Judgment Sanjay Dhar, J.-The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17.02.2016, whereby appellant has been convicted of offence under Section 302 and 307 RPC together with order of sentence dated 20.02.2016, whereby the appellant has been sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000/ for commission of offence under Section 302 RPC and rigorous imprisonment of ten years for commission of offence under Section 307 RPC. 2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the instant appeal are that on 31.10.2009, a written information was received by SHO, P/S Kokernagh from PW-1, Shri S. K. Basu, Deputy Commandant of 164 Bn. CRPF, wherein it was stated that on 30.10.2009 at around 9.15 PM, the appellant/accused, a Head Constable, serving in Unit No.164 of CRPF, had fired several rounds with his service rifle AKM bearing Butt No.S/71 body No.NK447619 in Jawans Barracks which resulted in death of two persons, namely, Head Constable Tufail Ahmad Khan and Head Constable Sadashiv Tiwari as also injuries to two more persons, namely, Head Constable Biren Malakar and Constable Hemango Burman. FIR No.115/2009 for offences under Section 302 and 307 RPC was registered and investigation of the case was set into motion. 3. During investigation of the case, the dead bodies of two deceased CRPF personnel were taken into custody for conducting their postmortem and the injured were sent to hospital for their medical treatment. The statements of witnesses conversant with the facts of the case were recorded under Section 161 Cr. P. C and statements of certain other witnesses were recorded under Section 164-A Cr. P. C before the concerned Magistrate. The weapon of offence, fired empty cartridges and magazines of the weapon were seized, where-after the weapon of offence as well as magazine and fired empty cartridges were sent to FSL, Srinagar, for examination and report by Ballistic expert. The report of the Ballistic expert was also obtained. 4. P. C before the concerned Magistrate. The weapon of offence, fired empty cartridges and magazines of the weapon were seized, where-after the weapon of offence as well as magazine and fired empty cartridges were sent to FSL, Srinagar, for examination and report by Ballistic expert. The report of the Ballistic expert was also obtained. 4. After conducting investigation of the case, it came to fore that on the day of occurrence, during day time, some altercation between appellant/accused Ramesh Chand and deceased Tufail Ahmad Khan over some unknown matter had taken place and because of this, at about 9.30 PM, the appellant/accused opened indiscriminate firing with his service weapon in Jawans Barracks, as a result of which, two CRPF personnel, namely, Tufail Ahmad Khan and Sadashiv Tiwari lost their lives and two more CRPF personnel, namely Hemango Burman and Biren Malakar sustained serious bullet injuries. Accordingly, offences under Section 302 and 307 RPC were found established against the appellant/accused and charge sheet was laid before the Court. 5. After the case was committed to the learned trial court, charges for offences under Section 302 and 307 RPC were framed against the appellant/accused in terms of order dated 27.03.2010. The appellant/accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. Accordingly the prosecution was directed to lead evidence in support of its case. Out of 21 witnesses cited in the charge sheet, all except PWs 4 and 9 were examined by the prosecution. The evidence of the prosecution was closed in terms of order dated 25.05.2015, where-after the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence were put to the appellant/accused and his statement under Section 342 of J&K Cr. P. C was recorded. The appellant/accused did not enter his defence. 6. The learned trial court after hearing the parties and after taking into consideration the evidence led in the case, came to the conclusion that the charges against the appellant/accused stand established and, accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence came to be passed. 7. P. C was recorded. The appellant/accused did not enter his defence. 6. The learned trial court after hearing the parties and after taking into consideration the evidence led in the case, came to the conclusion that the charges against the appellant/accused stand established and, accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence came to be passed. 7. The appellant/accused has challenged the impugned judgment, primarily, on the following grounds: (I) That the learned trial court has not appreciated the evidence led by the prosecution in proper perspective; (II) That there is no evidence on record that the appellant/accused had any motive to kill the deceased or the injured; (III) That the learned trial court was not justified in recording conviction of the accused on the sole testimony of PW-5, the eye witness, when there is other evidence on record to negate the story projected by him; (IV) That the learned trial court failed to appreciate the fact that there is evidence on record to show that on the fateful night, the bullets were fired by other CRPF personnel also and in the absence of any evidence on record to show that the deceased and the injured had fallen victims to the bullets fired by the appellant/accused, it was not open to the trial court to convict him; (V) That the learned trial court failed to take into consideration the fact that the postmortem of the deceased has not been conducted in the instant case and, as such, neither the cause of death of the deceased is established nor is it established that the deceased had received bullets that were fired from the rifle of the appellant/accused; (VI) That the Investigating Officer of the case has admitted that there has been faulty investigation of the case, benefit of which should have gone in favour of the accused, but the learned trial court has, without taking note of this fact, gone on to record order of conviction against the appellant/accused; (VII) That the prosecution has withheld vital evidence from the court and the learned trial court has failed to draw adverse inference against the prosecution. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Senior Additional Advocate General for respondent/State. We have also gone through the grounds of appeal, the impugned judgment, the evidence on record and the written synopsis submitted by the learned counsel for the parties. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned Senior Additional Advocate General for respondent/State. We have also gone through the grounds of appeal, the impugned judgment, the evidence on record and the written synopsis submitted by the learned counsel for the parties. 9. Much emphasis has been laid by learned counsel for the appellant/accused on the fact that the learned trial court while recording conviction of appellant/accused has placed heavy reliance upon the statement of eye witness PW-5, Constable Mohammad Azizur Rehman, when all other CRPF personnel, who were present in the barrack in which the occurrence is alleged to have taken place, have denied having seen appellant/accused firing upon the victims. According to the learned counsel, in the face of statements of other CRPF personnel who were present at the place of occurrence, the statement of PW-5 cannot be relied upon. 10. It is correct that out of the eye witnesses cited by the prosecution in the charge sheet only PW-5 has deposed before the court that he saw the appellant/accused firing with his service rifle upon the victims. So far as the version of other witnesses cited in the charge sheet, who as per prosecution case were present in the same barrack in which the occurrence is stated to have taken place, is concerned, none of them actually saw the appellant/accused firing upon the victims but then none of these witnesses have denied or contradicted the occurrence. All these witnesses have in one voice stated that firing took place inside the barrack resulting in death of two CRPF personnel and injuries to two more CRPF personnel but their version is that they could not perceive as to who had fired those shots upon the victims. At the same time these witnesses have confirmed the presence of the appellant/accused in the barrack at the relevant time. 11. In the face of aforesaid nature of eye witness account of occurrence, we are faced with a situation where only one eye witness, namely, PW-5, Constable Mohammad Azizur Rehman, is stated to have actually seen the appellant/accused firing upon the victims. The question arises whether reliance can be placed upon his solitary statement to come to a conclusion that it was the appellant/accused only, who had fired bullets upon the victims. In order to answer this question, we need to notice the legal position governing the field. 12. The question arises whether reliance can be placed upon his solitary statement to come to a conclusion that it was the appellant/accused only, who had fired bullets upon the victims. In order to answer this question, we need to notice the legal position governing the field. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar, 2002 CriLJ 2645, has held that credible evidence of even a solitary witness can form the basis of conviction. In Kunju Alias Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2008 CriLJ 1804, the Supreme Court has held that conviction on the basis of the testimony of the sole eye witness is permissible where the testimony of sole eye witness was not shaken although he was cross-examined at length and the same was corroborated by the evidence of another witness who did not support the prosecution version in toto. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish and Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2019) 7 SCC 711 , has laid down that conviction on the basis of a solitary eye witness is undoubtedly sustainable if there is reliable evidence cogent and convincing in nature along with surrounding circumstances. 13. It will also be advantageous to refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of “Vadivelu Thevar Vs. State of Madras” AIR 1957 SC 614 : “.............Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for, proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.” “12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court, equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. In the second category, the court, equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have, therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.” 14. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Sudip Kumar Sen @ Biltu v. State of West Bengal & Ors. (2016) 3 SCC 26 , has laid down the guidelines with regard to appreciation of testimony of a witness in the following manner. “12. Observing that there is no impediment for recording conviction based on the testimony of a single witness provided it is reliable in Prithipal Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 10 , it was observed as under:- “49. This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 10 , it was observed as under:- “49. This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number or the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence, rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.” [See Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.” 15. In Deny Bora v. State of Assam, (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 293, the Supreme Court, while explaining the manner in which testimony of a sole witness should be appreciated, has observed as under: “14. As we find, the conviction wholly rests on the sole testimony of PW14. It is well settled in law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a singular witness. It has been held in Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) that: (SCC p.371, para 9) “9. ...as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. ...as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration.” The same principle has been reiterated in Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra by stating that it is open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction, if the quality of the witness makes the testimony acceptable.” 16. From the foregoing analysis of the legal position governing the appreciation of evidence of a sole eye witness to an occurrence, it is clear that conviction of an accused can be recorded on the basis of sole testimony of an eye witness provided it inspires confidence of the Court, it is shown that the witness has withstood the test of cross-examination, his presence on spot is natural and he has no motive to falsely implicate the accused. 17. In the light of the above principles we need to analyse the statement of PW-5. He has stated that on 30.10.2009, he was posted with his battalion at Kokernag, at about 9.30 PM. While he was lying in his bed, the appellant/accused, who was also lying in his bed over there, took his weapon and went near the door, where-after he fired upon deceased T. A. Khan and S. S. Tiwari and then fled away. The witness has further stated that both these persons died on spot whereas two more persons, namely, HC Biral Malaka and Constable Haimal Burman got injured. According to the witness the appellant/accused ran out of the barrack and thereafter he was apprehended by Commanding Officer along with other personnel and handed over to police. The witness was cross-examined by defence counsel. During cross-examination, an effort was made by the defence counsel to set up a defence that some quarrel had taken place on the issue of liquor and mea. The defence sought to be put up by the accused is wholly irrelevant to the case. Even that defence has not been established from the cross-examination of the witness. During cross-examination, an effort was made by the defence counsel to set up a defence that some quarrel had taken place on the issue of liquor and mea. The defence sought to be put up by the accused is wholly irrelevant to the case. Even that defence has not been established from the cross-examination of the witness. The witness has, in fact, stated in his cross-examination that occurrence took place all of a sudden and that prior to the occurrence, the appellant/accused and deceased persons as well as the injured persons were having good relations. 18. Thus, from the cross-examination of the witness, his credit and trustworthiness has not been shaken at all. There is not even a suggestion from the defence that the witness was having any motive to falsely implicate the appellant/accused. The fact that the witness stated that there were good relations between the deceased and the appellant/accused, shows that he did not intend to falsely implicate the appellant/accused. The witness, an employee of the CRPF, was on duty on the day of occurrence and, as such, his presence on spot at the relevant time was natural. In these circumstances, the statement of the witness cannot be brushed aside simply because other witnesses who were present on spot at the time of the occurrence did not see the appellant/accused actually firing the bullets. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused has vehemently contended that the aforesaid eye witness admitted in his cross-examination that his statement was not recorded by the police during investigation of the case and, as such, his statement before the Court cannot be relied upon. 20. It is correct that the witness in his cross-examination has stated that his statement was not recorded by the police but then it does not have any bearing upon the credit and trustworthiness of his statement. This is so because during the investigation of the case the statement of the witness was not recorded by the police but the same was recorded before the Magistrate under Section 164-A Cr. P. C. His statement before the Court is on similar lines to the one that was recorded by the Magistrate during the investigation of the case. In these circumstances, it would not be open to this Court to discard the statement of PW-5 and take a view different from the one taken by the learned trial court in this regard. P. C. His statement before the Court is on similar lines to the one that was recorded by the Magistrate during the investigation of the case. In these circumstances, it would not be open to this Court to discard the statement of PW-5 and take a view different from the one taken by the learned trial court in this regard. 21. Another important witness of prosecution is PW-15, Head Constable Biren Malakar, the injured. He has stated that he was sleeping in the barrack after taking meals and after hearing the sound of firing, he woke up. He further submitted that he sustained one fire in his belly where-after he jumped and took shelter underneath the bed. In his cross-examination, he has confirmed the presence of appellant/accused in the barrack. He has further stated that he saw the appellant/accused along with other persons running here and there. 22. It is true that the aforesaid injured witness has not nominated and identified the assailant in his statement but then he has clearly stated that he was sleeping at the time of occurrence and all of a sudden, he received a bullet injury in his belly, where-after he took shelter underneath the bed. In such circumstances, it is quite natural that he would not have been in a position to identify and see the person who had fired the bullets. His natural reaction to the events would have been to save himself by taking shelter in any available safe space and not to concentrate on identifying the assailant. Thus, merely because the afore named injured did not identify or nominate the assailant does not mean that bullets were not fired by the accused. In fact, he has confirmed the presence of appellant/accused in the barrack and he has not denied the occurrence. 23. So far as the statements of other witnesses, namely, PW-7, Sumant Kumar and PW-14, Keshav Chander Dass, who as per the prosecution case were present in the same barrack in which the occurrence took place, are concerned, they have also testified to the fact that on the fateful night, firing did take place in the barrack which left two CRPF personnel dead and two more persons injured. Both these witnesses did not actually see the appellant/accused Ramesh Chand firing from his rifle but their statements do not negate the statement of PW-5, inasmuch as there is nothing in their statements to even remotely suggest that the bullets were fired by any person other than the appellant/accused. These witnesses have only seen the firing of bullets taking place but they have not seen the person who actually fired the bullets. This does not rule out the possibility of appellant/accused being the assailant, particularly when both these witnesses have stated that the appellant/accused was also present in the barrack at the relevant time. Thus, the statements of these witnesses cannot be used to contradict the statement of PW-5 so as to discard the version of occurrence narrated by him. 24. Coming to the post occurrence conduct of the appellant/accused, we have the statement of PW-6, Constable Ram Vilas Kumar. He has stated that on the fateful night when he had come out of his barrack for urinating, he heard sound of firing of bullets and when he looked back, he found appellant/accused coming. He got scared and perplexed and took shelter in an under construction building. According to the witness, the appellant/accused also took shelter in the same building and asked him to remain silent or else he would be killed. He has further stated that he pushed the appellant/accused aside and ran away from that place. He narrated this to Constable Daleep Ram and Constable Satnam Singh. Constable Satnam Singh in turn narrated this on telephone to his Commandant. The witness has further stated that he narrated the matter to the Commandant. His statement has been corroborated by the statement of PW-1, S. K. Basu, Dy. Commandant, who has confirmed that the witness had narrated the occurrence to the Commandant, where-after all the officers of the CRPF went near the under-construction building where the appellant/accused had taken shelter. The Quick Action Force of the battalion had also reached near the under-construction building and with their help, the appellant/accused was brought out from the said building and taken into custody. 25. This post occurrence conduct of the appellant/accused is a relevant fact in terms of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under: “8. The Quick Action Force of the battalion had also reached near the under-construction building and with their help, the appellant/accused was brought out from the said building and taken into custody. 25. This post occurrence conduct of the appellant/accused is a relevant fact in terms of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under: “8. Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct – Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding, in reference to such suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. Explanation 1 – the word “conduct” in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act. Explanation 2 – When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant. 26. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is clear that previous or subsequent conduct of any person accused of an offence is relevant if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. Thus, any behaviour or conduct of appellant would be relevant if it has nexus with the offence alleged to have been committed. 27. Adverting to the facts pertaining to post occurrence conduct of the appellant/accused that have been established from the evidence on record, it emerges that the appellant/accused tried to escape and hide himself in the under-construction building so as to avoid the consequences of his act. This post occurrence conduct of the appellant is a relevant fact which lends assurance to the statement of the eye witness, PW-5. 28. This post occurrence conduct of the appellant is a relevant fact which lends assurance to the statement of the eye witness, PW-5. 28. Besides the aforesaid evidence, we have on record the opinion of the Ballistic expert, EXPW-17, according to which the fired cartridge cases and the cartridges, that were sent to FSL for examination, were fired from the same rifle that was seized by the police during investigation of the case. It is to be noted here that, as per the evidence on record, the rifle, that has been seized by the police during investigation of the case, is the same rifle that had been issued in favour of appellant/accused officially. The opinion of Ballistic expert confirms that the rifle that had been issued in favour of the appellant/accused had been used and the same was in working condition. It has further been opined by the expert that 13 fired cartridge cases that were seized from the spot of occurrence had been fired through the said rifle. Thus, even the opinion of the Ballistic expert corroborates the version of occurrence given by the eye witness, PW-5 29. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused has vehemently argued that there is evidence on record to show that at the time of occurrence firing of bullets had taken place from several sources, as such, it cannot be stated with certainty that the deceased and the injured had fallen victims to the bullets fired by the appellant/accused. He has further contended that the investigating agency should have sent the weapons issued to all the CRPF personnel in the camp for their examination by the FSL to rule out the possibility of firing of fatal bullets by any person other than the appellant/accused 30. It is true that it has come in the statement of PW-3, Mithilesh Kumar (Commandant) that he fired ten rounds in air to ascertain the location of the accused when he had taken shelter in the under-construction building. However, there is no evidence on record to show that any other CRPF personnel had fired bullets in or around the barrack where the occurrence took place. The under-construction building where PW-3 is stated to have fired bullets in air is situated far away from the place of occurrence, as is clear from the site map, EXPW-20. However, there is no evidence on record to show that any other CRPF personnel had fired bullets in or around the barrack where the occurrence took place. The under-construction building where PW-3 is stated to have fired bullets in air is situated far away from the place of occurrence, as is clear from the site map, EXPW-20. Further, as per the statement of aforesaid witness, he fired the bullets well after the occurrence had taken place i.e. after the deceased and the injured had received the bullets. There is no evidence on record to even remotely suggest that at the time of occurrence or immediately thereafter anyone except the appellant/accused had resorted to firing of bullets in the barrack in which the occurrence took place. The cartridges, as per the evidence on record, have been recovered in the immediate vicinity of the barrack in which the occurrence has taken place and not near the building in which the appellant/accused had taken shelter. The cartridges, from which bullets, that have resulted in death/injury to the victims, were fired, were seized by the police and sent to Ballistic expert who has opined that the bullets from these cartridges were fired from the service rifle of the appellant/accused thereby connecting him to the crime. In these circumstances, the non-examination of weapons of other CRPF personnel present in the camp may not be of any consequence to the outcome of this case, particularly when there is no evidence on record to show that any other CRPF personnel had resorted to firing inside the barrack in which the occurrence took place. 31. It has also been contended that postmortem of the deceased has not been conducted in the instant case and, as such, neither the cause of death of the deceased has been established nor it has been established that the deceased had received the bullets fired from the service rifle of the appellant/accused. 32. It is true that the investigating agency has committed a grave blunder by not conducting the postmortem of the deceased thereby losing a vital piece of evidence because of non-retrieval of bullets from the bodies of the deceased. 32. It is true that the investigating agency has committed a grave blunder by not conducting the postmortem of the deceased thereby losing a vital piece of evidence because of non-retrieval of bullets from the bodies of the deceased. Had the investigating agency subjected the dead bodies to postmortem, the bullets received by the deceased would have been retrieved and from their examination by the expert, it could have been easily ascertained whether or not these bullets were fired from the service rifle of the appellant/accused. The same would have provided a vital link in the prosecution case making it easier to prove the guilt of the appellant/accused. This is a serious lapse in the investigation of the case and the same cannot be denied but then we have to see the effect of this lapse in investigation and ascertain as to whether it will have such a serious impact on the prosecution case as to negate the other evidence on record. 33. If we analyze the statement of PW-16, Dr. Mohammad Yousuf, who has examined the dead bodies of the deceased and the injured, he has clearly stated that the cause of death in the case of both the deceased was multiple fire arm injuries leading to massive blood loss, hemorrhage, cardinal, cardiopulmonary arrest. The doctor upon examination of dead body of deceased Tufail ahmad Khan noted the following injuries: (i) Fire arm injury on the right thigh post aspect horizontal region and the dimension of wound was 5x3 Cms. (ii) Fire arm injury on left hp, the dimension of wound was 4x2 Cms. (iii) Fire arm injury on scapular region, wound of entry 2x2 Cms. (iv) Fire arm injury left shoulder with wound exit 6x6 cms, muscle and bones were exposed. Upon examination of dead body of deceased Sadashiv Tiwari, the doctor noted the following injuries: (i) Fire arm injuries with wound entry left flon illicie region, the dimension of wound was 64 cms, peritoneum contents exposed. (ii) Fire arm injury with wound of exit of right flank 10x15 cms, contents of abdomen out. (iii) Fire arm injury wound of entry next right side with wound of 2x2 cms. (iv) Fire arm injury wound entry right shoulder 5x4 cms. (v) Fire arm injury with wound exit of next 4x4 cms. (ii) Fire arm injury with wound of exit of right flank 10x15 cms, contents of abdomen out. (iii) Fire arm injury wound of entry next right side with wound of 2x2 cms. (iv) Fire arm injury wound entry right shoulder 5x4 cms. (v) Fire arm injury with wound exit of next 4x4 cms. The witness has further clarified that since the cause of death was evident, as such, there was no need for conducting the postmortem. He may not be right in stating that there was no need for conducting postmortem of the deceased but then he has clearly stated that the cause of death of the deceased was multiple fire arm injuries. Thus, there cannot be any doubt that the deceased had died as a result of having received bullet injuries, as is evident from the nature of injuries received by them as have been noted hereinbefore. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Kehar Singh vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1988) 3 SCC 609 , are relevant to the context and the same are reproduced as under: “........There is no dispute that she died as a result of the gun shot injuries which was inflicted by Beant Singh and Satwant Singh, one who shot from his service revolver and other from the carbine. In view of such clear evidence about the cause of the death, the post-mortem examination loses all its significance. It becomes important only in cases where the cause of death is to be established and is a matter of controversy. .........Section 174 of the Code confers discretion to the Police Officer not to send the body for post-mortem examination if there is no doubt as to the cause of death. If the cause of PG NO 202 death is absolutely certain and beyond the pale of doubt or controversy, it is unnecessary to have the post-mortem done by Medical Officer...” 34. If the cause of PG NO 202 death is absolutely certain and beyond the pale of doubt or controversy, it is unnecessary to have the post-mortem done by Medical Officer...” 34. In Banwari Ram v. State of UP, (1998) 9 SCC 3 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case where postmortem of the deceased had not been conducted, while explaining its effect, observed as under: “The arguments of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that in the absence of any inquest or post mortem in respect of the deceased Army personnel it has to be held that the prosecution case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt is an argument which is merely to be mentioned for being rejected. The prosecution evidence unequivocally establishes the fact that the accused persons belonging to the Provincial Constabulary started indiscriminately firing at the Army jawans who had been called upon to take charge of the armoury. On account of such indiscriminate firing by the members of the Provincial Constabulary 12 persons belonging to the Army died whose dead bodies were recovered from the spot itself and the necessary death certificates had been issued by the Medical authority. In such an event non holding of any post mortem examination is immaterial and the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the prosecution failed on that score is wholly unsustainable in law and we have, therefore, no hesitation to reject the same...” 35. In view of the foregoing enunciation of law on the subject, the failure to conduct the postmortem of the dead bodies in the instant case, may not be of much significance, because the nature of injuries found on the deceased clearly establishes the cause of their death. In view of this, although the investigating agency has not performed its job in a professional and scientific manner, yet their inaptness or perfunctory manner of investigation may not have any adverse impact on the prosecution case in the face of the fact that complicity of the appellant/accused in the crime stands established from the other evidence on record, as discussed hereinbefore. The mere fact that the investigation of the case has not been conducted properly by itself cannot offer a ground for acquittal of the accused if from the evidence on record, his guilt is established. The mere fact that the investigation of the case has not been conducted properly by itself cannot offer a ground for acquittal of the accused if from the evidence on record, his guilt is established. We are supported in our aforesaid view by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Acharaparambath Pradeepan & Anr. vs State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643, wherein the Court has held that in a case where the testimonies of the witnesses cannot be disbelieved, defective investigation by itself may not lead to a conclusion that the accused is innocent. 36. Finally, it has been contended by learned counsel for the appellant/accused that the prosecution, in this case, has failed to prove motive for the crime and this creates grave doubt about the prosecution case, benefit of which must go to the appellant/accused. 37. It is true that in the instant case, the evidence led by the prosecution consistently goes on to show that there was no previous enmity between the deceased, injured on one side and the accused on the other side. The theory of there being a spar between one of the deceased and the accused on account of certain issues relating to mess is not supported by the evidence on record. In the instant case, as already discussed hereinbefore, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the occurrence on the basis of statement of eye witness and the other surrounding circumstances established on record. In the cases where occurrence is established by an eye witness account, the motive loses its significance. It is only in the cases where the prosecution case is solely based on circumstantial evidence that motive assumes a vital significance. In our aforesaid view, we are supported by the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Lodhi Vs. State of UP, (1987) 2 SCC 352 , wherein it was held that motive is not relevant in a case where murder has been committed in broad daylight and testimony of eye witness is found acceptable. 38. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCCC 387, while explaining the relevance of motive in a murder case, observed as under: “15. 38. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCCC 387, while explaining the relevance of motive in a murder case, observed as under: “15. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that there was no motive on the part of the appellant to commit murder of Raj Pal, as such, in absence of motive, it cannot be said that it was only the appellant who could have committed the crime. 16. It is settled principle of law that, to establish commission of murder by an accused, motive is not required to be proved. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention. The intention can be formed even at the place of incident at the time of commission of crime. It is only either intention or knowledge on the part of the accused which is required to be seen in respect of the offence of culpable homicide. In order to read either intention or knowledge, the courts have to examine the circumstances, as there cannot be any direct evidence as to the state of mind of the accused.” 39. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the instant case, it is to be noticed that from the eye witness account of PW-5 and the corroborative evidence, as discussed hereinbefore, it is proved that the appellant/accused fired bullets from his service rifle which resulted in death of two persons and injuries to two more persons. The evidence on record shows that the appellant/accused fired these bullets inside the barrack in which the victims were also sleeping. Considering the nature of weapon i.e. AK rifle used by the appellant/accused and the number of bullets which he fired, it can safely be stated that the appellant/accused did intend to cause death of the deceased or his act was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death of the victims or in the alternative he had the knowledge that his act was imminently so dangerous that it would have in all probability caused the death as there was no excuse for him to resort to firing of bullets. Thus, even if appellant/accused did not actually have any previous enmity with the deceased/injured, still then, having regard to the circumstances in which he has committed the crime, there is no escape from the conclusion that his act falls within the meaning of “murder” as defined in Section 300 RPC. 40. Lastly, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution has withheld vital evidence in as much as it has not examined PWs 4 & 9 and, as such, an adverse inference is required to be drawn against the prosecution. 41. It is a fact that the prosecution has not been able to produce the aforesaid two witnesses before the court nor has it produced the injured Constable Hemango Burman as witness. In this regard, it is to be noted that it is not a case where prosecution has itself chosen not to produce the aforesaid witnesses in the court but it is a case where evidence of the prosecution was closed by the orders of the court because the trial could not be completed expeditiously on account of the fact that most of the prosecution witnesses, upon their transfer to different parts of Country, were not readily available for their production before the Court. Thus, the prosecution in the instant case has not deliberately withheld any evidence from the Court, as such, no adverse inference can be drawn against it. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, without any merit. 42. For the foregoing discussion and reappraisal of the evidence on record, we do not find any reason to take a view other than the one taken by the learned trial court. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial court is well-reasoned and based upon correct appreciation of evidence on record. The same, therefore, does not call for any interference. The appeal of the appellant is, therefore, dismissed and the reference made by the learned trial court is accepted. 43. Record of the trial court along with a copy of this judgment be sent back. Sanjay Dhar, J.-Judgment pronounced today on 03.07.2021 in terms of Rule 138 (4) of the J&K High Court Rules, 1999.