ORDER : Sujoy Paul, J. 1. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution assails the order dated 01.02.2021 passed by the learned IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Rewa in M.C.A. No. 122/2018 whereby Misc. Appeal filed by the private respondents against the order passed by the court below under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC is allowed by the court and order of injunction dated 06.09.2018 was set aside. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioners/plaintiffs filed a civil suit under Section 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of certain lands situated in village Majhboga, Tehsil Raipur Karchuliyan, District Rewa. 3. Shri Ghildiyal, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that petitioners' prayed for declaration mainly on the ground of adverse possession for more than 12 years and prayed for injunction on the basis of possession. The trial court heard the parties on the application preferred under Order 39 rule 1 and 2 of CPC and rightly decided it by order dated 06.09.2018. The respondents/defendants were injuncted from creating third party right or alienate the property. This injunction order was initially granted for a period of one year but was extended from time to time and remained in operation till the injunction order dated 06.09.2018 was set aside by the appellate court on 01.02.2021. 4. Criticizing the impugned order of appellate court, Shri K.C. Ghildiyal, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the pleadings of the parties were rightly considered and appreciated by the trial court by holding that the petitioners/plaintiffs were in possession with the knowledge of defendants right from 1982. Heavy reliance was placed on para 14 to 18 of the order passed by the trial court on 06.09.2018. By taking this court to the appellate order, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the learned appellate court has erred in basing its findings solely on the ground that in support of claim of plaintiffs, no documentary evidence was produced. It is submitted that the documentary evidence was not required in a case of this nature when pleadings were clear. In support of aforesaid contention, Shri Ghildiyal placed reliance on para-62 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others Vs. Manjit Kaur and others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 . It is submitted that the documentary evidence was not required in a case of this nature when pleadings were clear. In support of aforesaid contention, Shri Ghildiyal placed reliance on para-62 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal and others Vs. Manjit Kaur and others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 . It is argued that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by following "due process". Moreso, when he was in adverse possession for over a period of 12 years. A person aggrieved by dispossession by another person by taking law in his hands can maintain a possessory suit under Article 64. Thus, the other side has a right to file a suit of that nature subsequently. Furthermore, the judgment of Apex Court reported in (1996) 2 SCC 225 (Rajnibai(smt.) alias Mannubai Vs. Kamla Devi (smt.) and others) was referred to contend that court has inherent power to protect the right of the parties in cases of corporeal right to the property. (1995) 5 SCC 545 (Gujrat Bottling Co. Ltd. and others Vs. Coca Cola Co. and others was relied upon to contend that apart from necessary ingredients for grant of injunction, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, there exists yet another important factor on the basis of which equity jurisdiction of injunction can be exercised. The conduct of the parties, submits Shri Ghildiyal is that factor. After the injunction order is set aside by the appellate court and till present date, the defendants have created third party rights. To elaborate, it is submitted that judgment of Gujarat Bottling (supra) is equally applicable to defendants. (2004) 8 SCC 488 (Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd) Faridkot Vs. Baldev Dass was referred to submit that in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, in a case of this nature, injunction order must be maintained. 5. Per contra, Shri Dubey learned counsel for the respondents opposed the said contention. He submits that indisputably the defendants are having the title over the property in question. Even assuming that plaintiffs were in possession, their possession was in the capacity of trespassers. The answering respondent is the true owner of the suit land. She never transferred her Bhumi Swami right or title to the petitioners. In absence of any documentary evidence, the appellate court has rightly set aside the injunction order. Even assuming that plaintiffs were in possession, their possession was in the capacity of trespassers. The answering respondent is the true owner of the suit land. She never transferred her Bhumi Swami right or title to the petitioners. In absence of any documentary evidence, the appellate court has rightly set aside the injunction order. It is further urged that if in the capacity of "Bataidar", the plaintiffs entered the land that will not bestow any right to seek injunction or any relief on the basis of adverse possession. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on 1995 AIR SCW 2425 (Premji Ratansey Shah and others Vs. Union of India and others) and judgment of this court reported in 2002 (1) MPLJ 508 (Maltibai Madhukar Rao Maratha Vs. Subhashchandra Kishorilal Jaiswal and 2015 (2) MPLJ 697 (Rajesh Mishra Vs. Ram Vilas Singh Kushwaha). 6. No other point was raised by learned counsel for the parties. 7. I have heard the parties at length and perused the record. 8. Indisputably, the order of injunction passed by the trial court is not based on any documentary evidence which establishes that plaintiffs were in possession of the land in question. The trial court based its findings on the basis of pleadings of the parties. However, the pleadings did not reflect that there exists any such unconditional admission on the part of defendants that plaintiffs are in possession. Apart from this, it is also noteworthy that possession alone is not decisive for grant of injunction. Pertinently, this point is decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Premji Ratansey (supra). The relevant portion reads as under:- "5. It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who have no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession, as against the owner. Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not be an excuse to claim injunction against true owner." (Emphasis supplied) This judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Premji Ratansey (supra) was considered by this court in the case of Malti Bai (supra) and the court opined as under:- "4. On the facts given above the trial Court had exercised its discretion properly in rejecting the application for temporary injunction on the finding that the plaintiffs prima-facie neither have title nor possession of the lands in dispute on the date of the suit. That could not be interfered by the appellant Court on unsubstantial grounds. The Appellate Court could not reply upon the entry in the remarks column of the khasras in the name of Meerabai. It is after trial that it can be held whether the plaintiffs' case that Meerabai was given possession in 1983 and she has acquired title by adverse possession for more than 12 years can be decided. Prima facie possession of Maltibai who is admittedly that Bhumiswami and true owner of the lands must be upheld. An injunction against the true owner of the land cannot be granted unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the plaintiff is in settled or lawful possession of the land in dispute. Premji vs. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 547 ." (Emphasis supplied) 9. Similarly, in the case of Rajesh Mishra (supra), this court considered various judgments of Supreme Court and opined as under:- 13. The Apex Court in 2010 (2) JLJ 210 (Narendra Kante Vs. Aanuradha Kante and others) opined that, while considering an application for grant of injunction, the Court has not only to take into consideration the basic elements regarding existence of a parma facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it has also to take into consideration the conduct of the parties since grant of injunction is an equitable relief. 14. This Court in 1986 (1) MPWN 159 (Kamal Singh Vs. Jairam Singh) opined that temporary injunction cannot be claimed merely on the basis of possession. The possession must be legal. Possession of trespassers cannot be protected. 14. This Court in 1986 (1) MPWN 159 (Kamal Singh Vs. Jairam Singh) opined that temporary injunction cannot be claimed merely on the basis of possession. The possession must be legal. Possession of trespassers cannot be protected. Same view is taken by this Court in 1990 (1) MPWN SN 136 Dattatraya Vaishampayan Vs. Janakarya Vibhag Karmachari Grih Nirman Sahakari Samiti. 15. The Apex Court in AIR 1995 SCW 3521 , M/s. Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. And Ors. Vs. Coca Cola Company and Ors. opined as under:- "In this context, it would be relevant to mention that in the instant case GBC had approached the High Court for the injunction order, granted earlier, to be vacated. Under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court, on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against whom he was seeking relief, His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations will arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39, Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings." 16. Same view is taken by Supreme Court in 2008 (11) SCC 1 (Mandali Ranganna & Ors. Etc. Versus T. Ramachandran & Ors.) and 1983 (4) SCC 31 (Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary Versus Sitaram Balachandra Sukhtankar). In view of aforesaid judgments, it is clear that injunction cannot be granted as a matter of course or on mere asking. Apart from three necessary ingredients, i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the courts are required to see the conduct of the parties. In view of aforesaid judgments, it is clear that injunction cannot be granted as a matter of course or on mere asking. Apart from three necessary ingredients, i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the courts are required to see the conduct of the parties. In the present case, the best available evidence with the plaintiff (mentioned in para 3 of plaint) was deliberately suppressed which creates serious doubt about the status of the plaintiff as a tenant. No prima facie case is established by the plaintiff showing that he is a tenant. The conduct of plaintiff also suggest that he was not entitled for any injunction. Mere possession on the basis of forcible entry cannot be a ground for grant of injunction. If injunctions are granted in such cases, it will encourage trespassers and encroachers. They may misuse and abuse the judicial process. The judgments cited by Shri Harish Dixit are based on different factual backdrops. The said judgments have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (Emphasis supplied) 10. The petitioner has not established any title in his favour. Prima facie, it cannot be said that he is in lawful possession. The appellate court has given a plausible findings that in absence of any documentary evidence there exists nothing to show that plaintiffs are in lawful possession of the land in question. At the cost of repetition, in the opinion of this court, there was no clinching pleadings on record on the basis of which it can be said that defendants have accepted that plaintiff is in lawful possession. The principle laid down in the judgment cited by Shri Ghildiyal cannot be doubted. Interestingly, during the course of hearing Shri S.P. Dubey, learned counsel for the private respondents also relied on the judgment of Gujrat Bottling (supra) which is reproduced by this court in the case of Rajesh Mishra (supra). 11. The appellate court in the impugned order came to hold that the documents on record before the trial court prima facie shows that defendants are title holders. There exists no documentary evidence that plaintiffs are in possession. It was further held that on the basis of giving land on "Batai", it cannot be said that pleadings of defendants amounts to lawful possession of land considerable long time. 12. There exists no documentary evidence that plaintiffs are in possession. It was further held that on the basis of giving land on "Batai", it cannot be said that pleadings of defendants amounts to lawful possession of land considerable long time. 12. In the factual backdrop of this case, I am unable to hold that the learned appellate court has committed any error of law or examined the order of injunction on impermissible parameters. Hence, the judgment cited by Shri Ghildiyal are of no assistance to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances of this case. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. Interference can be made if order suffers from any jurisdictional error, palpable perversity or manifest procedural impropriety. Another view is possible, is not a ground for interference. Since the court below has taken a plausible view, I find no reason to interfere in this petition. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost.