JUDGMENT 1. Rule. Rule is made returnable Forthwith. Learned AGPs waive service for Respondents-State. Mr. Prasanna Shahane, learned counsel waives service of notice for Respondent Nos.4 and 5. By consent, the Petitions are taken up for final hearing. 2. The Petitions involve common facts and issues, are therefore heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 3. The Petitioners were appointed as Assistant Teachers/ Shikshan Sevaks and Peons in respective Institutions. The Education Officer had granted approval to the appointment of the Petitioners. On satisfactory completion of three years period as Shikshan Sevak, the Management submitted a proposal to the Education Officer for approval and the Education Officer granted approval to the appointment of the Petitioners as Assistant Teachers. By order dated 13/06/2017 the Education Officer cancelled the approval. The said order was challenged by the Petitioners in Writ Petition No.8818 of 2017 with other connected Petitions. 4. It is relevant to note here that similar orders were challenged by the other teachers in Writ Petition No.10133 of 2016 with other connected petitions. The Division Bench of this Court (Coram: B. R. Gavai, as his lordship then was and Riyaz Chagla, JJ.) in Shivanee Prasanna Deshpande Vs. The State of Maharashtra in Writ Petition No.10133 of 2016 and other matters had set aside the orders passed by the Education Officer mainly on the ground that the Education Officer was not empowered to review the order unless vested with the power of review. The Division Bench had observed that if the Education Officer had granted approval to the Petitioners' appointment, may be erroneously, the same cannot be recalled and that a contrary order cannot be passed except in case of fraud, misrepresentation or suppression. It was held that when most of the Petitioners had already put in their services for 11 years, the impugned order would amount to penalizing them for no fault on their part. The Division Bench clarified that if the Education Officer is of the view that in some of the schools backlog of reserved category candidate is not properly maintained, the Education Officer would always be empowered to insist that hereinafter no candidate belonging to open category shall be filled in unless the quota of reserved category candidates as per the requirement of MEPS Act/Rules is fulfilled. 5. 5. Following this judgment, a Division Bench of this Court (Coram : Anup Mohta and Bharti Dangre, JJ.) allowed the earlier Petitions filed by these Petitioners by judgment dated 14/08/2017 in Shishir LUadhar Lele and Ors v/s. Satish Pradhan Dnyanasadhna College of Arts, Commerce and Science and Ors. The relevant paragraph reads thus:- "In view of the above, there is a force in the contention so raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. The learned AGP therefore on instructions, conceded to the position of law and makes statement that the concerned respondents/ officers/ authorities shall recall the impuged order/action and related proceeding, if any, dated 27th June, 2017 or such other dates as early as possible, preferably within two weeks and they will also recall/withdraw their impugned action and /or orders of cancellation of approval in question. Further they will grant/continue to provide all service benefits/ entitlement to the petitioners or such teachers." The statement made by the learned AGP was accepted and in view of withdrawal of the impugned orders the concerned Education Officers were directed to grant all consequential benefits including release of salary. 6. After withdrawing the earlier order of cancellation of approval, Respondent No.2-Deputy Director of Education issued notices to the Petitioners to show cause why the approval should not be canceled. The show cause notice states that the individual approvals granted to the Petitioners were scrutinized by the Commissioner (Education) M.S. Pune, and it was prima facie seen that there is irregularity in the said orders of approval. The Petitioners were therefore directed to show cause why the individual approvals granted to them should not be canceled. Not being satisfied with the reply given, the approval was once again canceled. 7. The show cause notices issued to the Petitioners are vague and do not disclose particulars. In M/s. Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow v/s. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2008) 14 SCC 151 , the Apex Court whilst considering the question whether the principles of natural justice demand that an opportunity of hearing should be afforded to an assessed before an order under Section 142( 2A) of the Income Tax Act, has explained the concept of 'natural justice' and principles governing its application. The relevant paragraphs read thus:- "11. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The relevant paragraphs read thus:- "11. Rules of "natural justice" are not embodied rules. The phrase "natural justice" is also not capable of a precise definition. The underlying principle of natural justice, evolved under the common law, is to check arbitrary exercise of power by the State or its functionaries. Therefore, the principle implies a duty to act fairly, i.e. fair play in action. As observed by this Court in A.K. Kraipak & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law but supplement it. (Also see: Income Tax Officer & Ors. Vs. M/s Madnani Engineering Works Ltd., Calcutta). 12. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India, R.S.Sarkaria, J., speaking for the majority in a three-Judge Bench, lucidly explained the meaning and scope of the concept of "natural justice". Referring to several decisions, his Lordship observed thus (SCC p.666; Head note): "Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alter am partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them being (a) notice of the case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving ofapre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise." 13. Initially, it was the general view that the rules of natural justice would apply only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to an administrative action. However, in State of Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei & Ors. , the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative decisions was perceptively mitigated and it was held that even an administrative order or decision in matters involving civil consequences, has to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Since then the concept of natural justice has made great strides and is invariably read into administrative actions involving civil consequences, unless the statute, conferring power, excludes its application by express language. 14. Recently, in Canara Bank Vs. V.K. Awasthy. the concept, scope, history of development and significance of principles of natural justice have been discussed in extenso, with reference to earlier cases on the subject. Inter alia, observing that the principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi- judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights, the Court said: "Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame- work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences' encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil 'liberties, material deprivations, and non- pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life." 15. Thus, it is trite that unless a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of principles of natural justice, because in that event the Court would not ignore the legislative mandate, the requirement of giving reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is made, is generally read into the provisions of a statute, particularly when the order has adverse civil consequences for the party affected. The principle will hold good irrespective of whether the power conferred on a statutory body or tribunal is administrative or quasi-judicial. 8. In Commissioner Central Excise, Bangalore v/s. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. and Ors. 2007 DCLS (SC) 764, the Apex Court has held that :- "The show cause notice is the foundation on which the department has to build up its case. If the allegations in the show cause notice are not specific and are on the contrary vague, lack details and /or unintelligible i.e. sufficient to hold that the notice was not given proper opportunity to meet the allegation indicated in the show cause notice." 9. In the instant case, the show cause notice does not specify the irregularities which were allegedly noticed by the Commissioner (Education) M.S. Pune. The report prepared by the Commissioner was also not Furnished to the Petitioners. The Petitioners therefore had no opportunity of knowing the nature of irregularities in the orders of approval, based on which approvals granted to the individual Petitioners were sought to be canceled. The report prepared by the Commissioner was also not Furnished to the Petitioners. The Petitioners therefore had no opportunity of knowing the nature of irregularities in the orders of approval, based on which approvals granted to the individual Petitioners were sought to be canceled. The action based on the notice, which is completely vague and indiscernible, is certainly not in compliance with the rules of natural justice. 10. Mr. S.H. Kankal, learned AGP contends that by GR dated 06/02/2012, the Government had issued guidelines for grant of individual approval/permission to appointment and promotion. He submits that in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shivani Deshpande (supra), the State Government has issued a fresh GR dated 23/08/2017 wherein powers have been conferred on the immediate superior authority to issue show cause notice, giving an opportunity of hearing to teaching and non teaching staff, whose approval is liable to be canceled for whatsoever reasons and to take appropriate decisions as per the Rules. Learned AGP contends that the Petitioners were appointed without following due procedure. He submits that the appointments were made without prior permission and without Filling the reserved posts/backlog and in contravention of the provisions under the M.E.P.S. Act and Rules. The appointments were per se illegal and hence the Petitioners are not entitled to continue on the said post. 11. It is to be noted that in the case of Shivani (supra), the Division Bench of this Court while setting aside the order of cancellation of approval, had clarified that the Education Officer would be empowered to insist that hereinafter no candidate belonging to open category shall be Filled in unless the quota of reserved category candidate, as per the requirement of M.E.P.S Act is Fulfilled. In the light of these observations, the Respondent No.2-Deputy Director of Education was not empowered to cancel the approvals, which were already granted on the ground that the appointments were made without Filling in the quota of reserved category. Furthermore, the contention relating to illegality of the appointment which is now sought to be raised appear to be an afterthought. As noted earlier, the show cause notice merely refers to certain irregularities in grant of approval and does not proceed on the basis that the appointments were illegal. Moreover, such contention, though available was not raised in the previous round of litigation. As noted earlier, the show cause notice merely refers to certain irregularities in grant of approval and does not proceed on the basis that the appointments were illegal. Moreover, such contention, though available was not raised in the previous round of litigation. On the contrary, a statement was made that the cancellation of approval would be withdrawn. Having withdrawn the said cancellation order, without seeking any liberty to initiate Fresh action, Respondent No.2 was not justified in recalling the approval order on the basis of the same grounds/irregularities allegedly noticed by the Commissioner (Education), M.S., Pune. 12. It is also pertinent to note that these Petitioners are in service since the year 2002 to 2013. Respondent No.2 has sought to exercise the power of cancellation of approval after a considerable length of time. Suffice it to say that even when no time limit has been Fixed, the authority has to exercise such powers within a reasonable time, which is an essential requirement of justice and Fair play. The uncertainty in career prospects due to gross and inordinate delay in recalling the approval is bound to adversely affect efficiency of the teaching and non-teaching staff who have rendered a considerable number of years of service. Advancement of age is also likely to deprive them of seeking alternative opportunities of earning livelihood. Failure to act in a reasonable time would therefore cause immense hardship to the employee and his/her Family. Hence, such delayed action, which is not in consonance with the demands of Fair play and substantial justice, cannot be countenanced. 13. Under the circumstances and in view of discussion supra, the Petitions are allowed. The impugned orders of cancellation of approval are hereby quashed and set aside. The approvals to the appointment of the respective Petitioners stand restored. The Respondent Nos.2 and 3 are directed to grant to the Petitioners all consequential service benefits including continuation of service, payment of monthly and salary allowance together with arrears.