JUDGMENT : Non disclosure of pending criminal cases by the candidates seeking employment-which they were obligated to do statutorily as per the notifications inviting applications or through the extant Regulations; and consequent terminations, have very often reached the High Courts and answered in subtly different manner. 2. Some High Courts have taken the view that mere registration of a criminal case and its non disclosure ipso facto cannot visit a candidate with dire consequences, when the applicable notifications/Regulations only provided such disclosure to be made when arrests had been recorded; while certain other Courts have taken the view that such deliberate non-disclosure of a pending case is to be viewed seriously. 3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the year 2016, delivered the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Union of India [ (2016) 8 SCC 471 ], clearing the air of confusion and specifically stipulating how employers are to act in such situation. 4. The petitioner in this case seeks the benefit of Avatar Singh (supra); and this Court is called upon to decide if he can obtain it, in the backdrop of certain specific factual assertions made by him. 5. The petitioner, who had been originally appointed as a “Watch and Ward” in the services of ‘State Bank of India’ ('the Bank', for short), Agali Branch, has approached this Court impugning his termination from service, effected for the reason that he had not disclosed that he was implicated in a criminal case at the time when his application was submitted for appointment. 6. The petitioner’s specific case is that he was not aware of the criminal case against him at the time when he made the application; and therefore that, there was no question of him disclosing such a factum, when he himself was oblivious of the same. 7. The petitioner explains that there was a squabble, in which he was unwittingly involved and attacked; and that he was, therefore, constrained to file a criminal case against the perpetrators. He asserts that he was, however, not aware -until the Bank intimated him about a year later -that a counter case had been filed against him by the culprits of the scuffle, which was registered as Crime No.572 of 2012 by the Nenmara Police Station. 8. He asserts that he was, however, not aware -until the Bank intimated him about a year later -that a counter case had been filed against him by the culprits of the scuffle, which was registered as Crime No.572 of 2012 by the Nenmara Police Station. 8. The petitioner says that the moment he came to be aware of this case, he contacted the first informants and entered into a settlement with them, which finally led to Exts.P7 and P8 orders of this Court quashing the crime registered against him. 9. The petitioner contends that in spite of this, the Bank terminated him from service through Ext.P9 order dated 19.11.2014; constraining him to approach this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.4301 of 2015, culminating in Ext.P12 judgment, through which, the competent Authority of the Bank was directed to reconsider his case, taking note of the afore facts and adverting to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (supra). 10. The petitioner alleges that, in spite of the detailed observations and directions in Ext.P12 judgment, the Bank has again issued Ext.P14, reiterating their earlier stand and asserting that petitioner does not deserve to continue in service, thus maintaining that the termination order, namely Ext.P9, is irreproachable. The petitioner, therefore, prays that Ext.P14 be set aside and the respondent Bank be directed to reinstate him in service forthwith. 11. I have heard Sri.Baby Mathew – learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.P.Ramakrishnan learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Bank. 12. As I notice above, the specific case stated by the petitioner is that he was not aware that a criminal case had been registered against him at the time when he had made the application for appointment before the State Bank of India. He, however, unequivocally concedes that he was expected to disclose the factum of any pending criminal case in his application; but asserts that he was not in a position to do so, because he was not aware of any case against him, at that point of time. 13. He, however, unequivocally concedes that he was expected to disclose the factum of any pending criminal case in his application; but asserts that he was not in a position to do so, because he was not aware of any case against him, at that point of time. 13. However, the Bank has now produced on record Ext.R1(d) Final Report in Crime No.572 of 2012, of the Nenmara Police Station, wherein, it has been recorded that petitioner is charged under Sections 341 and 324 of the IPC; that he was arrested on 26.06.2012 and released on bail on the same day, on the strength of security bonds executed by two sureties. 14. Pertinently, Sri.Baby Mathew – learned counsel for the petitioner, answers these contentions of the Bank by saying that his client had gone to the Police Station on 26.06.2012, thinking that he has been summoned for the purpose of the crime registered at his instance and that he was never aware that he was arrested and enlarged on bail on that day, in a case against him. 15. As an alternative contention, Sri.Baby Mathew submitted that even if it is assumed that the petitioner was aware of the criminal case against him and that he had not disclosed the same in the application made before the Bank, since the charges imputed against him were very trivial, he is entitled to latitude and indulgence, as per the ratio in Avtar Sing (supra) and Commissioner of Police and Others v. Sandeep Kumar [ (2011)4 SCC 644 ]. The learned counsel, in addition, also relied on Manu v. Union of India [2014(3)KLT 400], arguing that this is a judgment delivered by another learned judge of this Court, in which analogous factual circumstances had been noticed and reliefs granted to the petitioner therein. 16. The afore submissions of Sri.Baby Mathew makes it obvious that though the petitioner has not pleaded so, his present attempt is to contend that even if he is found guilty of having suppressed the factum of the pendency of a criminal case against him at the time when he made the application before the Bank, his termination is bad because, the imputed charges against him were trivial. 17. 17. Sri.P.Ramakrishnan – learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Bank, however, contends to the contrary and submits that, what is relevant in this case is not whether the charges against the petitioner were trivial or otherwise, but whether he was guilty of misrepresentation at the time when his application was filed. He submitted that this is extremely crucial because -as the petitioner himself concedes -it was incumbent upon every candidate to make full disclosure fairly and truthfully, particularly regarding criminal cases against them. He, therefore, submitted that if the petitioner concedes that he is guilty of misrepresentation, then no further latitude can be showed to him, especially because the job involved is that of a Guard, for which high levels of rectitude and strength of character is required. 18. When I evaluate the afore submissions, it is perspicuous that the petitioner has two arguments: (a) that he was not guilty of misrepresentation or suppression of facts at the time when his application was made; and (b) that even if he is found so, it was not necessary for the Bank to have terminated him, since the imputed criminal charges were trivial in nature. 19. On the first limb of the argument as afore contended by Sri.Baby Mathew, I am afraid that I cannot find favour with the petitioner for more than one reason: (a) For the first, it is the consistent pleading of the petitioner that he was not aware that a criminal case had been registered against him; and that he had gone to the Police Station on 26.06.2012 in connection with a crime that he had registered against the persons who attacked him. However, Ext.R1(d) makes it very clear, without leaving any room for doubt, that he had been arrested on that day and enlarged on bail on the strength of bonds executed by two solvent sureties. It is, therefore, impossible to believe that the petitioner was not aware that he had been enlarged on bail, particularly when the persons who offered themselves as sureties were those whom he had presented before the Police. It is, therefore, impossible to believe that the petitioner was not aware that he had been enlarged on bail, particularly when the persons who offered themselves as sureties were those whom he had presented before the Police. His argument, therefore, that he was under the impression that he had gone to the Police Station with respect to a crime registered at his instance cannot be believed for even one moment; and consequently I can only repel the same as being a desperate attempt to create a defence against the charges impelled against him by the Bank. (b). For the second, the petitioner's specific case is that he came to be aware of a crime registered against him only when the Bank informed him about his proposed termination and that he approached his “attackers” and entered into a settlement, which thus enabled him to approach this Court to have the criminal case quashed. These statements by itself would show that the petitioner certainly was aware of his alleged “attackers”; and that he was also aware that a crime had been registered against him. Therefore, the fact that crime had been quashed would be of no consequence whatsoever, as long as he is unable to cogently demonstrate that he was not aware of the crime registered against him at the time when he made the application before the Bank. 20. As a consequence, I cannot find favour with the petitioner on his first limb of argument and am constrained to hold that he was certainly aware that a crime had been registered against him at the time when he made his application before the Bank; and that he had, for some reason, decided not to disclose the same. 21. Now coming to the second limb of the argument of the petitioner that, even if he is found guilty of misrepresentation as alleged by the Bank, the order of termination against him was grossly unconscionable or excessive, I am afraid I cannot find favour with this either, because the issue involved in this case is not with respect to the gravity of the offences alleged against him, but as to whether he had deliberately refused to disclose the factum of the pendancy of a criminal case against him, even though he was enjoined to do so by the applicable Regulations and by the terms of the application form itself. This is more so because he had been arrested and enlarged on bail at that time. 22. Therefore, the fact that he was either exonerated later or that the charges against him were trivial, would be of no real consequence because the Bank has chosen to terminate for not having disclosed the factum of the criminal case against him and for not having come clean with respect to his declarations made before them. 23. That said, the contentions of the petitioner based on Sandeep Kumar (Supra), certainly enjoins this Court to consider the same with some care, because he contends that the facts involved therein were analogous to the facts in this case. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that the petitioner therein was involved in a criminal case under Section 325 and Section 34 of the IPC and that he was acquitted on 18.01.1998. However, the petitioner, thereafter, applied for the job only in 24.02.1999, though without mentioning that he had been earlier involved in a crime. It was in such factual context that the Hon'ble Supreme Court felt that the petitioner should be granted some latitude because “indiscretions of young people must be condoned if the allegations are not grievous like murder, decoity or rape”. 24. The case at hand is completely different because the petitioner's application before the Bank was made at the time when a criminal case against him was still pending and when he was on bail; and therefore, he was certainly obligated to disclose the same faithfully and honestly. 25. Quad Hoc Manu (Supra), what was noticed by this Court was that the petitioner therein was involved in a criminal case which culminated from a civil dispute and noticing this specifically, this Court found that a lenient indulgence should be given to him. 26. However, the petitioner in this case was not charged in a crime that emanated from a civil dispute, but under Sections 341 and 324 of the IPC on account of a physical altercation with certain other people. 27. Obviously, therefore, the Bank had reason to be concerned, because the employment offered to the petitioner was that of a guard, which requires the highest levels of honesty and comportment. 28. 27. Obviously, therefore, the Bank had reason to be concerned, because the employment offered to the petitioner was that of a guard, which requires the highest levels of honesty and comportment. 28. That having been said, when I examine Ext.P12 judgment of this Court, there is no doubt that the learned Judge directed the Bank to reconsider the petitioner's case adverting to Avtar Singh (Supra). The Bank, thereafter, issued Ext.P14 explaining in detail as to why the petitioner cannot be granted any relief and I have carefully examined the said order. It is manifest therefrom that all relevant factors and inputs have been carefully assessed and evaluated by the competent Authorities. 29. As it is well settled, this Court is not expected to sit as an Appellate Authority over Ext.P14, but can only judicially review the same to find out whether any of the imperative principles have been violated or whether the decision making process is vitiated on account of any cause which is legally impermissible. 30. I cannot find any such factors to be attracted in Ext.P14; and, as I have already said above, the very factum of the petitioner having not disclosed that a criminal case was pending against him and that he was on bail at the time when he made the application, would certainly be sufficient for the Bank to deny employment and to terminate him consequently. 31. I must also add that Ext.P14, in my view, conforms to the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Avtar Singh (Supra) because in Paragraph 38(1) thereof, it is perspicuously declared that the “information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendancy of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.” (emphasis supplied). In this case the fact that petitioner was arrested is evident from Ext.R1(d), but he had chosen to suppress the same in his application made before the Bank. 32. That apart, the petitioner was terminated in the year 2014 through Ext.P9 and had been unable to obtain any interim order from this Court throughout the life of this writ petition. In this case the fact that petitioner was arrested is evident from Ext.R1(d), but he had chosen to suppress the same in his application made before the Bank. 32. That apart, the petitioner was terminated in the year 2014 through Ext.P9 and had been unable to obtain any interim order from this Court throughout the life of this writ petition. Consequently, he has remained out of service for the last more than seven years and I am certain that, therefore, even on that account the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief from this Court. In the afore circumstances, I have no other option but to dismiss this writ petition, holding that Ext.P14 is without error.