JUDGMENT : S. Manikumar, J. Captioned writ appeals are filed challenging the common judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P.(C) No.17391/2020 and connected cases, dated 21.12.2020 and the order in R.P.No.1 of 2021 and connected cases dated 28.1.2021, whereby a learned single Judge allowed the writ petition in part, setting aside an order of the National Green Tribunal, Principal bench, New Delhi, (hereinafter called 'NGT') in Original Application No.304 of 2019 and NGT was directed to dispose of the representation of respondents 3 to 115, which was treated as an application by the NGT, afresh, after notice by publication, to those who are affected by the prescription of the stringent distance criteria from residential building and other human inhabited sites, other than what is prevailing in the State for permitting stone quarrying. 2. It was further ordered that the interim order passed by the learned single Judge on 6.8.2020 would continue to be in force till the disposal of the said application by the NGT. However, the NGT was given the liberty to modify the said interim order pending disposal of the application, if situation warrants, and all other issues were left open. 3. It is thus challenging the legality and correctness of the judgment so rendered by the learned single Judge, the appeals are preferred. 4. Some of the appeals are filed by third persons to the judgment, after securing leave from this Court. The State Government has also preferred appeal being aggrieved by the judgment. The contentions raised in the appeals are basically similar or typical in nature and the foundation of the contentions are in regard to the power of the NGT to treat a representation as an application and the power to issue omnibus directions to the authority under the environmental laws to fix a distance criteria to conduct quarry operations to any installations by incorporating conditions in the consent granted by the Pollution Control Board. We think it appropriate to narrate basic facts available in one of the writ appeals to have a general understanding of the issues properly so as to arrive at a logical conclusion, taking into account various provisions of various environmental laws and the NGT Act. Therefore, we consider the facts, circumstances and the documents involved in writ appeal No.255 of 2021. 5. Therefore, we consider the facts, circumstances and the documents involved in writ appeal No.255 of 2021. 5. The appellant in the said appeal is a project proponent to conduct quarry operations in an extent of 08.0140 hectares of land situated in Re-sy No.55 of Koodal Village, Konni Taluk, Pathanamthitta District. As per Exhibit P1 dated 26.8.2019, the Kerala State Pollution Control Board has issued consent to establish the quarry under section 25 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, which is valid till 31.5.2024. On the basis of application submitted by the appellant, Exhibit P3 letter of intent has been issued by the Director of Mining and Geology. Likewise applications were submitted before the Geologist for approval of the mining plan and State Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA) for obtaining environmental clearance. According to the appellant, the State Expert Appraisal Committee (SEAC) gave a favourable recommendation, based on which, the terms of reference was approved by SEIAA in its meeting and in accordance with Appendix IV of the Environment Impact Assessment Notification, a public hearing has to be conducted by the State Pollution Control Board. 6. Matters thus being so, a complaint was submitted by way of a letter before the NGT, Principal Bench, by M.Haridasan, the 5th respondent in W.P.(C) No.15962 of 2020 & connected cases, against the operations of stone quarries and crushers, without requisite safeguards at Kizhakkencherry II Village, Palakkad District, which was numbered as Original Application 304/2019 by the NGT. As per Ext.P7 order dated 6.5.2019, NGT has directed the Kerala State Pollution Control Board to submit a report and accordingly, a report was submitted on 10.7.2019 that the said quarry in Palakkad District has not started operations, but the location being 50 meters from residence and public road, environmental clearance had been granted by the District Environment Impact Assessment Authority (DEIAA), subject to certain conditions. 7. 7. While so, in Ext.P8 order dated 9.10.2019, the NGT observed that in the absence of any study, any stone quarrying near the residence and public road is bound to cause air and noise pollution even beyond 50 meters, and accordingly, directed the State PCB to revisit the existing criteria based on appropriate study, and further the Central Pollution Control Board was directed to give its views in that regard to the State PCB within two weeks in the light of available expert studies on the subject. The State PCB was also directed to furnish its action taken report in the matter by email before the next date and the matter was posted to 18.12.2019 for further consideration. In contemplation of the direction so issued, the State PCB has submitted Ext.P9 report dated 17.12.2019 basically stating that the prevailing distance criteria of 50 meters can be maintained, if the 14 conditions contained in the report are satisfied by the project proponents. 8. Apparently, on the basis of the directions contained in Ext.P8 order dated 9.10.2019, the Central Pollution Control Board has issued a communication dated 24.10.2019 to the Member Secretary of the Kerala State PCB, stating that there is no study of the Central Pollution Control Board available on the subject of stone quarrying to suggest or prescribe minimum distance between any road/habitation and stone quarry to be maintained. But two points were requested to be considered while revisiting the criteria regarding stone quarry and other issues raised in the application. It was also informed that the CPCB has prepared guidelines regarding pollution control in stone crushers and Central Government have notified standard for stone crushers, however, the standards notified by the Central Government do not prescribe any common stone crusher citing criteria for the country and stone crusher citing criteria is generally prescribed by State Governments/State PCBs based on local needs and conditions. 9. 9. After taking note of the report submitted by the State PCB and probably the proceedings leading thereto, the NGT has passed Ext.P10 order dated 28.2.2020, observing that the distance of 50 meters for stone quarry particularly when blasts are involved is highly inadequate and can have deleterious effect on noise and air ambient conditions, environment and public health and accordingly, directed the CPCB to examine and lay down more stringent conditions and appropriately longer distance within one month and convey the same to the State Boards. Accordingly, the State Board was directed to take further action and sought a compliance report, before the next date by e-mail and the case was posted to a particular date. 10. Thereafter, Ext.P11 report was submitted by the CPCB on 9.7.2020 pointing out the distance criteria fixed by various States and Union Territories in regard to stone quarrying as per the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) and as per the provisions of Minor Mineral Concession Rules made by the respective State Governments by virtue of the powers conferred under section 15 of the MMDR Act, 1957. However, the report concludes by stating that in view of the available information, the minimum distance criteria of 100 meters when blasting is not involved and 200 meters, when blasting is involved from residential/public buildings, inhabited sites, protected monuments, heritage sites, National/State Highway, District roads, public roads, railway line/area, rope way or rope way trestle or station, bridges, dams, reservoir, river, canals, lakes or tanks, or any other locations to be considered for permitting stone quarrying, by State PCBs. As per the Note thereto, it was specified that the regulations for dangerous zones of 500 meters prescribed by Director General of Mines Safety also have to be complied compulsorily and necessary measures should be taken to minimise the impact on environment. But it was made clear that, if any State is already having stringent criteria than the above for Minor Mineral Mining, the same shall be applicable. 11. As per Ext.P13 dated 21.7.2020, the NGT, relying upon Ext.P11 report, ordered the CPCB and State PCBs, to follow minimum distance criteria of 200 meters from residential/public buildings when blasting is involved and 100 meters if no blasting is involved, for permitting quarry operations. 11. As per Ext.P13 dated 21.7.2020, the NGT, relying upon Ext.P11 report, ordered the CPCB and State PCBs, to follow minimum distance criteria of 200 meters from residential/public buildings when blasting is involved and 100 meters if no blasting is involved, for permitting quarry operations. The foundation of the case of the appellants/writ petitioners was on the basis of Ext.P13 order passed by the NGT and accordingly sought to quash the same. They have sought for further directions to the State Authorities to consider the applications submitted for consents/licence/NOC etc. 12. The case projected by the appellants in the writ court was that the impugned Ext.P13 order has been issued by the NGT without any scientific study or obtaining any expert opinion. It was also the contention of the appellants that as per Ext.P16 order dated 24.8.2018 in O.A.597/2018, the NGT permitted republication of the draft notification dated 27.2.2017 and directed finalisation of the matter positively within six months; that it also directed that no environmental clearance be granted and no activity adversely impacting eco-sensitive areas be permitted in the area covered by draft notification dated 27.2.2017 till the matter is finalised. It was the further submission that as per Ext.P17 order dated 3.10.2018, yet another draft notification was published clearly specifying the ecologically sensitive areas in the notification; and that the property of the petitioner in the instant case is not included as an ecologically sensitive area. 13. The appellants have relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Director General (Road Development) National Highways Authority of India v. Aam Aadmi Lokmanch and others reported in [2020 SCC Online SC 572] to canvass the proposition that similar directions issued by the NGT was found to be without any rationale and not based on any scientific study and without any notice whatsoever to any affected party. 14. The judgment of the Apex Court in Goa Foundation v. Union of India and others [ (2014) 6 SCC 590 ] was relied upon to contend that the procedural checks made in rules cannot be overruled by issuing notifications and unless and until the procedure prescribed under the Environmental (Protection) Rule, 1986, was followed and a notification under Rule 5 thereto is issued, prohibiting mining operations in a certain area, there can be no prohibition under law to carry on mining activity. 15. 15. It was also submitted that the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries(I) Limited and others [(2019) SCC Online SC 221] has held that under the NGT Act, 2010, the Tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction cannot strike down rules or regulations made under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and therefore, relying upon the said proposition, it was contended that it would be fallacious to state that the Tribunal has powers of judicial review akin to that of a High Court exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and entertain a representation and consequently treating the same as an application, to be submitted as per the procedure contemplated. 16. Argument was also advanced to the effect that NGT has no general power of judicial review enabling it to pass any orders as that of Ext.P13 and therefore, bad in law. That apart various provisions of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, the MMDR Act, 1957, the Air (Prevention and Control) Act, 1981, the Water (Prevention and Control) Act, 1974 and provisions of other Acts were relied upon to substantiate the contentions advanced by the appellants, which would be dealt with hereafter. 17. In fact, review petitions were filed by the appellants seeking to review the impugned judgment on the basis of the judgments relied upon, and the provisions of various statutes. However, except a clarification made at paragraph 25 of the review order, no other interference was made with the judgment. 18. The 3rd respondent viz., M.Haridasan, had filed a detailed counter affidavit basically contending that against the order passed by the NGT, the appellants have a remedy under section 22 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, to prefer an appeal to the Apex Court and has relied upon various judgments in that regard. 19. According to the 3rd respondent, the NGT is vested with ample powers under sections 14, 15, 18 and 20 of the NGT Act, 2010 to ensure implementation of orders passed by the statutory authorities under the Air Act, 1981 and Water Act, 1974. So also it was submitted that the order of the NGT was only to make the Central Pollution Control Board to exercise their statutory powers to have a stringent mechanism in the quarrying activity and not further. So also it was submitted that the order of the NGT was only to make the Central Pollution Control Board to exercise their statutory powers to have a stringent mechanism in the quarrying activity and not further. Therefore, according to the 3rd respondent, the appellants did not make out a case justifying interference in the order passed by the Tribunal. 20. The learned single Judge after making an in-depth analysis of the provisions of law, the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in its various judgments and the rival submissions made across the Bar, has arrived at the ultimate conclusion that the NGT has suo motu power to make inquisitorial adjudication by virtue of the powers conferred under the Act, especially bearing in mind the fact it is a Forum created for adjudication of cases involving public interest and cases involving fundamental rights of the citizens. It was further held that the power to initiate proceedings suomotuis a matter of procedure and the NGT is not bound by the procedures contained in the Code of Civil Procedure and it is free to choose and regulate its own procedure. The learned Single Judge, at paragraphs 32 and 33 of the judgment, held thus: “32. The questions remaining to be considered are mainly questions relating to the sustainability of the impugned order, and if it is found that the impugned order is sustainable in law, the questions relating to its applicability. insofar as it is found that the impugned order is vitiated for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, the matter is liable to be remitted to the NGT for fresh consideration. Even otherwise, on the facts of the present case, the questions remaining to be considered are questions that could be decided only by the NGT, the specialized tribunal constituted for the said purpose. I am fortified in this view by the observations made by the Apex Court in Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa Limited (SOUTHCO) and Another v. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108 , while examining the correctness of the judgment rendered by the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution, in the context of a case arising under the Electricity Act, 2003. The said observations read thus: : “Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given case. We are of the considered view that interest of administration of justice shall be better subserved if the cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the Act. However, it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case”. Needless to say that the matter has to go back to the NGT. 33. Should the status quo prevailing as on the date of the impugned order as regards the distance criteria to be maintained for permitting stone quarrying from residential buildings and other human inhabited sites be restored pending disposal of the matter by the NGT, is the next question to be considered. As noted, pursuant to Ext.P8 order of the NGT, the SPCB had deliberations with the various stakeholders and arrived at the conclusion that the existing distance criterion of 50 meters from residential buildings and other human inhabited sites for permitting stone quarrying involving blasting could be considered as adequate for the purpose of abating pollution, only if the various conditions stipulated in Ext.P9 report filed by them before the NGT are complied with by the operators, and that the compliance of the said conditions are not insisted at present. It has also come out that SPCB had earlier prescribed stringent distance criteria from residential houses and other human inhabited sites for permitting stone quarrying and the same was brought down to 50 meters to make it in tune with the requirement in the KMMC Rules which has nothing to do with the environment pollution caused by the stone quarrying activity. In other words, even according to the SPCB, the present distance criterion of 50 meters from residential buildings and other human inhabited sites for permitting stone quarrying involving blasting is not adequate to prevent, control and abate the pollution arising from stone quarrying activity. Restoring status quo as on the date of the impugned order as regards the distance criterion from residential buildings and other human inhabited sites for permitting stone quarrying pending disposal of the matter by NGT, in the said circumstances, would amount to infraction of the fundamental rights of the citizens of this State under Article 21 of the Constitution. In the circumstances, in the interests of justice, I deem it appropriate to order that the interim order passed by this court on 6.8.2020 as referred to in paragraph 6 shall continue till the disposal of the matter by the NGT. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed in part, the impugned order of the NGT is set aside and the NGT is directed to dispose of the representation of respondents 3 to 115 which was treated by the NGT as an application, afresh after notice by way of publication to those who are affected by the prescription of the stringent distance criteria from residential building and other human inhabited sites other than what is prevailing in the State, for permitting stone quarrying. It is also ordered that the interim order passed by this court on 6.8.2020 will continue till the disposal of the said application by the NGT. It is also ordered that the NGT would be free to modify the said interim order pending disposal of the application, if situation warrants. All other issues which are not dealt with in this judgment are left open. ” 21. A reading of the extracted portion of the judgment, it would be clear that, the learned single Judge found that the order was passed violative of the principles of natural justice and therefore, liable to be re-considered by the NGT. A further reading of the judgment shows that the interim order granted by the learned single Judge on 6.8.2020 was directed to be continued till the disposal of the application in question by the NGT. A further reading of the judgment shows that the interim order granted by the learned single Judge on 6.8.2020 was directed to be continued till the disposal of the application in question by the NGT. Therefore, on an analysis of the contentions raised in the appeal, it would be clear that the appellants are more aggrieved by the interim order directed to be maintained till a decision is taken in the application. 22. Be that as it may, the appellants have preferred review petitions seeking to review the judgment by raising various grounds including the ground that the NGT being a creature of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, it can exercise only the powers conferred on it under the said statute; that in terms of the said statute the NGT can exercise power only in respect of a dispute falling within the scope of section 14 of the NGT Act, 2010 and grant only the relief provided for in section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010 and further that, the grievance/dispute raised by respondents 3 to 115, is not a dispute that falls within the scope of section 14 of the NGT Act. It was also contended therein that the NGT is empowered to deal with any grievance, only if an application is filed for the same in terms of the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedures) Rules, 2011 and the NGT Act, 2010 and the Rules, do not confer authority on the NGT to treat a representation as an application and since the impugned order being one passed on a representation, the same is without jurisdiction. 23. On a reading of the order passed by the learned single Judge in the review petitions, dated 21.8.2021, it is quite clear that, various contentions were raised relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court, basically to drive home the point that under the NGT Act or under the Environmental Laws, the NGT is not empowered to fix a distance criteria in terms of the Environmental Laws, and that the Central Government alone is vested with powers under such laws to fix a distance criteria. 24. 24. Contentions were also advanced by the appellants in the review petitions specifically pointing out that many of the appellants were having requisite permits/clearances/consents from the statutory authorities to conduct quarry and some, after submitting applications, were waiting for necessary orders and consequent to the impugned order passed even the processing of applications were stopped by the statutory authorities, which is causing serious prejudice to the appellants. 25. Apart from making certain clarifications in some of the review petitions that the judgment did not preclude the competent authorities from considering the applications for renewal/revalidation of ancillary permissions, licenses, clearances, such as environmental clearance and consent under Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and the Air (prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, explosive licence, D&O licence of the local bodies etc., in the case of persons, who are holding valid and current quarrying permit/lease as on the date of the order of the NGT viz., 21.7.2020, no other modifications were made. 26. We have heard learned Senior Counsel Sri.K.P.Dandapani, Mr.George Poonthottam and Mr.S.Sreekumar, learned counsel Mr.Santhosh Mathew, Mr.Philip J.Vettickatt, Mr.Jobi Jose Kondody, Mr.Alex M.Scaria, Mr.P.Haridas, Mr.Roshan Alexander who have appeared for appellants and Mr.Reji George, Mr.Harish Vasudevan and others for the party respondents, learned Government Pleader Mr.S.Kannan, Mr.M.Ajay, counsel for Central Pollution Control Board, learned standing counsel Mr.Naveen.T. for State Pollution Control Board and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 27. Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986, is enacted with the main objective to provide protection and improvement of environment and for matters connected therewith. The Act covers all forms of pollution viz., air, water and notice. 28. National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 is an Act to provide for the establishment of a National Green Tribunal for the effective and expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and conservation of forests and other natural resources including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment and giving relief and compensation for damages to persons and property and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 29. Environmental protection, conservation of forests and other natural resources, including enforcement of legal rights relating to the environment, are the objects of Act 2010. Giving relief and compensation as contemplated under Section 15 of the NGT alone is not the objective of Act, 2010. Power of the Tribunal, cannot be circumscribed to only granting relief and compensation. 29. Environmental protection, conservation of forests and other natural resources, including enforcement of legal rights relating to the environment, are the objects of Act 2010. Giving relief and compensation as contemplated under Section 15 of the NGT alone is not the objective of Act, 2010. Power of the Tribunal, cannot be circumscribed to only granting relief and compensation. Such a narrow interpretation to the Act, 2010 and provisions, in our view, would clip the wings of the Act for issuing directions/orders of restraint etc., relating to environmental protection and conservation of forest and other natural resources. 30. What is included and empowered on the National Green Tribunal, to grant relief and compensation, as provided in Section 15 of the Act, 2010, cannot be isolated, to mean that there is no power conferred on the National Green Tribunal, to protect and conserve, and thus, enabling the National Green Tribunal to pass appropriate orders, both interim and final. 31. Interpreting Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT Act, 2010, as submitted by the appellants, in our view, is in direct negation of the principles and object of the Act. Interpretation of a provision should be with regard to the object of the Act, endeavour to find out whether exercise of the power is purpose and in furtherance, to achieve the object of the Act, and if any provision is interpreted narrowly, whether it would offend the avowed object. Intention of the Legislature, conferring powers on the NGT, is not only to protect the environment, conserve forest and other natural resources, but also to grant relief and compensation to the aggrieved. 32. In Samrao v. District Magistrate, Thana reported in AIR 1952 SC 324 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “It is the duty of the Courts to give effect to the meaning of an Act, when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act, must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed the law goes so far as to require the Courts sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.” 33. It is well settled that a statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act, so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within the statute or between a Section or other parts of the statute. [Ref. Raj Krishna v. Bonod Kanungo reported in AIR 1954 SC 202 ]. 34. As per Section 14(1) of the Act, the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, the Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. 35. Schedule I of the NGT Act, 2010, reads thus: “SCHEDULE I [See sections 14(1), 15(1), 17(1)(a), 17(2), 19(4) (j) and 34(1)] 1. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; 2. The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; 3. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; 4. The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; 5. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; 6. The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; 7. The Biological Diversity Act, 2002.” 36. Reading of Section 14 of the Act, 2010, again makes it clear that, “where a substantial question relating to environment is involved, and such question arises out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I of the NGT Act, 2010, the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction. Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, including enforcement of legal rights relating to the environment. Both Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, 2010, read together, harmoniously makes it clear that there are five parts. One, jurisdiction over all cases, where there is a substantial question relating to the environment; two, enforcement of any legal right relating to the environment; three, provide for relief and compensation; four, restitution of the property damaged; and five, restitution of the environment for such area or areas. One, jurisdiction over all cases, where there is a substantial question relating to the environment; two, enforcement of any legal right relating to the environment; three, provide for relief and compensation; four, restitution of the property damaged; and five, restitution of the environment for such area or areas. Interpretation of Section 15 of Act, 2010, to restrict relief, compensation and restitution of the property and environment etc., would not take away the jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal, to entertain applications, in the case on hand, representation treated as an application, and issue orders in the nature of protection and conservation of environment. Section 15 of the Act, 2010, cannot be narrowly interpreted, in transgression of Section 14 and the object of the Act. In Rananjaya Singh v. Baji Nath Singh reported in AIR 1954 SC 749 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- “The spirit of law may well be an illusive and unsafe guide in the interpretation of the statutes and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act, and the rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their language they work injustice, the appeal must be made to the Parliament and not to the Supreme Court.” 37. While interpreting Sections 14 and 15 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, it is worthwhile to consider the following decisions: (i) In The State of Bihar v. Hira Lal Kejriwal reported in AIR 1960 SC 47 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 6, held thus:- “To ascertain the meaning of a section it is not permissible to omit any part of it: the whole section should be read together and an attempt should be made to reconcile both the parts. ......The first part gives life to that Order, and, therefore, the acts authorised under that Order can be done subsequent to the coming into force of the Ordinance. ......The first part gives life to that Order, and, therefore, the acts authorised under that Order can be done subsequent to the coming into force of the Ordinance. ......The second part appears to have been enacted for the purpose of avoiding this difficulty or, at any rate, to dispel the ambiguity.” (ii) In S. Gurmej Singh v. S. Pratap Singh reported in AIR 1960 SC 122 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 9, held as follows: “It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself, and that phrases are to be construed according to the rules of grammar.” (iii) In A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak reported in (1984) 2 SCC 500 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:- “It is a well established cannon of construction that the court should read the section as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any cannon of construction permit the court to read the section in such manner as to render it to some extent otiose.” (iv) In Balasinor Nagrik Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya reported in (1987) 1 SCC 606 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, at paragraph 4, held as follows: “It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to be made of all parts together. It is not permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section.” (emphasis supplied) (v) In Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh [ AIR 2015 SC 1420 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that marginal note appended to Section 47 of Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1955 makes it clear that idea of Section 47 was not to discriminate against employees who acquire disability during service. Relevant paras read thus: “16. It is well settled that the provisions of a statute must be read harmoniously together. However, if this is not possible then it is settled law that where there is a conflict between two Sections, and you cannot reconcile the two, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other. However, if this is not possible then it is settled law that where there is a conflict between two Sections, and you cannot reconcile the two, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other. This statement of the law is to be found in Institute of Patent Agents & Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood, [1894 A.C. 347 at 360]. Lord Herschell, L.C., stated this, as follows: "Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best you may. If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other." 17. This Judgment has been subsequently followed by the High Court of Australia in Project Blue Sky Inc. v. Australian Broadcasting Authority, [153 ALR 490], in the following terms: "A legislative instrument must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals. Where conflict appears to arise from the language of particular provisions, the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions. Reconciling conflict provisions will often require the court "to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other". Only by determining the hierarchy of the provisions will it be possible in many cases to give each provision the meaning which best gives effect to its purpose and language while maintaining the unity of the statutory scheme." (at pages 509-510) 38. Now, let us consider a few decisions on purposive construction, which are extracted below: (i) In Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. [ (2011) 9 SCC 573 ], while discussing about the conferment of extensive meaning, it has been opined that the Court would be justified in giving the provision a purposive construction to perpetuate the object of the Act while ensuring that such rules framed are within the field circumscribed by the parent Act. [ (2011) 9 SCC 573 ], while discussing about the conferment of extensive meaning, it has been opined that the Court would be justified in giving the provision a purposive construction to perpetuate the object of the Act while ensuring that such rules framed are within the field circumscribed by the parent Act. It is also clear that it may not always be absolutely necessary to spell out guidelines for delegated legislation when discretion is vested in such delegated bodies. In such cases, the language of the rule framed as well as the purpose sought to be achieved would be the relevant factors to be considered by the Court. (ii) In Sarah Mathew and Ors. v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director K.M. Cherian and Ors. [ (2014) 2 SCC 62 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “32. There can be no dispute about the rules of interpretation cited by the counsel. It is true that there is no ambiguity in the relevant provisions. But, it must be borne in mind that the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure This Court had to therefore interpret this word. We have adverted to that interpretation. In fact, we have proceeded to answer this reference on the basis of that interpretation and keeping in mind that special connotation acquired by the word 'cognizance'. Once that interpretation is accepted, Chapter XXXVI along with the heading has to be understood in that light. The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation. A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (See: Francis Bennion on Statutory Interpretation). After noticing this definition given by Francis Bennion in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut (2007) 3 SCC 700 , this Court noted that more often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut (2007) 3 SCC 700 , this Court noted that more often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. In light of this observation, we are of the opinion that if in the instant case literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the legislative intent or is leading to absurdity, purposive interpretation will have to be adopted. 33. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and Anr. etc. (2008) 3 SCC 279 while dealing with eviction proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 this Court was concerned with interpretation of Sections 4 and 5 thereof. This Court was of the view that literal meaning thereof would place undue burden on the noticee and would lead to conclusion that the landlord i.e. the State would not be required to adduce any evidence at all. This Court observed that such a construction would lead to an anomalous situation. In the context of fairness in State action this Court observed that with a view to reading the provisions of the said Act, in a proper and effective manner, literal interpretation which may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity will have to be avoided. This Court further observed that so as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator. So done, the rules of purposive construction will have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the statute in such a manner so as to see that it's object is fulfilled.” (emphasis supplied) (iii) In Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla [ (2016) 3 SCC 619 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “31. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother, would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to the reasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother, would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of 'purposive interpretation' or 'purposive construction' is based on the understanding that the Court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the 'purpose' behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the Court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed to realise. As Aharan Barak puts it: “Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language.” 32. of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purpose and discretion 'of the Court', insofar as purposive component is concerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text. This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims that the text is designed to actualize. It is the function that the text is designed to fulfill. 33. We may also emphasize that the statutory interpretation of a provision is never static but is always dynamic. Though literal rule of interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the 'golden rule', it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the Courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as well.” (emphasis supplied) (iv) In Abhiram Singh and Ors. Not only legal process thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the Courts not only in this country but in many other legal systems as well.” (emphasis supplied) (iv) In Abhiram Singh and Ors. v. C.D. Commachen (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. [ (2017) 2 SCC 629 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “36. The conflict between giving a literal interpretation or a purposive interpretation to a statute or a provision in a statute is perennial. It can be settled only if the draftsman gives a long-winded explanation in drafting the law but this would result in an awkward draft that might well turn out to be unintelligible. The interpreter has, therefore, to consider not only the text of the law but the context in which the law was enacted and the social context in which the law should be interpreted. This was articulated rather felicitously by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R. v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle [2003] UKHL 13 when it was said: “8. The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment. 9. There is, I think, no inconsistency between the Rule that statutory language retains the meaning it had when Parliament used it and the Rule that a statute is always speaking. If Parliament, however long ago, passed an Act applicable to dogs, it could not properly be interpreted to apply to cats; but it could properly be held to apply to animals which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was passed but are so regarded now. The meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" has not changed over the years since 1689, but many punishments which were not then thought to fall within that category would now be held to do so. The courts have frequently had to grapple with the question whether a modern invention or activity falls within old statutory language: see Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 4th ed. (2002) Part XVIII, Section 288.A revealing example is found in Grant v. Southwestern and County Properties Ltd. [1975] Ch 185, where Walton J had to decide whether a tape recording fell within the expression "document" in the Rules of the Supreme Court. Pointing out (page 190) that the furnishing of information had been treated as one of the main functions of a document, the judge concluded that the tape recording was a document.” 37. In the same decision, Lord Steyn suggested that the pendulum has swung towards giving a purposive interpretation to statutes and the shift towards purposive construction is today not in doubt, influenced in part by European ideas, European Community jurisprudence and European legal culture. It was said: “....... the adoption of a purposive approach to construction of statutes generally, and the 1990 Act [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990] in particular, is amply justified on wider grounds. It was said: “....... the adoption of a purposive approach to construction of statutes generally, and the 1990 Act [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990] in particular, is amply justified on wider grounds. In Cabell v. Markham (1945) 148 F 2d 737 Justice Learned Hand explained the merits of purposive interpretation, at p.739: “Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of construction. This change was not initiated by the teleological approach of European Community jurisprudence, and the influence of European legal culture generally, but it has been accelerated by European ideas: see, however, a classic early statement of the purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 763. In any event, nowadays the shift towards purposive interpretation is not in doubt. The qualification is that the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the context, e.g. social welfare legislation and tax statutes may have to be approached somewhat differently.” [Emphasis supplied by us]. To put it in the words of Lord Millett: "We are all purposive constructionists now.” In Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, it is said that: “General judicial adoption of the term 'purposive construction' is recent, but the concept is not new. Viscount Dilhorne, citing Coke, said that while it is now fashionable to talk of a purposive construction of a statute the need for such a construction has been recognized since the seventeenth century.12 In fact the recognition goes considerable further back than that. The difficulties over statutory interpretation belong to the language, and there is unlikely to be anything very novel or recent about their solution........ Little has changed over problems of verbal meaning since the Barons of the Exchequer arrived at their famous resolution in Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep 7a. Legislation is still about remedying what is thought to be a defect in the law. Little has changed over problems of verbal meaning since the Barons of the Exchequer arrived at their famous resolution in Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep 7a. Legislation is still about remedying what is thought to be a defect in the law. Even the most 'progressive' legislator, concerned to implement some wholly normal concept of social justice, would be constrained to admit that if the existing law accommodated the notion there would be no need to change it. No legal need that is ....” [Emphasis supplied by us] 51. I agree with the conclusion drawn by my learned brother Lokur, J. that the bar Under Section 123(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") to making an appeal on the ground of religion must not be confined to the religion of the candidate because of the word 'his' in that provision. I also agree that the purposive interpretation in the social context adjudication as a facet of purposive interpretation warrants a broad interpretation of that section. That the Section is intended to serve the broad purpose of checking appeals to religion, race, caste, community or language by any candidate. That to maintain the sanctity of the democratic process and to avoid the vitiating of secular atmosphere of democratic life an appeal to any of the factors should avoid the election of the candidate making such an appeal. 52. I would, however, add that such a construction is not only warranted upon the application of the purposive test of interpretation but also on textual interpretation. A literal interpretation does not exclude a purposive interpretation of the provisions whether in relation to a taxing statute or a penal statute. In IRC v. Trustees of Sir John Aird's Settlement [ 1984 CH 382 : (1983) 3 All ER 481 (CA)], the Court observed as follows: “... Two methods of statutory interpretation have at times been adopted by the court. One, sometimes called literalist, is to make a meticulous examination of the precise words used. The other sometimes called purposive, is to consider the object of the relevant provision in the light of the other provisions of the Act--the general intendment of the provisions. They are not mutually exclusive and both have their part to play even in the interpretation of a taxing statute.” 57. The other sometimes called purposive, is to consider the object of the relevant provision in the light of the other provisions of the Act--the general intendment of the provisions. They are not mutually exclusive and both have their part to play even in the interpretation of a taxing statute.” 57. It is an overriding duty of the Court while interpreting the provision of a statute that the intention of the legislature is not frustrated and any doubt or ambiguity must be resolved by recourse to the Rules of purposive construction. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India [ 2003(7) SCC 628 ], this Court observed as follows: “26. The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v. Duncombe (AC at p.634).] Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts would accept the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. The courts, when Rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, should be very reluctant to hold that Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve. [See BBC Enterprises v. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd. (All ER at pp. 122-23).]” Further, this Court observed as follows: “36. These decisions are authorities for the proposition that the Rule of strict construction of a regulatory/penal statute may not be adhered to, if thereby the plain intention of Parliament to combat crimes of special nature would be defeated.” (emphasis supplied) (v) In K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob and Ors. [ AIR 2019 SC 4681 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should first be identified and then a construction that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should be adopted. It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or social welfare legislations should be given strict construction10. It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik (supra) that the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik (supra) that the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council [2008] HCA 48, Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive construction to beneficial legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be construed narrowly.” (emphasis supplied) (vi) In D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society and Ors. v. Director of Public Instructions and Ors. [ (2019) 9 SCC 185 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “20. The principle of purposive construction of a statute is a well-recognised principle which has been incorporated in our jurisprudence. While giving a purposive interpretation, a court is required to place itself in the chair of the Legislature or author of the statute. The provision should be construed in such a manner to ensure that the object of the Act is fulfilled. Obviously, if the language of the Act is clear then the language has to be followed, and the court cannot give its own interpretation. However, if the language admits of two meanings then the court can refer to the Objects and Reasons, and find out the true meaning of the provisions as intended by the authors of the enactment. Justice S.B. Sinha in New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 279 held as follows: “51. ...to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of reasonable legislator/author. So done, the Rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled; which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfil its constitutional obligations as held by the court inter aliain Ashoka Marketing Ltd.” (emphasis supplied) Justice Sinha quoted with approval the following passage from Barak's treatise on Purposive Interpretation in Law, which reads as follows: “52. ...Hart and Sachs also appear to treat 'purpose' as a subjective concept. ...Hart and Sachs also appear to treat 'purpose' as a subjective concept. I say 'appear' because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably.” (emphasis supplied) 39. The paramount contention advanced by the appellants are that, the finding of the learned single Judge that, pursuant to the order dated 9.10.2019, the State PCB had deliberations with various stakeholders, is factually incorrect since no representative of the quarry operators were consulted by the State PCB; that the finding in paragraphs 9 & 33 of the judgment that compliance of conditions mentioned in Exhibit P9 report of the State PCB are not insisted at present in the matter of granting consent to operate stone quarries is factually incorrect and that quarrying operations are being carried out strictly complying with the conditions. Apart from the same, it is contended that the issue raised by the applicants before the NGT does not amount to a dispute, which can be considered by the NGT under section 14 of the NGT Act, 2010 and it is so advanced by placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Tachi Taga Tara v. Rajendra Singh Bhandari [ (2018)11 SCC 734 ]. 40. Yet another contention is that the findings rendered by the learned single Judge placing reliance on rule 24 of the NGT Rules, that the NGT is empowered under section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010, to issue general directions is based on an incorrect appreciation of the scope of section 15 of Act, 2010. 40. Yet another contention is that the findings rendered by the learned single Judge placing reliance on rule 24 of the NGT Rules, that the NGT is empowered under section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010, to issue general directions is based on an incorrect appreciation of the scope of section 15 of Act, 2010. That apart it is submitted that the judgment relied upon by the learned single Judge in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Centre for Environment Protection Research and Development and Others [(2020) SCC Online SC 687] is not applicable to the facts of the present case since there is no specific statutory provision that is alleged to be violated by the quarry operators. So also it is stated that the findings in the judgment that, according to the State PCB, the present distance of 50 meters is not adequate to prevent the pollution arising from stone quarry activity, is factually incorrect since the specific case of State PCB was that, quarrying can be permitted within a distance of 50 meters, if conditions as prescribed in Ext.P9 report are complied with. It was also contended that the NGT does not have any power to direct the State PCB or the Central Pollution Control Board to prescribe a particular distance criteria in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Subhash Chandra Jaiswal [ (2017) 5 SCC 163 ]. 41. Contentions were also raised relying upon the provisions of the Water Act, 1974 and the Air Act, 1981, to the effect that, the State PCB and Central Pollution Control Board, only have the power to advise the Central and State Governments on any matter concerning the prevention and control of pollution and that neither the Central or State PCBs have any power to prescribe any prescriptions on the functioning of the quarries. Again it was contended that by virtue of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board v. Sterlite Industries (I) Limited and others [(2019)SCC Online SC 221], NGT does not have the power of judicial review to consider the adequacy of distance criteria prescribed by the State Government under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, a rule constituted by virtue of the powers conferred under section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. 42. 42. Added to the above contention relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Goa Foundation v. Union of India and others [ (2014)6 SCC 590 ], it was submitted that, the prohibitions and restrictions on the location of industries and carrying on processes and operations in different areas can only be done by the Central Government on the basis of power conferred under sections 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the Environment Protection Act, 1986. So also the judgments of the Apex Court in Rajeev Hitendra Pathak v. Achyut Kashinath [ (2011) 9 SCC 541 ] and Standard Chartered Bank v. Dharminder Bhohi [(2013) 15 SCC 341] were pressed into service to canvass for the proposition that NGT does not have the powers to initiate suomotu proceedings relating to a dispute, which can be adjudicated under section 14 or matters which can be decided under section 16 of the NGT Act. 43. It is also the alternative contention of the appellants that no dispute was raised regarding the permissions granted and licenses to be granted for conducting the proposed quarry of the appellants nor the appellants were parties to the proceedings before the NGT and further that, no scientific study was conducted nor was any technical evidence or expert opinion obtained by the NGT before passing the impugned order. So also it was submitted that no opportunity was given to any of the parties, who were likely to be affected to make any representation before the NGT prior to passing of Ext.P13 impugned order. 44. Yet another contention advanced was that it is a well settled rule of construction that no provision should be given retrospective effect unless the legislature by express or by necessary implications made it retrospective. Over and above the said contention, it was submitted that having found that the order passed by the NGT is in absolute violation of the principles of natural justice and the order was set aside accordingly, it was not legal and proper on the part of the learned single Judge to maintain the interim order granted on 6.8.2020 and the relevant portion of the order for convenience is extracted hereunder : “9. Accordingly, it is ordered that in cases where a quarrying permit/quarrying lease issued under the provisions of the Kerala Minor Mineral concession Rules, 2015 is valid and current as on 21.7.2020 (date of the impugned order rendered by the Tribunal), which do not fulfil the new distance norms stipulated by the NGT order, then it shall be ensured that status quo regarding the distance criteria based on Rule 10(f) and Rule 40(i) of the Kerala Minor Mineral concession Rules may be maintained by the respondent authorities concerned during validity period of such current permits/lease. Needless to say, in such cases, the competent authorities concerned can insist for strict compliance of the other applicable norms, guidelines, orders, etc. However, it is made clear that in the case of the applications of fresh grant of quarrying permits/quarrying leases or applications for renewal of quarrying permits/leases, which do not fulfil the abovesaid impugned distance criteria stipulated in the order of the Tribunal, then such requests need not be granted for the time being. But at the same time, in those cases, such fresh or renewal application, including that for EC, PCB consent, explosive licence, local body licences, etc. in that regard may be processed and such applications need not be rejected solely on the ground of non-fulfilment of the new distance norms stipulated in the impugned order dated 21.7.2020 of the NGT. This order will be in force for a period of 2 weeks.” 45. In the appeal filed by the State Government and its officials, it is submitted that due to the impugned order, none of the applications seeking mineral concessions or its renewal is able to be considered or granted by the statutory authorities leading to a stalemate due to the scarcity of minerals and consequent to the same, many of the prestigious projects launched in the State of Kerala, which are underway will be stalled, running industries have to be eventually stopped for want of minerals and substantial prejudice and hardship has been caused and is continuing to be caused, which materially affects the larger public interest, and further that the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge does not lay down the correct proposition of law and accordingly liable to be set aside. 46. 46. In some of the writ appeals, it is contended that the distance to be maintained by the quarries from residential area is prescribed by the State Government as per rule 10(f) and rule 40(1)(i) of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015,(KMMC Rules) and the National Green Tribunal does not have any jurisdiction whatsoever to consider the validity of the said rules under the KMMC Rules, 2015; that the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, is also bound by the notification regarding the territorial jurisdiction that has been issued under section 4(3) of the NGT Act, 2010 and the procedure prescribed under the NGT Practice and Procedure Rules, 2011 and it is contended that in so far as Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Union Territories of Pondicherry and Lakshadweep is concerned, the States would come under the southern zone and therefore, the Principal Bench at New Delhi is ousted from the jurisdiction and viewed in that manner, the order passed by the NGT is absolutely lacking territorial jurisdiction and therefore, bad in law. 47. Bearing in mind the contentions put forth by the respective counsel, the primary question emerges for consideration is, whether the NGT is vested with powers to entertain an application communicated by way of a letter as a petition under the provision of the NGT Act, 2010 and the NGT can pass orders thus prohibiting the rights conferred on the quarry operators or project proponents or applicants for such licenses/consents/permits ? The learned counsel on either side have addressed their arguments basically relying upon the NGT Act, 2010, MMDR Act, 1957, the Water Act, 1974, the Air Act, 1981, the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015. In order to have a thorough understanding of the provisions of the aforesaid Acts and Rules thereto, we deem it fit to consider the relevant provisions. Before we do that, we extract hereunder the impugned order passed by the NGT dated 9.7.2020 which would throw light to the circumstances that led to the directions. “ORDER 1. The issue for consideration is the safeguards in operation of stone quarries close to residences and public roads. At present, the Kerala State PCB has permitted the stone quarry beyond 50 mtrs. from residences and public roads. 2. The Tribunal considered the matter on 28.02.2020. “ORDER 1. The issue for consideration is the safeguards in operation of stone quarries close to residences and public roads. At present, the Kerala State PCB has permitted the stone quarry beyond 50 mtrs. from residences and public roads. 2. The Tribunal considered the matter on 28.02.2020. Finding the distance to be inadequate, CPCB was required to consider the matter and report. It was observed: “2. Accordingly, a report has been filed by the Kerala State PCB on 17.12.2019 retreating the distance criteria of 50 mtrs. and mentioning that no study is available with the CPCB. 3. We are of the view, ad earlier observed that the distance of 50 mtrs. for stone quarry, particularly when blasts are involved, is highly inadequate and can have deleterious effect on noise and air pollution, environment and public health. 4. In view of the above, we direct the CPCB to examine and lay down more stringent conditions and appropriately longer distance within one month and convey the same to the State Boards. The State Board may take further action accordingly. Compliance reports be filed before the next date by email at judicial-ngt@gov.in.” 3. Accordingly, the CPCB has filed its report on 09.07.2020 concluding as follows: “6.0 conclusion: In view of available information, following minimum distance criteria may be considered for permitting stone quarrying by SPCBs. Mining Type Minimum distance Locations A When Blasting is not involved 100 m Residential/public buildings, inhabited sites, locations to be considered by States B When Blasting is involved 200m ** **Note: The regulations for danger zone (500m) prescribed by Directorate General of Mines Safety also have to be complied compulsorily and necessary measures should be taken to minimise the impact on environment. However, if any states is already having stringent criteria than the above for minor mineral mining (i.e., more prescribed distances than the above), the same shall be applicable. 4. In view of the above, the said criteria be followed throughout India. The CPCB may monitor compliance. A copy of this order be sent to the CPCB and all the State {Cbs/PCCs by email for compliance” 48. 4. In view of the above, the said criteria be followed throughout India. The CPCB may monitor compliance. A copy of this order be sent to the CPCB and all the State {Cbs/PCCs by email for compliance” 48. Therefore, on a reading of the said order, it is clear that the Tribunal has concluded that in view of the available information, a minimum distance criteria of 100 meters distance when blasting is not involved and 200 meters distance when blasting is involved from residential/public buildings, inhabited sites, locations may be considered for permitting stone quarrying by State PCBs. However, it was made clear that if any State is already having stringent criteria than the above for Minor Mineral Mining (i.e., more prescribed distances than the above), the same shall be applicable. In view of the said stipulations, it was further directed that the said criteria be followed throughout India and the Central Pollution Control Board may monitor compliance. As we have pointed out earlier, the sum and substance of the contentions advanced by the appellants is that the NGT is not vested with any powers to fix any distance criteria and in accordance with the Environment Protection Act, 1986, the power to do so is vested with the Central Government alone and therefore, the order passed by the NGT is absolutely illegal and without any jurisdiction. 49. Since the contention with respect to the jurisdiction of the NGT is predominant, we proceed to analyse the scope of the National Green Tribunal and the power enjoyed by it. The statement of objects and reasons of NGT Act, 2010, which has come into force on and with effect from 2.6.2010 shows that such a legislation was necessitated due to the rapid expansion in industrial, infrastructure and transportation sectors, and increase in urbanisation in recent years have given rise to new pressures on the natural resources and environment of the country. It was also realised that there is a commensurate increase in environment related litigation pending in various courts and other authorities and the risk to human health and environment arising out of hazardous activities has also become a matter of concern. Moreover, India was a party to the decisions taken at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm in June, 1972, calling upon the States to take appropriate steps for the protection and improvement of the human environment. Moreover, India was a party to the decisions taken at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm in June, 1972, calling upon the States to take appropriate steps for the protection and improvement of the human environment. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held at Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992, in which India participated, has also called upon the States to provide effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings including redress and remedy, and to develop national laws regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage. 50. Above all the right to a healthy environment has been construed as a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the judicial pronouncement in India. It was also felt that in order to tackle the large number of environmental cases pending in higher courts and the involvement of multidisciplinary issues in such cases, constitution of a specialised Tribunal was necessary. Therefore, it was considered expedient to implement the decisions taken at the aforesaid conferences and to have a National Green Tribunal in view of the involvement of multi-disciplinary issues relating to the environment. The Bill introduced as the National Green Tribunal Bill, 2009 inter alia among other aspects included that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all civil cases, where a substantial question relating to environment, including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments specified in the Schedule I to the Bill and to grant reliefs and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule I to the Bill and to hear appeals under certain enactments specified in the Schedule III to the Bill. 51. Environment is defined under section 2(c) to include water, air and land and the inter-relationship, which exists among and between water, air and land and human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms and property. Sub-section(2) of section 2 makes it clear that the words and expressions used in the Act but not defined therein and defined in the Water Act, 1974, the Air Act, 1981, the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and other enactments specified therein shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in those Acts. Sub-section(2) of section 2 makes it clear that the words and expressions used in the Act but not defined therein and defined in the Water Act, 1974, the Air Act, 1981, the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and other enactments specified therein shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in those Acts. Therefore, it can be seen that the National Green Tribunal is entrusted with the power to protect the environment taking note of the appropriate environmental laws prescribed in Schedule I of Act, 2010. 52. The Tribunal is constituted by the Central Government, consisting of a full-time Chairperson; not less than 10 but subject to maximum of 20 full-time judicial members; not less than 10 but subject to maximum of 20 full-time expert members, as the Central Government may notify from time to time. Section 4(2) enables the Chairperson of the Tribunal, if considered necessary to invite any one or more persons having specialised knowledge and experience in a particular case before the Tribunal to assist the Tribunal in that case. Sub-section (3) of section 4 empowers the Central Government to notify the ordinary place or places of sitting of the Tribunal and the territorial jurisdiction falling under each such place of sitting. Sub-section (4) of section 4 empowers the Central Government, in consultation with the Chairperson of the Tribunal to make rules regulating generally the practises and procedure of the Tribunal, which includes the rules as to the procedure for hearing applications and appeals and other matters including the circuit procedure for hearing at a place other than the ordinary place of sitting falling within the jurisdiction referred to in sub-section (3) pertaining to the applications and appeals. 53. The qualification of the Chairperson or judicial member of the Tribunal is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court of India or Chief Justice of a High Court. However, proviso to section 5 makes it clear that the person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court shall also be qualified to be appointed as a judicial member. However, proviso to section 5 makes it clear that the person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court shall also be qualified to be appointed as a judicial member. The Act also prescribes qualification for appointment as expert members with basic degree in Master of Science with a Doctorate Degree of Master of Engineering or Master of Technology and has an experience of 15 years in the relevant field including 5 years practical experience in the field of environment and forests and other qualifications of Management in Pollution Control etc. apart from other administrative experience of 15 years including experience of 5 years in dealing with environmental matters in the Central or a State Governments or in a reputed National or State level institutions. The method of appointment of the Chairperson and the judicial members are also prescribed under section 6 of the Act, 2010. The qualifications prescribed for the Chairperson and other judicial and expert members and the manner in which the appointments are made would show that it is done with the avowed object of translating the provisions of Act and the objects and reasons specified above which inter alia includes consideration of applications and other matters apart from the appeals. 54. With the aforesaid aspects in mind, we proceed to deal with Chapter III conferring jurisdiction and powers to the Tribunal and conduct of proceedings of the Tribunal. Section 14 deals with settlement of disputes by Tribunal, which specifies that the Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases, where a substantial question relating to environment including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment, is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. Which thus, means all civil cases relating to environment and the questions arising out of the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I shall be decided by the Tribunal and pass orders thereon. 55. True, a period of 6 months is provided as the limitation for entertaining application for adjudication of the dispute from the date on which the cause of action arose first. It has also the power to condone delay on sufficient cause within a further period not exceeding 60 days. Section 15 empowers the Tribunal to grant relief, compensation and restitution. True, a period of 6 months is provided as the limitation for entertaining application for adjudication of the dispute from the date on which the cause of action arose first. It has also the power to condone delay on sufficient cause within a further period not exceeding 60 days. Section 15 empowers the Tribunal to grant relief, compensation and restitution. It is appreciating the power conferred under section 15, the learned single Judge has held that the Tribunal has suo motu powers to consider any application submitted by any person in order to provide reliefs. Sections 14 & 15 of the Act, 2010 is extracted hereunder for convenience: “14. Tribunal to settle disputes. -(1) The Tribunal shall have the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is involved and such question arises out of the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. (2) The Tribunal shall hear the disputes arising from the questions referred to in sub-section (1) and settle such disputes and pass order thereon. (3) No application for adjudication of dispute under this section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of six months from the date on which the cause of action for such dispute first arose: Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. 15. Relief, compensation and restitution.-(1) The Tribunal may, by an provide,- a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule 1 (including accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance); (b) for restitution of property damaged; (c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as the Tribunal may think fit. (2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) shall be in addition to the relief paid of payable under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991(6 of 1991). (2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) shall be in addition to the relief paid of payable under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991(6 of 1991). (3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment under this section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose: Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, divide the compensation or relief payable under separate heads specified in Schedule 11 so as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environment, as it may think fit. (5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief under this Act shall intimate to the Tribunal about the application filed to, or, as the case may be, compensation or relief received from, any other court or authority.” 56. On an analysis of Section 15, it can be seen that it is a power enjoyed by the Tribunal independent of other provisions of Chapter III of Act, 2010. Sub-section(3) only specifies that no application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment under section 15 shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of 5 years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose. However, the proviso makes it clear that it has the power to enhance the period by 60 days to file the application on sufficient cause. It is relevant and important to note that section 15(1) enables the Tribunal to pass such orders as contemplated in clauses (a) to (c) therein. 57. To put it another way, the limitation of 5 years is prescribed only when an application is filed by any person seeking the reliefs contained under section 15(1). It is relevant and important to note that section 15(1) enables the Tribunal to pass such orders as contemplated in clauses (a) to (c) therein. 57. To put it another way, the limitation of 5 years is prescribed only when an application is filed by any person seeking the reliefs contained under section 15(1). It is also equally important to note that sub-section (5) thereto empowers the Tribunal to consider claims of compensation or relief to any claimant after ascertaining as to whether the claimant has received any compensation from any other court or authority. Section 16 confers appellate jurisdiction on the Tribunal from the orders passed by the authorities under the enactments specified in Schedule I. Section 18(1) dealing with application or appeal to Tribunal specifies that each applications under sections 14 & 15 or an appeal under section 16 shall be made to the Tribunal in such form and containing such particulars and documents. 58. Therefore, on an appreciation of the provisions discussed above, it is evident that the powers conferred under sections 14 & 15 are of original nature, whereas, section 16 is an appellate jurisdiction from the orders passed under various statutes. Apart from the above, Section 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice. It further provides that subject to the provisions of the Act, the Tribunal shall have the power to regulate its own procedure and it is not entangled with the trappings of the Evidence Act, 1872. However, it is vested with the powers enjoyed by a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit enumerated in sub-section (4) of section 19. Therefore, it is unequivocal, it is vested with the original powers of conducting a trial in order to identify the issues that have been placed before it by any person or which has come to its knowledge in order to provide relief in contemplation of section 15(1) of the Act. It is also relevant to note that under section 20 of Act, 2010, the Tribunal, while passing any order or decision or award, shall apply the principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. 59. It is also relevant to note that under section 20 of Act, 2010, the Tribunal, while passing any order or decision or award, shall apply the principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle. 59. The phraseologies employed in the above discussed provisions would make it clear that it has the original jurisdiction to entertain any application or any matters which has come to its notice enabling it to pass any decision, any order or any award, however, guided by the principles of natural justice. It is significant to mention that though section 15(1)(a) is referring to relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in Schedule I, clauses (b) and (c) thereto have not been made referable to enactments contained in Schedule I of the Act. Therefore, it can be seen that the Tribunal enjoys varied power under the provisions of sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. In fact the said issue has been considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mantri Techzone (Pvt.)Ltd v. Forward Foundation and Others [(2019)SCC Online SC 322]. Paragraphs 41 to 46 read thus: “41. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is provided under Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act. Section 14 provides the jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment) is involved. However, such question should arise out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I. 42. The Tribunal has also jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) of the Act to provide relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in Schedule I. Further, under Sections 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c), the Tribunal can provide for restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fit. It is noteworthy that Sections 15(1) (b) and (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act. Rightly so, this grants a glimpse into the wide range of powers that the Tribunal has been cloaked with respect to restoration of the environment. 43. Section 15(1)(c) of the Act is an entire island of power and jurisdiction read with Section 20 of the Act. Rightly so, this grants a glimpse into the wide range of powers that the Tribunal has been cloaked with respect to restoration of the environment. 43. Section 15(1)(c) of the Act is an entire island of power and jurisdiction read with Section 20 of the Act. The principles of sustainable development, precautionary principle and polluter pays, propounded by this Court by way of multiple judicial pronouncements, have now been embedded as a bedrock of environmental jurisprudence under the NGT Act. Therefore, wherever the environment and ecology are being compromised and jeopardised, the Tribunal can apply Section 20 for taking restorative measures in the interest of the environment. 44. The NGT Act being a beneficial legislation, the power bestowed upon the Tribunal would not be read narrowly. An interpretation which furthers the interests of environment must be given a broader reading. (See Kishore Lalv. ESI Corpn.[Kishore Lalv. ESI Corpn., (2007) 4 SCC 579 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 1], para 17.) The existence of the Tribunal without its broad restorative powers under Section 15(1)(c) read with Section 20 of the Act, would render it ineffective and toothless, and shall betray the legislative intent in setting up a specialised Tribunal specifically to address environmental concerns. The Tribunal, specially constituted with Judicial Members as well as with experts in the field of environment, has a legal obligation to provide for preventive and restorative measures in the interest of the environment. 45. Section 15 of the Act provides power and jurisdiction, independent of Section 14 thereof. Further, Section 14(3) juxtaposed with Section 15(3) of the Act, are separate provisions for filing distinct applications before the Tribunal with distinct periods of limitation, thereby amply demonstrating that jurisdiction of the Tribunal flows from these sections (i.e. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act) independently. The limitation provided in Section 14 is a period of 6 months from the date on which the cause of action first arose and whereas in Section 15 it is 5 years. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear to keep Sections 14 and 15 as self-contained jurisdictions. 46. Further, Section 18 of the Act recognises the right to file applications each under Section 14 as well as Section 15. Therefore, it cannot be argued that Section 14 provides jurisdiction to the Tribunal while Section 15 merely supplements the same with powers. Therefore, the legislative intent is clear to keep Sections 14 and 15 as self-contained jurisdictions. 46. Further, Section 18 of the Act recognises the right to file applications each under Section 14 as well as Section 15. Therefore, it cannot be argued that Section 14 provides jurisdiction to the Tribunal while Section 15 merely supplements the same with powers. As stated supra the typical nature of the Tribunal, its breadth of powers as provided under the statutory provisions of the Act as well as the scheduled enactments, cumulatively, leave no manner of doubt that the only tenable interpretation to these provisions would be to read the provisions broadly in favour of cloaking the Tribunal with effective authority. An interpretation that is in favour of conferring jurisdiction should be preferred rather than one taking away jurisdiction." 60. The said question was again considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Director General (Road Development) National Highways Authority of India v. Aam Aadmi Lokmanch and others [(2020)SCC Online SC 572]. Paragraphs 38 to 43 are extracted hereunder: “38. A conjoint reading of Sections 14, 15 and the Schedules would lead one to infer that the NGT has circumscribed jurisdiction to deal with, adjudicate, and wherever needed, direct measures such as payment of compensation, or make restitutionary directions in cases where the violation (i.e. harm caused due to pollution or exposure to hazards, etc.) are the result of infraction of any enactment listed in the first schedule. Yet, that, interpretation, in the opinion of this court, is not warranted. 39. The reference to Schedule II, in Section 15(4) is not merely by way of events which are actionable in relation to harm caused due to the acts resulting in violation of any enactment under Schedule I. The wide language of that provision enables the tribunal (NGT) to direct, inter alia, payment of compensation, “having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment”. This interpretation is borne out by a reading of Section 17(2) regarding the apportionment of liability for payment of compensation. 40. In the decision of this court reported as Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi, this court held that ponds constituted public utility and were meant for common use. The court held that ponds could not be allotted or commercialised, and that filling up of ponds was illegal. Recently, in Jitendra Singhv. 40. In the decision of this court reported as Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi, this court held that ponds constituted public utility and were meant for common use. The court held that ponds could not be allotted or commercialised, and that filling up of ponds was illegal. Recently, in Jitendra Singhv. Ministry of Environment, the Court quoted and applied the observations in Hinch Lal(supra), in the context of an appeal directed against an order of the NGT which had summarily dismissed an application under Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT Act seeking directions to cease the filling up of ponds in the Greater Noida Industrial Development Area. 41. Long ago, in State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone, this court made following observations : “6. Rivers, Forests, Minerals and such other resources constitute a Nation's natural wealth. These resources are not to be frittered away and exhausted by any one generation. Every generation owes a duty to a succeeding generations to develop and conserve the natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. It is in the interest of mankind. It is in the interest of the nation. It is recognised by Parliament. Parliament has declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the Regulation of mines and the development of minerals. It has enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 …” 42. Likewise, in Lafarge Umiam Mining (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, the sepertinent observations we remade : “75. Universal human dependence on the use of environmental resources for the most basic needs renders it impossible to refrain from altering the environment. As a result, environmental conflicts are ineradicable and environmental protection is always a matter of degree, inescapably requiring choices as to the appropriate level of environmental protection and the risks which are to be regulated. This aspect is recognised by the concepts of “sustainable development”. It is equally well settled by the decision of this Court in Narmada Bachao And olan v. Union of India that environment has different facets and care of the environment is an ongoing process. This aspect is recognised by the concepts of “sustainable development”. It is equally well settled by the decision of this Court in Narmada Bachao And olan v. Union of India that environment has different facets and care of the environment is an ongoing process. These concepts Rule out the formulation of an across-the-board principle as it would depend on the facts of each case whether diversion in a given case should be permitted or not, barring “no go” areas (whose identification would again depend on undertaking of due diligence exercise). In such cases, the margin of appreciation doctrine would apply.” 43. Recently, in State of Meghalaya v. All Dimasa Students Union, Dima-Hasao District Committee, this court had affirmed a part of the decision of the NGT issuing directions in respect of large-scale mining in the state of Meghalaya, on the ground that it had an adverse impact on the environment. This was despite the fact that mining and the subject of mines is not specified in the list of enactments under the first schedule. The court also approved the NGT's directions, appointing experts, to assess the impact of such mining on the environment." 61. The Hon'ble Apex Court has taken note of the judgment in Mantri Techzone while rendering its findings as above. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court has also taken note of rule 24 of the National Green Tribunal (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011 and held that it empowers the Tribunal to make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to secure the ends of justice. It was further held therein that rule 24 vests special power to the Tribunal to pass orders and issue directions to secure the ends of justice and the expressions employed would make it clear that it empowers the Tribunal with wide discretion. So also at paragraph 80 of the said judgment it was held that the “the NGT's directions though placed in the context of its adjudicatory role, have a wider ramification in the sense that its rulings constitute the appropriate norm which are to be followed by all those engaging in similar activities. Therefore, its orders, contextually in the course of adjudication, also establish and direct behaviour appropriate for future guidance. Therefore, its orders, contextually in the course of adjudication, also establish and direct behaviour appropriate for future guidance. In these circumstances, even the panoply of the NGT's powers under the NGT Act, which include considering regulatory directions issued by expert regulatory bodies under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, the Air(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Bio Diversity Act, 2002, it has to be held that general directions for future guidance to avoid or prevent injury to the environment for appropriate assimilation in relevant rules, can be given by the NGT.” 62. It is by appreciating the aforesaid provisions and the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court, the learned single Judge has arrived at the finding that the Tribunal has the suomotu power to take any action on any information received. That apart section 22 of the Act deals with appeal to Hon'ble Supreme Court and therein also it is specified that any person aggrieved by any award, decision or order of the Tribunal, may appeal to the Supreme Court within the time period prescribed thereunder. It also shows that any award or decision passed by the Tribunal apart from the orders passed in its appellate jurisdiction is appealable to the Supreme Court. 63. However, on the other hand, learned counsel for the appellants invited our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Authority and others [(2021) SCC Online SC 7] and submitted that NGT is not a plenary body with inherent powers to address concerns of a residuary character but it is a statutory body with limited mandate over environmental matters as and when they arise for its consideration and therefore, it was submitted that in a cause before it, NGT cannot go on to adjudicate on concerns of violation of fundamental rights and once the contours of a subject matter traverse the scope of appeal from a grant of environmental clearance, the merits review by the Tribunal cannot traverse beyond the scope of jurisdiction vested in it by the statute. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Techi Tagi Tara supra was pressed into service to contend that in order to exercise the powers under sections 14, 15 & 18 by the NGT, there must be a substantial question relating to the environment and that question must arise in a dispute and it should not be an academic question and further that there must also be a claimant raising the dispute and which dispute is capable of settlement by the NGT by the grant of some reliefs which could be in the nature of compensation or restitution of property, damage or restitution of the environment and any other incidental or ancillary relief connected therewith. 64. In our considered opinion, the question that was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases was in regard to the power enjoyed by the NGT in an application filed by any aggrieved person seeking any relief in terms of section 15 of Act, 2010. The question in regard to the case at hand was not considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the subject matter being one concerning the distance criteria of 50 meters fixed in the consent provided by the State PCBs from residential buildings and other installations exercising suomotu power. The issue in Sterlite Industries supra considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court was in regard to the appellate jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal vis-a-vis the original order of the Tamil Nadu PCB made under section 27 of the Water Act and section 21 of the Air Act, which has no bearing to the issue at hand, and the question actually considered therein was, since no decision has been made by the appellate authority under the Water Act or Air Act, whether a direct appeal to NGT against the original order of TN PCB was maintainable. The judgment of the Apex Court in Goa Foundation supra was also pressed into service, wherein the question considered was in respect of illegal and uncontrolled and unmonitored mining affecting environment and revenue and expired mining leases in the State of Goa vis-a-vis the power exercised by the Hon'ble Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in which the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the powers of the court to give a direction prohibiting mining activities upto a certain distance from the boundaries of national parks or wildlife sanctuaries. Therein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered the power of the Central Government under rule 5 of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986, to prohibit carrying on of mining operations in areas which are proximate to a wildlife sanctuary or a national park. According to us, though various aspects of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the Rules thereto, were considered, the Hon'ble Apex Court never had an occasion to consider the power of the NGT, vis-a-vis the provisions of the NGT Act, 2010. Therefore, the findings contained thereunder cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of adjudicating an issue as to whether the NGT is vested with suomotu powers under the provisions of Act, 2010. 65. The judgment of the Apex Court in Deepak Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and others relied upon by the learned counsel for appellants was in relation to the environmental consequences of quarrying of mines and minerals, boulders, gravel and sand in notified areas and river beds and the requirement of effective mining planning framework taking into account the constitutional guarantee contained under Article 21 and Articles 48-A and 51-A(G) vis-a-vis the mining laws. We do not think that the findings rendered by the Apex Court in that judgment would support the case put forth by the appellants. The judgment of the Apex Court in Rajeev Hitendra Pathak and others v. Achyut Kashi Nath Karekar and another was relied upon, which was a case, in which the power of the Consumer Forums under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, was considered and accordingly held that it is abundantly clear that the Tribunals are creatures of the statute and derive their power from the express provisions of the statute and the District Forums and State Commissions have not been given any power to set aside exparte orders and the power of review and the powers which have not been expressly given by the statute. We do not think the proposition laid down thereunder would come to the rescue of the appellants in view of the categoric and specific powers conferred on the NGT under Chapter III as discussed above. 66. We do not think the proposition laid down thereunder would come to the rescue of the appellants in view of the categoric and specific powers conferred on the NGT under Chapter III as discussed above. 66. Taking into account the objectives of the NGT Act, 2010, the qualification of the Chairperson and members of the Tribunal by incorporating legal and technical persons, and the specific powers conferred on original and appellate nature would make it clear that the Parliament intended it to exercise powers to protect the environment having regard to the statutes specified in the First Schedule of the Act. As held by the Apex Court in Mantri Techzone supra and the Aam Aadmi Lokmanch, supra the NGT has power under sections 15(1)(b) & (c) to consider any other matter not referable to the statutes specified in Schedule I, which in our view, is an omnibus power to deal with the provisions of the statutes specified in Schedule I other than cases of individual compensation and outside the same. 67. Assimilating the factual and legal situations, we do not think the appellants have made out any case in regard to the power enjoyed by the NGT suo motu to protect the environment from pollution. However, a question is raised as to whether the NGT has got power under the Environment Protection Act to fix a distance criteria by and between a quarry and residential and other installations ? In order to answer the said question the relevant provisions of the Environment Protection Act and the Rules thereto along with the Water Act, 1974, and the Air Act, 1981 are to be considered and incidentally the provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957 and the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, may also have to be referred to, to sort out the question raised. The Environment Protection Act is enacted with the intention of protecting and improving the environment and for matters connected therewith. Under section 2(a) environment is defined to mean, “water, air and land and the inter-relationship which exists among and between water, air and land and human beings, other living creatures, plants, microorganisms and property”. The said definition is in pari materia with the definition of environment under section 2(c) of the NGT Act, 2010. Under section 2(a) environment is defined to mean, “water, air and land and the inter-relationship which exists among and between water, air and land and human beings, other living creatures, plants, microorganisms and property”. The said definition is in pari materia with the definition of environment under section 2(c) of the NGT Act, 2010. Moreover section 2(2) of NGT Act, 2010, as we have stated above takes in all the environmental laws specified in the First Schedule of the said Act which includes Environment Protection Act and by virtue of the said provision wherever the expressions are not defined under the said Act, the definition provided under the laws in the Schedule would be applicable to assign meaning to the expressions used in the NGT Act, 2010. 68. It is true, as per section 3 of Environment Protection Act, 1986, the Central Government is vested with powers to take all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution subject to the provisions of the Act. The thrust of the contention advanced by the learned counsel for appellants was that as per section 3 of Act, 1986, the Central Government alone is vested with powers to take measures to protect and improve the environment. 69. It is also the case of the appellants that as per section 3(2),(iii), (v), (xiv) of Act, 1986, the Central Government is the sole authority empowered for laying down standards for the quality of environment in its various aspects; restriction of areas in which any industries, operations or processes or class of industries, operations or processes shall not be carried out or shall be carried out subject to certain safeguards; such other matters as the Central Government deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing the effective implementation of the provisions of the Act. So also it was submitted that section 5 of Act, 1986 is a sweeping power enjoyed by the Central Government alone to issue directions in writing to any person, officer or any authority and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions notwithstanding anything contained in any other law but subject to the provisions of the Act, 1986. Explanation thereto was also highlighted wherein it is specified that the power to issue directions under section 5 includes the power to direct; (a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process; or (b) stoppage of the supply of electricity or water or any other service. 70. Reading together the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel for appellants submitted that the power being conferred on the Central Government under Act, 1986, NGT is not vested with powers to direct the State PCBs to fix up the distance criteria by and between the quarry and residential and other installations. It is also clear from section 5A that any person aggrieved by any directions issued under section 5 of Act, 1986, to appeal to the National Green Tribunal established under NGT Act, 2010. Added to that it is submitted that section 6 empowers only the Central Government by publication of notification in the official gazette to make rules in respect of all or any of the matters referred in section 3. The paramount contention advanced in that regard is on the basis of section 6(2)(a) & (b) of Act, 1986, which empowers the Central Government to make rules in regard to the standards of quality of air, water or soil for various areas and purposes and also to prohibit and restrict the location of industries and the carrying on of processes and operations of the different areas. 71. According to the learned counsel, all these provisions would make it clear that the attempt made by the NGT to issue rules, and directions in the nature of overlooking the powers conferred on the Central Government, is not legally sustainable. That apart it is submitted that as per section 7 of Act, 1986, any person carrying on industry operation etc. cannot allow emission or discharge of environmental pollution in excess of the standards fixed by the Central Government. So also section 24 of Act, 1986 has been referred, to drive home a point that the effect of other laws is subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) thereto, the provisions of this Act and the Rules or orders made therein notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than Act, 1986. So also section 24 of Act, 1986 has been referred, to drive home a point that the effect of other laws is subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) thereto, the provisions of this Act and the Rules or orders made therein notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than Act, 1986. So also section 25 of Act, 1986 is pressed into service, which is the rule making power of the Central Government which stipulates that the Central Government may by notification in the official gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, which power includes also to fix the standards in excess of which the environmental pollutants shall not be discharged or emitted. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for appellants is that the NGT was not right in taking up the role of the Central Government and issuing directions instead of granting liberty to the Central Government to do so as envisioned by the Parliament under the Act, 1986. 72. That apart rule 3 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 has been referred to, which deals with the standards for emissions or discharge of environmental pollutants, by which it is specified that the standards for emission or discharge of environmental pollutants from the industries, operations or processes shall be as specified in Schedules I to IV thereto. Sub-rules (2), (3) and (3A) were also invoked to canvass the proposition that notwithstanding anything contained in rule 3(1), the Central Board or a State Board is left with the liberty to specify more stringent standards from those provided in Schedules I to IV. Rule 5 and the sub-rules thereto were also pointed out dealing with prohibition and restrictions on the location of industries and the carrying on processes and operations in different areas in order to exemplify that the Central Government and the State Government alone are the authority to carry out the provisions of Act and Rules, 1986. 73. Our attention was also invited to Sl.No.11 of Schedule I dealing with stone crushing unit and submitted that it only deals with suspended particulate matter and the standard prescribed thereto is the suspended particulate matter measured between 3 meters and 10 meters from any process equipment of a stone crushing unit which shall not exceed 600 micrograms per cubic meter. Our attention was also invited to Sl.No.11 of Schedule I dealing with stone crushing unit and submitted that it only deals with suspended particulate matter and the standard prescribed thereto is the suspended particulate matter measured between 3 meters and 10 meters from any process equipment of a stone crushing unit which shall not exceed 600 micrograms per cubic meter. Therefore, the attempt made by the appellants is that the Rules, 1986, does not prescribe any distance criteria as is fixed by the NGT and therefore, it is an action without authority and jurisdiction. So also our attention was drawn to Schedule III of the Rules dealing with ambient air quality standards in respect of noise, wherein as per Note 3, the silence zone is defined as areas upto 100 meters around such premises as hospitals, educational institutions and courts. So also Schedule IV was brought to our attention dealing with standards for emission of smoke, vapour etc. from motor vehicles to contend that so far as a quarry is concerned, no standards for smoke, vapour etc. are fixed. 74. Learned counsel for the appellants also invited our attention to the general standards for discharge of environmental pollutants contained under Schedule VI and submitted that the Central Government have not fixed any standard in regard to the discharge of environmental pollutants in regard to a quarry and therefore, the NGT is not empowered to fix any standards without undertaking any study in regard to the likelihood of the pollutants remaining in the air at a distance of 100 and 200 meters as insisted upon by the NGT with regard to a blasting and non-blasting quarry respectively. Annexure 1 guideline under Schedule VI of the Rules, 1986 was also brought to our notice, wherein para 7 specifies that the standards mentioned in the Schedule shall also apply to all other effluents discharged such as mining and mineral processing activities and sewage. 75. We have no doubt in our mind that when the provisions of the Act, 1986 and the Rules thereto are read together, various standards are fixed and which may even apply to a stone crushing unit and even mining and mineral processing activities as is discussed above, but the fact remains under the Act and the Rules, 1986, no standard with respect to quarrying activity vis-a-vis generation of pollutants thereto and any distance criteria is fixed under the Act. Therefore, the attempt of the learned counsel for appellants that the NGT was not empowered to issue any directions overlooking the provisions of the Act and the Rules, 1986 is not a sustainable argument. This is identifiable, if appropriate reference is made to the provisions of the Air Act, 1981 and the Water Act, 1974. The Air Act, 1981 was brought into force w.e.f. 16.5.1981 with the intention to provide for the prevention, control and abatement of air pollution, for the establishment with a view to carrying out the aforesaid purposes, of Boards, for conferring on to such Boards, powers and functions relating thereto and for matters connected therewith. 76. In fact, the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the Air Act, 1981 were brought into force on the basis of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in June, 1972 and India was a signatory to the decisions taken in the said conference. It is important to note that Air Act, 1981 was the first among the series after the conference, which was brought with the specific intention of preventing, controlling and abatement of air pollution. In that view of the matter, provisions of Air Act, 1981 are to be looked into with more concern so far as the issues relating to air pollution is concerned. Section 2(a) defined air pollutant to mean, “ any solid, liquid or gaseous substance including noise present in the atmosphere in such concentration as may be or tend to be injurious to human beings or other living creatures or plants or property or environment”. Emission is defined under section 2(j) to mean, “any solid or liquid or gaseous substance coming out of any chimney, duct or flue or any other outlet”, section 2(k) defines industrial plant to mean, “any plant used for any industrial or trade purposes and emitting any air pollutant to the atmosphere”. 77. It is relevant and important to note that there are no definitions for air pollutant, emission and industrial plant either under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 or under the NGT Act, 2010. Accordingly, the said definitions contained under the Air Act, 1981 are to be read into NGT Act, 2010 by virtue of the imperatives contained under section 2(2) of the said Act. Accordingly, the said definitions contained under the Air Act, 1981 are to be read into NGT Act, 2010 by virtue of the imperatives contained under section 2(2) of the said Act. Sections 3 & 4 of Act, 1981 specifies that the Central Pollution Control Board and State PCB constituted under sections 3 & 4 of the Water Act, 1974 shall perform the powers and functions under the Act, 1981. 78. The Water Act, 1974 was brought into force for the purpose of prevention and control of water pollution and for conferring on and assigning the Boards constituted for the purpose with powers for the prevention and control of water pollution and enacted consequent to the resolution passed under Article 252(1) of the Constitution of India by various States including the State of Kerala to the effect that the water pollution should be regulated in those States by Parliament by law. Section 16 of Water Act, 1974 deals with functions of the Central Board, which stipulates that subject to the provisions of the said Act, the main function of the Central Board shall be to promote cleanliness of streams and wells in different areas of the States. Sub-section (2) therefore enables the Central Board with various powers including the power to advise the Central Government on any matter concerning the prevention and control of water pollution. Similarly section 17 deals with the functions of State Boards, which is also vested with powers under the said provision to advise the State Government on any matter concerning the prevention, control or abatement of water pollution, interalia among other powers. Clause (g) of section 17(1) empowers the State Boards to lay down, modify or annul effluence standards for the sewage and trade effluent and for the quality of receiving water (not being water in an inter-State Stream) resulting from the discharge of effluent and to classify the waters of the State. 79. The said provisions of the Water Act, 1974 were pointed out since under sections 16 and 17 of the Air Act, 1981, the functions of the Central Board and State Boards are co-related to the said Boards constituted under the Water Act, 1974. 79. The said provisions of the Water Act, 1974 were pointed out since under sections 16 and 17 of the Air Act, 1981, the functions of the Central Board and State Boards are co-related to the said Boards constituted under the Water Act, 1974. As per section 17 of the Air Act, 1981, State Boards are vested with powers to plan a comprehensive programme for the prevention, control or abatement of air pollution and secure the execution thereof among other powers and also to lay down in consultation with the Central Board and having regard to the standards for the quality of air laid down by the Central Board, standards for emission of air pollutants into the atmosphere from industrial plants and auto mobile or for the discharge of any air pollutants into the atmosphere for any other source whatsoever not being a ship or an aircraft. The State Boards are also vested with powers to inspect air pollution control areas at such intervals as it may think necessary, assess the quality of air therein and take steps for the prevention, control or abatement of air pollution in such areas. 80. True, as per section 18(1) of Act, 1981, the Central Board shall be bound by such directions in writing as the Central Government may give to it; and every State Boards shall be bound such directions in writing as the Central or the State Government may give to it: provided that where a direction given by the State Government is inconsistent with the directions given by the Central Board, the matter shall be referred to the Central Government for its decisions. Analysing the aforesaid provisions of the Air Act, 1981, we are of the firm view that the Central Board as well as the State Boards are vested with sufficient, ample and adequate powers to deal with the air pollution. There is no case advanced by the appellants that either the Central Board or State Boards have violated any of the directions given by the Central Government or for that matter, the Kerala PCB has violated any of the directions in writing issued by the Central Board or the Central Government. There is no case advanced by the appellants that either the Central Board or State Boards have violated any of the directions given by the Central Government or for that matter, the Kerala PCB has violated any of the directions in writing issued by the Central Board or the Central Government. Section 19 deals with the power to declare air pollution control areas by the State Government in consultation with the State Board by notification in the official gazette and section 21 imposes restriction on use of certain industrial plants without the previous consent of the State Board and the procedure for securing consent is prescribed thereunder. Even though no distance criteria is fixed under the Air Act, 1981 or the Rules, 1982 framed thereunder, sub-section (5) of section 21 enables the State Board to impose various conditions delineated thereunder and to impose such other conditions as the State Board may specify on that behalf. Sub-section (7) thereto specifies that where a person to whom consent has been granted by the State Board under sub-section (4) of section 21, transfers his interest in the industry to any other person, such consent shall be deemed to have been granted to such other person and he shall be bound to comply with all the conditions subject to which it was granted as if the consent was granted to him originally. Section 22 of Act, 1981 requires any person operating any industrial plant in any air pollution control area to adhere to the standards fixed by the State Board under sections 17(1)(g) of Act, 1981. 81. True, appeals are provided under section 31 to the Air Appellate Authority constituted by the State Government in accordance with the limitation prescribed. Section 22 of Act, 1981 requires any person operating any industrial plant in any air pollution control area to adhere to the standards fixed by the State Board under sections 17(1)(g) of Act, 1981. 81. True, appeals are provided under section 31 to the Air Appellate Authority constituted by the State Government in accordance with the limitation prescribed. Section 31A was inserted w.e.f.1.4.1988, whereby power was conferred on the State Board notwithstanding anything contained in any other law but subject to the provisions of the Act, 1981 and to any directions that the Central Government may give in that behalf, a Board may in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under the Act issue any directions in writing to any person, officer or authority, and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions and the explanation thereto unequivocally states that the power to direct includes the power to (a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry or operation or process; or (b) the stoppage, or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service. Section 31B provides appeals to National Green Tribunal enabling any person aggrieved by an order or decision of the appellate authority made under section 31, on or after the commencement of the National Green Tribunal established under section 3 of the NGT Act, 2010. The said power conferred under section 31B of Act, 1981, is referable to section 16 of the NGT Act, 2010 enabling the NGT to have the appellate jurisdiction to deal with the orders passed by the Air Appellate Authority. 82. Similar provisions are there in the Water Act, 1974. It is an admitted fact that under the Air Act, 1981, or the Rules thereto, any standards are fixed with respect to the ambient air quality vis-a-vis the distance criteria, however, it is an undisputed fact that while the State Board is issuing consent, standard condition of 50 meters is fixed from residential buildings and other installations. It is an admitted fact that under the Air Act, 1981, or the Rules thereto, any standards are fixed with respect to the ambient air quality vis-a-vis the distance criteria, however, it is an undisputed fact that while the State Board is issuing consent, standard condition of 50 meters is fixed from residential buildings and other installations. The discussion of facts and the law made above would make it clear that even though powers are conferred on the Central Board and the State Boards to lay down standards for the quality of air in order to regulate and control the air pollution, they have not done so and is thus taking into account the non-exercise of power by the statutory authorities under law, NGT has directed the Central PCB to submit reports as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, and after considering the reports, the NGT has passed an order fixing the distance criteria in regard to quarrying activity, which according to us, cannot be said to be erroneous or without jurisdiction. 83. In our view, when the power conferred on such Boards under the Air Act, 1981, in spite of the lapse of almost 30 years is not exercised, it is for the Tribunal to step in, call for reports and issue directions, keeping in mind the the object for which the Act has been passed and Tribunal constituted. Though a contention has been advanced by the appellants that the Tribunal has not undertaken any study in regard to the distance criteria and therefore, it is bad and illegal, we are unable to subscribe to the said view in view of the study conducted by the Central PCB, report submitted and also in view of the presence of the expert members in Tribunal, who are technically qualified to deal with such issues. That said, when a query was posed to the learned Standing Counsel for the Pollution Control Board as to how the distance of 50 meters was fixed, it was pointed out that it could be only by virtue of the provisions contained under Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015. That said, when a query was posed to the learned Standing Counsel for the Pollution Control Board as to how the distance of 50 meters was fixed, it was pointed out that it could be only by virtue of the provisions contained under Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015. Therefore, it is clear that even the State PCB has not conducted any study before imposing the distance criteria and it just followed the provisions of rule 40(1)(i) of the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, which stipulates the lessee shall not carry on or allow to be carried on any quarrying operations at or to any points within a distance of 100 meters from any railway line except with the previous written permission of the railway administration concerned and any bridge on national highway or 50 meters from any reservoir, tanks, canals, rivers, bridges, public roads, other public works, residential buildings, the boundary walls or places of worship, burial grounds, burning ghats or 1 Km. from the boundaries of national park or wildlife sanctuaries except with the previous permission of the authorities concerned or the Government or the competent authority. 84. A contention is raised by the learned counsel for appellants that when a specific power is conferred on a statutory authority under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, to deal with any situations of mining operations of minor minerals, the NGT was not right in intruding into the powers of the statutory authority. But the fact remains that a competent authority specified under the Rules, 2015 is defined under rule 2(1)(iii) to mean the authority or officer appointed by the Government by notification in the official gazette to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the competent authority under the Rules, 2015. The Rules, 2015, was enacted by virtue of section 15(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 for the purpose of grant of quarrying permit/lease/licence and collection of royalty consolidated royalty, dead rent etc. The Rules, 2015, was enacted by virtue of section 15(1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 for the purpose of grant of quarrying permit/lease/licence and collection of royalty consolidated royalty, dead rent etc. True, under rule 10(f) of Rules, 2015, dealing with the distance criteria to be incorporated in a quarrying permit as it originally stood, the second proviso thereto comprehended that in case where explosives are used for quarrying, the permit holder shall not carry on or allowed to be carried on any quarrying operations at or to any points within the distance as specified by the Kerala State Pollution Control Board from time to time for granting consent to operate such quarrying as approved by the Government from any railway line, any bridge, reservoir, tanks, residential buildings etc. or places of worship or 50 meters from any burial grounds or burning ghats or village roads or forest lands. In fact clause (f) of rule 10 was substituted as per SRO 346/2017 dated 23.6.2017, by which the second proviso thereto discussed above was removed and therefore, if at all any power enjoyed by the competent authority under the Rules, 2015 in regard to insistence for any consent issued by the State PCB is no more in existence. 85. Even analysing the second proviso to rule 10(f), it is clear that there was no distance criteria fixed from a quarry to the installations provided thereunder except the distance criteria of 50 meters from any burial grounds or burning ghats or village roads or forest lands. Likewise the second proviso to rule 40(1)(i) dealing with distance criteria as that of rule 10(f) and the consequential consent of State PCB is also taken away by virtue of SRO 346/2017. When the competent authority under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015 is divested with the powers, to fix any distance for giving consent to establish and operate, a quarrying unit, including a crushing unit, can the appellants rely on the directions or circulars, issued from time-to-time, by any authority under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015 and adopted by the State Pollution Control Board? Our answer to the said query is 'No'. Air, noise, and water pollution Acts are special enactments, and therefore, to the extent of distance, when the power of the authority under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015 is taken away, no reliance can be made. 86. Our answer to the said query is 'No'. Air, noise, and water pollution Acts are special enactments, and therefore, to the extent of distance, when the power of the authority under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015 is taken away, no reliance can be made. 86. At this juncture, we categorically state that the appellants have no statutory rights to fall back on the directions/circulars, issued by the authority under the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015, and we may say so, adopted by the State Pollution Control Board. We also do not think that any of the provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957 would support the contentions advanced by the appellants except the fact that by virtue of the powers conferred under section 15, the State Government have enacted the Rules, 2015 as discussed above. Lastly a contention was advanced that the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, has no jurisdiction to consider an issue in regard to quarries functioning in the State of Kerala placing reliance on the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Ordinary Places of Sitting of the National Green Tribunal – Territorial Jurisdiction – Notification, which reads thus: x xx x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xx x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x xx x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x *NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL ACT, 2010- ORDINARY PLACES OF SITTING OF THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL -TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION NOTIFICATION '[In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (19 of 2010) and in supersession of the notifications of the Government of India in the erstwhile Ministry of Environment and Forests number S.O 1003 (E), dated the 5th May, 2011 and number S.O 1908(E), dated the 17th August, 2011, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby specifies the ordinary places of sitting and the territorial jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal as under Sl.No. Zone Place of Sitting Territorial Jurisdiction 1. Northern Delhi (Principal place) Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir Goa, National Capital Territory of Delhi and Union territories of Chandigarh, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli. 2. Western Pune Maharashtra and Gujarat. Northern Delhi (Principal place) Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir Goa, National Capital Territory of Delhi and Union territories of Chandigarh, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli. 2. Western Pune Maharashtra and Gujarat. 3. Central Bhopal Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh 4. Southern Chennai Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, Union territories of Puducherry and Lakshadweep. 5. Eastern Kolkata West Bengal, Odisha, Bihar, Jharkhand, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim and Union territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands,] 87. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, by virtue of the powers conferred under section 3 of the NGT Act, 2010, the said notification was issued by the Central Government conferring jurisdiction on various Tribunals. Therefore, as per Sl.No.4, only the southern zone Bench at Chennai has the power to deal with any matters in Kerala and consequent to which the Principal Bench which has its seat at Delhi has power only to deal with the issues relating to the States and Union Territories specified thereunder, and accordingly, action of the NGT issuing an order, in the nature of a direction to be issued by the Central Government is without jurisdiction and therefore, bad in law. 88. In our considered opinion, the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi was dealing with a seminal issue in regard to the air and noise pollution and the drainage to the properties consequent to the functioning of quarries in the country, as such and probably, and that the representation made from Kerala was an eye opener to the NGT to discuss, deliberate and adjudicate on the issues at the national level, in particular, substantial question relating to environment, including enforcement of any right relating to environment involved and such questions arising out of implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I to NGT Act, 2010, which includes, (1) The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (2) The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1977 (3) The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (4) The Air ( Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (5) The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (6) The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 and (7) The Biological Diversity Act, 2002. What is important is the power exercised by the NGT under the provisions of Act, 2010 and other consequential Acts. What is important is the power exercised by the NGT under the provisions of Act, 2010 and other consequential Acts. We have no doubt to say that the Principal Bench and Zonal Benches are governed by the provisions of the NGT Act, 2010. The concept of territorial jurisdiction is a concept, introduced in the statutes, which according to us is, in order to effectively deal into suomotu or filed by the aggrieved persons, to protect their interests, which is only a procedure, rather than a rule of absolute nature. To put it otherwise territorial jurisdiction is a concept well known in law, empowering judicial officers and courts and Tribunals to function within the precincts of the territorial jurisdiction, which is basically intended to regulate the procedure in filing litigations, and in our considered view, will never take away the power conferred under law, on the NGT, New Delhi, to deal with the object of the provisions the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, rules framed thereunder, provisions of law and that is why procedural laws empower the superior courts to transfer a litigation from one place to another. Issue on distance criteria for allowing mining activity in particular, quarrying activities have a national relevance and importance in a State, for the reason that it is a matter concerning citizens to have a quality life assured under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Tribunal is constituted with the predominant objective of redressing grievances and remedy and to develop national laws regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage, thought it fit to consider the situation in question, addressing at the national level, which would avoid multiplicity of proceedings too. Moreover, whether it is considered by the Principal Bench or the Zonal Bench, no manner of prejudice is caused to the appellants other than the inconvenience of travelling up to the Principal Bench. The territorial jurisdiction is distinct from the jurisdictional power exercised by an authority conferred under a statute. The power exercised by the Principal Bench and the Zonal Benches are co-equal in nature and there is no superior power conferred on the Principal Bench. The territorial jurisdiction is distinct from the jurisdictional power exercised by an authority conferred under a statute. The power exercised by the Principal Bench and the Zonal Benches are co-equal in nature and there is no superior power conferred on the Principal Bench. But, however, the provisions of Act, 2010 shows that there is only a Chairperson to the Tribunal, who is vested with powers under rule 3 of the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011, in the matter of distribution of business among the different ordinary place or places of sittings of Tribunal and the Chairperson shall have the power to decide the distribution of business of the Tribunal among the members of the Tribunal sitting at different places by order and specify the matters which may be dealt with by each such sitting in accordance with the provisions of clause (d) of sub-section (4) section 4 of the Act,2010. It is significant to note that as per rule 3(3) of the Procedural Rules, 2011, if any question arises as to whether any matter falls within the purview of the business allocated to a place of sitting, the decision of the Chairperson shall be final. The explanation thereto makes it clear that the expression “matter” includes application for interim relief, which is an inclusive definition clearly indicating that it is an empowerment added to the main powers under law. Various other powers are conferred on the Chairperson as per Rules, 2011, to adopt procedure and issue general or special orders for adopting circuit procedure etc. Taking into account the provisions of Rules, 2011, we are of the view, the notification issued by the Government of India extracted above is subservient, which can never stand in the way of the NGT translating the provisions of the acts specified in Schedule I of NGT Act, 2010 and the Rules thereto, which is the predominant purpose for which the Tribunal is constituted for. 89. Assimilating the factual and legal position, we are of the view that the appellants have not made out a case, as regards the suo motu power of the NGT, exercised, to protect the environment from pollution. 89. Assimilating the factual and legal position, we are of the view that the appellants have not made out a case, as regards the suo motu power of the NGT, exercised, to protect the environment from pollution. Matters being so, we are of the view that the appellants have not made out any case for interference with the judgment of the learned single Judge, there being no jurisdictional error or other legal infirmities justifying to do so in an intra court appeal filed under section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We also make it clear that the discussions were made above in view of the grounds raised in the appeals and the arguments advanced traversing through the said laws. 90. The appellants are concerned with the directions issued by the learned single Judge to maintain the common interim order in some of the writ petitions dated 6.8.2020, which is extracted above. But we are of the view that, if the interim order is not maintained, the purpose for which the Tribunal has ordered the distance criteria, would be diluted and there can be serious ramifications consequent to the permit/licence/consent granted by the statutory authorities, leading to a cascading effect at the national level, which would ultimately defeat the purpose of the distance criteria. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the interim order granted by the learned single Judge pending consideration of the matter by the NGT. In the result, writ appeals fail and they are dismissed. However, we make it clear that since the order of the Tribunal was set aside having not complied with the principles of natural justice, the appellants are at liberty to take up the matter with the Tribunal including the distance of 100 and 200 meters fixed by the Tribunal in its impugned order, and ordered to be continued by the learned single Judge to the extent specified in the interim order dated 6.8.2020. It is also made clear that, by the above discussion, we do not intend to alter the findings and directions issued by the learned Single Judge in any manner, and they would remain intact as such.