JUDGMENT : Manish Choudhury, J. This criminal appeal under Section 378(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘the Code’, and/or ‘the CrPC’, for short) is preferred against the judgment and order dated 25.03.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl in Sessions Case no. 67/2015. By the said judgment and order dated 25.03.2019, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 302 and Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). 2. The investigation was set into motion with the institution of a First Information Report (FIR) lodged by one Ms. Lalrinthari [P.W.2] before the Officer In-Charge, Kulikawn Police Station, District – Aizawl on 18.12.2014. In the FIR, the informant had, inter-alia, stated that in the morning hours of 18.12.2014, Thursday, at around 9:30 a.m., the grandmother of the informant, Zokhumi, 83 years, wife of Late Z. Lalsanhzuala was found dead in her bedroom inside their house. The deadbody was found lying on her bed in a pool of blood covered with a quilt. A severe injury was found to have been inflicted in the left side of the neck. According to the informant, a sum of about Rs. 64,000/- was found missing from the steel almirah. The informant had further stated that her grandmother died at the hand of a certain miscreant but they were clueless as to how the miscreant entered into the room of her grandmother. It was reported that the incident had taken place between 1:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. on 18.12.2014. 3. On receipt of the FIR, the Officer In-Charge, Kulikawn Police Station, District – Aizawl registered a case being Kulikawn Police Station Case no. 185/2014 for offences under Sections 302/380, IPC on 18.12.2014. After such registration, the investigation of the case was carried on by P.W.19, Sri F. Lalbiakzauva, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Aizawl Police Station as the Investigating Officer (I.O.) of the case. 4. After receipt of information about the incident of unnatural death of Late Zokhumi on 18.04.2014 at about 10:15 a.m. telephonically, the I.O. reached the place of incident where other police personnel and a team of officials from the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Mizoram, Aizawl also arrived. The house of the deceased was thoroughly searched and the forensic experts collected suspected blood stained bedsheet, blanket, quilt covers, pillow cover, paijama, etc. and suspected blood stains from various places inside the house. The house of the deceased was thoroughly searched and the forensic experts collected suspected blood stained bedsheet, blanket, quilt covers, pillow cover, paijama, etc. and suspected blood stains from various places inside the house. The experts from the FSL also lifted 9 (nine) nos. of chance fingerprints from the place of occurence i.e. 5 (five) from a balcony door, 2 (two) from a steel almirah inside the bedroom and 2 (two) from a steel almirah in the corridor. A number of other articles were also seized during the said process. A sketch map of the place of occurrence was prepared, photographs of crime scene were taken and a crime scene visit report was made. The inquest of the dead body was carried out in presence of witnesses and thereafter, the dead body was sent to the Civil Hospital, Aizawl for post-mortem examination. 5. After completing the required formalities, the team of police personnel went back to the Police Station wherein the informant [P.W.2] lodged the FIR. Accordingly, the case was registered and investigated upon. During the course of investigation, the I.O. recorded statements of a number of witnesses under Section 161, CrPC. The post-mortem examination was duly carried out and thereafter, the dead body was handed over to the family. The funeral service of Late Zokhumi took place on 19.12.2014. 6. The accused i.e. the respondent no. 1 herein was summoned by the I.O. to the police station on 19.12.2014 as he did not attend the funeral service of the deceased who was his grandmother by relation and also for the reason that he was implicated in a murder case earlier. After being so summoned, the fingerprint of the accused was obtained at Kulikawn Police Station under the supervision and direction of the I.O. and the accused was kept in the police station for the night of 19.12.2014. The accused was, thereafter, released on 20.12.2014 on personal recognizance bond. 7. The fingerprints of the accused and the chance fingerprints lifted from the place of occurrence were sent to the FSL for examination and report. On 21.12.2014, a note book was seized from the residence of the accused and on the same day, the accused was arrested. During custody, the I.O. stated to have recorded an alleged confessional statement of the accused at around 12:00 a.m.- 01:00 a.m. on 25.12.2014 purportedly in presence of two witnesses. On 21.12.2014, a note book was seized from the residence of the accused and on the same day, the accused was arrested. During custody, the I.O. stated to have recorded an alleged confessional statement of the accused at around 12:00 a.m.- 01:00 a.m. on 25.12.2014 purportedly in presence of two witnesses. According to the I.O., the accused confessed to have committed the act of deadly assault on the deceased and made admissions inter-alia about the alleged weapon of assault and stealing an amount of money away from inside the almirah. Consequently, attempts were made to recover the aforesaid incriminatory articles. 8. Upon completion of investigation, the I.O. submitted a charge sheet being Charge Sheet no. 20/2015 dated 17.03.2015 finding a prima facie case against the accused for commission of offences punishable under Section 302, IPC and Section 380, IPC. A supplementary charge sheet to the afore-mentioned charge sheet was also filed by the I.O. on 29.04.2015. 9. After receipt of the charge sheet and the supplementary charge sheet, the case was committed by the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aizawl to the learned Sessions Court in terms of the provisions of Section 209, CrPC as the offence under Section 302, IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. On receipt of the case record, the Sessions Case no. 67/2020 was registered. Upon hearing the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the defence and perusal of the materials on record, the learned Sessions Judge, Aizawl (‘the trial court’, for short) framed charges against the accused under Section 302, IPC and under Section 380, IPC separately on 18.05.2015. When the charges were read over and explained to the accused, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 10. During the course of trial, the prosecution in order to bring home the charges against the accused examined 18 (eighteen) nos. of witnesses and they were (1) P.W.1 – Sh. Rosangzuala, (2) P.W.2 - Ms. Lalrinthari, (3) P.W.3 - Ms. Sh. Rayner Malsawmtluanga, (4) P.W.4 - Sh. Laldawngliana, (5) P.W.5 – Dr. Lalringmaia, (6) P.W.6 – Sh. R.L. Pianmawia, (7) P.W.7 – Sh. J. Lalsailova, (8) P.W.8 – James Lalrinsanga, (9) P.W.10 - Sh. Joseph Vanlalchungnunga, (10) P.W.11 – Smt. Remlalnghaki, (11) P.W.12 – Sh. Samuel Lalbiaksanga, (12) P.W.13 – Sh. H. Lalchawimawia, (13) P.W.14 – Smt. Zodinpuii, (14) P.W.15 – Sh. F. Vanthuama, (15) P.W.16 – Ms. Lalringmaia, (6) P.W.6 – Sh. R.L. Pianmawia, (7) P.W.7 – Sh. J. Lalsailova, (8) P.W.8 – James Lalrinsanga, (9) P.W.10 - Sh. Joseph Vanlalchungnunga, (10) P.W.11 – Smt. Remlalnghaki, (11) P.W.12 – Sh. Samuel Lalbiaksanga, (12) P.W.13 – Sh. H. Lalchawimawia, (13) P.W.14 – Smt. Zodinpuii, (14) P.W.15 – Sh. F. Vanthuama, (15) P.W.16 – Ms. Dorothy Zohmagaihi, (16) P.W.17 – Smt. Lalnunpuii, (17) P.W.19 – Sh. F. Lalbiakzauva, and (18) P.W.20 – Sh. R. Vanlalkima. The learned trial court also examined one Sri K.C. Hmingthanga as a Court Witness [C.W.1]. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313, CrPC. When he was asked whether he wanted to adduce evidence in his defence, the accused answered in the affirmative and he examined 4 (four) witnesses on his behalf. The defence witnesses were (1) D.W.1 - Smt. Lalnunpuii, (2) D.W.2 - Sh. R. Sanghluna, (3) D.W.3 – Smt. Lalsangpuii, and (4) D.W.4 – Smti. Zothanmawii. Thereafter, the arguments of both the sides were heard. The learned trial court after discussing the evidence brought on record, reached a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the presence of the accused at the scene at the relevant time. The learned trial court by the impugned judgment and order dated 25.03.2019 had acquitted the accused of the charges under Section 302, IPC and Section 380, IPC and set him at liberty. 11. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said impugned judgment and order of the learned trial court, the State of Mizoram is in appeal. 12. Heard Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Public Prosecutor for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Saurabh Pradhan, learned counsel for the accused-respondent no. 1 and Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. Ruth Lalruatfeli, learned counsel for the informant-respondent no. 2. 13. Referring elaborately to the testimonies of the witnesses and other evidence on record, learned Public Prosecutor had submitted that the prosecution sought to bring home the charges against the accused on the basis of a number of incriminating circumstances. Firstly, the accused had a clear motive to commit the crime because he bore grudge and animosity towards the deceased as the deceased had got the land settlement certificate (LSC) of the land and building where the accused was living, transferred in her name. Firstly, the accused had a clear motive to commit the crime because he bore grudge and animosity towards the deceased as the deceased had got the land settlement certificate (LSC) of the land and building where the accused was living, transferred in her name. As a result, the accused had been deprived of the ownership of the house and the land. Secondly, the fact that the accused was earlier involved in a case of murder goes to show that it was not impossible on his part to commit such a dastardly act like killing his related grandmother i.e. the deceased. Thirdly, the accused in his disclosure statement, recorded in presence of civilian witnesses, had clearly admitted about committing the crime. Fourthly, one of the chance fingerprint recovered from a balcony door of the bedroom of the deceased where the deceased was found dead, matched with the fingerprint of the deceased whereas the accused himself admitted that he never visited the house of the deceased since 21.11.2011. Fifthly, the recovery of the blue jumper from the house of the deceased during search pursuant to the disclosure statement, is a relevant circumstance in the chain of circumstances. Sixthly, the entries in the notebook seized from his house clearly indicated that the accused was closely following the steps taken in the investigation but he himself neither visited the house of the deceased aftermath the murder nor attended the funeral of the deceased. Seventhly, the accused failed to explain regarding his whereabouts from the evening hours of 17.12.2014 to the morning hours of 18.12.2014. 13.1. It was his submission that the prosecution by leading cogent oral evidence and documentary evidence was able to bring home all the circumstances and if all those circumstances were considered cumulatively, it pointed out about the culpability of the accused in the incident of murder of the deceased. The learned trial Court, according to him, had failed to appreciate the evidence in the correct perspective in the backdrop of facts and circumstances leading to the incident and the antecedents of the accused. 13.2. It was further submitted by him that a combined reading of his disclosure statement where he admitted about using a knife with the nature of injury which led the deceased to her death the hypothesis that it was only the accused who killed the deceased was established. 13.2. It was further submitted by him that a combined reading of his disclosure statement where he admitted about using a knife with the nature of injury which led the deceased to her death the hypothesis that it was only the accused who killed the deceased was established. The said fact stood further substantiated by the recovery of the fingerprints of the accused from the place of occurrence. 13.3. To buttress his submissions, learned Public Prosecutor had referred at the decisions in (i) B.A. Umesh vs. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 85 ; (ii) State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj and another, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 ; (iii) State of T.N. vs. T. Thulasingam and others, reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 405; (iv) State represented by Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation vs. M. Subrahmanyam, reported in (2019) 6 SCC 357 ; and (v) Geejaganda Somaiah vs. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 9 SCC 315 . 13.4. By advancing the above submissions, the learned Public Prosecutor had made submission that the impugned judgment and order is liable to be reversed by converting the acquittal into conviction or in the alternative, the case should be remanded back for re-appreciation of the evidence on record as the evidence were not correctly analyzed and appreciated. 14. Mr. Pradhan, learned counsel for the accused-respondent no. 1 had submitted that the prosecution in the present case had failed to bring any evidence on record to link the accused with the alleged murder of the deceased. The entire case of the prosecution was based on surmises and conjectures. None of the circumstances was established and, thus, there was no question of linking those circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances leading to any complicity of the accused with the alleged crime. 14.1. He has further submitted that the prosecution even failed to establish about the nature of weapon used in inflicting the fatal wound on the deceased. No recovery of the alleged weapon of assault whatsoever was also made. Though it was alleged that money was stolen from inside the almirah but no money was recovered from anywhere. 14.1. He has further submitted that the prosecution even failed to establish about the nature of weapon used in inflicting the fatal wound on the deceased. No recovery of the alleged weapon of assault whatsoever was also made. Though it was alleged that money was stolen from inside the almirah but no money was recovered from anywhere. Those facts clearly give rise to a doubt that from the very beginning the investigation and the prosecution were directed by identifying the accused first as the perpetrator of the crime and to collect such kind of evidence which would connect the accused with the alleged crime. He had submitted that such kind of investigation was impermissible in law. 14.2. It was his further submission that expert evidence as regards fingerprint and handwriting were mere opinions only and the same could not be relied on without other cogent and reliable corroborative evidence. From the evidence on record itself it would be revealed that there were many suspects who could be involved in the alleged crime. He further submitted that from prosecution evidence itself it had emerged that it was not possible on the part of the accused to commit the alleged crime at the relevant time as during the relevant time he was found to be elsewhere in the company of other persons. 14.3. Mr. Pradhan had relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in (i) Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy vs. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) through legal representatives and another, reported in (2019) 14 SCC 220 ; (ii) Roop Singh @ Rupa vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2008) 11 SCC 79 ; and (iii) Sonvir @ Somvir vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2018) 18 SCC 24. 15. Mr. Lianhrima, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the informant-respondent no. 2 had endorsed the submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor. He had further submitted that both the civilian witnesses to the disclosure statement – P.W.7 and P.W.8 – had made it clear that the said statement was made by the accused voluntarily wherein he admitted about wearing the blue jumper jacket in the night of 17.12.2014. 15.1. It was his further submission that though the defence by adducing evidence of four witnesses sought to raise the plea of alibi but it had failed to achieve so because of the inconsistent statements of the defence witnesses. 15.1. It was his further submission that though the defence by adducing evidence of four witnesses sought to raise the plea of alibi but it had failed to achieve so because of the inconsistent statements of the defence witnesses. He as an example, cited the differences in their depositions about the time periods to cover the distance between the house of the accused and the house of the deceased. 15.2. According to him, the evidence of fingerprint could not have been discarded by the learned trial Court by making reference to the provisions of the Identification of the Prisoners Act, 1920 and as such, the reasoning of the trial Court is not sustainable. According to him, the State of Mizoram has not adopted the Identification of the Prisoners Act, 1920 under the provisions of Article 371G of the Constitution of India. 15.3. Mr. Lianhrima had placed reliance in the decisions in (i) Jaspal Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1980) 1 SCC 487 ; (ii) Mohan Lal and another vs. Ajit Singh and another, reported in (1978) 3 SCC 279 ; and (iii) Jitender Kumar vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2012) 6 SCC 204 . 16. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials on record. In order to appreciate the rival submissions of the parties and before proceeding further, it appears necessary to consider the evidence brought on record by the parties. 17. The deceased was the grandmother from the mother’s side of P.W.2 i.e. the informant. The mother of P.W.2 was the eldest daughter of the deceased, who died on 14.05.2004. The P.W.2 deposed that her grandfather, Late J. Lalsangzuala died in June, 2009. She was living with her grandparents since the time she was less than a year old as her parents were separated. She stated that the accused is the grandson of Late Pu Rotluanga, the elder brother of Late J. Lalsangzuala. The parents of the accused were also dead. The accused was staying in a house at Kulikawn belonging to the deceased. The accused last visited the house of the deceased on 21.11.2011 when the birthday of the deceased was celebrated. Regarding the events on 17.12.2014, P.W.2 deposed that the deceased went to the house of her younger brother, Mr. The parents of the accused were also dead. The accused was staying in a house at Kulikawn belonging to the deceased. The accused last visited the house of the deceased on 21.11.2011 when the birthday of the deceased was celebrated. Regarding the events on 17.12.2014, P.W.2 deposed that the deceased went to the house of her younger brother, Mr. Pu Lalrintluanga for dinner at around 5:00 p.m. and came back to her house at around 7:00 p.m. P.W.2 stated that she herself left the house soon thereafter through the kitchen door by locking it from outside but did not lock the main door. There is a private road from the main road leading to their house. She came back to the house at around 10:00 p.m. along with her three friends viz. Dorothy Zohmangaihi [P.W.16], Malsawmdawngliana and Laldawngzela and entered the house through the kitchen door. They again left the house at around 11:00 p.m. through the kitchen door by locking it from outside. They all returned back to the house at around 2:00 a.m. on 18.12.2014 and that time they entered the house through the unlocked main door. In that night, P.W.16 slept in her room and P.W.2 slept in the main room. She got awake at around 8:00 a.m. and after some time, the wife of Pu Lalrintluanga, Ms. Pi Zodinpuii [P.W.14] and her son came to the house bringing breakfast for them. Mr. Pu Vanthuama [P.W.15], the manager of the shop, V.Z. Bianka & Sons came to the house to take the keys of the shop from her grandmother. Both P.W.2 and P.W.15 entered the bedroom of the deceased. They found one of the steel almirahs open. They saw the deceased on her bed covered with a duvet (rijai). On removing the duvet (rijai), she found her grandmother lying with a deep cut on the left side of the neck in a pool of blood and her wearing apparels of the lower parts were found removed. Having seen the same, she raised hue and cry and upon hearing her voice, P.W.16 came to the bedroom of the deceased. Thereafter, some relatives and other persons also reached at the scene. The police was informed and police personnel also reached after some time. She further deposed that an amount of Rs. 64,000/- approx. appeared to be missing from the almirah. Thereafter, some relatives and other persons also reached at the scene. The police was informed and police personnel also reached after some time. She further deposed that an amount of Rs. 64,000/- approx. appeared to be missing from the almirah. In her cross-examination, P.W.2 stated that she did not have any suspicion against any person. It was within her knowledge that an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was with her deceased grandmother as she was engaging some labourers for painting the house and the amount of Rs. 64,000/- appeared to be available with her deceased grandmother at that point of time. She further deposed that the deceased had a maid servant, Zovi who used to come every day at about 08:30 a.m. and leave at about 04:00 p.m. On 17.12.2014 as well as on 18.12.2014, Zovi came to their house. P.W.2 stated that she worked as a Finance Assistant and used to go out for work every day. In her cross-examination, she stated that her room was adjoining to the room of the deceased. Before going out to the restaurant, they had consumed liquor and after returning from the restaurant also, they consumed liquor while sitting at the T.V. room. Initially, the police had considered them to be suspects. Her boyfriend, Jeremy Lalnunmawia also came to the house with two of his cousins after 02:00 a.m. and after spending some time, the three of them left the place. But Jeremy returned and spent the night in the house wherefrom he left at about 04:00 a.m. Jeremy was staying in a house near about 20 steps from their house. P.W.2 further stated that she did not see the accused in the night of the incident i.e. on 17.12.2014. 18. P.W.15 was the storekeeper of the shop belonging to the deceased which dealt in arms and ammunitions. The shop was located inside the compound of the deceased and he was working there since 1995. P.W.15 deposed to the effect that at about 09:30 a.m. on 18.12.2014, he reached the residence of the deceased as usual to take the keys of the shop. When he entered the residence of the deceased he did not find her and when he looked into her room, he saw an open steel almirah. Thinking that the deceased was in the bathroom, he left the room. When he entered the residence of the deceased he did not find her and when he looked into her room, he saw an open steel almirah. Thinking that the deceased was in the bathroom, he left the room. When after 5 (five) minutes one customer came for a bullet, P.W.15 asked P.W.2 to get the keys of the shop. Thereafter, he along with P.W.2 entered the room of the deceased and found the deceased dead on her bed in a pool of blood. There was a stab wound in the left side of her neck. In his cross-examination, P.W.15 stated that he did not see the accused either on the previous night (17.12.2014) or in the morning hours of 18.12.2014. He further stated that he did not know the accused till the date of his deposition. 19. P.W.16 is a friend of P.W.2. In her examination-in-chief, P.W.16 deposed that on 17.12.2014, she along with P.W.2, Malsawmdawngliana and Laldawngzela left the house of the deceased at around 07:00 p.m. for a dinner at a restaurant and came back at around 10:00 p.m. After spending some time in the house of the deceased, they left again at around 11:00 p.m. to roam around the Aizawl city to see the Christmas decorations. All of them came back to the house at around 01:00 a.m. of 18.12.2014. She spent the night in the room of P.W.2. To her knowledge, none of them entered the room of the deceased in the night of 17.12.2014. She woke up at around 08:30 a.m. on 18.12.2014 and it was at around 09:30 a.m., P.W.2 informed her about the death of the deceased. She rushed to the room of the deceased and found her dead body lying on her bed. In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not see the accused in the night of 17.12.2014 or in the early hours of 18.12.2014. 20. P.W.14 is the wife of Mr. Lalrintluanga, a younger brother of the deceased. P.W.14, in her testimony, stated that the distance between their residence and the residence of the deceased would be about 50 feet. In the evening hours of 17.12.2014, at around 05:30 p.m., the deceased had dinner with them in their residence and after dinner, the deceased left their house at around 07:00 p.m. She deposed that the accused never went to the residence of the deceased. In the evening hours of 17.12.2014, at around 05:30 p.m., the deceased had dinner with them in their residence and after dinner, the deceased left their house at around 07:00 p.m. She deposed that the accused never went to the residence of the deceased. The defence did not cross-examine P.W.14. 21. P.W.1 was a Junior Scientific Officer in the FSL whereas P.W.11 was an Assistant Director, FSL, Mizoram at the relevant point of time. P.W.1 in his examination-in-chief had deposed that on 18.12.2014, he along with a mobile forensic team consisting of four Scientific Officers of FSL including one Sri K.C. Hmimgthanga [C.W.1], visited the crime scene and found the deceased dead on her bed and observed blood stains around it. P.W.1 stated to have taken photographs of the crime scene and a chance fingerprint on the balcony door of the bedroom of the deceased [EXT-P-11]. The said chance print was lifted by Sri K.C. Hmimgthanga, Junior Scientific Officer, FSL [C.W.1]. He also prepared a crime scene visit report vide Ext-P-12. In his cross-examination, he deposed that he did not take photographs of fingerprints from any other place in the crime scene, except Ext-P-11. According to him, C.W.1 is an expert in finger print. 22. P.W.11 testified that the mobile team of four officers of FSL including P.W.1 and C.W.1, visited the crime scene on 18.12.2014 and lifted total nine chance fingerprints including one chance fingerprint from the balcony door. On receipt of requisition from the investigating authority for examination of fingerprints, comparison of chance fingerprints with specimen fingerprints of suspected persons as well as with specimen fingerprints of inmates was carried out. He further stated that he made an examination report vide Ext-P-20. In his said report of fingerprint examination [Ext-P-20], he recorded the finding that the left middle impression of specimen print of the accused, marked as Ext-D(1) was identical with the chance fingerprint marked as Ext-D(2) which was lifted from the balcony door of the crime scene. He further deposed that C.W.1 also made a comparative analysis of the specimen fingerprint [Ext-D(1)] with the chance fingerprint [Ext-D(2)] and reached the same result. According to him, two different persons’ fingerprints could never be identical. 23. He further deposed that C.W.1 also made a comparative analysis of the specimen fingerprint [Ext-D(1)] with the chance fingerprint [Ext-D(2)] and reached the same result. According to him, two different persons’ fingerprints could never be identical. 23. C.W.1 deposed that after reaching the place of occurrence, where the police personnel were already present, he took some fingerprints from the veranda side of the balcony door which led out from the bedroom of the deceased. He also took some fingerprints from some steel almirahs inside the bedroom. He further deposed that the fingerprints lifted from the balcony door were fresh and would be about one week old. The reason for such opinion about one week old fingerprint, he stated, was for the fact that the fingerprints could be developed by use of black powder, which was activated charcoal. According to him, had the fingerprints been about one month old it would not have been possible to develop it even with chemicals as the fingerprints were on a smoothly painted wooden surface exposed to sunlight which was prone to quicker deterioration. He further deposed that the examination of fingerprints was done by P.W.11 who passed away recently and he assisted P.W.11. In his cross-examination, he stated that the other fingerprints lifted from the place of occurrence were not of comparable quality. He had submitted that the matching fingerprint was taken from the door frame of the balcony door. 24. P.W.12 was a police constable who was on duty at Kulikawn Police Station on 19.12.2014. He deposed that as he was trained in fingerprint lifting, he lifted the fingerprint of the accused on the fingerprint slip at Kulikawn Police Station as per the direction of the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl and in presence of the I.O. [P.W.19]. 25. P.W.20 was the Assistant Director, FSL who deposed that he received a requisition from the I.O. to compare the handwritings marked as Q-1 and a handwriting/signature of the accused marked as Ext-A-1. He as a handwriting expert, examined the said two exhibits with the help of scientific instruments and found that Q-1 [Ext M-1] and the admitted handwriting of the accused agreed in their general and individual writing characteristics. After such comparison, he came to a definite conclusion that the handwritings appearing in both the writings were of the same person and accordingly, he submitted an examination report as Ext-P-15. After such comparison, he came to a definite conclusion that the handwritings appearing in both the writings were of the same person and accordingly, he submitted an examination report as Ext-P-15. He also stated that C.W.1 is an expert in fingerprint. 26. P.W.13 was a Sub-Inspector of Police attached to Kulikawn Police Station on 18.12.2014. On receipt of information about the death of the deceased, he went to the place of occurrence with his team and found the body of the deceased on the bed inside the bedroom. He made seizure of a number of articles including chance fingerprints and blood stains, from the place of occurrence. He conducted inquest on the dead body of the deceased on 18.12.2014 in presence of witnesses and found the left side of the neck wide open caused by sharp tool and prepared Inquest Report [Ext-P-5]. The dead body was, thereafter, taken to the Civil Hospital, Aizawl for post-mortem examination. He also prepared a sketch-map of the place of occurrence [Ext-P-23]. He admitted the fact that some civilians mostly local leaders entered the room where the dead body was lying before his arrival. 27. P.W.6 and P.W.7 had deposed to the effect that at around 10:00 a.m. on 18.12.2014, they went to the place of occurrence i.e. the residence of the deceased on getting information that the deceased was found dead. Both of them were present when the police conducted inquest of the dead body of the deceased and they signed as witnesses in the Inquest Report [Ext-P-5]. They also signed as witnesses to the seizure made by the police vide Ext-P-6 and Ext-P-7 whereby blanket with suspected blood stains, suspected blood stains on bed sheet, pillow cover and quilt cover, pyjama and other wearing apparels, chance fingerprints (supra), etc. were seized from the place of occurrence. P.W.7, in his cross-examination, stated that he did not see the chance fingerprints lifted by the FSL personnel and the exact places wherefrom the suspected blood stains were found. 28. P.W.8 like P.W.7, was also an office bearer of YMA. P.W.7 and P.W.8 had deposed to the effect that in the early morning hours, at around 03:00 a.m., on 25.12.2014 both of them were called by police to the Police Station. 28. P.W.8 like P.W.7, was also an office bearer of YMA. P.W.7 and P.W.8 had deposed to the effect that in the early morning hours, at around 03:00 a.m., on 25.12.2014 both of them were called by police to the Police Station. On reaching the Police Station, they found that the Superintendent of Police, Aizawl, the Additional Superintendent of Police, the I.O., the Officer In-charge of the Police Station and some other police officers were already in the Police Station. These two witnesses further deposed that before all of them the accused confessed that he murdered the deceased on the night of 17.12.2014. The accused stated to have confessed that he stole money from the house of the deceased and kept the jumper with ‘Valley Strong’ imprinted on it and the black T-shirt he wore at the time of committing the alleged crime, inside his residence. P.W.7 and P.W.8 stated that they signed as witnesses in the said disclosure statement of the accused [Ext-8]. P.W.7 further stated that the accused made the disclosure statement at 03:00 a.m. on 25.12.2014 when he was in police custody. 29. Both P.W.3 and P.W.4 were office bearers of local branch of Young Men Association (YMA) who were called by the police to be witnesses during the time search was conducted in the residence of the accused on 21.12.2014 on the basis of a search warrant. During the search, a note book, ‘Amri Hospital 2461-2626’ was seized by police marking it as Ext-M-1. Both these witnesses deposed that they did not see/look inside the said note book and the handwritings therein. 30. P.W.10 was a neighbour of the accused. He deposed that at around 09:20 p.m. on 17.12.2014, the accused came inside their house and left after a few minutes to have dinner in his house. P.W.10 immediately thereafter, at 09:26 p.m., called the accused by using his wife’s mobile number The accused came back to their house immediately without going to his house and stayed with them in their house till 01:30 a.m. of 18.12.2014. Thereafter, the accused left for his house. As the accused was very drunk, he and his wife [P.W.17] followed the accused after a minute and on reaching the house of the accused, they found the accused asleep on his bed. Thereafter, the accused left for his house. As the accused was very drunk, he and his wife [P.W.17] followed the accused after a minute and on reaching the house of the accused, they found the accused asleep on his bed. He also deposed that when the accused came to their house on that night he was wearing a blue jumper with ‘Valley Strong Cement’ imprinted on its front side and back side. In his cross-examination, P.W.10 stated that the accused was in their house from 09:28 p.m. of 17.12.2014 to 01:30 a.m. of 18.12.2014 during which time he continuously drank liquor. He stated that he had no further knowledge regarding the movement of the accused after they left him in his house finding him asleep. In his re-examination by the prosecution, he mentioned that the I.O. asked him as about the time he called the accused and P.W.10 showed the I.O. his wife’s mobile phone wherefrom it was clear that he spoke to the accused on phone at 09:26 p.m. 31. P.W.17 is the wife of P.W.10 and she deposed likewise P.W.10 as about the time when the accused came to their house on 17.12.2014 and left their house on 18.12.2014. She also stated that when the accused left their house at around 01:30 a.m., he was drunk because he was continuously drinking liquor with her husband. 32. P.W.5 was the Head of Department, Forensic Medicine & Toxicology at the Civil Hospital of Aizawl on 18.12.2014 when he conducted Post Mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased. Exhibiting the Post Mortem Examination Report [Ext-P-21] he stated that his findings were : “1. Body – fresh moderately build 2. Rigor mortis-present. 3. Dress of the deceased as per police inquest report. 4. An incised wound of 7X4 cms present on left side of the neck, 2.5 cms below left angle of mandible (lower jaw) and 7.5 cms below left ear lobe, and obliquely placed. Left Carotid artery and vein (blood vessels of left side of the neck) are completely cut off. Anterior half of Trachea was cut at the level of upper margin of Thyroid Cartilage (Adam’s Apple). 5. No other injury found over the dead body. 6. Left Carotid artery and vein (blood vessels of left side of the neck) are completely cut off. Anterior half of Trachea was cut at the level of upper margin of Thyroid Cartilage (Adam’s Apple). 5. No other injury found over the dead body. 6. Stomach contained partially digested food particles.” He opined that the cause of death was due to Hemorrhagic Shock as a result of the incised wound on the left side of the neck which completely severed left carotid artery and vein. According to him, the deceased died about 12 hours before his examination. In his cross-examination, he stated that he conducted autopsy at 12:30 p.m. on 18.12.2014 which meant that the deceased died at about 09:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of 17.12.2014. He also deposed that except one obliquely placed incised wound on the left side of the neck, there was no other injury. It was his testimony that he presumed that the deceased died at about 09:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of 17.12.2014 as he was informed that the deceased had her last meal in between 05:00 p.m. to 06:00 p.m. on 17.12.2014. He deposed that by Hemorrhagic Shock, he meant that the deceased had excessive bleeding from her injury. On re-examination, he stated that it was not possible for him to pin point the exact time of death of the deceased. 33. P.W.19 who was the I.O. of the case, deposed about the steps he had taken at the place of occurrence on 18.12.2014 about which mention is made already herein-above. He found an empty envelope stained with blood inside the steel almirah in the bedroom of the deceased. He also found the balcony door of the bedroom open from inside. He did not find any forced entry into the bedroom or breakage of any lock or door or windows of the said room. The inquest was done in his presence. He further deposed that both the hands and the left thigh of the deceased were stained with blood. The cut injury at the left side of the neck, according to him, was apparently caused by a sharp object. He deposed about the examination of the witnesses. The inquest was done in his presence. He further deposed that both the hands and the left thigh of the deceased were stained with blood. The cut injury at the left side of the neck, according to him, was apparently caused by a sharp object. He deposed about the examination of the witnesses. He stated to have summoned the accused to the police station on 19.12.2014 finding that the accused did not attend the funeral service, held on 17.12.2014, of the deceased who was incidentally his grandmother and the accused was implicated in a murder case earlier. He admitted about collection of fingerprint of the accused on 19.12.2014 through P.W.12 in his presence and keeping the accused in the police station for the night of 19.12.2014 for examination before his release on P.R. bond on 20.12.2014. On 21.12.2014, a notebook, ‘Amri Hospital 2461-2626’ was seized from the residence of the accused wherein the incident about the death of the deceased was written. The said notebook was sent to the FSL to compare the handwriting therein. He arrested the accused at around 05:40 p.m. on 21.12.2014. He stated that the disclosure statement was made by the accused at around 12:00 a.m.–01:00 a.m. of 25.12.2014 in presence of civilian witnesses, P.W.8 and P.W.9. After the disclosure statement, he along with the accused, P.W.8 and P.W.9 proceeded to the residence of the accused and recovered one blue jumper with words ‘Valley Strong’ imprinted on its front side. He testified that in his disclosure statement the accused confessed to have used a pocket knife to commit the crime and threw it from the veranda of the bedroom of the deceased. But despite search, the said alleged knife could not have been recovered. On receipt of the report about matching of fingerprint of the accused with one of the chance fingerprints lifted from the place of occurrence, he investigated further and found that the accused was angry because the ownership of land settlement certificate (LSC) of the land and the house where he was staying, got transferred in the name of the deceased. Having convinced that there was a prima facie case against the accused, he filed the charge sheet (supra) and the supplementary charge sheet (supra). Having convinced that there was a prima facie case against the accused, he filed the charge sheet (supra) and the supplementary charge sheet (supra). He stated that though accused confessed about the place where he had kept the money taken from the almirah of the deceased, no money was recovered by him during search carried out in the house of the accused. He stated that the entries in the seized notebook gave rise to the suspicion that the accused could be involved in the crime. 34. D.W.1 deposed also as P.W.17. D.W.1 had, in substance, reiterated almost in similar manner what she deposed as P.W.17. She as D.W.1 had, however, deposed that as the accused was very drunk and could not walk by himself she and her husband [P.W.10] dropped the accused at 01:30 a.m. on 18.12.2014 and put him to bed in his house. By the time they returned to their own house, it was 02:00 a.m. When they left the accused at his house, he was not in a physical condition to go out by himself. She also stated that she saw the accused at about 07:30 p.m. on 17.12.2014 speaking to members of the YMA. In cross-examination, D.W.1 stated that she did not see the accused in between 07:30 p.m. and 09:15 p.m. on 17.12.2014. The accused was wearing a blue jumper with words ‘Valley Strong’ printed on it when he came to their house at around 09:10 p.m. on 17.12.2014. 35. D.W.2, a commandant of the Village Defence Party, Kulikawn deposed that he knew the accused. On 17.12.2014, he along with others got out of the local church at around 07:40 p.m. and prepared a bonfire near the house of the accused where the accused also came. The accused and the YMA members brought out some materials from the house of the accused and decorated the road for Christmas celebration. D.W.2 stated to have seen the accused and others standing and talking near the house of one K. Lalhmingthanga till around 08:00 p.m. In his cross-examination, D.W.2 stated that he knew the accused since his childhood and their houses were near to each other. The accused was not his relative and did not mix up much with him. She stated to have seen P.W.17 with him near the bonfire. 36. The accused was not his relative and did not mix up much with him. She stated to have seen P.W.17 with him near the bonfire. 36. D.W.3 stated that he was at his home in the evening hours of 17.12.2014 and when he went out of his house shortly after 08:00 p.m. to get his mobile recharge from a shop near the junction of Salvation Army Church, Kulikawn the accused called him. When he returned from the shop he saw the accused engaged in decoration and he reached home by 08:30 p.m. In his cross-examination, D.W.3 stated that he was close with the accused and regarded him as a first cousin though he was his second cousin. He could not remember what clothes the accused was wearing that night as he did not notice. On being asked, he stated that if someone walked very fast from the place in Kulikawn where the decorations were being done to the house of the deceased, it would take about 15 minutes to reach. He denied to have been tutored by the defence to depose. But he admitted that he was requested by the maternal uncle of the accused to inform the Court when the uncle came to know that he had seen the accused between 08:00 p.m. and 08:30 p.m. on 17.12.2014. 37. D.W.4 stated that she had a tailoring shop in Kulikawn. Due to the Christmas season, she closed the shop late on 17.12.2014 and was walking home with her husband at around 09:00 p.m. Then, the accused called her and her husband. Her husband spoke to the accused. The accused and her husband thereafter went to the house of P.W.17 when she went to washroom. Then she went there and called her husband out but the accused remained in the house of P.W.17. In the next morning at about 10:00 a.m. when she saw the accused standing in front of his house she informed him about the murder of the deceased. According to her, it would take about half an hour of walk to reach the house of the deceased from the house of the accused. In her cross-examination, she did not remember what clothes the accused was wearing on 17.12.2014. According to her, it would take about half an hour of walk to reach the house of the deceased from the house of the accused. In her cross-examination, she did not remember what clothes the accused was wearing on 17.12.2014. She stated that she offered to go to the Court and to depose if it was necessary by telling the younger sister of the accused that she had seen him on the night of the incident of 17.12.2014. She denied that she deposed falsely and stated that she was not a relative of the accused. 38. With regard to the first circumstance sought to be urged on behalf of the prosecution, it is true that in a case to be proved on the basis of circumstantial evidence presence of motive on the part of the accused to commit the alleged crime has significance. Though motive which is in the mind of the accused cannot be directly proved but it can be inferred from various other circumstances. The prosecution in the present case sought to project at the time filing the charge sheet that the accused had a motive to commit the crime because the land settlement certificate (LSC) in relation to the plot of land and the house where he was living at the time of the incident got transferred by the deceased in her name without giving him a share. During the course of the trial though the prosecution examined a large number of witnesses, some of which were known to and/or relatives of both the deceased and the accused, none of those prosecution witnesses spoke anything about any animosity that the accused had borne in mind and any previous act of the accused wherefrom any ill-will and grudge of the accused towards was manifested due to such transfer of land and house in the name of the deceased. Without leading any evidence to that effect by the prosecution, it is not open for the prosecution on the basis of the other evidence on record, discussed above, to contend that motive on the part of the accused can be inferred for commission of the alleged crime on such count. 39. Similarly, it was projected that since the accused was involved in a case of murder earlier it was not impossible on his part to kill the deceased, a grandmother by relation. 39. Similarly, it was projected that since the accused was involved in a case of murder earlier it was not impossible on his part to kill the deceased, a grandmother by relation. In the charge sheet mentions were made about the involvement of the accused in a murder case registered as Aizawl Police Station Case no. 197 dated 09.04.1994 under Section 302, IPC and about submission of a charge sheet against him vide Charge Sheet no. 240 dated 30.05.1994, by annexing a Khatian Register wherein those details were entered. The learned trial court had elaborately discussed the issue by taking into consideration the age of the accused at the time of the alleged incident who appeared to be juvenile at that time, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, necessity of bringing the same to form as a part of the charge under Section 211(7) of the Code and the provisions of Section 53 and Section 54 of the Evidence Act and found an attempt made by the prosecution to establish the bad character of the accused clearly unjustifiable in the backdrop of leading no evidence during the course of the trial. In the absence of any evidence to prove the said fact, it is not possible for this Court to comment anything further in this regard. We find no reason to depart from the view taken by the learned trial court in this regard. In view of the aforesaid fact situation, the said circumstance in the chain of circumstantial evidence cannot be held to be proved against the accused. 40. Section 26 of the Evidence Act is emphatic in so far as the confession by an accused in custody of police is concerned. It states that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. From the evidence of the I.O. [P.W.19], it has emerged that the accused was arrested in connection with Kulikawn Police Station Case no. 185/2014 on 21.12.2014 at about 05:40 p.m. and the accused was found to have made the alleged disclosure statement at around 12:00 a.m.–01:00 a.m. of 25.12.2014. Thus, it is clear that the alleged disclosure statement was made by the accused while he was in police custody. 185/2014 on 21.12.2014 at about 05:40 p.m. and the accused was found to have made the alleged disclosure statement at around 12:00 a.m.–01:00 a.m. of 25.12.2014. Thus, it is clear that the alleged disclosure statement was made by the accused while he was in police custody. Though it was stated to have been made before the I.O. in present of two witnesses – P.W.7 and P.W.8 – who were not police officers but in the absence of a Magistrate, such disclosure statement is not admissible in evidence. In such view of the matter, the contention advanced on behalf of the prosecution that the accused had confessed to have committed the crime was impermissible to be read in evidence. 41. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is, however, in the form of a proviso to the preceding Section 26. Despite the bar placed on the admissibility of confessional statement by Section 26, Section 27 is concerned with the information derived from the statement made under Section 26 which leads to discovery of fact subsequently. By Section 27, it is provided that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. In the case in hand, the accused was alleged to have stated that the accused had committed the alleged crime with a kitchen knife and thereafter, the said kitchen knife was thrown outside from the verandah adjoining the bedroom of the deceased. If such a kitchen knife would have been discovered in consequence of such information of the alleged disclosure statement that could have been a relevant circumstance in the chain of circumstances to render assistance in the case of the prosecution. But in the instant case, no kitchen knife was discovered in consequence of such disclosure statement of the accused. Thus, nothing had come out of such information to assist the cause of the prosecution. The accused was also alleged to have confessed that he stole an amount from money from inside the almirah of the bedroom of the deceased where the deceased was found dead. Thus, nothing had come out of such information to assist the cause of the prosecution. The accused was also alleged to have confessed that he stole an amount from money from inside the almirah of the bedroom of the deceased where the deceased was found dead. The I.O. though made a search at the place the accused confessed to have kept the stolen money but no money was recovered in consequent such information alleged to have been made by the accused. The decision in Jitendra Kumar (supra) highlights the principle contained in Section 27. 42. The prosecution witness, P.W.14 who was the sister-in-law of the deceased had testified that during the time-period from 05:30 p.m. to 07:00 p.m. of 17.12.2014, the deceased was at their house, located at a distance of 50 feet from the house of the deceased. The deceased had dinner with them during that time-period. From the testimony of the autopsy doctor, P.W.5 it is found that P.W.5 was informed that the deceased took her last meal in between 05:00 p.m. and 06:00 p.m. on 17.12.2014. P.W.5 during the post-mortem examination found the stomach of the deceased containing partially digested food particles. He on one hand opined that the deceased died about 12 hours before his examination which he conducted at 12:30 p.m. on 18.12.2014 and on the other hand, also stated that the deceased died in between 09:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. of 17.12.2014. If the time of death of the deceased was taken to be 12 hours before 12:30 p.m. of 18.12.2014, then the death would have occurred after the midnight hours in the night between 17.12.2014 and 18.12.2014. The time-period of 09:00 p.m.-11:00 p.m. of 17.12.2014 is beyond 12 hours from 12:30 p.m. Thus, the autopsy doctor was not consistent in indicating the approximate time-period/time of death of the deceased. 43. The informant, P.W.2 in the FIR, mentioned that the incident took place between 01:00 a.m. and 09:30 a.m. on 18.12.2014. P.W.2 and her friend P.W.16 were consistent in their testimonies that they came back to the house of the deceased at around 10:00 p.m. on 17.12.2014 and left the house again at around 11:00 p.m. at night along with two of their other friends. P.W.2 and her friend P.W.16 were consistent in their testimonies that they came back to the house of the deceased at around 10:00 p.m. on 17.12.2014 and left the house again at around 11:00 p.m. at night along with two of their other friends. They were also consistent in their testimonies stating that they came back to the house again at around 02:00 a.m. on 18.12.2014 and since that time, they were in the house of the deceased along with their other friends. It also came out from the testimony of P.W.2 that her boyfriend, Jeremi Lalnunmawia along with two of his cousins came to their house after 02:00 a.m. 44. The prosecution also led evidence through P.W.10 and P.W.17 about the presence of the accused in their house during the period from 09:20 p.m. on 17.12.2014 till 01:30 a.m. of 18.12.2014. During that period of time, the accused was consuming liquor with P.W.10, who is the husband of P.W.17. These two witnesses had deposed that the accused was fully drunk at 01:30 a.m. of 18.12.2014 when he left for his house, located nearby, followed by them closely to see that he reached his house properly. From the evidence of D.W.3 and D.W.4, it is clear that the house of the accused was situated at a distance from the house of the deceased. According to D.W.3, it would have taken a person 15 minutes to cover the said distance if the person walked very fast from Kulikawn. As per D.W.4, it would take about half an hour of walk to reach the house of the deceased from the house of the accused. One had said about the time-period to cover the distance with very fast walk and the other had spoken about only walk. Thus, it cannot be said, as has been sought to be urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the informant, that their evidence were at vast variance to each other. D.W.4 also stated to have seen the accused at around 09:00 p.m. at Kulikawn. D.W.2 stated to have seen the accused near the church at Kulikawn till around 08:00 p.m. Nothing had been elicited from these witnesses during their cross-examination to demolish their such testimonies. D.W.4 also stated to have seen the accused at around 09:00 p.m. at Kulikawn. D.W.2 stated to have seen the accused near the church at Kulikawn till around 08:00 p.m. Nothing had been elicited from these witnesses during their cross-examination to demolish their such testimonies. There was no evidence that accused was seen either in the vicinity of or entering into or coming out of the house of the deceased at any time of 17.12.2014 or 18.12.2014. 45. From the evidence of the autopsy doctor it was clear that the death of the deceased was a homicidal death and he attributed the cause of death to the incised wound on the left side of the neck of the deceased. The prosecution did not seek opinion from the post-mortem doctor about the nature of the weapon/tool by which such kind of incised wound could have been possible, not to speak of about the possibility of a kitchen knife to be the weapon of assault for such incised wound which severed left carotid artery and vein. The prosecution had failed to lead any evidence as regards the possible weapon of assault. Nothing incriminatory act can be attributed against the accused from the aforesaid evidence led by the prosecution. 46. The prosecution also sought to bring the entries made in ‘Amri Hospital 2461-2626’ notebook, stated to be seized from the house of the accused on 21.12.2014. The prosecution by comparison of the handwritings and examining handwriting expert, P.W.20 led evidence to say that the entries in the notebook were made by the accused. The learned trial court took note of those entries appearing in the said notebook with the translated version in English. The entries were ‘the reason the dog did not bark?’, ‘seen at 10:00 a.m.’, ‘believed to have died at 7 O’clock in the morning’, ‘they did not have a maid’, ‘Siama and others arrested on suspicion’, ‘Tei saw it, had dined out with her friends’, ‘why should an 83-year-old woman has been killed?’, etc. In his examination under Section 313, CrPC, the accused stated that Lalrinthari was also known as ‘Tei’. He further stated in the examination under Section 313, CrPC that his younger brother, Lalrosanga and his cousin, Rohlupuii had gone to the house of the deceased after they learnt about her death. In his examination under Section 313, CrPC, the accused stated that Lalrinthari was also known as ‘Tei’. He further stated in the examination under Section 313, CrPC that his younger brother, Lalrosanga and his cousin, Rohlupuii had gone to the house of the deceased after they learnt about her death. After they returned, they discussed who the possible suspects could be and they thought that the painters could be involved in her death and one Siama from Tripura, who was also arrested by police, was mentioned as a suspect by some persons. He put down the entries in the notebook after discussion on possible suspect and the circumstances of the deceased murder as he wanted to inform his younger sister Zoparmawii who stayed in Kolkata. If a person does not attend the funeral service of a related person who was murdered non-attendance by itself does not lead to an automatic presumption against such non-attending person without any other cogent evidence to infer that he was involved in the alleged crime as there could be many other reasons for such non-attendance. A presumption of fact can only be drawn on the basis of another established fact. It cannot be said that the explanation offered by the accused about the entries in the notebook was not a plausible one. The entries in the notebook in no manner had indicated anything suspicious against the accused in the absence of any corresponding incriminatory evidence in that regard. Mere making of such entries in a notebook as regards unnatural death of a person who was incidentally a related grandmother of the accused, does not lead to a presumption that the accused was involved in some manner with the death of the deceased. For the aforesaid reasons, those entries cannot be taken as a piece of incriminating evidence against the accused. 47. In so far the alleged recovery of the blue jumper with words ‘Valley Strong’ imprinted on it, it was P.W.10 and P.W.17 who stated to have seen the accused wearing that jumper in the night of 17.12.2014 when he was in their company from around 09:20 p.m. to 01:30 a.m. of 18.12.2014. Some of the defence witnesses also stated to have seen him wearing the jumper in the evening hours of 17.12.2014. All of them saw him at Kulikawn. Some of the defence witnesses also stated to have seen him wearing the jumper in the evening hours of 17.12.2014. All of them saw him at Kulikawn. It is to be iterated that nobody had seen the accused either in the vicinity of or entering into or coming out of the house of the deceased at any time of 17.12.2014 or 18.12.2014. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused in his disclosure statement, albeit inadmissible in evidence, disclose that he was wearing that blue jumper on 17.12.2014 and the same was recovered in consequence of the information made by him in the disclosure statement. It is not the case of the prosecution that the blue jumper was concealed in any manner by the accused and was in exclusive possession of the accused and the same was blood stained or bore some other evidence related to the crime. Mere fact of such alleged seizure cannot be held to be an incriminating piece of evidence against the accused. 48. It was the case of the prosecution that non-visitation of the accused to the house of the deceased since 21.11.2011 which was also not denied by the accused, coupled with the fact that the fingerprint of the accused was found in the place of occurrence would indicate about the complicity of the accused in the crime. In that connection, it placed reliance in the decision in B.A. Umesh (supra) where lifting of the fingerprints of the accused from the handle of the steel almirah in the room of the deceased established the presence of the accused in the room. On perusal, it is seen that in B.A. Umesh (supra), the accused was seen and identified in the house immediately after the deceased was murdered and coming out of the house at the relevant point of time by three witnesses and the presence of fingerprint corroborated the fact of presence of the appellant therein. On the other hand, there was no witness in the case if hand who had seen the accused either in the vicinity of or entering into or coming out of the house of the deceased at any time of 17.12.2014 or 18.12.2014. In the absence of any corroborating evidence, the decision in the B.A. Umesh (supra) is found not of much assistance to the case of the prosecution. In the absence of any corroborating evidence, the decision in the B.A. Umesh (supra) is found not of much assistance to the case of the prosecution. The decision in Lekh Raj (supra) has been referred to for ignoring minor discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details. 49. The decisions in T. Thulasingam (supra) and M. Subrahmanyam (supra) had been referred to by the prosecution with regard to irregularity in collection of fingerprints of the accused, as against the contention raised by the defence that the fingerprints of the accused were taken in violation of the provisions of the Identification of the Prisoners Act, 1920. The decisions in Jaspal Singh (supra) and Mohan Lal (supra) were referred to urge that the science of identifying thumb impression did not admit of any mistake or doubt and the report about matching of fingerprints by the experts in the case in hand was clear and the same should have been accepted qua the charge of murder. 50. It is to be noted that it is settled that expert evidence is a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature. It is also settled that it may not be safe to solely rely upon such evidence, and the court may seek independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given case. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it [Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy (supra)]. Even if its assumed that matching of fingerprints of the accused is a pointer towards the presence of the accused in the bedroom of the deceased it is not conclusive proof of the fact that the accused was present in the house of the deceased on 17.12.2014 or on 18.12.2014 during the relevant time-period in view of the inconclusive evidence of the fingerprint expert that the fingerprints could be a week old. Further, matching of the chance fingerprint itself did not establish that the accused was the assailant. Such matching of fingerprint had not ruled out the possibility of presence of other persons in the said room or other person(s) committing the crime. The evidence led by the prosecution were more suggestive of the fact that the accused had not visited the house of the deceased at the relevant time period. Such matching of fingerprint had not ruled out the possibility of presence of other persons in the said room or other person(s) committing the crime. The evidence led by the prosecution were more suggestive of the fact that the accused had not visited the house of the deceased at the relevant time period. In view of the discussion as regards on evidence on record in its entirety, we have no hesitation to hold that such assumed fact as a stand-alone fact is not any assistance to the case of the prosecution. On the face of such determination, there is no necessity to dilate on the subject of non-adoption of the Identification of the Prisoners Act, 1920 by the State of Mizoram in terms of Article 371G of the Constitution of India and the regularity/legality or otherwise of the fingerprint obtained from the accused prior to his arrest or without permission of a Magistrate. 51. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Roop Singh (supra) considered the principles required to be followed in a case rested on circumstantial evidence with there being no direct evidence available. Admittedly, in the case in hand, there is no eyewitness account with regard to the homicidal death of the deceased and the case is based on circumstantial evidence. In Roop Singh (supra), a number of earlier decisions on circumstantial evidence were surveyed and observations were made to the following effect : - “12.“10. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (1977) 2 SCC 99 ; Eradu vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316 ; Earabhadrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 SCC 330 ; State of U.P. vs. Sukhbasi, 1985 Supp SCC 79; Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1987) 1 SCC 1 ; and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee vs. State of M.P., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560). The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ramvs. State of Punjab, AIR 1954 SC 621 , it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt. 11. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy vs. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed thus : (SCC pp. 206-7, para 21) 21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.’ 12. In Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests : ‘(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.’ 13. In State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) 2 SCC 86 , it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 14. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted". 15. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the this Court as far back as in 1952. 16. In Hanuman Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 , wherein it was observed thus: “10. ……It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 17. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 . Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are : (SCC p. 185, para 153) (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so compete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 52. It is the settled principle of law that while considering an appeal against the acquittal where the case rest squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt is justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. The facts and circumstances must be of such nature which unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and there shall not be any iota of doubt that no person other than the accused, could have committed the crime. The facts and circumstances must be of such nature which unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused and there shall not be any iota of doubt that no person other than the accused, could have committed the crime. It is open to the appellate court to appreciate the evidence upon which the trial court had based its verdict as regards acquittal of the accused so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. It is also well settled in law that if the trial court takes a view that the accused deserves to be acquitted on the basis of evidence on record, such verdict cannot be reversed unless there is gross perversity and wrong appreciation of the evidence on record. It is for the purpose of assurance, we have considered and examined the evidence on record. Upon such re-consideration, we have found that the evidence on record were not sufficient to bring home the charges framed against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302, IPC and under Section 380, IPC. The learned trial court had appreciated the evidence on record in its entirety and reached its finding of acquittal by a well reasoned order. In such view of the matter, we have not found any good and sufficient reason to depart from the finding of the learned trial court and accordingly, the judgment and order of the learned trial court is upheld. 53. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal is found bereft of any merit. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed.