JUDGMENT : A.P. THAKER, J. 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the impugned award dated 12.08.2009 passed by the Labour Court, Jamnagar in Reference L.C.J. No. 174/1996 whereby the claim put up by the petitioner has been rejected. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was working under the respondents as Vijdi Gar Helper since for more than 14 years and his services have been terminated without following due procedure of law on 01.03.1996. It is contended by the petitioner that he has filed the Reference (L.C.J.) No. 174/1996 before the Labour Court, Jamnagar. It is further contended by the petitioner that the Labour Court has partly allowed the Reference by order dated 12.08.2009 directing respondent no. 1 to reinstate the workman if the scheme of Vij Gar is continued and if the scheme is not continued and as and when respondent no. 2 started the scheme, he be given priority without back wages. According to him, he has completed 240 days of service. It is also contended that the Labour Court has not considered the fact that on applying the principles of lifting vail, the real employer is the Vij Company and the wages were paid by cheque by the Electricity Company and the workman was working under supervision and control of the officers of the Electricity Company. It is further contended by the petitioner that the Labour Court has not considered the factual aspects as well as legal aspects and has committed serious error of facts and law in passing the impugned award. On all these grounds, the petitioner has prayed to allow the present petition. 3. Heard Mr. P.H. Pathak, learned advocate for the petitioner, Ms. Khyati Hathi, learned advocate for respondent no. 1 and Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate for respondent no. 2 through video conferencing. 4. Mr. P.H. Pathak, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the workman was working as helper in the lighthouse and he preferred the impugned reference before the Labour Court, which has passed the award dated 12.08.2009. While referring to the award, he has submitted that the Labour Court has observed that there was breach of Section 25(F), (G) and (H) of the I.D. Act and accordingly, the reference was allowed. While referring to the award, he has submitted that the Labour Court has observed that there was breach of Section 25(F), (G) and (H) of the I.D. Act and accordingly, the reference was allowed. He has submitted that while granting reinstatement, no order for back wages has been passed by the Labour Court and it amounts to refusal of the prayer and, therefore, the workman has preferred this petition for getting relief of back wages. According to him, the non-granting of back wages by the Labour Court is not legal and valid. He has submitted that in such a case “if” and “but” are not available. However, the Labour Court has passed the impugned award “if” and “but.” He has submitted that when the workman was ordered to be reinstated, then, as consequential relief, the back wages ought to have been granting to the workman. Of course, he has submitted that due to length of time spent, the workman has crossed the retirement age and now, he is aged of 60 years. He has submitted that the award of Labour Court may be modified to that extent by granting back wages. He has relied upon the two decisions in the case of Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192 and Anoop Sharma vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, Panipat, (2010) 5 SCC 497 . For his submissions, he has submitted that when the workman was entitled to reinstatement, the full back wages ought to have been granted by the Labour Court. 5. Ms. Khyati Hathi, learned advocate for respondent no. 1 has submitted that the scheme of the Vijadi Ghar is not in existence. She has submitted that the scheme was flouted by the GEB and, therefore, the Panchayat has nothing to do it. She has submitted that if the appointment is made by the GEB, then, the Panchayat has no objection. She has submitted that the workman was the employer of the GEB. She has submitted that the termination of the workman was far away back and at present workman might have crossed the age of superannuation. She has prayed to dismiss the present petition qua the Panchayat. 6. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the GEB has submitted that the award has not been challenged by the Panchayat. She has submitted that the termination of the workman was far away back and at present workman might have crossed the age of superannuation. She has prayed to dismiss the present petition qua the Panchayat. 6. Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the GEB has submitted that the award has not been challenged by the Panchayat. He has submitted that there is no relationship between the workman and the GEB as employee and employer. For this assertion, he has relied upon the decision of this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr.Justice Paresh Upadhyay) dated 16.03.2016 passed in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited and another Vs. Jagdishsinh Kuvarsinh Wala and others in Special Civil Application No. 1217 of 2016 wherein after referring to the various decisions, this Court has come to the conclusion that there was no employer and employee relationship between the workman and the GEB. He has prayed to dismiss the present petition qua the GEB. 7. In rejoinder, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the Labour Court has passed the award in favour of the workman against the Panchayat and that award has not been challenged by the Panchayat. He has submitted that the age of the workman in the year 2005 was 54 years and 6 months and considering the age in the year 2014, he had reached the superannuation and, therefore, appropriate order may be passed against the respondents. 8. In the case of Harjinder Singh (supra), the Apex Court has observed in Paras-20 and 31 as under:- “20. The distinction between Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act was recently reiterated in Bhogpur Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Harmesh Kumar, (2006) 13 SCC 28 in the following words: (SCC p.31, Para 9) “9. We are not oblivious of the distinction in regard to the legality of the order of termination in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies on the one hand, and a situation where Section 25-G thereof applies on the other. Whereas in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies the workman is bound to prove that he had been in continuous service of 240 days during twelve months preceding the order of termination; in a case where he invokes the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H thereof he may not have to establish the said fact. Whereas in a case where Section 25-F of the Act applies the workman is bound to prove that he had been in continuous service of 240 days during twelve months preceding the order of termination; in a case where he invokes the provisions of Sections 25-G and 25-H thereof he may not have to establish the said fact. See: Central Bank of India vs. S. Satyam, (1996) 5 SCC 419 , Samishta Dube vs. City Board, Etawah, (1999) 3 SCC 14 , SBI vs. Rakesh Kumar Tewari, (2006) 1 SCC 530 and Jaipur Development Authority vs. Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684 .........” 31. It need not emphasis that if a man is deprived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity, the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the directive principles of State policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer-public or private.” 8.1 In the said case, the Labour Court has granted the reinstatement of the workman which order was set aside by the Hon'ble Labour court which was reversed by the Supreme Court and holed the order passed by the Labour Court. 9. In the case of Anoop Sharma (supra), while dealing with the various decisions of the Apex Court, the Apex Court has observed from para-16 to para-22 that “the termination of service of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the requirement of giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof and compensation in terms of Sections 25(a) and (b) has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as nullity and the employee is entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated. Clause (b) of Section 25-F casts as duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. Clause (b) of Section 25-F casts as duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. If the workman is asked to collect his dues from the cash office the same is not considered sufficient compliance with Section 25-F. The workman cannot be retrenched without payment at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed in terms of Section 25-F(b). If the workman is retrenched by an oral order or communication or he is simply asked not to come for duty, the employer will be required to lead tangible and substantive evidence to prove compliance with clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act. 10. In the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited and Another (supra), the Coordinate Bench has considered the point that whether there was employer employee relationship between the Electricity Company and the workman where the workman was working in the Gram Panchayat concerned and ultimately by following the decision of the Division Bench of this Court passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 777 of 1996 as well as the decisions rendered by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 10737 of 1998 dated 25.07.2007 and Special Civil Application No. 5644 of 1997 dated 31.07.2007, has come to the conclusion that there was no employer employee relationship between the Electricity Company and the respondents thereof. 11. Now, considering the factual of this case, it appears that the workman was appointed by the Gram Panchayat by resolution and his service came to be terminated by passing resolution by the Panchayat. This fact has also been admitted by the workman in his deposition which has been reflected in the award itself. It is constant stand of the Electricity Company that there was no relation as employer and employee between the Electricity Company and the present petitioner. It also reveals from the observation of the Labour Court that the workman was working in the Panchayat by way of order given by the Panchayat and he has been terminated by the Panchayat. There is no cogent evidence produced to substantiate the say of the workman that he was workman of the Electricity Company. It also reveals from the observation of the Labour Court that the workman was working in the Panchayat by way of order given by the Panchayat and he has been terminated by the Panchayat. There is no cogent evidence produced to substantiate the say of the workman that he was workman of the Electricity Company. Now, admittedly, by passing the impugned award, the Labour Court has not passed any relief against the Electricity Company and has rejected the relief against the Electricity Company. 12. It is pertinent to note that in the entire proceedings before the Labour Court, the Panchayat has not taken care to defend its stand or produced any evidence in the matter. The documentary evidence produced by the Electricity Company and the workman has already been discussed by the Labour Court while coming to the conclusion that there is breach of mandatory provisions of the I.D. Act in a way that the workman has been retrenched without paying any retrenchment allowance or issuing notice as well as after his retrenchment, other person has been appointed and the work is going on. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that in view of the submissions of the learned advocate for the petitioner that at the time of award, the workman was at the age of 54 years and 6 months and, therefore, in the year 2014, he has reached at the age of superannuation. Considering this aspect, it is not possible, now, to reinstate the workman. But, since, the award has not been challenged by the Panchayat nor has defended itself before the Labour Court and considering the time gap between 1996 till today, instead of granting reinstatement, if some lump sum amount is awarded against the Panchayat and in favour of the workman, it will meet the end of justice. It is also come on record that there was agreement between the Electricity Company and the Panchayat that the Panchayat can appoint any person for carrying out the scheme and the payment of wages will be made by the Electricity Company. This factor has been dealt with by the Labour Court in award and that fact has not been challenged by neither Panchayat nor by the Electricity Company. 13. This factor has been dealt with by the Labour Court in award and that fact has not been challenged by neither Panchayat nor by the Electricity Company. 13. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that the Panchayat has committed the breach of mandatory provisions of the I.D. Act and the fact that the assertion made on behalf of the workman that at the time of his retrenchment, he has served for more than 14 years in the Panchayat which has not been denied by the Panchayat. If lump sum amount of monetary compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- is awarded, then, it will meet the end of justice. 14. Considering the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Tapash Paul vs. BSNL and Another, 2016 (1) Scale 92 and BSNL vs. Bhurumal, 2014 (7) SCC 177 , this Court is of the view that in the facts of this case granting of relief of reinstatement after a gap of almost 14 years, no useful purpose will be served and, therefore, this Court deems fit to order grant of compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- as full and final settlement of the claim, in lieu of the reinstatement. Such amount be paid to the workman by the employer after proper verification of the identify by an account payee cheque/pay order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the workman shall be entitled to claim interest at the rate of 9% from today till the date of actual realization. It is observed that the aforesaid amount is in addition to whatsoever paid to him. 15. With the aforesaid conclusion, the petition stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.