for the manufacture of the offending beverage and if, as noted above, the first appellant was the manufacturer thereof. 30. It is no comfortable thought for the appellants to be told that they could appear before the court which is at a far off place in Ghazipur in the State of Uttar Pradesh, seek their release on bail and then to either move an application under Section 245(2) of the Code or to face trial when the complaint and the preliminary evidence recorded makes out no case against them. It is certainly one of those cases where there is an abuse of the process of the law and the courts and the High Court should not have shied away in exercising their jurisdiction. Provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code are devised to advance justice and not to frustrate it. In our view the High Court should not have adopted such a rigid approach which certainly has led to miscarriage of justice in the case. Power of judicial review is discretionary but this was a case where the High Court should have exercised it.” (iii) SHARAD KUMAR SANGHI vs. SANGITA RANE, (2015) 12 SCC 781 : “Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Ss.190(1)(a), 200, 202, 204 and 482 - Offence by Company - Initiation of criminal proceedings against Managing Director or any officer of Company - Prerequisites for - Where Company had not been arrayed as a party to the complaint, held, criminal proceedings initiated against Managing Director were not maintainable - More so where there was no specific allegation against him and even the allegations made were of vague nature - Penal Code, 1860, S. 420” The relevant portions of the said judgment read as under: “9. The allegations which find place against the Managing Director in his personal capacity seem to be absolutely vague. When a complainant intends to rope in a Managing Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to make requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious liability. …” “11. The allegations which find place against the Managing Director in his personal capacity seem to be absolutely vague. When a complainant intends to rope in a Managing Director or any officer of a company, it is essential to make requisite allegation to constitute the vicarious liability. …” “11. In the case at hand as the complainant's initial statement would reflect, the allegations are against the Company, the Company has not been made a party and, therefore, the allegations are restricted to the Managing Director. As we have noted earlier, allegations are vague and in fact, principally the allegations are against the Company. There is no specific allegation against the Managing Director. When a company has not been arrayed as a party, no proceeding can be initiated against it even where vicarious liability is fastened under certain statutes.” (iv) PRIYANKA SRIVASTAVA vs. STATE OF U.P., ( (2015) 6 SCC 287 ): “C. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Ss. 482 and 156(3) - Quashment of FIR - Grounds - Abuse of process of court - Impugned FIR got registered against statutory authorities by misusing remedy available under S. 156(3) CrPC - Borrower of housing loan failing to repay the loan to Bank concerned” “49. Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non for recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is that there must be information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in charge of the police station satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1), the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. The provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on the basis of information disclosing a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning. 115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences, yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time. 115. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences, yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time. One such instance is in the case of allegations relating to medical negligence on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and inequitable to prosecute a medical professional only on the basis of the allegations in the complaint.” This observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme court of India that the learned HCGP for the State addressed her arguments as this sort of an observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that concept of section 154 of the Cr.P.C. postulates the mandatory registration of FIR on receipt of a cognizable offence. Accordingly, the Hennur P.S. have received the complaint filed by Smt. Minnie Varghese based upon her complaint, case in FIR No.240/2011 came to be registered and then proceeded with the case for investigation and laid the charge-sheet against the accused persons. However, the learned Senior counsel in the same reliance supports the grounds urged in this petition at paragraph 32, wherein it is held that the present lis can be perceived from another angle. We are slightly surprised that the financial institution has been compelled to settle the dispute and we are also disposed to think that it has so happened because the complaint cases were filed. Such a situation should not happen. 33. At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act, which reads as follows: “32.Protection of action taken in good faith.—No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any secured creditor or any of his officers or manager exercising any of the rights of the secured creditor or borrower for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith under this Act.” In the present case, Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 are employees of IBHFL and they have discharged their duty on verification of the material documents facilitated by the borrower and have granted the loan. But there is no specific role made by Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel contends that Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act shall lie in protection of the present employees of IBHFL i.e., the accused. But there is no specific role made by Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel contends that Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act shall lie in protection of the present employees of IBHFL i.e., the accused. However, learned HCGP for the State refers to Section 33 of the SARFAESI Act, 2003, which reads thus: “33. Offences by companies.— (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company, for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,— (a) “company’’ means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” Learned HCGP contends that keeping in view Section 33 of the SARFAESI Act, there is no protection of any action even taken in good faith by Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 arraigned as petitioners before this court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them by Hennur P.S. in Cr.No.240/2011. (v) ANEETA HADA vs. GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS (P) LTD., ( (2012) 5 SCC 661 ): “58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. (v) ANEETA HADA vs. GODFATHER TRAVELS & TOURS (P) LTD., ( (2012) 5 SCC 661 ): “58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted. 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh [ (1970) 3 SCC 491 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 97] which is a three Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal [ (1984) 4 SCC 352 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 620] does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada [ (2000) 1 SCC 1 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 174] is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery [ (1987) 3 SCC 684 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 632] has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove. 60. We will be failing in our duty if we do not state that all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents relate to service of notice, instructions for stopping of payment and certain other areas covered under Section 138 of the Act. The same really do not render any aid or assistance to the case of the respondents and, therefore, we refrain ourselves from dealing with the said authorities. The same really do not render any aid or assistance to the case of the respondents and, therefore, we refrain ourselves from dealing with the said authorities. Resultantly, Criminal Appeals Nos. 838 and 842 of 2008 are allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act are quashed.” (vi) SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL VS. CBI, ( (2015) 4 SCC 609 ): “A. Corporate Laws - Company Law - Corporate criminal liability - Principle that criminal intent of person(s) controlling company can be imputed to company based on principle of “alter-ego” - Held, reverse application of principle is not permissible (as purported to be done by Magistrate in present case) - When company is the accused, its Directors can be roped in only if (a) there is sufficient incriminating evidence against them coupled with criminal intent or (b) the statutory regime attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability - Companies Act, 1956 - S.34 - Companies Act, 2013 - S.9 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Ss. 200 to 204” Further, the relevant portions of the judgment are extracted hereunder: “34. On reading of the impugned order which is already extracted verbatim, it is very clear that in para 2 of the order, the learned Special Judge discusses the submissions of the Public Prosecutor in respect of the persons who are made accused in the charge-sheet. Insofar as the charge-sheet is concerned, it has named Mr Shyamal Ghosh, who was the public servant and other three accused persons are the corporate entities. Submission of the learned Public Prosecutor is recorded in this paragraph that there is enough incriminating material on record against them and they be proceeded against, as per law. Immediately thereafter in para 3, the learned Special Judge records his satisfaction on the perusal of the records, namely, FIR, charge-sheet, statement of witnesses and documents and states that he is satisfied that there is enough incriminating material on record to proceed against the “accused persons”. Para 3 is clearly relatable to para 2. Here, the “accused persons” referred to are those four persons whose names are mentioned in para 2. Obviously, till that stage, the appellants were not the accused persons as they are not named as such in the charge-sheet. 36. It is on this basis alone that the Special Judge records that “in this fact situation, the acts of companies are to be attributed and imputed to them”. Obviously, till that stage, the appellants were not the accused persons as they are not named as such in the charge-sheet. 36. It is on this basis alone that the Special Judge records that “in this fact situation, the acts of companies are to be attributed and imputed to them”. 40. It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the “alter ego” of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in the aforesaid judgment in Iridium India case [Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201] is that if the person or group of persons who control the affairs of the company commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be imputed to the company as well as they are “alter ego” of the company. 41. In the present case, however, this principle is applied in an exactly reverse scenario. Here, company is the accused person and the learned Special Magistrate has observed in the impugned order that since the appellants represent the directing mind and will of each company, their state of mind is the state of mind of the company and, therefore, on this premise, acts of the company are attributed and imputed to the appellants. It is difficult to accept it as the correct principle of law. As demonstrated hereinafter, this proposition would run contrary to the principle of vicarious liability detailing the circumstances under which a Director of a company can be held liable. (iii) Circumstances when Director/person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person 42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 44. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. 44. When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada, the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of “alter ego”, was applied only in one direction, namely, where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. 20. ‘Taking cognizance’ does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence.” 48. Sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence is the application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore, imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound to consider the question as to whether the same discloses commission of an offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not. 49. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender are two different things. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not. 49. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender are two different things. Section 190 of the Code empowered taking cognizance of an offence and not to deal with offenders. Therefore, cognizance can be taken even if offender is not known or named when the complaint is filed or FIR registered. Their names may transpire during investigation or afterwards. 51. Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e. the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses, if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused.” On reading of the impugned order which is already extracted clarify, it is very clear that in para 2 of the order, the learned Special Judge discusses the submissions of the Public Prosecutor in respect of the persons who are made accused in the chargesheet. Insofar as charge-sheet is concerned, it has named Mr. Shyamal Ghosh, who was the public servant and other three accused persons are the corporate entities. Submission of the learned Public Prosecutor is recorded in this para that there is enough incriminating material on record against them and they be proceeded against, as per law. Immediately thereafter in para 3, the learned Special Judge records his satisfaction on the perusal of the records namely FIR, charge-sheet, statement of witnesses and documents and states that he is satisfied that there is enough incriminating material on record to proceed against the "accused persons". Para 3 is clearly relatable to para 2. Here, the "accused persons" referred to are those four persons whose names are mentioned in para 2. Obviously, till that stage, appellants were not the accused persons as they are not named as such in the charge-sheet. Para 3 is clearly relatable to para 2. Here, the "accused persons" referred to are those four persons whose names are mentioned in para 2. Obviously, till that stage, appellants were not the accused persons as they are not named as such in the charge-sheet. It is on this basis alone that the Special Judge records that "in this fact situation, the acts of companies are to be attributed and imputed to them". It is abundantly clear from the above that the principle which is laid down is to the effect that the criminal intent of the "alter ego" of the company, that is the personal group of persons that guide the business of the company, would be imputed to the company/corporation. The legal proposition that is laid down in the aforesaid judgment is that if the person or group of persons who control the affairs of the company commit an offence with a criminal intent, their criminality can be imputed to the company as well as they are "alter ego" of the company. In the present case, however, this principle is applied in an exactly reverse scenario. Here, company is the accused person and the learned Special Magistrate has observed in the impugned order that since the appellants represent the directing mind and will of each company, their state of mind is the state of mind of the company and, therefore, on this premise, acts of the company is attributed and imputed to the appellants. It is difficult to accept it as the correct principle of law. As demonstrated hereinafter, this proposition would run contrary to the principle of vicarious liability detailing the circumstances under which a direction of a company can be held liable. (iii) Circumstances when Director/Person in charge of the affairs of the company can also be prosecuted, when the company is an accused person: No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its officers, directors, managing director, chairman etc. If such a company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy. However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides so. When the company is the offendor, vicarious liability of the Directors cannot be imputed automatically, in the absence of any statutory provision to this effect. One such example is Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In Aneeta Hada (supra), the Court noted that if a group of persons that guide the business of the company have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate and it is in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be understood. Such a position is, therefore, because of statutory intendment making it a deeming fiction. Here also, the principle of "alter ego", was applied only in one direction namely where a group of persons that guide the business had criminal intent, that is to be imputed to the body corporate and not the vice versa. Otherwise, there has to be a specific act attributed to the Director or any other person allegedly in control and management of the company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for the acts committed by or on behalf of the company. "Taking Cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence...." Sine Qua Non for taking cognizance of the offence is the application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore, imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound to consider the question as to whether the same discloses commission of an offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the Court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender are two different things. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the Court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not. Cognizance of an offence and prosecution of an offender are two different things. Section 190 of the Code empowered taking cognizance of an offence and not to deal with offenders. Therefore, cognizance can be taken even if offender is not known or named when the complaint is filed or FIR registered. Their names may transpire during investigation or afterwards. Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This Section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e., the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused.” Whereas the learned HCGP for the State in the same reliance, has taken a contention that the cognizance of an offence and the prosecution of an offender are two different things. In support of their contention, she has referred to the scope of Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. which empowers taking cognizance. Therefore, cognizance can be taken even if offender is not known or named when the complaint is filed or FIR registered. However, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has facilitated all these aforesaid reliances which are squarely applicable to the given facts and circumstances of the case where Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 are employees of IBHFL and there is no direct overt act attributed against these accused to commit offences. There is no vital role played by them in committing the offences narrated in the complaint filed by Respondent No.2/Minnie Varghese. In respect of Cr.No.17/2011 wherein Minnie Varghese is arraigned as Accused No.3 relating to Koramangala P.S., the I.O. has laid the chargesheet against the accused in C.C.No.13055/2013. But in order to overcome the charge-sheet laid against her, complainant had approached the Hennur P.S. to register the case. In respect of Cr.No.17/2011 wherein Minnie Varghese is arraigned as Accused No.3 relating to Koramangala P.S., the I.O. has laid the chargesheet against the accused in C.C.No.13055/2013. But in order to overcome the charge-sheet laid against her, complainant had approached the Hennur P.S. to register the case. These petitioners are arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 respectively and they have been cited as CW-4, CW-5 and CW-6 in the aforesaid charge-sheeted case of Koramangala P.S. On all these premise, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners is seeking intervention as contemplated under section 482 Cr.P.C. If not, the petitioners being the gravamen of the charges, would be the sufferers. Consequently learned Senior counsel seeks to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners, which is pending before the Court of the XI ACMM, Bangalore, in C.C.No.53018/2016. 10. Per contra, learned HCGP for the State has taken me through the FIR said to have been recorded by the Hennur P.S. in Cr.No.240/2011. It is based upon the complaint filed by Smt. Minnie Varghese and based upon her complaint, the crime came to be registered and then the I.O. has taken up the case for investigation and laid the charge-sheet against the accused which consists of the statement of witnesses and so also material documents secured by the I.O. during the course of investigation. On the allegations of cheating, forgery, impersonation and commission of other offences, Minnie Varghese arraigned as Respondent No.2 filed a complaint before the Hennur P.S. against Shri Prabina Kumar Pradhan, Manager, India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd. arraigned as petitioner No.1 herein and Shri S.B. Sudhakar arraigned as Accused No.2, Shri Narasimha Reddy arraigned as Accused No.3 and another lady as Accused No.4. Shri S.B. Sudhakar telephonically informed to Minnie Varghese that he was in possession of her original sale deeds which he had kept with him for the loan that she had taken from him. Without the original document, no Bank or financial institution will sanction the loan. However, due to criminal conspiracy and forged sale deeds, he got sanctioned huge amount as loan and misappropriated so as to cause wrongful loss to her and wrongful gain to himself and thereby committed offences reflected in the FIR said to have been recorded by the Hennur P.S. Subsequent to registration of the FIR, the I.O. has taken up the case for investigation and laid the charge-sheet against the accused. Smt. Minnie Varghese is arraigned as CW-1 in C.C.No.53018/2016 and other witnesses have been cited, in all as CW-1 to CW-10. The substance of the chargesheet laid by the I.O. against the accused indicates that the role has been made by this Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 with other accused relating to sanction of loan and misappropriation. There has been some criminal conspiracy hatched among themselves in order to cheat Minnie Varghese for wrongful gain. This allegation made against the accused persons would have to be tested by the evidence facilitated by the prosecution. Unless the material secured by the I.O. is tested before the Trial Court, it cannot be said at this stage that there are no strong materials or prima facie materials against the accused and consequently quashment of the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused in C.c.No.53018/2016, does not arise. On all these premises, learned HCGP for the State seeks for dismissal of the petition filed by Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 as there is no merit in this matter. If criminal proceedings against these accused were to be quashed, unless the materials secured by the I.O. are tested, it cannot be arise to hold that there is no strong material or prima facie material to proceed against the accused and it is the domain vested with the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. The material shall be tested by the prosecution and also subjected to cross-examination on the part of the defence. On all these premise, the learned HCGP seeks for dismissal of this petition filed by Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. 11. In the backdrop of the contentions taken by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners and so also the counter made by the learned HCGP for the State, it is relevant to refer that Respondent No.2/Minnie Varghese who is an instrument of the complaint had approached the Hennur P.S. and based upon her complaint, the case in Cr.No.240/2011 came to be registered by recording an FIR. But in her complaint, she has specifically stated about cheating, forgery, impersonation and commission of other offences by the accused persons. It is stated in her complaint that during the second week of May 2011, Smt. Minnie Varghese along with her husband, had gone for Ayurvedic treatment to Kerala. But in her complaint, she has specifically stated about cheating, forgery, impersonation and commission of other offences by the accused persons. It is stated in her complaint that during the second week of May 2011, Smt. Minnie Varghese along with her husband, had gone for Ayurvedic treatment to Kerala. On 10.07.2011, one of her friends who stayed near her residence in Bangalore had telephonically informed her that the officials of the accused/Manager India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd., Local Branch office, Malleswaram, Bangalore has sealed her house. She has further stated that she did not know the India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd and had never handed over her house documents to the said finance company. Further, she was in occupation of the above said house property. However, no notice was given to her or affixed on her house by the said finance company. Hence, immediately, she had rushed back to Bangalore and had found that Shri S.B. Sudhakar from who she had taken a hand loan was in possession of her documents. Further, that one Narasimha Reddy arranged a lady who impersonated Minnie Varghese and went to the Sub-Registrar’s office and got her house property registered in the name of Shri Narasimha Reddy on 19.07.2010. A copy of the said sale deed was also furnished along with her complaint. Further, the photo on her original sale deed and the photo on the forged sale deed were not of the same individual. Hence, with the said forged sale deed, India Bulls Housing Finance had sanctioned loan to Shri Narasimha Reddy. In her computerized complaint, she has produced List of documents, that is (i) sale deed dated 5.3.2005 in favour of complainant, (ii) Forged sale deed dated 19.07.2010 executed by impersonating the complainant (iii) Memorandum of understanding dated 18.07.2010 by complainant, her husband and Shri S.B. Sudhakar, (iv) Agreement of sale by complainant in favour of S.B. Sudhakar, (v) Mortgage deed in favour of India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd. By G. Narasimha Reddy with the help of forged sale deed. 12. This complaint was filed by Minnie Varghese/Respondent No.2 herein before the Hennur P.S. on 6.8.2011 at around 4.30 p.m. and based upon the said complaint, the case in Cr.No.240/2011 came to be registered for offences under Sections 420, 405, 418, 419, 120B read with Section 34 of the IPC. 12. This complaint was filed by Minnie Varghese/Respondent No.2 herein before the Hennur P.S. on 6.8.2011 at around 4.30 p.m. and based upon the said complaint, the case in Cr.No.240/2011 came to be registered for offences under Sections 420, 405, 418, 419, 120B read with Section 34 of the IPC. Subsequent to registration of the crime, the I.O. has investigated the case and laid the charge-sheet against the accused. But on 10.01.2011, a complaint in Cr.No.17/2011 has been given to the Station House Officer, Koramangala, Bangalore. The said complaint was filed by India Bulls Housing Finance Ltd. against Narasimha Reddy/Accused No.1, G. Gayathri/Accused No.2 and Minnie Varghese/Accused No.3, in respect of which charge-sheet has been laid in C.C.No.13055/2013. That one M.B.Chengappa, working as Assistant Vice President Legal with M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited, he being duly authorised representative of the company and being well conversant with the facts of the case, had sought the indulgence against the illegal, unlawful and nefarious activities of Accused persons. M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited is a company duly registered under Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at F-60, II Floor, Malhotra Building, Connaught Place, New Delhi. The miscreants had applied for home loan for a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- vide application dated 24.05.2010 against equitable mortgage of the property/site Nos.41, 42, 43 and 44, Katha No.248, Vaddarapalya Village, Horamavu, Agara, K.R.Puram, Bangalore which were to be purchased from miscreant No.3. The miscreant No.1 Mr.Narasimha Reddy Gudibandi is the Managing Director of M/s.Sonigne Advertising Pvt. Ltd., Flat No.104, May Flower Garden 91/6, Naagavar Palya Main Road, C.V.Raman Nagar, Post Bangalore. The miscreant No.2 Mrs.G.Gayathri is the wife of Mr.Narsimha Reddy Gudibandi. The detail complaint has been filed by CW.1 - M.B.Changappa working as Assistant Vice President Legal with M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited. Based upon the said complaint, the Koramangala Police registered Crime No.17/2011 and then proceeded with the case for investigation for the offence punishable under Sections 406, 468, 471, 420, 120B r/w 34 of IPC. But it is relevant to refer that Accused No.1 - Narasimha Reddy Gudibande, Accused No.2 - Smt.Gayathri and Accused No.3 - Smt.Mini Verghese, Accused No.4 - Sudhakar have been arraigned as accused in C.C.No.13055/2013 arising out of Crime No.17/2011 registered by Koramangala Police. 13. But it is relevant to refer that Accused No.1 - Narasimha Reddy Gudibande, Accused No.2 - Smt.Gayathri and Accused No.3 - Smt.Mini Verghese, Accused No.4 - Sudhakar have been arraigned as accused in C.C.No.13055/2013 arising out of Crime No.17/2011 registered by Koramangala Police. 13. The loan application along with the documents produced by the miscreants were processed by different officials of M/s.Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited and were sent for legal opinion with M/s.D and M Law Associates - Legal Firm and obtained legal opinion for sanction of loan. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioners has produced Annexures-F and G that is the copy of application for loan and its enclosures and the copy of the legal opinion for the purpose of reference in this matter for consideration of the grounds as urged. The genuineness of the application was satisfied by the officials of M/s.IBHFL and the same was accepted, loan of Rupees one crore was sanctioned by Sunil Gupta being the Zonal Credit Manager on 30.06.2010. Subsequent to sanctioning of loan by accepting the documents, the cheque for a sum of Rs.94,49,062/- was issued in the name of Mrs.Minnie Varghese to her account No.894697466 with Indian Bank, Rajaji Nagar Branch, Bangalore and the said cheque was handed over to Minnie Varghese on execution of sale deed in favour of G.Narasimha Reddy. But Accused No.3 - G.Narasimha Reddy, after availing the loan, became defaulter from day one. The cheques issued by him for loan EMIs got bounced and after the stage of fourth EMI, the officers of M/s.IBHFL tried to follow accused No.3, but he could not be traced either in his office or his residential house. Thereafter, the officials went to the house property bearing NOs.41 to 44 of which, the original title deeds were deposited with the bank for availing equitable mortgage and in the said house premises, Minnie Varghese was present and she told the officials that she had not sold her house in anybody’s favour and not executed any documents and she further told that she had taken the loan from Vijaya Bank by deposit of title deeds of her house premises and after availing hand loan amount from Accused No.2 - Sudhakar, she had cleared the said loan and collected the original title deeds from Vijaya Bank and handed them over to Accused No.2 - Sudhakar. 14. 14. After ascertaining the fact of fraud being played on M/s.IBHFL by accused No.3 and his wife and Minnie Varghese, they filed a complaint before Koramangala police for taking necessary action regarding creation of false documents and defrauding M/s.IBHFL. Based upon the said complaint the Koramangala Police registered the FIR in Crime No.17/2011. In the meanwhile, the petitioners - M/s.IBHFL had initiated the proceedings under the relevant provisions of SARFAESI Act before the VIII Addl.CMM, Bangalore in C.C.No.5502/2011 and the same came to be allowed on 09.08.2011 holding that M/s.IBHFL is entitled to take possession of property with the assistance of police. The copy of the said order is produced at Annexure-M. Thereafter, the petitioners had taken physical possession of property and kept lock and key. Against the said order, the second respondent - Minnie Varghese had filed petition before the Debts Recovery Tribunal in IR 1810/2011 which came to be dismissed by order dated 02.03.2012. Even before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Minnie Varghese respondent No.2 herein and so also, the instrument of the complaint had failed to demonstrate her bonafides. Therefore, the DRT upheld the measures initiated by M/s.IBHFL. In the said order the Tribunal had made an observation that the applicant has not approached the Tribunal with clean hands and do not deserve any interim order as such on date. Therefore, keeping in view the facts and so also, the materials which pointed out and the real fact as to the fraud played on M/s.IBHLF was clearly traced out by the Koramangala Police wherein they registered Crime No.17/2011 which culminated in the charge sheet in C.C.No.13055/2013. On filing of the charge sheet on the file of IV ACMM, Bangalore and later the steps taken under SARFAESI Act by M/s.IBHFL, demonstrates no offence being committed by any of the officials of it - much less these petitioners who are arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11. 15. It is contended that the loan was sanctioned by one Sunil Gupta, the Zonal Credit Manager and not by the petitioner No.1. He being arraigned as Accused No.1 do not have any pivotal role with regard to the sanction of loan. Therefore, he cannot be called upon to face any criminal charge before the Court. Similarly petitioner Nos.2 and 3 have not played any role in the alleged transaction. He being arraigned as Accused No.1 do not have any pivotal role with regard to the sanction of loan. Therefore, he cannot be called upon to face any criminal charge before the Court. Similarly petitioner Nos.2 and 3 have not played any role in the alleged transaction. Therefore, it is made it clear that Respondent No.1 Police without looking into the material facts have deliberately filed false and mechanical charge sheet against them which is nothing short of an abuse of process of law. These are all the contentions as taken by learned Senior counsel for the petitioners by supporting the grounds which is urged and also facilitating the reliance of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is “Saving of inherent power of High Court - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This is the object of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. 16. In the instant case, petitioners being arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 in C.C.No.53018/2016 and these petitioners arraigned as witnesses in C.C.No.13055/2013 as CW.4 - Azar Ali s/o Abdul Wahab, CW.5 - Sriharsha s/o Krishnappa, CW.6 - Prabina Kumar Pradhan, s/o Daya Nidhi Pradhan. Therefore, it is well settled that the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. But even though remedy under the relevant provision of Cr.P.C. is available, the power being the extra ordinary it has to be exercised sparingly. To prevent abuse of process of Court, High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 could quash the proceedings but there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive. The power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. shall be exercised judicially, judiciously, sparingly and cautiously. 17. To prevent abuse of process of Court, High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 could quash the proceedings but there would be justification for interference only when the complaint did not disclose any offence or was frivolous vexatious or oppressive. The power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. shall be exercised judicially, judiciously, sparingly and cautiously. 17. In the instant case, petitioner No.1/accused No.1, Petitioner No.2/Accused No.10 and Petitioner No.3 /Accused No.11 they have been cited as witnesses in C.C.No.13055/2013 as wherein the Koramangala Police have been thoroughly investigated the case and cited them as witnesses in a charge sheeted case. The officials of M/s. IBHFL have tried to ascertain as to the fraud played by G.Narasimha Reddy and his wife Smt.Gayathri and so also, Minnie Varghese who is respondent No.2 in this petition and filed complaint before the Koramangala Police for taking necessary action against them regarding creation of false documents and defrauding M/s.IBHFL. On receipt of complaint, the Koramangala Police have registered the case in Crime No.17/2011 for the offences reflected in the FIR said to have been recorded and then the IO has done the investigation thoroughly and laid the charge sheet. But these petitioners who have been cited as witnesses in C.C.No.13055/2013 have been arraigned as Accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 in C.C.No.53108/2016 arising out of Crime No.240/2011 registered by the Hennur Police. Therefore, under the circumstances, the inherent powers as postulated under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. if not exercised, certainly the petitioners being the gravamen of charges leveled against them by the investigating agency, would be the sufferers. In terms of the aforesaid reasons and findings, it is just and proper to consider the grounds urged by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners and so also, the reliance of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred by him. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER The criminal petition filed by the petitioners/accused Nos.1, 10 and 11 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed. Consequently, the criminal proceedings initiated against them in C.C.No.53018/2016 arising out of Crime No.240/2011 of Hennur Police Station pending before the XI ACMM, Bangalore are hereby quashed.