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2021 DIGILAW 299 (AP)

Novatic Trading F. Z. E. v. Hero Fincorp. Ltd.

2021-04-30

A.V.SESHA SAI, J.UMADEVI

body2021
JUDGMENT: The present appeal, preferred under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 14 of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 (for short, the Act, 2017’), calls in question the order dated 16.04.2021 in Com.S. No.2 of 2019 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court. 2. Respondent No.1 herein instituted the said COM.S.No.2 of 2019, under Section 4 (1) (c) of the Act, 2017, laying a claim for a sum of Rs.19,72,06,028/-together with interest, against respondent No.2 herein. The said suit came to be instituted on the basis of a loan agreement date 24.10.2016, supply agreement dated 24.10.2016, deed of mortgage dated 15.11.2016 and deed of hypothecation dated 15.11.2016, whereunder 1st respondent herein advanced loan to 2nd respondent. Initially, by way of an order dated 28.03.2019 in I.A.No.3 of 2019, learned single Judge directed respondent No.3 herein-Port, to detain 2nd respondent’s ship which is berthed at Kakinada port. Subsequently, 1st respondent herein filed I.A.No.8 of 2019, wherein learned single Judge passed an order dated 22.10.2019, fixing the time schedule for the purpose of sale of the subject vessel by way of auction in the following manner. “a) 2nd November 2019 -Registrar (Judicial), of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi to hold meeting with Advocates of all parties to finalize the advertisements and terms and conditions of sale at 11.00 a.m. and appoint Mr. Vijendra Vatsa, Kakinada, as Valuer to appraise and value the vessel. (b) 25th November, 2019: Submission of valuation report in a sealed cover by the Appraiser to the office of Registrar (Judicial) of High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravathi. (c) 29th November, 2019: Registrar (Judicial) to hold meeting with the of all parties to finalize the reserve price of defendant No.1-vessel at 11.00 a.m. (d) 6th December, 2019: Registrar (Judicial) to cause to publish the advertisement for sale of defendant No.1-vessel in 'the Hindu', English Daily and Times of India English Daily Newspapers both All India Editions, mentioning therein the reserve price along with technical details of defendant No.1-vessel (Ex. tonnage, year of build, etc.,) furnished by the parties. Defendant No.1-vessel will be sold on "as is where is, what is there is" basis. tonnage, year of build, etc.,) furnished by the parties. Defendant No.1-vessel will be sold on "as is where is, what is there is" basis. All risks, costs, charges, fees and expenses of any kind or nature involved in the removal of defendant No.1-vessel from her present position will be solely to the account of the successful purchaser. This must be stated explicitly in the public advertisement notice. Defendant No.2-port shall also post this publication in its website. (e) 13th December, 2019: Intending bidders to submit their bid by 2.00 p.m to the office of the Registrar (Judicial) for purchase of the defendant No.1 vessel. (f) 23rd December, 2019: Office of the Registrar (Judicial) to place the sealed bids and report before this Hon'ble Court at 2.15 p.m., for sale of the 1st respondent-vessel. (g) 31st December, 2019: payment of balance purchase money by successful bidder. (h) Purchase money shall be paid either in Indian Rupee currency or US Dollars or Euros and be deposited in appropriate Bank account opened by the Registrar (Judicial) for the purpose of the cases of this nature under Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017. (The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to obtain permission Hon'ble the Chief Justice, for opening such account.)” But, the said process could not materialize in view of the lesser amounts quoted by the bidders, which prompted the learned single Judge to cancel further process. 3. Subsequently, the learned single Judge, vide order dated 15.12.2020 in I.A.No.2 of 2019, directed the valuer to appraise the value once again. Later, as per order dated 28.01.2021 in COM.S.No.2 of 2019, the learned single Judge directed publication of the schedule of the auction once again. In terms of the said order, the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati, got a notice published on 15.03.2021, fixing the last date for receipt of bids as 30.03.2021, while indicating the upset price at Rs.3,30,00,000/-. In response to the said notice of auction, two sealed tenders were received by this Court within the time stipulated i.e. 30.03.2021. 4. Thereafter, though the matter was directed to be listed on 15.04.2021, which was the date fixed for opening of bids, the matter did not appear on the said date. On a request made, the learned single Judge directed the matter to be listed on the next day i.e. on 16.04.2021. 4. Thereafter, though the matter was directed to be listed on 15.04.2021, which was the date fixed for opening of bids, the matter did not appear on the said date. On a request made, the learned single Judge directed the matter to be listed on the next day i.e. on 16.04.2021. On 16.04.2021, the bids (2 in number) were opened and it was found that M/s. San Marine Company, Kakinada quoted Rs.2.25 Crores and 4th respondent herein-M/s. Lilly Maritime Private Limited, quoted Rs.3.25 Crores. At that point of time, the appellant herein, who did not admittedly submit the bid within the stipulated time, appeared through its counsel and orally offered the amount more than the amount quoted by the highest bidder. On hearing the same, the representative of 4th respondent enhanced the bid amount from Rs.3.25 Crores to Rs.3.85 Crores and also made an endorsement to the said effect. Eventually, the learned single Judge, vide the impugned order dated 16.04.2021, declared 4th respondent herein as the highest bidder and accepted the bid submitted by 4th respondent herein. The learned single Judge also recorded that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant herein was trying to enhance the bid amount to Rs.4.00 Crores, and declined to accept the said oral offer made by the appellant herein. In the above back ground, the present appeal has been filed challenging the validity and legal sustainability of the said order passed by the learned single Judge. 5. Heard Sri Vishal Seth, learned counsel, representing Sri G.Arun Showri, learned counsel for the appellant on record, Sri Sanjay Surineni, learned counsel for 1st respondent and Sri Vikram Shetty, learned counsel, representing Sri Pruthvi Teja, learned counsel for 4th respondent, apart from perusing the material available on record. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant emphatically contends that the order of the learned single Judge, declaring 4th respondent as successful bidder while declining to accept the offer made by the appellant herein, is highly erroneous and contrary to law. In elaboration, it is further contended by the learned counsel that the learned single Judge ought to have accepted the bid offered by the appellant as the appellant, admittedly, offered the amount more than the amount offered by 4th respondent. In elaboration, it is further contended by the learned counsel that the learned single Judge ought to have accepted the bid offered by the appellant as the appellant, admittedly, offered the amount more than the amount offered by 4th respondent. It is also the contention of the learned counsel that the learned single Judge erred in giving preference to the procedural aspects, rather than the substantive aspect of the highest amount offer made by the appellant herein. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that stipulation of the last date for receipt of bids is only directory and not mandatory. It is further contended by him that contrary to the conditions prescribed for deposit of the balance amount, the learned single Judge granted 15 days to deposit the amount into the Court. Eventually, a request is made by the learned counsel to set aside the impugned order and to direct re-auction. In support of his contentions and submissions, learned counsel places reliance on the following judgments. (i) in Bancorex S.A. v. Ocean Marine Service Co. Ltd, AIR 1998 Madras 225; (ii) in Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works & others, (1991) 3 SCC 273 ; (iii) an unreported judgment of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 10.03.2021 in R/Admiralty Suit No.37 of 2000. 7. Learned counsel for 1st respondent advanced his arguments, totally supporting the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 8. On the contrary, learned counsel for 4th respondent, totally supporting the order impugned in the present appeal, contends that there is absolutely no illegality, nor there exists any procedural infirmity, in the impugned order or in the process undertaken, and in the absence of the same, the questioned order is not amenable for any correction by this Court. In furtherance of his stand, the learned counsel maintains that having failed to respond within the time stipulated in the tender notification, it is not open for the appellant to raise any objection as to the validity and legal sustainability of the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge. He further contends that the last date stipulated in the tender notification is a mandatory condition, and in the event of the same being relaxed, there is no sanctity for the process undertaken pursuant to the tender notification. He further contends that the last date stipulated in the tender notification is a mandatory condition, and in the event of the same being relaxed, there is no sanctity for the process undertaken pursuant to the tender notification. He further submits that the judgments sought to be pressed into service by the learned counsel for the appellant have no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. In the above back ground, now, the issues which this Court is called upon to answer in the present appeal are- (1) Whether the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is sustainable and tenable ? and (2) Whether the impugned order warrants any interference of this Court under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 14 of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 ? 10. The information available before this Court, in clear and manifest terms, discloses that though initially, in the year 2019, the process was taken up for sale of the subject vessel, the same did not materialize in view of the fact that the bidders responded to the said notification quoted less amounts, which prompted this Court to cancel the said process. Therefore, this Court, vide order dated 28.01.2021, fixed a fresh schedule for sale of the said vessel. In pursuance of the said schedule, the Registrar (Judicial) issued a notification dated 15.03.2021, inviting bids from 16.03.2021 to 30.03.2021. Admittedly, in response to the said Notification, 4th respondent herein and another submitted their bids within the time stipulated by enclosing the E.M.D. amounts. Though 15.04.2021 was fixed as the date for opening of the bids, as the case did not appear on board on the said day, on the mention made by the learned counsel, the learned single Judge directed the matter to be listed on the next day i.e. on 16.04.2021. It is also not in controversy that on 16.04.2021, after opening of the bids, the appellant herein appeared through its counsel before the learned single Judge and offered its bid quoting, admittedly, the amount higher than the amount quoted by 4th respondent. It is also not in controversy that on 16.04.2021, after opening of the bids, the appellant herein appeared through its counsel before the learned single Judge and offered its bid quoting, admittedly, the amount higher than the amount quoted by 4th respondent. It is also not in controversy that on hearing the offer made on behalf of the appellant herein for Rs.3.50 Crores and Rs.3.75 Crores later, the representative of 4th respondent, enhanced its offer to Rs.3.85 Crores. The learned single Judge, eventually, while declining to consider the further request of the appellant herein, accepted the bid of 4th respondent and declared 4th respondent as successful bidder. 11. During the course of arguments, in support of his stand, learned counsel for 4th respondent-successful bidder, has placed on record Annexure-II, which contains terms and conditions of tender. Clauses 4, 6 and 8 of Annexure-II read as under: “4. All the tenders received after the due date and time will be summarily rejected. 6. Each tender should be accompanied by a demand draft payable at Amaravati drawn on State Bank of India, in favour of the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Amaravati, for an amount of Rs.30,00,000/-(Rupees thirty lakhs only) towards Earnest Money Deposit in a separate cover. 8. The tenders sent without Earnest Money Deposit as mentioned above will be rejected summarily.” According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the last date fixed in the tender notification for submission of bids is required to be taken as ‘directory’, but not ‘mandatory’. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. In Bancorex S.A. v. Ocean Marine Service Co. Ltd (supra), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, at paragraph Nos. 30 to 36, held as under: “30. Regardless of the change of attitude shown by the appellant, this Court is to consider as to whether the impugned order accepting the highest bidder, the third respondent for US $ 7,90,000/-is valid or not in the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. The principles which govern the confirmation of sale are well established. It is settled law that at the time of confirmation of the sale of the vessel, adequacy of price is a vital and essential aspect to be considered by the Court. 31. The principles which govern the confirmation of sale are well established. It is settled law that at the time of confirmation of the sale of the vessel, adequacy of price is a vital and essential aspect to be considered by the Court. Admittedly, there is no finding in the impugned order with reference to the adequacy of price, having regard to the claims made against the vessel, more particularly as stated earlier, when the value of the vessel as per the Valuation Report is very much higher than the sale price. While considering the adequacy of price, the Court has to necessarily consider various circumstances, as referred to above, including the market value of the vessel. 32. In this context, the observations of the Apex Court made in the decision in Navalkha andSons v. Ramanya Das (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2037) is quite relevant which is as follows: “In every case it is the duty of the Court to satisfy itself that having regard to the market value of the property the price offered is reasonable. Unless the Court is satisfied about the adequacy of the price the act of confirmation of the sale would not be a proper exercise of judicial discretion.” 33. When the similar question has been raised before this Court earlier on various occasions, this Court would hold as reported in A.I.R. 1921 Mad 286 (Gordnan Das Chnui Lal v. Kathimathinatha Pillai); A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 318 (Rathanasami Pillai v. Sabapathi Pillai); A.I.R.1940 Mad 42 = (1939) 50 L.W. 699 (Soundararajan v. Mohamed Ismail) and A.I.R. 1951 Mad 986 = 64 L.W. 821 (A.Subbaraya Mudaliar v. K.Sundararajan), that it is the duty of the court to satisfy itself that the price fixed is the best that could be expected to be offered and that the condition of confirmation by the Court being a safeguard against the property being sold at an inadequate price, it will be not only proper but necessary that the Court in exercising the discretion should see that the price fetched at the auction is an adequate price. 34. 34. So, if the principles enunciated in the decisions referred to above are applied to this case, there is no difficulty for us to come to the conclusion that the aspect of adequacy of sale price has not been given due consideration by the learned single Judge, more so when the price offered by the third respondent was less than the minimum price fixed by the court. As already discussed above, if others also had known that they could offer price for purchase of the vessel less than the minimum price fixed by the court, perhaps there would have been more offers. We have reason to think so, as during the pendency of hearing before the learned single Judge, and as well as before us, some persons have come forward offering more price, and assuring that in case sale is confirmed they will pay or deposit money as ordered by the Court. Under the circumstances, and having regard to the position of law stated in the decisions referred in paragraphs 32 and 33 of this judgment, we are unable to sustain the order of the learned single Judge confirming the sale in favour of the third respondent. 35. However, it must be stated that we are handicapped in ordering for re-tendering or calling for fresh tenders, as none of the parties are willing to bear the expenditure for publication regarding sale of the vessel. Therefore, we deem it fit and proper to remit the matter to the learned single Juge to ensure that the best possible price is secured through the parties who have come forward to pubchase the same before the learned single Judge as well as before us, and others, who may be present in the Court, on the given date, including the third respondent. 36. Admittedly, various parties approached the learned single Judge with application expressing willingness to offer for the bid for the amount which is higher than the bid amount offered by the third respondent. The Global Marketing System, the applicant in Application No.3139 of 1997, Sumarina Limited, the applicant in Application No.3197 of 1997 and other applicants in Application Nos. 3245, 3265 and 3380 of 1997 are some of the parties who offered to bid. There are some of the applicants before us also. The Global Marketing System, the applicant in Application No.3139 of 1997, Sumarina Limited, the applicant in Application No.3197 of 1997 and other applicants in Application Nos. 3245, 3265 and 3380 of 1997 are some of the parties who offered to bid. There are some of the applicants before us also. All these persons and others including the third respondent may be allowed to participate in the fresh auction to be held in the Court before the learned single Juge, in the view we are taking.” In Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works & others (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs 4 to 8, held as under: “4. The relevant clause 6 of the notice required the tender to be accompanied by earnest money calculated at 5% of the offer under the tender subject to a maximum of Rs 50,000 and in terms permitted the deposit by cash or by demand draft drawn on the State Bank of India. the defect pointed out by the respondent no. 1 and accepted by the High Court is in the appellant sending the cheque of the Union Bank of India drawn on its own branch and not on the State Bank. By the impugned judgment it has been held that in view of this defect the authorities had no power to accept the appellant's tender. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that having regard to the circumstances in the case it must be held that the Tender Committee had the power to accept the appellant's tender. Referring to the books "Bills of Exchange" by Byles, and "Cheques in Law and Practice" by M.S. Parthasarathy, it has been argued that certified cheques are as good as cash and the irregularity relied upon in the appellant's submitting his tender could be validly waived by the Diesel Locomotive Works. Reliance was also placed on M/s B.D. Yadav and M.R. Meshram v. Administrator of the City of Nagpur, AIR 1984 Bombay 351 and T.V Subhadra Amma v. Kerala Board of Revenue and Others, AIR 1982 Kerala 81. 6. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank the clause no. 6. It is true that in submitting its tender accompanied by a cheque of the Union Bank of India and not of the State Bank the clause no. 6 of the tender notice was not obeyed literally, but the question is as to whether the said noncompliance deprived the Diesel Locomotive Works of the authority to accept the bid. As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two categories-those which lay down the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the condition. In the first case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in appropriate cases. This aspect was examined by this Court in GJ Fernandez v. State of Karnataka Ors., [1990] 2 SCC 488 a case dealing with tenders. Although not in an entirely identical situation as the present one, the observations in the judgment support our view. The High Court has, in the impugned decision, relied upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., [1979] 3 SCC 489 but has failed to appreciate that the reported case belonged to the first category where the strict compliance of the condition could be insisted upon. The authority in that case, by not insisting upon the requirement in the tender notice which was an essential condition of eligibility, bestowed a favour on one of the bidders, which amounted to illegal discrimination. The judgment indicates that the Court closely examined the nature of the condition which had been relaxed and its impact before answering the question whether it could have validly condoned the shortcoming in the tender in question. This part of the judgment demonstrates the difference between the two categories of the conditions discussed above. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses, the present case belongs. 7. This part of the judgment demonstrates the difference between the two categories of the conditions discussed above. However it remains to be seen as to which of the two clauses, the present case belongs. 7. The nature of payment by a certified cheque was considered by this Court in Sita Ram Jhunjhunwala v. Bombay Bullion Association Ltd. & Anr., [1965] 35 Company Cases 526. Several objections were taken there in support of the plea that the necessary condition in regard to payment was not satisfied and in that context this Court quoted the observations from the judgment in an English decision (vide Spargo's case: 1873 L.R. & Ch. App. 407) that it is a general rule of law that in every case where a transaction resolves itself into paying money by A to B and then handing it back again by B to A, if the parties meet together and agree to set one demand against the other, they need not go through the form and ceremony of handing the money backwards and forwards. This Court applied that the observations to a transaction requiring payment by one to another. The High Court's decisions in B.D. Yadav's case and T.V. Subhadra Amma's case are also illustrations where literal compliance of every term of the tender notice was not insisted upon. 8. In the instant case the certified cheque of the Union Bank of India drawn on is own branch must be treated as sufficient for the purpose of achieving the object of the condition and the Tender Committee took the abundant caution by a further verification from the bank. In this situation it is not correct to hold that the Diesel Locomotive Works had no authority to waive the technical literal compliance of clause 6, specially when it was in its interest of not to reject the said bid which was the highest. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and dismiss the writ petition of the respondent no. 1 filed before the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs through out.” 12. In the case on hand, it is absolutely not in controversy that specifically stipulating the last date for submission of bids as 30.03.2021, the notification came to be issued on 15.03.2021, i.e. by giving 15 days’ clear time to the intending bidders, the Notification came to be issued, calling for tenders. In the case on hand, it is absolutely not in controversy that specifically stipulating the last date for submission of bids as 30.03.2021, the notification came to be issued on 15.03.2021, i.e. by giving 15 days’ clear time to the intending bidders, the Notification came to be issued, calling for tenders. The said time given in the said notification, by any stretch of imagination, cannot be said to be unreasonable. The fact remains that in response to the said tender notification, two bidders offered their bids. As mentioned supra, according to clause (4) of Annexure-II, tenders received after the due date are liable for rejection summarily. For every exercise or transaction, there needs to be a finalty, as such, the Notification came to be issued fixing the last date for receipt of the bids as 30.03.2021. In the absence of such a stipulation, there is no end for any transaction or exercise. It is also required to be noted that in view of the large variation in the price, the Madras High Court in the decision in Bancorex S.A. v. Ocean Marine Service Co. Ltd (supra), ordered re-auction. In the instant case, the difference between the offer orally made by the appellant herein and the bid finalized is only Rs.15.00 lakhs. Having failed to respond to the tender notification within the time stipulated therein and in the absence of any violation of any vested right of the appellant herein and in the absence of any public interest involved, the appellant herein, in the considered opinion of this Court, is not entitled for any relief from this Court. 13. In fact, the learned single Judge had also taken care of the situation and having regard to the enhancement of the bid amount made by the highest bidder-4th respondent to Rs.3.85 Crores, finalized the bid of 4th respondent and declared 4th respondent as successful bidder. Therefore, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be construed that the order passed by the learned single Judge is unreasonable. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Valji Khimji & Co. v. O.L. of Hindusta Nitroproduct, (2008) 9 SCC 299 . In the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph Nos. 31 to 36, held as under: “31. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Valji Khimji & Co. v. O.L. of Hindusta Nitroproduct, (2008) 9 SCC 299 . In the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph Nos. 31 to 36, held as under: “31. If it is held that every confirmed sale can be set aside the result would be that no auction sale will ever be complete because always somebody can come after the auction or its confirmation offering a higher amount. 32. It could have been a different matter if the auction had been held without adequate publicity in well-known newspapers having wide circulation, but where the auction sale was done after wide publicity, then setting aside the sale after its confirmation will create huge problems. When an auction sale is advertised in well-known newspapers having wide circulation, all eligible persons can come and bid for the same, and they will be themselves be to blame if they do not come forward to bid at the time of the auction. They cannot ordinarily later on be allowed after the bidding (or confirmation) is over to offer a higher price. 33. Of course, the situation may be different if an auction sale is finalized say for Rs.1 crore, and subsequently somebody turns up offering Rs. 10 crores. In this situation it is possible to infer that there was some fraud because if somebody subsequently offers 10 crores, then an inference can be drawn that an attempt had been made to acquire that property/asset at a grossly inadequate price. This situation itself may indicate fraud or some collusion. However, if the price offered after the auction is over which is only a little over the auction price, that cannot by itself suggest that any fraud has been done. 34. In the present case we are satisfied that there is no fraud in the auction sale. It may be mentioned that auctions are of two types -(1) where the auction is not subject to subsequent confirmation and (2) where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation by some authority after the auction is held. 35. In the first case mentioned above, i.e. where the auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain rights accrue in favour of the auction purchaser. 35. In the first case mentioned above, i.e. where the auction is not subject to confirmation by any authority, the auction is complete on the fall of the hammer, and certain rights accrue in favour of the auction purchaser. However, where the auction is subject to subsequent confirmation by some authority (under a statute or terms of the auction) the auction is not complete and no rights accrue until the sale is confirmed by the said authority. Once, however, the sale is confirmed by that authority, certain rights accrue in favour of the auction purchaser, and these rights cannot be extinguished except in exceptional cases such as fraud. 36. In the present case, the auction having been confirmed on 30.7.2003 by the Court it cannot be set aside unless some fraud or collusion has been proved. We are satisfied that no fraud or collusion has been established by any one in this case.” 14. It is very much evident from a reading of the above ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court that when an auction sale is advertised in well known newspapers having wide circulation, those who could not come forward within the time stipulated, are required to blame themselves. If the request of the appellant is considered, the entire herculean exercise undertaken before the learned single Judge for the second time obviously for the sale of the vessel, is required to be redone. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that as 4th respondent offered the amount less than the amount of reserved price initially, its bid ought not to have been accepted, is also not sustainable in the absence of any clause in the tender notification to the said effect. In the considered opinion of this Court, the judgments sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant would not render any assistance to the appellant herein having regard to the factual and the circumstantial variation. 16. In view of the reasons narrated supra, in the considered opinion of this Court, the order passed by the learned single Judge does not warrant any interference of this Court and this Court finds no merits in the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs of the appeal. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in the Appeal shall stand closed.