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2021 DIGILAW 3 (BOM)

Priyanka Vinayak Ranmale v. State of Maharashtra

2021-01-04

MANGESH S.PATIL

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. Rule. The Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent of both the sides, the matter is heard finally at the stage of admission. 3. The petitioner submitted her nomination form for election to the Gram Panchayat Mirpur, from Ward No. 2. Respondent No. 6 raised an objection to the Returning Officer, on the ground that the petitioner had not completed the age of 20 years and therefore, was not qualified for contesting the election. By the impugned order, the Returning Officer upheld the objection and rejected the nomination, which is under challenge in this Writ Petition. 4. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, by referring to the impugned order points out that simply because the age of the petitioner was appearing as 20 years in the voters list the Returning Officer has passed the impugned order. He, further, points out that even a Transfer Certificate issued by a college in which the petitioner was studying, was produced before the Returning Officer who prima facie recorded an observation that even going by the date of birth mentioned on her Transfer Certificate, she was 22 years and 7 months old. He would point out that purportedly relying on the decision in case of Dhondba Adku and another Versus Civil Judge, Junior Division, Hinganghat, AIR 1967 Bombay 232, the Returning Officer has refused to consider the date of birth mentioned in the Transfer Certificate. The learned Advocate would submit that there is no law which prohibits the Returning Officer from independently verifying the aspect of age. The view taken by him is de hors the provisions of law and is arbitrary and illegal. 5. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 6 referring to the decision in the case of Dhondba Adku (supra) submits that if at all, the petitioner wanted to challenge the voters list, she should have done it at an appropriate time. She is now indirectly seeking to correct the voters list which is not permissible. 6. The learned Advocate Mr. Kadethankar referring to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade Versus Returning Officer, Akot, 2003 (4) Mh.L.J. 359 , submits that it is too late to interfere in the process of election which has already commenced. Today is the date for allotment of symbols. The clock cannot be set back. Kadethankar referring to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vinod Pandurang Bharsakade Versus Returning Officer, Akot, 2003 (4) Mh.L.J. 359 , submits that it is too late to interfere in the process of election which has already commenced. Today is the date for allotment of symbols. The clock cannot be set back. The process of election cannot be stalled in this fashion. He also cites the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Election Commission Versus Shivaji and others, AIR 1988 SC 61 , and submits that this court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction should not assume jurisdiction which would have a tendency to obstruct or stall the election process. 7. As far as maintainability of the present petition is concerned, it is a matter of record that today is the date for withdrawal of nomination forms and allotment of symbols. There can also be no dispute that the Supreme Court as well as this Court has taken a consistent view in the aforementioned cases that the writ jurisdiction is not to be invoked to stall the election process. However, in the case of Poonam Rajesh Pawar Versus Returning Officer, 2017 (4) Mh.L.J. 85 which in turn relies upon the Division Bench judgment in the case of Sudhakar Misal Versus State of Maharashtra and others, 2007 (6) ALL MR 773, in which this Court has marked a distinction between the cases where there is a challenge to the acceptance of a nomination form and where it is against rejection of a nomination. The former results in or has a tendency to result in interfering in the election process but not the latter. Following these principles laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Misal (supra) and subsequently followed in the case of Ponam Pawar (supra), in my considered view, the facts and circumstances of the matter in hand present a peculiar state of affair where this Court can invoke writ jurisdiction to cause inclusion of the petitioner in the process of election without hampering it. 8. As far as factual aspects are concerned, even impugned order records specific observation of the Returning Officer, that the date of birth of the petitioner going by the Transfer Certificate presented by her was 04.05.1998, and she was 22 years and 7 months old. 8. As far as factual aspects are concerned, even impugned order records specific observation of the Returning Officer, that the date of birth of the petitioner going by the Transfer Certificate presented by her was 04.05.1998, and she was 22 years and 7 months old. If such is the case and when the law does not independently require that the age mentioned in the voters list should be taken into consideration for eligibility of a candidate to participate in the election on the ground of age, the impugned order cannot stand the scrutiny of law. 9. The decision in the case of Dhondiba Adku (supra) was in respect of a challenge to the voters list which is not a case in the matter in hand. The petitioner is not seeking correction in the voters list. Her name already appears in the voters list. It is only a matter of her age which is being questioned by the respondent No. 6. In view of this peculiar state of affairs the impugned order is liable to be quashed albeit the election process has reached the stage of allotment of symbols. The Writ Petition deserves to be allowed. 10. At this juncture, the learned Advocate Mr. Kadethankar for the State Election Commission submits that a representative of the Upper Tahsildar and Resident Naib Tahsildar are personally present in the Court while this order is being dictated. 11. The Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. The Returning Officer shall now treat the petitioner as a candidate eligible to contest the election. Since the representative of the Returning Officer is present personally, she shall act on the basis of the order being dictated in the open Court.