ORDER : This writ petition is filed to declare the action of the respondents in rejecting the claim of the petitioner No.2 for dependant employment vide proceedings dated 23.11.2019 issued by the respondentNo.2, as being illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice; violative of Articles 14, 16, 19(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India and against the judgment of the Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA v. V.R. TRIPATHI, (2019) 14 SCC 646 and to set aside the impugned proceedings dated 23.11.2019 and direct the respondents to consider the petitioner No.2 for dependant employment. 2. It is stated that the petitioner No.3 is the wife of the petitioner No.1; petitioner No.4 is the second wife of the petitioner No.1; petitioner No.2 is the eldest son of the second wife of the petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.5 is the youngest son of second wife of the petitioner No.1. Petitioner No.1 was a permanent employee of the Singareni Collieries Company Limited and his designation was coal cutter. He worked until March 2019 at Kasipet Mine, Mandamarri Area. He was removed from service since he was declared medically invalid by the Corporate Medical Board for further service. His name was removed from the service rolls of the Kasipet Mine with effect from 26.03.2019. 3. It is the contention of the petitioners that as per the National coal Wage Agreement, the petitioner No.1 is entitled for either employment to one of the dependants or monetary benefits. Petitioner No.2 is the eldest son of the second wife of the petitioner No.1. He completed SCC/10th class with 7.3 CGPA for the academic year 2015-2016 and his age is 20 years. He is eligible for dependant employment and the petitioners No.1, 3, 4 and 5 agreed unanimously for dependant employment for the petitioner No.2. Accordingly, the petitioners No.1 to 5 submitted application before the respondent No.3 for dependant employment to petitioner No.2. However, under the impugned proceedings dated 23.11.2019, the dependant employment was rejected by giving the following reason: “… As per the NCWA provision of dependant employment, “Son born to second wife not legally married to the employee is not eligible for employment”. Respondent No.2 to 4 advised the Petitioner No.1 vide proceeding Ref.No.CRP/PER/WEL/DE/5926 dated 23-11-2019 to nominate any other eligible dependant for employment or to apply for payment of MMC or LSP in accordance with company guidelines.” 4. Respondent No.2 to 4 advised the Petitioner No.1 vide proceeding Ref.No.CRP/PER/WEL/DE/5926 dated 23-11-2019 to nominate any other eligible dependant for employment or to apply for payment of MMC or LSP in accordance with company guidelines.” 4. It is submitted by the petitioners that the National Coal Wage Agreement does not bar ‘Son born to Second wife for dependant employment’. Under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a child born out of void marriage would have to be treated as legitimate child. In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (1 supra) passed an order holding that the children born to the second wife are entitled for compassionate appointment. 5. In the counter filed by the respondents, it is stated that the respondent/company is having work force of 46,000 employees and carrying on mining operation. It is engaged in exploration, excavation, extracting and mining of coal in six districts of the Telangana State. It is a Scheduled Industry under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Code of Discipline is in force and the workmen are covered under various Statutes, including Coal Mines Regulations and Mines Act, 1952 and Mines Rules. The employees are governed by the National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) formulated by the Joint Bi-Partite Committee for Coal Industry (JBCCI). The JBCCI evolves wage structures, leaves, LTC/LLTC, medical facilities, allowances, increments, service conditions other fringe benefits. 6. It is further stated that the petitioner No.1 was medically invalidated by the Corporate Medical Board and his services were terminated with effect from 26.03.2019. As per the rules of the respondent/company, the petitioner No.1 is eligible for social security benefit i.e. he may opt either for lumpsum amount or monthly monetary compensation or dependent employment to one eligible dependant. As per the company records, the petitioner No.1 is having two sons whose names are Durgam Vamshi and Durgam Akhil and the name of the wife of the petitioner No.1 is entered as Durgam Laxmi. As per the SCC certificate of Durgam Vamshi, his mother’s name is mentioned as Durgam Rama whereas the name of Durgam Rama, alleged second wife of the petitioner No.1, is not entered in any of the company’s records. As per the provisions of NCWA for dependant employment, son born to the second wife not legally married to the employee is not eligible for employment. As per the provisions of NCWA for dependant employment, son born to the second wife not legally married to the employee is not eligible for employment. The petitioner No.1 was informed by letter dated 23.11.2019 to propose the name of any other eligible dependant for employment. 7. It is further asserted by the respondents that as per the Circular No.P(PMP38/2229/2647 dated 27.11.1992, son born to wife not legally married to the employee, is not eligible for employment. The marriage between the petitioner No.1 and petitioner No.4 is null and void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as the petitioner No.1 contracted the second marriage with the petitioner No.4, while his marriage with the petitioner No.3 was subsisting. The Supreme court in STATE BANK OF INDIA v. JASPAL KAUR, (2007) 9 SCC 571 held that public post is not heritable therefore right to dependant employment is not a heritable property. Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act would not come to the aid of the petitioners, as the legal presumption of legitimacy in such provision is restricted only to the property of the deceased and not to other things. The second marriage was in any event permissible under Muslim Personal Law but not under the Hindu Marriage Act. The decision in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (1 supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the Supreme Court held that the issue as to whether in a particular case, the applicant meets all the stipulations of the scheme including financial need and other requirements are matters which will be decided on the facts of each individual case. 8. Heard Mr. M. Surender Rao, learned senior counsel representing Mr. Ramesh Bura, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. J. Sreenivasa Rao, learned Standing counsel for the respondent/company. 9. The learned senior counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to clause 9.30 of Chapter IX of NCWA-VI, which deals with dependant employment and is extracted below: “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by para 9.5.0. 9.3.3. the dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4 the dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment. 9.4.0. Employment to one dependant of a worker who is permanently disabled in his place (i) … (ii) … (iii) The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the employee and almost wholly dependant on the earning of the employee may be considered. (iv) … 10. Learned senior counsel submitted that the memorandum of agreement in NCWA-IX was entered into between the Management and the Union on 31.01.2012 wherein certain modifications were made to NCWA-VI. He further submitted that as per memorandum of agreement dated 10.10.2017, it was agreed that status quo (as per NCWA-VI) shall be maintained so far as dependant employment is concerned. 11. The combined clauses 9.3.0, 9.4.0 and 9.5.0 of the memorandum of agreement dated 10.10.2017 is extracted hereunder: “9.3.0, 9.4.0 Provision of Employment/payment of & 9.5.0 monthly monetary compensation to Dependant A committee is constituted under the chairmanship of Director (P&IR), CIL consisting of representative of Trade Unions and Management to finalise the scheme for employment or financial benefits to the dependant. The aforesaid committee shall submit the scheme tentatively by 31st March 2018. Till then, status quo shall be maintained in respect of these provisions.” 12. The aforesaid committee shall submit the scheme tentatively by 31st March 2018. Till then, status quo shall be maintained in respect of these provisions.” 12. Learned standing counsel for the respondent/company has placed on record the proceedings dated 05.05.1994 whereunder the respondent/company rejected dependant employment of other claimants on the ground that son born to the second wife, while first wife is alive, is not eligible for dependant employment in the respondent/company, as second marriage is not legal. Further the learned standing counsel referred to the guidelines framed by the company under proceedings dated 15.10.1994 with regard to the dependant employment. 13. Learned senior counsel relied on a recent decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP.No.26926 of 2019 dated 09.07.2021 and contended that the writ petition was allowed following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra). The relevant portion of the decision of this Court is extracted hereun: “…The Apex Court has considered that compassionate appointment has to be made strictly in accordance with the scheme of compassionate appointment. Admittedly, the respondents have not filed scheme of compassionate appointment, which prohibits children born out of second marriage are not entitled for compassionate appointment. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has rightly contended that the Apex Court in Union of India vs. V.R. Tripathi ((1) referred to supra) has considered all these issues and held that children born out of second marriage cannot be treated as illegitimate children, therefore, the impugned rejection order dated 24.04.2018 passed by the respondents is contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India vs. V.R.Tripathi ((1) referred to supra).” 14. Learned standing counsel for the respondent/company relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of Kolkata High Court in EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DILIP SINGH, 2013 SCC OnLine CAL 4285. He also relied on another decision of the High Court of Kolkata in SHRISTIDHAR PATHAK v. UNION OF INDIA, 2012 SCC OnLine CAL 5268. 15. It is to be noticed that the judgment in EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD.’s case (supra) was overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra). The following observations were made by the Supreme Court: “12. 15. It is to be noticed that the judgment in EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD.’s case (supra) was overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra). The following observations were made by the Supreme Court: “12. The real issue in the present case, however, is whether the condition which has been imposed by the circular of the Railway Board under which compassionate appointment cannot be granted to the children born from a second marriage of a deceased employee (except where the marriage was permitted by the administration taking into account personal law, etc) accords with basic notions of fairness and equal treatment, so as to be consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. While answering this issue, it would be necessary to advert to the provisions of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which provide thus: “16. Legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages.-(1) Notwithstanding that marriage is null and void under section 11, any child of such marriage who would have been legitimate if the marriage had been valid, shall be legitimate, whether such child is born before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), and whether or not a decree of nullity is granted in respect of that marriage under this Act and whether or not the marriage is held to be void otherwise than on a petition under this Act. (2) Where a decree of nullity is granted in respect of a voidable marriage under section 12, any child begotten or conceived before the decree is made, who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if at the date of the decree it had been dissolved instead of being annulled, shall be deemed to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the decree of nullity. (3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be construed as conferring upon any child of a marriage which is null and void or which is annulled by a decree of nullity under section 12, any rights in or to the property of any person, other than the parents, in any case where, but for the passing of this Act, such child would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any such rights by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents.” 13. In sub-section (1) of Section 16, the legislature has stipulated that a child born from a marriage which is null and void under Section 11 is legitimate, regardless of whether the birth has taken place before or after the commencement of Amending Act 68 of 1976. Legitimacy of a child born from a marriage which is null and void, is a matter of public policy so as to protect a child born from such a marriage from suffering the consequences of illegitimacy. Hence, though the marriage may be null and void, a child who is born from the marriage is nonetheless treated as legitimate by sub-section (1) of Section 16. One of the grounds on which a marriage is null and void under Section 11 read with clause (i) of Section 5 is that the marriage has been contracted when one of the parties had a spouse living at the time of marriage. A second marriage contracted by a Hindu during the subsistence of the first marriage is, therefore, null and void. However, the legislature has stepped in by enacting Section 16(1) to protect the legitimacy of a child born from such a marriage. Sub-section (3) of Section 16, however, stipulates that such a child who is born from a marriage which is null and void, will have a right in the property only of the parents and none other than the parents. 14. The issue essentially is whether it is open to an employer, who is amenable to Part III of the Constitution to deny the benefit of compassionate appointment which is available to other legitimate children. Undoubtedly, while designing a policy of compassionate appointment, the State can prescribe the terms on which it can be granted. However, it is not open to the State, while making the scheme or rules, to lay down a condition which is inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. The purpose of compassionate appointment is to prevent destitution and penury in the family of a deceased employee. The effect of the circular is that irrespective of the destitution which a child born from a second marriage of a deceased employee may face, compassionate appointment is to be refused unless the second marriage was contracted with the permission of the administration. The effect of the circular is that irrespective of the destitution which a child born from a second marriage of a deceased employee may face, compassionate appointment is to be refused unless the second marriage was contracted with the permission of the administration. Once Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 regards a child born from a marriage entered into while the earlier marriage is subsisting to be legitimate, it would not be open to the State, consistent with Article 14 to exclude such a child from seeking the benefit of compassionate appointment. Such a condition of exclusion is arbitrary and ultra vires. 15. Even if the narrow classification test is adopted, the circular of the Railway Board creates two categories between one class of legitimate children. Though the law has regarded a child born from a second marriage as legitimate, a child born from the first marriage of a deceased employee is alone made entitled to the benefit of compassionate appointment. The salutary purpose underlying the grant of compassionate appointment, which is to prevent destitution and penury in the family of a deceased employee requires that any stipulation or condition which is imposed must have or bear a reasonable nexus to the object which is sought to be achieved. The learned Additional Solicitor General has urged that it is open to the State, as part of its policy of discouraging bigamy to restrict the benefit of compassionate appointment, only to the spouse and children of the first marriage and to deny it to the spouse of a subsequent marriage and the children. We are here concerned with the exclusion of children born from a second marriage. By excluding a class of beneficiaries who have been deemed legitimate by the operation of law, the condition imposed is disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved. Having regard to the purpose and object of a scheme of compassionate appointment, once the law has treated such children as legitimate, it would be impermissible to exclude them from being considered for compassionate appointment. Children do not choose their parents. To deny compassionate appointment though the law treats a child of a void marriage as legitimate is deeply offensive to their dignity and is offensive to the constitutional guarantee against discrimination.” 16. Children do not choose their parents. To deny compassionate appointment though the law treats a child of a void marriage as legitimate is deeply offensive to their dignity and is offensive to the constitutional guarantee against discrimination.” 16. The Union of India, which is the appellant in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra), relied upon a circular of the Railway Board dated 02.01.1992 whereunder children born to second wife (widow) are not entitled for appointment on compassionate grounds unless administration has permitted second marriage, in special circumstances, taking into account the personal law etc. In para 17 of the said decision, the Supreme Court observed as under: “17. We may note at this stage, that a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Namita Goldar [2010 1 Cal.LJ 464] quashed the circular of the Railway Board dated 2 January 1992 to the extent that it prevented the children of the second wife from being considered for appointment on compassionate grounds.” 17. Learned standing counsel for the respondent/company referred to a Circular No. P(PM)5/3932/NCWA/1326 dated 05.05.1994, which is extracted below: “The dependant to be considered for employment shall be physically fit suitable for employment underground and should be in the age group of 18 – 35 years. Son born to second wife, not legally married to the employee is not eligible for employment.” On the strength of the above circular, the learned standing counsel for the respondent/company contended that the petitioner No.2 is not entitled to claim appointment on compassionate grounds as he is, admittedly, the son of the second wife of the petitioner No.1 18. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners argued that the respondent/company is bound by NCWA VI dated 23.12.2000 and 10th Wage Agreement dated 10.10.2017, which also cover dependant employment under clauses 9.3 and 9.4. He submitted that there is no specific bar for children born to second wife to claim compassionate appointment. In view of the NCWA agreements entered into in the year 2000 and 2017 and status quo being maintained with regard to clauses 9.3 and 9.4, this Court is of the view that the circular dated 05.05.1994 is deemed to have been superseded and no more in force. In any case, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra), the action of the respondent/company is unsustainable. 19. In any case, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra), the action of the respondent/company is unsustainable. 19. In view of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in V.R. TRIPATHI’s case (supra), this Court holds that the rejection of claim of the petitioner No.2 for dependant employment vide impugned proceedings dated 23.11.2019 is illegal, arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The impugned proceedings dated 23.11.2019 are set aside. The writ petition is accordingly allowed directing the respondents to consider the petitioner No.2 for the dependant employment and issue appointment order within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.