ORDER : 1. The petitioner arraigned as accused in C.C. No. 138 of 2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 176, 177, 181, 199 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which is pending before the Court of Senior City Civil and JMFC, Soraba Taluk, Shivamogga District, is before this Court seeking to quash the order dated 26.05.2017 passed by the Court below taking cognizance of the offences pursuant to the charge-sheet filed in C.C. No. 138 of 2017 by urging various grounds. 2. Heard Shri S. Kalyan Basavaraj, learned counsel for the petitioner, so also, Smt. Rashmi Jadhav, learned HCGP appearing for the first respondent/State and Shri Prakash M. Patil, learned counsel for the second respondent who are physically present before the Court. But counsel for the second respondent can only assist the learned HCGP appearing for the first respondent/State as under Section 301 of Cr.P.C. but cannot independently address his arguments. 3. It is transpired from the materials available on record that a private complaint has been lodged by the second respondent/complainant against the accused in P.C.R. No. 81 of 2015 for the offences, which reflected therein. On filing of a private complaint, the Court of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Soraba pursuant to the charge-sheet filed in C.C. No. 138 of 2017 took cognizance against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 176, 177, 181, 199 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 vide its order dated 26.05.2017. The case has been referred as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. to the jurisdictional police having domain to investigate the case and submit the report. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me to the initiation of the private complaint by the second respondent against the accused. He submits that the alleged offences in respect of which cognizance was taken by the Trial Court vide its order dated 26.05.2017 is erroneous and without any authority of law and also do not have any domain to proceed with the case so as to refer the matter as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation and submit the report. On that ground alone, it requires intervention of this Court by exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 5. On that ground alone, it requires intervention of this Court by exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 5. The primary ground as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is relating to taking cognizance of the offences on the basis of a final report submitted by the first respondent/Police. Further, he contended that the Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the offences based on the final report in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 176, 177, 181, 199 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on the basis of the complaint made by the second respondent under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. pursuant to which referring the same under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and thereafter taking cognizance after filing of the final report in the light of express bar contemplated under Section 195 of Cr.P.C. 6. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the case of Sachida Nand Singh and Another vs. State of Bihar and Another, 1998 (2) SCC 493 whereas in the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had addressed the issues relating to the concept of Section 190 of Cr.P.C. wherein it is held that: “7.........Section 190 of the Code empowers “any magistrate of the first class” to take cognizance of “any offence” upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the Magistrate and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtailed. It is a well recognized canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise [Abdul Waheed Khan vs. Bhawani, AIR 1966 SC 1718 ].” 7. Lastly the counsel for the petitioner submits that it is the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts in catena of judgments that even if the entire evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce to prove the guilty of the accused if fully accepted, even before it is challenged in the cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, then also there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding with the trial. On these grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks for intervention of this Court as contemplated under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by allowing this petition. 8. On these grounds, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks for intervention of this Court as contemplated under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. by allowing this petition. 8. The learned HCGP appearing for the first respondent/State took me through the initiation of the private complaint by the complainant against the accused relating to commission of offences, which reflected in the FIR. Subsequent to registration of the crime against the accused, the Court referred the matter as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation and to submit a report. When once the matter has been referred for the purpose of investigation and to submit a report, it is the domain vested with the Investigating Agency to proceed with the investigation and to submit a report. However, the materials, which were secured by the Investigating Officer should be tested under the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the instant case, the materials said to have been collected by the Investigating Officer has not been tested in order to prove the offences lugged against the accused. 9. The submission made by the learned HCGP has been supported by the counsel appearing for the second respondent. The same has been considered by this Court and is taken on record. 10. In this backdrop of the contentions taken by the counsel on both sides, it is relevant to refer Section 195 of Cr.P.C. which reads as under: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence: (1) No Court shall take cognizance: (a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). ***** ***** ***** Except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.” 11. However, there is an express bar for taking of cognizance for the offence under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive), unless there is in writing, a complaint by the public servant concerned. The object of the provision is to provide for a particular procedure in the case of violation of lawful authority of the public servant. However, there is an express bar for taking of cognizance for the offence under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive), unless there is in writing, a complaint by the public servant concerned. The object of the provision is to provide for a particular procedure in the case of violation of lawful authority of the public servant. The Court cannot take cognizance in certain types of offences, as enumerated in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. In M.S. Ahlawat vs. State of Haryana and Another, (2000) 1 SCC 278 , the Apex Court has held that the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. are mandatory and no Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein, unless there is a complaint in writing, as required under that section. 12. The second respondent herein who is an instrument of the private complaint before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Soraba, which is contrary to the specific provisions of Section 195 Cr.P.C. and so also to Section 190 of Cr.P.C. Section 190 of Cr.P.C. empowers “any magistrate of the first class” to take cognizance of “any offence” upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Learned counsel for the petitioner even though placed reliance on catena of decisions and so also, the views of the Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. has been grounded in the petition, which facilitated the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Crl. Pet. No. 2237 of 2017 dated 13.07.2015. 13. In Daulat Ram vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206 , cognizance of the offence had been taken on police report by the Magistrate and the appellant therein had been tried and convicted, though the public servant concerned, the Tahsildar had not filed any complaint. Considering the factual background and while allowing and setting aside the judgment of conviction and order sentence passed on the appellant, it has been held as follows: “4.........the cognizance of the case was therefore wrongly assumed by the Court without the complaint in writing of the public servant, namely, the Tahsildar in this case. The trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction cannot be maintained.” 14. The trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction cannot be maintained.” 14. In the instant case, the second respondent who is an instrument to initiate private case against the accused before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Soraba for the offences, which reflected in the FIR said to have been recorded as contemplated under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. But the concept of cognizance is a mandatory equipment, so also is a judicial action. Even the cognizance of the case was erroneously assumed by the Court without complaint in writing made by the competent authority, i.e. public servant. The trial was thus without jurisdiction ab-initio and the conviction cannot be maintained. 15. Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C. defines complaint. The said definition being relevant, is extracted herein-below: “2(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.” 16. The said definition being relevant even in the present case on hand. Merely because initiation of the private complaint against the accused, the judicial Magistrate should apply its mind whether it needs for taking cognizance by referring the case to the police having jurisdiction to register the crime as contemplated under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. by referring the FIR. Merely because it is referred under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. certainly it is said that erroneously taking cognizance and referring the matter to the police having jurisdiction to deal with the matter in terms of investigation and submit a report. 17. In the instant case, the second respondent who is an instrument of the complaint having lodged the complaint before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Soraba for the offences, which reflected in the FIR but Section 482 of Cr.P.C. states that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled principles of law that inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the section itself. The High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. 18. Therefore, in terms of the aforesaid reasons and findings, it needs for interference by this Court, if not, certainly, the petitioner being an accused would suffer. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following order: (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) Consequently, the order dated 26.05.2017 taking cognizance of the offences pursuant to the charge-sheet filed in C.C. No. 138/2017 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Soraba is hereby quashed.