JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Nirmal Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This is the defendants' second appeal against the judgment of reversal passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Unnao in R.C.A. No.9/2000 whereby it allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs-respondents bearing R.C.A. No.9/2000 and dismissed the R.C.A. No.43/2002 preferred by the appellants herein as a result the suit filed by the respondents for specific performance of contract stood decreed. 3. In order to put the controversy in a perspective, certain facts giving rise to this second appeal are being noticed first. 4. Smt. Meharunnishan and Kamal Ali were the original plaintiffs of R.S. No.105/1978 which was filed in the Court of Munsif, North, Unnao (now the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.), North, Unnao) against Shri Chhedua (original owner of the property, who died during pendency of the suit and now is represented by his heirs) and also against Shri Darshan (the subsequent purchaser of the property of Chhedua), who also died during pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate Court and is now represented through legal representatives, who are the appellants before this Court. Shri Kamal Ali the original plaintiff No.2 and respondent No.2 herein also expired during pendency of this second appeal and is represented by his legal representatives of the respondents No.1 and respondent No.2/1 to 2/8. 5. That Smt. Meharunnishan and Kamal Ali had instituted a suit for specific performance with the averments that the property in question was owned by Shri Chhedua, who had executed a registered agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs on 10.10.1977 for a total some of Rs.1500/-out of which Rs.1000/-was paid as earnest money and the remaining Rs.500/-was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale-deed. It was further pleaded that at the time of registered agreement to sell the village was under consolidation operations and as soon as the village would be de-notified, the defendant (Shri Chhedua) would execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs and in case of any reluctance the plaintiffs would have a right to get the sale-deed executed for which the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to pay the remaining consideration of Rs.500/-. 6. 6. It was also averred that the defendant No.2 namely Darshan had surreptitiously obtained a sale-deed from the original owner namely Shri Chhedua and he was not a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and in the aforesaid circumstances the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of specific performance against both Shri Chhedua and Shri Darshan, who may be directed to execute the sale-deed. Alternatively, it was prayed that for some reason if the relief of specific performance cannot be granted then the earnest money be refunded to the plaintiffs. 7. The defendant No.1 Shri Chhedua filed his written statement and supported the case of the plaintiffs. He specifically stated that he had not executed any sale-deed in favour of Darshan nor he was aware of any such sale-deed. He had not received any consideration from Darshan and the alleged sale-deed as claimed by Darshan was not binding on Shri Chhedua. 8. Darshan (original defendant No.2) filed his written statement stating that Shri Chhedua had executed an agreement to sell in favour of Darshan on 12.09.1976 wherein he had agreed to sell the property in question for total sale consideration of Rs.25,000/-out of which a sum of Rs.10,000/-was paid to Shri Chhedua. Subsequently since Shri Chhedua was in need of money again an agreement was entered on 26.06.1977 and the remaining consideration of Rs.15,000/-was paid to the original owner Shri Chhedua, who upon receiving the entire sale consideration handed over the possession of the property in dispute to Darshan and since the village was under consolidation he indicated that the sale-deed would be executed once the village was de-notified. Since the said agreement to sell was prior in time, hence he was a bonafide purchaser and the sale-deed was in furtherance of his agreement to sell which was earlier in time to that the plaintiffs coupled with the fact that he had purchased the property for the actual consideration and not at the paltry sum which is alleged to be subject matter of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1. Consequently it was prayed that the suit deserves to be dismissed and if at all the alternative relief be granted the same is liable to be satisfied by the defendant No.1 alone. 9. Consequently it was prayed that the suit deserves to be dismissed and if at all the alternative relief be granted the same is liable to be satisfied by the defendant No.1 alone. 9. The parties led their respective evidences and the trial court recorded a finding that since the agreement of the defendant No.1 was prior in time and that he had purchased the property for much valuable price and there was nothing on record to indicate nor it was proved by the plaintiffs that the sale-deed executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 was accuated by fraud nor the plaintiffs had sought a relief for cancellation of the sale-deed or for declaring the same to be void in such circumstances the relief of specific performance was refused and the trial court provided that since the property had been sold by the defendant No.1 in favour of the defendant No.2 consequently the earnest money of Rs.1000/-paid by the plaintiff was entitled to be refunded, however, this liability was placed on the defendant No.2 to be returned alongwith interest @ 16% per annum by means of the judgment and decree dated 21.12.1999. 10. Being aggrieved against the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 21.12.1999 both the plaintiffs namely Smt. Meharunnishan and Kamal Ali preferred R.C.A. No.9/2000 against the refusal of the decree for specific performance and even Darshan filed R.C.A. No.43/2000 on the ground that the refund of the earnest money was to be satisfied by Chhedua. These two R.C.A. No.9/2000 and 43/2000 were connected and heard together by the Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Unnao who by means of the common judgment dated 20.07.2000 it reversed the judgment passed by the trial court and allowed the appeal by the plaintiffs Smt. Meharunnishan and Kamal Ali and also allowed the appeal of Darshan insofar as it related to fixing of liability for refund of earnest money on him. It is in this backdrop that the legal heirs of Darshan preferred two second appeals before this Court registered as Second Appeal No.375/2001 and Second Appeal No.360/2001. 11. The second appeal No.375/2001 was admitted on the substantial question of law framed at S.No.A and D in the memo of the appeal whereas the Second Appeal No.360/2001 was admitted on the substantial question of law framed at S.No.A and E. 12. 11. The second appeal No.375/2001 was admitted on the substantial question of law framed at S.No.A and D in the memo of the appeal whereas the Second Appeal No.360/2001 was admitted on the substantial question of law framed at S.No.A and E. 12. Since, the issues involved in both the second appeals arises from the common judgment and are similar, hence, these two second appeals are being decided by this common judgment and it shall govern the Second Appeal No.375/2001 and Second Appeal No. 360/2001. 13. For the sake of convenience, the substantial questions of law framed at Clause A and D in the memo of appeal of Second Appeal No.360/2001 if matched with A and E of Second Appeal No.375/2001 would indicate that they are the same, accordingly, the court for the sake of convenience is reproducing the substantial questions of law A, D, and E from the memo of Second Appeal No.375/2001, which also covers the issue and the substantial question of law A & E of the Second Appeal No.360/2001. "A. Whether having it has been successfully proved that the appellants are bonafide purchasers of the property for value, the lower appellate court has not committed manifest illegality in ordering that remaining Rs.5000/-shall be paid by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 to the heirs of the deceased Chhedua i.e. respondent Nos.3 to 6 and the appellants have to execute the sale-deed in favour of the respondent Nos.1 and 2, who have paid Rs.25,000/-as sale consideration? D. Whether the lower appellate court has not committed manifest illegality in ignoring that before 1.1.1977 there was no requirement for registration of agreement to sell, so the agreement to sell dated 12.9.1976 in favour of the defendant No.2 was a valid agreement to sell and subsequent conduct of the defendant No.1 i.e. execution of sale-deed dated 26.6.1978 was in pursuance of the agreement dated 12.9.1976? E. Whether the courts below have not committed manifest illegality in not considering that the sale-deed dated 26.6.1978 in favour of the defendant No.2 shall relate back to its agreement to sell dated 12.9.1976, therefore, subsequent agreement to sell dated 10.10.1977 in favour of the plaintiff is illegal?" 14. In furtherance of the aforesaid three questions as framed, the Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 15. In furtherance of the aforesaid three questions as framed, the Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 15. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the lower appellate Court was not justified in reversing the judgment passed by the trial court inasmuch as by granting relief of specific performance the lower appellate court has committed an error in failing to consider that the prayer which was not even sought by the plaintiffs has been granted. 16. Elaborating his submissions, Shri Nirmal Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellants has urged that the trial court had clearly noticed that the plaintiffs had not sought to challenge the sale-deed executed by Chhedua in favour of Darshan. Even in the prayer there was no relief sought regarding cancellation of the sale-deed or seeking the said sale-deed to be declared as null and void and in absence of any such prayer, the relief of specific performance could not have been granted and this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the lower appellate court who had exceeded his jurisdiction in granting a relief which was not prayed for. Thus, the decree passed by the lower appellate court suffers from manifest error of law. 17. It is further urged by Shri Tiwari that the plaintiffs could not indicate that under what circumstances Chhedua had agreed to sell the property for a paltry sum of Rs.1,500/-whereas the defendant had purchased the same property for a sum of Rs.25,000/-. In the aforesaid backdrop coupled with the fact that Darshan had made prior agreement to sell in his favour whereas the plaintiffs got the agreement to sell executed only subsequently hence it was for them to explain what due diligence they had carried out to ascertain that the property of which they had entered in an alleged agreement to sell was not already agreed to be sold by the original owner to Darshan. 18. Thus, the issue relating to the defendant No.2 (Darshan) whether he was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice actually ought to have been framed against the plaintiffs who had a subsequent agreement to sell whereas the agreement to sell of Darshan was prior in time and not having considered this aspect of the matter, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court deserves to be set aside. 19. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants in support of his submissions has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 2005 SC 3156 and State of Orrisa and another vs. Mamta Mohanti, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436 and on the strength of the aforesaid judgments, it is urged that in absence of any pleadings the prayer made by a party, could not be granted as such a relief would be beyond the Per contra, Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior counsel for the respondents submits that the plaintiffs-respondents had a registered agreement to sell in their favour dated 10.10.1977. The sale-deed said to have been executed in favour of the defendant No.2 is dated 26.06.1978 i.e. subsequent to the date of the registered agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs. The alleged agreement to sell claimed by Darshan to be prior in time is unregistered agreement dated 12.09.1976 and another unregistered agreement dated 26.07.1977. 20. It is urged by Shri Khan that by means of the legislative amendment, "The Registration Act, 1908" was amended w.e.f. 01.01.1977 which made an agreement to sell in respect of an immovable property compulsory registrable. It is urged that since the sale-deed of the defendant No.2 was subsequent to the registered agreement to sell which was in favour of the plaintiffs hence in order to cover up this lacuna the defendant No.2 fabricated two alleged agreement which was unregistered. It is only to get over the bar as created by the legislative amendment w.e.f. 01.07.1977 that the unregistered agreement to sell was dated 12.09.1976. It has also been urged that the second agreement dated 26.06.1977 was subsequent to the amendment in the Registration Act and this ought to be registered but being unregistered could not have been taken note of nor could give any benefit on the defendant No.2. 21. It is further urged that the findings of the trial court is completely erroneous inasmuch as in a suit for specific performance the plaintiffs only has to seek the aforesaid substantive relief. If the subsequent purchaser has got a sale-deed in his favour, the plaintiff is not required to seek its cancellation or to seek declaration that the subsequent sale-deed be annulled. If the subsequent purchaser has got a sale-deed in his favour, the plaintiff is not required to seek its cancellation or to seek declaration that the subsequent sale-deed be annulled. All what is required is upon decree of the suit for specific performance, the defendant (the subsequent purchaser) would also join in executing the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, the trial court has completely mis-appreciated the legal position and even without considering the subsequent and surrounding circumstances failed to record any finding regarding the readiness and willingness nor noticed that the defendant No.2 had failed to specifically prove his case of being a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. 22. It is further urged that the lower appellate court having considered the evidence including that of defendants' witnesses found that the defendant was not a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice as well as the fact that the defendant No.2 could not explain as to how he got the sale-deed executed especially when the defendant No.1 (Chhedua) in his written statement had clearly raised a plea that he had not executed any sale-deed in favour of Darshan and that any sale-deed as claimed by Darshan was not binding him and was an outcome of fraud. 23. Considering the material evidence and the fact that the readiness and willingness of the plaintiffs was proved, the lower appellate court has allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs and granted a decree of specific performance. The lower appellate court found that the trial court had erred in directing the defendant No.2 (Darshan) to refund the said earnest money paid to Chhedua by the plaintiffs along with interest @ 16% per annum whereas if at all such a decree was to be passed, the same could be only against the legal representatives of Chhedua and not against Darshan. Thus, taking a comprehensive view of the evidence and material on record, the lower appellate court rightly allowed both the appeals. Since, the issue and the substantial question of law as pressed by the appellants is contrary to the settled principles of law, hence, the above second appeals are not sustainable and consequently the appeals deserves to be dismissed. 24. In order to answer the questions as formulated it would be relevant to notice the pleadings and the material on record. Since, the issue and the substantial question of law as pressed by the appellants is contrary to the settled principles of law, hence, the above second appeals are not sustainable and consequently the appeals deserves to be dismissed. 24. In order to answer the questions as formulated it would be relevant to notice the pleadings and the material on record. Insofar as the plaintiffs are concerned they specifically led sufficient foundation in their pleadings that they have registered agreement to sell in their favour dated 10.10.1979. It was also pleaded that the defendant No.2 on the basis of misrepresentation has got a sale-deed executed dated 26.06.1978. In the aforesaid backdrop it was pleaded that the plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform their part of contract and requested for a decree in the nature of specific performance to be passed in favour of the plaintiffs. It was only in the alternative that it was pleaded that in case the aforesaid relief is not granted then the earnest money be refunded. 25. In reply to the aforesaid the original defendant Chhedua filed his written statement which bearing Paper No.Ka-24 wherein in the additional pleas he had categorically stated that he had not executed any agreement in favour of the defendant No.2 nor he had executed any sale-deed in favour of the defendant no.2. In case of any sale-deed as claimed by the defendant No.2 the same was an outcome of fraud and in any case the same was not binding on the defendant 26. The defendant No.2 also filed his written statement wherein he had pleaded that the defendant No.1 had executed an unregistered agreement to sell on 12.09.1976 in pursuance whereof he had agreed to sell the property for total consideration of Rs.25,000/-and had received Rs.10,000/-as earnest money. Subsequently, the defendant No.1 further required more money for the purpose of wedding of his nephew and the defendant No.2 gave the remaining sum of money on the condition that the defendant No.1 would give the possession of the disputed property and in this backdrop the second unregistered agreement dated 26.06.1977 was executed and the defendant No.2 paid remaining Rs.15,000/-to the defendant No.1. It is in furtherance thereof that the defendant No.1 after the village was de-notified under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953, executed the sale-deed in favour of the defendant No.2 on 26.06.1978. It is in furtherance thereof that the defendant No.1 after the village was de-notified under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953, executed the sale-deed in favour of the defendant No.2 on 26.06.1978. In fact the sale-deed in pursuance of the earlier agreement to sell dated 12.09.1976 was prior in time to the agreement executed in favour of the plaintiffs. It was also pleaded that the defendant No.2 had purchased the property for Rs.25,000/-whereas the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs was for a consideration of Rs.1,500/-which was quite low and thus the agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs was not liable to be specifically enforced and the suit was liable to be dismissed. 27. During pendency of the suit i.e. prior to leading of evidence the defendant No.1 namely Chhedua died and by means of the order dated 13.05.1983 passed by the trial court, the legal representatives of Chhedua were brought on record. 28. In light of the pleadings, the trial court framed four issues. Issue No.1 was whether there was a registered agreement in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 and if so its effect. Issue No.2 was whether the defendant No.2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and if so its effect. The issue No.3 was whether the defendant No.1 had executed any prior agreement in favour of the defendant No.2 and if so its effect and whether the sale-deed was in pursuance of the said agreement. 29. Issue No.2 was whether the defendant No.2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration and if so its effect. The issue No.3 was whether the defendant No.1 had executed any prior agreement in favour of the defendant No.2 and if so its effect and whether the sale-deed was in pursuance of the said agreement. 29. The trial court while dealing with the issue no.1 found that the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 was established however, since knowing the fact that the defendant had already executed a sale-deed in favour of the defendant No.2 and no relief regarding cancellation of the sale-deed or seeking a declaration that the said sale-deed was bad was sought and also that it was most unnatural that the property was purchased by the defendant No.2 for Rs.25,000/-was being sold by the defendant No.1 in favour of the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs.1,500/-indicated unnatural circumstances and for all the said reasons, it decided issue no.2 against the plaintiffs but held that since Rs.1,000/-was paid as earnest money by the plaintiffs, therefore, the same was entitled to be refunded and as the defendant No.2 had purchased the property, hence, the liability to pay the same was fixed on the defendant No.2 by means of the judgment dated 21.12.1999. While the lower appellate Court has reversed the said findings and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. 30. In the aforesaid backdrop, if the judgment of the lower appellate court is seen it reveals that considering the evidence which was before the court it is found that the plaintiffs had led evidence wherein it proved its agreement to sell which was on record and also not disputed by the defendant No.1 while filing his written statement and to that extent there was no dispute and it was registered and also admitted by the defendant No.1. The sale-deed in favour of the defendant No.2 is a registered document brought on record however, the plea of the defendant that the said sale-deed was in pursuance of the unregistered agreement to sell dated 12.07.1976 and other unregistered agreement dated 26.06.1977 has vehemently been denied by the defendant No.1 in his written statement and was also denied by the plaintiffs. 31. The issue which was to be considered by the Court was whether the defendant No.2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. 31. The issue which was to be considered by the Court was whether the defendant No.2 was a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. In order to prove the same, the defendant had examined himself and a witness of the agreement dated 12.09.1976 and unregistered agreement dated 26.06.1977 and a witness of the sale-deed dated 26.06.1978. 32. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice that in a suit for specific performance of contract relating to sale of an immovable property and if a sale-deed has been executed by the vendor in favour of a third party who is also a party to the proceedings, then it is incumbent on the such third party to prove that he is a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice. [See Section 19b of the Specific Relief Act, 1963] 33. Primarily his defence is confined to the aforesaid plea alone. He is not entitled to raise such plea regarding inadequacy of consideration of the agreement between the vendor and the plaintiffs or that it was effectuated by fraud inasmuch as such plea can be taken only by the vendor and not by the subsequent purchaser. It is also equally true that in case of the sale-deed having been executed by the vendor in favour of the subsequent purchaser, the plaintiff is not required to seek the cancellation or declaration of the sale-deed in favour of the third party. If the suit of the specific performance is decreed then the original vendor and the third party purchaser/subsequent purchaser is required to join and execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs to convey the full title. 34. This Court is fortified in its view based on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Lala Durga Prasad and another vs. Lala Deep Chand and others, AIR 1954 SC 75 , wherein in Para 40 to 42, it has been held as under:- "40. First, we reach the position that the title to the property has validly passed from the vendor and resides in the subsequent transferee. The sale to him is not void but only voidable at the option of the earlier “contractor”. First, we reach the position that the title to the property has validly passed from the vendor and resides in the subsequent transferee. The sale to him is not void but only voidable at the option of the earlier “contractor”. As the title no longer rests in the vendor it would be illogical from a conveyancing point of view to compel him to convey to the plaintiff unless steps are taken to re-vest the title in him either by cancellation of the subsequent sale or by reconveyance from the subsequent purchaser to him. We do not know of any case in which a reconveyance to the vendor was ordered but Sulaiman, C.J. adopted the other course in Kali Charan v. Janak Deo [ AIR 1932 All 694 ] . He directed cancellation of the subsequent sale and conveyance to the plaintiff by the vendor in accordance with the contract of sale of which the plaintiff sought specific performance. But though this sounds logical the objection to it is that it might bring in its train complications between the vendor and the subsequent purchaser. There may be covenants in the deed between them which it would be inequitable to disturb by cancellation of their deed. Accordingly, we do not think that is a desirable solution. 41. We are not enamoured of the next alternative either, namely, conveyance by the subsequent purchaser alone to the plaintiff. It is true that would have the effect of vesting the title to the property in the plaintiff but it might be inequitable to compel the subsequent transferee to enter into terms and covenants in the vendor's agreement with the plaintiff to which he would never have agreed had he been a free agent; and if the original contract is varied by altering or omitting such terms the court will be remaking the contract, a thing it has no power to do; and in any case it will no longer be specifically enforcing the original contract but another and different one. 42. In our opinion, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. 42. In our opinion, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff. This was the course followed by the Calcutta High Court in Kafiladdin vs. Samiraddin [AIR 1931 Cal 67] and appears to be the English practice. See Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn., p. 90, para 207; also Potter v. Sanders [67 ER 1057]. We direct accordingly." 35. Thus, being the settled legal position in this backdrop if the facts and evidence on record are noticed it would indicate that so far as the registered agreement to sell executed between the plaintiffs and the defendant No.1 is concerned, the same is not disputed. The defendant No.1 while filing his written statement has not raised any plea regarding inadequacy of consideration or any fact which belies the execution of the registered agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs. From the perusal of the written statement of the defendant No.1 it will be clear that he has denied the execution of any agreement to sell with the defendant No.2 including the alleged sale-deed dated 26.06.1978. 36. It being the admitted position it was incumbent upon the defendant No.2 to have led cogent and clear evidence to establish that he was the bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the agreement to sell which was in favour of the plaintiff dated 10.10.1977. 37. In light of the aforesaid if the material on record is seen it would be clear that the registered sale-deed executed in favour of the defendant No.2 which has been brought on record as Paper No.Ka-31 (keeping in mind that the execution of the said sale-deed is disputed and denied by the original vendor). The said sale-deed does not make any reference to any of two alleged unregistered agreements said to have been executed by Chhedua in favour of the defendant No.2. The sale-deed also does not indicate the date and the manner in which the sale consideration was paid. The said sale-deed does not make any reference to any of two alleged unregistered agreements said to have been executed by Chhedua in favour of the defendant No.2. The sale-deed also does not indicate the date and the manner in which the sale consideration was paid. It is only natural that in case if the aforesaid two agreement to sell had been executed and the sale consideration was paid in furtherance thereof a reference of the same would have been definitely mentioned in the sale-deed. 38. Another factor which is noted is that Shri Pal and Jagannath were two witnesses of the unregistered agreement to sell dated 12.07.1976 which is in dispute. Both the said witnesses were not of same village. Shri Pal was examined as DW-2 and from his testimony it would indicate that he did not know about the details of the property in question. Another important fact noticed is that both the DW-1 Darshan himself as well as Shri Pal DW-2 admitted the fact that prior to the agreement to sell as well as the sale-deed dated 26.06.1978 no effort was made to find out whether the property in question has been the subject matter of any encumbrance or agreement. The defendant in order to prove the second unregistered dated 26.06.1977 examined Ram Ratan as DW-3. Significantly, he also in his testimony stated that he was not of the same village. It was also admitted by him that at the time of agreement Chhedua was not in the village. From the testimony of the defendant's witnesses it would borne out that both the agreements were executed by Darshan at his residence. 39. Another relevant fact which is elicited from the testimony on record is as far as the house of Chhedua is concerned, it was occupied by Shri Jagannath and after his death it was in the occupation of Ram Ratan. This would indicate that the house of Chhedua was in occupation of Jagannath, who was witness of the first unregistered agreement to sell then in the occupation of Ram Ratan, who is the witness of second unregistered agreement. Admittedly, both of them did not pay any sale consideration to Chhedua to purchase or occupy the house and from the overall consideration of the testimony, it appears that they had forcibly occupied the premises since Chhedua had been residing in a different village namely Ruri. 40. Admittedly, both of them did not pay any sale consideration to Chhedua to purchase or occupy the house and from the overall consideration of the testimony, it appears that they had forcibly occupied the premises since Chhedua had been residing in a different village namely Ruri. 40. It is the case of the defendant that at the time of the execution of the second agreement, the possession was handed over to him by Chhedua, however, from the material on record, there are three different version by three different witnesses. According to the sale-deed Paper No.Ka-31, the possession was given at the time of the execution of the sale-deed. The defendant No.2 Darshan (DW-1) stated that he received the possession when the second unregistered agreement dated 26.06.1977 was executed. DW-2 Shri Pal and DW-3 Ram Ratan stated that the possession was given after 8 to 10 days of the execution of the second unregistered agreement dated 26.06.1977. The witnesses also could not clearly establish the execution of the unregistered agreement to sell, its material date and time of the execution and there are gross discrepancies and contradictions in their respect testimonies. 41. In the aforesaid backdrop where the defendant No.2 clearly admitted that he had not made any inquiries prior to purchase or the agreement to sell, this fact is corroborated with the statement of defendant witness clearly indicates that the defendant could not be treated as a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the registered agreement to sell executed in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents on 10.10.1977. Once this important plea could not be established by the defendant No.2 moreover the sale-deed which was disputed no attempt was made to prove the same, through his thumb impression were available on record in shape of the written statement wherein the defendant No.1 had disputed and denied the execution of the agreement and the sale-deed. Thus, the burden to prove the same lay on the defendant No.2 and he could easily have got the thumb impression compared through scientific evidence to establish that it was Chhedua who had executed both the unregistered agreement to sell and the sale-deed, however, no such effort was made. 42. Thus, the burden to prove the same lay on the defendant No.2 and he could easily have got the thumb impression compared through scientific evidence to establish that it was Chhedua who had executed both the unregistered agreement to sell and the sale-deed, however, no such effort was made. 42. The reference made to the evidence in the preceding paragraphs is not for the purpose of re-appreciating the evidence but to refer to the evidence on record relying upon which the lower appellate Court has arrived at his conclusion as recorded in its judgment. 43. This Court is satisfied that the manner in which the evidence has been scrutinized by the lower appellate court, who is a final court of both fact and law, has arrived at the proper conclusion. The findings recorded by the trial court are cursory in nature and does not take into account the evidence of the witnesses nor does it refers to the same in the manner it should have, and even otherwise the notion upon which the trial court has proceeded is also erroneous and is contrary to the law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Durga Prasad (supra) and for the said reasons, the lower appellate court has rightly reversed the decree passed by the trial court. 44. Insofar as the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, the same does not come to his rescue inasmuch as merely not seeking a relief of cancellation of the sale-deed executed in favour of the defendant No.2 is not going to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs-respondents to seek specific performance as already indicated above that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiffs-respondents are not required to seek the cancellation of the sale-deed executed in favour of the subsequent purchaser rather the original vendor and the subsequent purchaser are both required to join in executing the sale-deed of the plaintiffs-respondents for the said reason the sale-deed does not require any cancellation. 45. For the aforesaid reasons, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 46. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the findings recorded by the lower appellate court does not suffer from any error. 45. For the aforesaid reasons, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. 46. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the findings recorded by the lower appellate court does not suffer from any error. The defendant No.2 as held by the lower appellate court could not prove his defence of being a bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice nor could he establish that his unregistered agreement to sell related to the sale-deed, hence, he could not be given the benefit of non-registration of his agreement to sell which was prior to 01.01.1977. This Court is in agreement with the findings and conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate court. There is no merit in both the second appeals. Consequently, the same are dismissed. 47. The judgment and decree dated 20.07.2000 passed in R.C.A. No.9/2000 and R.C.A. No.43/2002 by the Additional District Judge, Court No.7, Unnao is affirmed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 48. The record of lower court be remitted to the court concerned within two weeks from today.