JUDGMENT: CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA, J. 1. Challenging the validity and the legality of the judgment that is rendered by the Court of Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in C.C.No.8 of 2002, dated 28.3.2007 the appellant who is the accused in the said Calendar Case is before this Court by way of appeal. 2. In the grounds of appeal, it is urged that the judgment of the trial Court is contrary to law and weight of evidence; that the learned judge of the trial Court ought to have seen that DSP, ACB, acted against the appellant-accused without any complaint and without conducting any preliminary enquiry; that the learned judge ought to have observed the discrepancy in the date mentioned in Ex.P-4-complaint; that the learned judge failed to see that Exs.P-1 to P-3-applications were not ready by the time of the alleged meetings dated 18.9.2000 and 20.9.2000; that the learned judge failed to see that the appellant-accused is not a competent authority to act on Exs.P-1 to P-3 and issue valuation certificates which were sought by P.W-1; that the learned judge failed to suspect the genuineness of Exs.P-1 to P-3 which were not found during the pre-trap proceedings; that the learned judge failed to appreciate the fact that P.Ws.3 and 4, who are the mediators, deposed to the effect that they found the amount on the table and not in his hands of the appellant-accused; that the learned judge failed to appreciate the fact that the tainted amount was not recovered by P.W-10 from the hands of the appellant-accused; and that the learned judge failed to consider that the entire post-trap proceedings were drafted to the dictation of P.W-10 and that Ex.P-4-complaint was obtained during the course of said proceedings and in spite of absence of any evidence either regarding demand or acceptance of bribe, the learned judge raised presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which is improper and therefore, the punishment awarded to the appellant-accused by the trial Court is unsustainable. 3. Heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused and the submissions of the learned Special Public Prosecutor who represented the respondent. 4. 3. Heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused and the submissions of the learned Special Public Prosecutor who represented the respondent. 4. Now the points that arise for consideration are: (1) Whether the respondent emerged successful in establishing the guilt of the appellant-accused beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (2) Whether the respondent emerged successful in establishing the guilt of the appellant-accused beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (3) Whether there exists any infirmity in the judgment of the trial Court either in appreciating the facts of the case or in applying the established principles of law to the said facts, as contended by the appellant, which in turn requires the interference of this Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. 5. Point Nos.1 & 2: The matrix of the case, as could be culled out from the charge sheet, is that P.W-1 being an unemployee intended to obtain loan from the State Finance Corporation to purchase a tractor and for that purpose, he required market value certificates from the Sub-Registrar’s office concerned and therefore, he collected three required forms, obtained the signatures of his father and relatives, affixed the required stamps and approached the appellant-accused who was working in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Husnabad, on 18.9.2000 and requested him to receive the forms and process them, and on that, the appellant-accused demanded Rs.600/- @ Rs.200/- for each application for accepting and processing the same, and that P.W-1 again approached the appellant-accused on 20.9.2000 requesting to take the applications, but the appellant-accused reiterated his earlier demand of bribe and when P.W-1 expressed his inability to pay such a huge amount, he reduced the same to Rs.500/- and as P.W-1 was not willing to pay any bribe, he lodged a report on 21.9.2000 at 10.00 am. and on that, the matter was investigated into and on 22.9.2000, after observing all the formalities required for the trap, the trap was laid and the tainted amount was recovered from the possession of the appellant-accused and thus, the appellant-accused has committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 6. and on that, the matter was investigated into and on 22.9.2000, after observing all the formalities required for the trap, the trap was laid and the tainted amount was recovered from the possession of the appellant-accused and thus, the appellant-accused has committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 6. Record discloses that putting the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 11, Exs.P-1 to P-15 and MOs.1 to 6 to scrutiny, the learned judge of the trial Court came to a conclusion that the respondent emerged successful in proving the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and therefore, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the charge under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and further, sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and also to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the charge under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and held that both the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. The way of appreciating the facts of the case and the way in which conclusions were drawn by the learned judge of the trial Court are seriously assailed by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused. 8. 7. The way of appreciating the facts of the case and the way in which conclusions were drawn by the learned judge of the trial Court are seriously assailed by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused. 8. Arguing at length in respect of the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the appellant-accused submitted that the appellant did not commit any offence whatsoever and in fact, the appellant was not the authorised person who had to receive the applications from P.W-1 and there is no evidence whatsoever that is brought on record by the respondent to show that the appellant was entrusted with the duty to receive the applications and further, though it is clearly brought on record through the cross-examination of the witnesses and the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution itself that no complaint was lodged on 21.9.2000 by P.W-1 as alleged, and the alleged complaint which is marked as Ex.P-4 was drafted and brought into existence as an after-thought, the said fact was not appreciated by the learned judge of the trial Court and though all the material witnesses turned hostile, the learned judge of the trial Court only with a pre-minded determination that all the cases booked under the Prevention of Corruption Act should end in conviction, has convicted the appellant-accused and therefore, the impugned judgment is totally perverse and has to be set aside. 9. Contradicting the aforesaid submissions, the learned Special Public Prosecutor contended that the prosecution with all its evidence, which is cogent and convincing, has established its case beyond all reasonable doubt before the trial Court and there are no grounds whatsoever to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Court which is based on convincing evidence that is produced by the prosecution and only because the appellant was convicted, he approached this Court seeking to set aside the same and in fact, the appellant has committed the offences and as the same is proved before the trial Court, he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment and therefore, the appeal is unsustainable and deserves dismissal. 10. 10. To come to a conclusion with regard to the validity of the judgment that is rendered by the trial Court, there is every necessity on the part of this Court to scrutinise the entire evidence that is brought on record by the prosecution before the trial Court and then to see whether the said evidence stands to the test of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. 11. As per the version of the prosecution, law was set into motion by P.W-1 as the demand for bribe was made by the appellant-accused from P.W-1 and that P.W-1 is the person who complained about the said demand of bribe to the investigating agency, who in turn laid trap and caught the appellant-accused red-handed. Thus, the evidence of P.W-1 gains much significance. 12. Thus, the evidence of P.W-1 gains much significance. 12. It is the evidence of P.W-1 that he being an unemployee went to the State Finance Corporation, Karimnagar, in the month of August, 2000, for obtaining loan and met the Manager and the Manger informed him that for sanctioning loan, he has to produce security of immovable property and valuation certificates pertaining to the said property and on that, he obtained title deeds pertaining to the properties held by L.W-5-S.Laxmi, P.W-8 and L.W-7-B.Rajaiah who possessed immovable properties and went to the office of the Sub-Registrar, Husnabad, for obtaining the valuation certificates and there, he met one document writer, got filled up the applications i.e., Exs.P-1 to P-3 through him, obtained the signatures of L.W-5-S.Laxmi, P.W-8 and L.W-7-B.Rajaiah on those applications on 21.9.2000 and on the very same date, he approached the Sub-Registrar, Husnabad at his office and on that, the Sub-Registrar informed him that the persons who signed on Exs.P-1 to P-3 must come to him and subscribe their signatures in his presence and he reluctantly threw Exs.P-1 to P-3 on the ground stating that the forms are incorrect and on that, he collected those forms from the ground and came out of the office and that, an unknown person met him and informed him that only if he spends money, his work would be done and as he was reluctant to give any bribe, on the advice of the said unknown person, he went to the office of the ACB, Karimnagar on 22.9.2000 and orally informed DSP, ACB about his grievance and the DSP did not ask him to submit any written complaint, but he had written and submitted the complaint on 22.9.2000 after the trap incident and the same is Ex.P-4. At the request of the Special Public Prosecutor, P.W-1 was declared hostile by the trial Court and the Special Public Prosecutor was accorded permission to cross-examine P.W-1. 13. P.W-1 during the course of cross-examination by the learned counsel for the accused stated that since he did not obtain the signatures of the applicants on Exs.P-1 to P-3 till 21.9.2000, he did not go to the Sub-Registrar’s office till then. He further stated that on 21.9.2000 he met only the Sub-Registrar, but not any other person in the said office. He further stated that on 21.9.2000 he met only the Sub-Registrar, but not any other person in the said office. P.W-1 during the course of cross-examination admitted that one hour after the trap, P.W-9 obtained Ex.P-4-complaint by getting the contents therein written by him on the dictation of P.W-9 with antedate as ‘21.9.2000’. He further stated that the contents of Ex.P-4-complaint are false and he did not approach the appellant on 18.9.2000 and 20.9.2000, as mentioned in the said complaint, since Exs.P-1 to P-3 were completed only on 21.9.2000. He also deposed that there is an endorsement of the DSP, ACB that he received Ex.P-4-complaint on 22.9.2000 at 10 am. He further stated that the appellant accused never demanded and accepted any bribe from him much less Rs.500/-. 14. Coming to the evidence of P.W-2, he stated that he is an auto driver by profession and P.W-1 is his friend and on 22.9.2000, P.W-1 met him at 6 am at his house and took him to Karimnagar informing him that there is some work and that himself and P.W-1 went to the ACB office and P.W-1 went inside the office of the DSP, ACB and after half-an-hour, the DSP called him inside and asked him to participate as a witness for which he agreed and the DSP instructed him to accompany P.W-1 to the Sub-Registrar Office, Husnabad and to watch what transpires between P.W-1 and the Sub-Registrar and to narrate him what he has seen and accordingly, he accompanied P.W-1 to Sub-Registrar’s office and that P.W-1 offered namaskar to the Sub-Registrar and informed the Sub-Registrar that he has brought applications for issuance of valuation certificates and the Sub-Registrar asked P.W-1 whether he brought the applicants concerned, for which P.W-1 replied in negative and the Sub-Registrar informed P.W-1 that unless the applicants are brought, the valuation certificates cannot be issued and thereafter, the Sub-Registrar directed P.W-1 to meet the clerk concerned and accordingly, P.W-1 approached the appellant who was working as Clerk in the Sub-Registrar office and asked him to process Exs.P-1 to P-3-applications and the appellant informed P.W-1 that those applications were not in appropriate forms and also informed that the presence of the applicants is required and when the appellant had thrown Exs.P-1 to P-3- applications on his table, the amount from the said applications fell on the ground. 15. 15. P.W-2 during the course of cross-examination by the learned counsel for the appellant-accused stated that he is not in the habit of wearing any cap on his head. 16. The prosecution has examined P.W-3 who gave evidence about the pre-trap and the post-trap proceedings, but as P.W-3 also failed to support the case of the prosecution in material particulars, though he gave detailed statements about the things that transpired, permission was sought by the Special Public Prosecutor to treat P.W-3 as hostile and to accord permission to cross-examine him and the said request was honoured. 17. P.W-3 during the course of cross-examination by the learned counsel for the appellant stated that none of the trap party members were aware as to what transpired between P.W-1 and the appellant-accused after P.W-1 left the trap party till P.W-2 relayed pre-arranged signal. He further gave evidence, as that of his chief-examination during the course of cross-examination also, that when he entered into the room of the appellant-accused he found currency notes on the table. 18. P.W-4 corroborated the evidence of P.W-3 in material particulars. However, P.W-4 stated that he found wad of currency notes inserted in an envelope on the ground together with Exs.P-1 to P-3 and the DSP made the appellant pick up the said cover containing currency notes and Exs.P-1 to P-3, and accordingly, the appellant picked up the same and kept on the table and thereafter, the DSP secured water in two tumblers and asked the appellant to rinse his both hand fingers in the said glass tumblers containing water and when the appellant did so, the water in which he rinsed his right hand fingers turned into pink colour. 19. P.Ws.5 and 6 failed to support the case of the prosecution. 20. P.W-5, who stated that he worked as the Sub-Registrar, Husnabad, deposed that applications for issuance of market value certificates will be submitted to the Sub-Registrar concerned and after receiving the applications, the Sub-Registrar would initial thereon and thereafter, depending upon the work load, it would be handed over to any of the clerks in the office to prepare such certificates and if the application form and the prepared certificate are correct, then only the Sub-Registrar would subscribe his signatures and invariably applications for issuance of market value certificates should be submitted to the Sub-Registrar and to none else in the office. 21. 21. The appellant-accused questioned the genuineness of the case of the prosecution from the initial stage of inception of the case. While arguing the matter, learned counsel for the appellant-accused submitted that no complaint was presented in writing on 21.9.2000 as projected by the respondent and indeed, after all the trap proceedings were completed, Ex.P-4-complaint was obtained from P.W-1 on 22.9.2000 and the same is evident from a bare perusal of the contents of Ex.P-4, but making a small observation that the endorsement on Ex.P-4 by the DSP concerned is due to accidental pen slip, the learned judge of the trial Court gave undue weight to the said document and it is not even the case of the prosecution that the endorsement on Ex.P-4 is an accidental pen slip and this itself goes to show the predetermined mind of the trial Court to convict the appellant and therefore, the said point needs due appreciation by this Court exercising the appellate jurisdiction. 22. A meticulous perusal of contents of Ex.P-4-complaint reveals force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused. On Ex.P-4 there is an endorsement as under:- “ ____R______” 22/9/2000 at 10 am” 23. Even if it is taken into consideration that the said date is an accidental pen slip and the date ought to have been mentioned as ‘21.9.2000’, at page-2 of the said document, the date is mentioned again as ‘22.9.2000’. The translated copy, which is annexed to Ex.P-4, contains an endorsement that it was translated by one Sri V.V.Ramana Murthy, Inspector, ACB, Karimnagar Range, Karimnagar and surprisingly, it is noted therein that it was received on 21.9.2000 at 10 am. The actual endorsement on the said translated copy is as under:- “Received on 21.9.2000 at 10:00 A.M:Sd/- DSP, ACB, KNR-Range, Karimnagar.” 24. Thus, it becomes evidently clear that the prosecution tried somehow to cover something regarding the actual date of presentation of the complaint to suite the case. When the said discrepancy is put to P.W-10 during the course of cross-examination, he clearly stated that as per his endorsement on Ex.P-4, he received it on 22.9.2000 at 10.00 am. He further deposed that he did not receive the said complaint on 21.9.2000 as deposed by him in his chief-examination. When the said discrepancy is put to P.W-10 during the course of cross-examination, he clearly stated that as per his endorsement on Ex.P-4, he received it on 22.9.2000 at 10.00 am. He further deposed that he did not receive the said complaint on 21.9.2000 as deposed by him in his chief-examination. This discrepancy in the statements made by P.W-10 during the course of his chief and cross-examinations is fatal to the case of the prosecution as when the complaint was received on 22.9.2000 at 10 am., securing the witnesses on the said date at 9 am does not arise and fetching P.W-2 by P.W-1 to the office of ACB at 8 am on the said date also does not arise. 25. Further, by the evidence brought on record it is clear that what transpired between the appellant-accused and P.W-1 is not known as P.W-2 did not support the case of the prosecution in material particulars. Both P.Ws.1 and 2 stated that on that date, they first met the Sub-Registrar and P.W-1 did not even state that he met the appellant-accused thereafter. However, P.W-2 stated that after meeting the Sub-Registrar, on his directions, they met the appellant. The Sub-Registrar who was examined as P.W-5 did not state that he directed P.Ws.1 and 2 to meet the appellant-accused. 26. Further, one of the mediators i.e., P.W-4, who supported the case of the prosecution in the chief-examination, stated that the DSP, ACB made the appellant to pick up a cover containing currency notes and Exs.P-1 to P-3 and accordingly, the appellant picked up the same and kept on the table and thereafter, the DSP secured water in two glass tumblers and asked the appellant to rinse both his hand fingers in the said glass tumblers containing water and when the appellant did so, the water in which he rinsed his right hand fingers turned into pink colour. Thus, by the evidence of P.W-4 it is clear that on the instructions of the DSP, the appellant-accused touched the cover containing the currency notes and thereafter, he was subjected to chemical examination. No other evidence is on record to show that the appellant demanded or accepted the bribe. 27. In the case on hand, both these aspects i.e., demand and acceptance of bribe are not proved by the prosecution through any of the witnesses examined by it. No other evidence is on record to show that the appellant demanded or accepted the bribe. 27. In the case on hand, both these aspects i.e., demand and acceptance of bribe are not proved by the prosecution through any of the witnesses examined by it. But the trial Court without observing and considering these discrepancies which goes to the root of the case has passed the judgment of conviction. The prosecution failed to produce satisfactory proof to show that by accidental pen slip, the date was wrongly mentioned in Ex.P-4-complaint. The witness who endorsed Ex.P-4 i.e., P.W-10 also did not state that it is an accidental pen slip. Thus, as rightly urged in the grounds of appeal, the said observation by the learned judge of the trial Court is untenable. 28. Contending that when once the prosecution establishes that gratification was paid and accepted by the public servant, presumption arises that it was paid and accepted as a motive or reward to do or forbear any official act, the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 571 wherein their Lordships at para-12 held as follows:- “The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. So the word gratification need not be stretched to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like gratification or any valuable thing. If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word gratification must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it.” 29. On the same aspect, the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M.Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 , Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel Vs. On the same aspect, the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in M.Narsinga Rao Vs. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691 , Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel Vs. The State of Gujarat, (1976) 3 SCC 46 and Hazari Lal Vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1980) 2 SCC 390 . 30. Submitting that even after the trap if the witnesses turn hostile, conviction can be held on the testimony of the complainant, the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. Vs. Dr. G.K.Ghosh, (1984) 1 SCC 254 wherein their Lordships at para-10 held as follows:- “The court may therefore, depending on the circumstances of a case, feel safe in accepting the prosecution version on the basis of the oral evidence of the complainant and the police officers even if the trap witnesses turn hostile or are found not to be independent. When therefore besides such evidence there is circumstantial evidence which is consistent with the guilt of the accused and not consistent with his innocence, there should be no difficulty in upholding the prosecution case.” 31. Their Lordships in the afore-mentioned decision clearly made a mention that when the circumstantial evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused and not consistent with his innocence, there should be no difficulty in upholding the prosecution case. 32. In the case on hand, such consistent evidence is not found. The evidence produced by the prosecution before the trial Court does not lead the case towards the establishment of guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Only because grave allegations are laid, the Courts cannot proceed with the conviction of the persons charged. If such a thing is permitted to be done, there is no requirement for the Courts of law to sit on trial and render judgments. The investigating agency itself would be sufficient to deal with the cases. The Courts of law are expected to administer justice basing on the established principles of law. The law laid down is that the prosecution ought to necessarily establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 33. The investigating agency itself would be sufficient to deal with the cases. The Courts of law are expected to administer justice basing on the established principles of law. The law laid down is that the prosecution ought to necessarily establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 33. In the case on hand, even the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be drawn as there is no prima facie case found that the appellant-accused has accepted or obtained the gratification as alleged by the prosecution. Therefore, this Court holds that the prosecution failed in its attempt to establish the guilt of the appellant-accused beyond all reasonable doubt before the trial Court. 34. Point No.3:- When the judgment of the trial Court is gone through, it is found that though the learned judge of the trial Court had reiterated and dealt with the evidence of all the witnesses in detail, due to the aspects that are discussed in point Nos.1 and 2, it is found that the learned judge of the trial Court failed to come to a justifiable conclusion as the case of the prosecution did not rest on proper footing of evidence which is convincing and unblemished. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the judgment of the trial Court lacks merits and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 35. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed setting aside judgment that is rendered by the Court of Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in C.C.No.8 of 2002, dated 28.3.2007. The appellant-accused is acquitted of the charges levelled against him and thereby, the bail bonds executed by him shall stand cancelled. 36. Pending Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, shall stand closed.